Army Blocks Air Force’s AI Program Over Data Security Concerns   

Army Blocks Air Force’s AI Program Over Data Security Concerns   

The Army has blocked the Air Force generative AI chatbot, NIPRGPT, from its networks, citing cybersecurity and data governance and highlighting the challenges the U.S. military faces in assessing risk when adopting cutting-edge technologies like artificial intelligence. 

NIPRGPT, developed as an experimental project of by the Air Force Research Laboratory, aims to give military personnel a generative AI Large Language Model (LLM) comparable to OpenAI’s ChatGPT, but free of the security, data protection and privacy concerns posed by consumer AI products. 

But the Army flagged the program as risky and on April 17 pulled the plug on it for anyone using Army networks, an unusual decision that exposed a rift between the two military services.  

“NIPRGPT was shot dead,” said one Army user who wasn’t authorized to speak to the media.   

IT security for the U.S. military is a patchwork—each network or system commander has the power to make their own decisions about what risks to accept. So when one commander makes a risk calculation, others are under no obligation to accept it, meaning tools like NIPRGPT can be allowed in some commands but not others.  

The result can impact user trust, tool consistency, and the sharing of capabilities across joint operations—and is also a major stumbling block to the swift adoption of cutting-edge technologies. 

‘It Was My Call’ 

Chief Technology Officer Gabriel Chiulli of the Army’s Enterprise Cloud Management Agency told Air & Space Forces Magazine that the NIPRGPT block was part of a wider move by the Army to transition from experimentation with AI LLMs and launch into full implementation using real Army data. 

“The block was focused on getting us to a governance framework for AI used in a production state,” he said. “We were trying to make sure we had the guardrails in place for how we’re doing AI for real.”  

So NIPRGPT might have been fine for experimenting, but not for mission requirements.   

“It was my decision to make the call,” Chiulli said.  

Air Force officials declined to comment.   

Weeks after the block was implemented, the Army deployed its Army Enterprise LLM Workspace, a platform that allows users to access locally hosted secure LLMs. It’s powered by Ask Sage, which bills itself as “a LLM agnostic, secure and extensible Generative AI platform,” and was founded by Nick Chaillan, a controversial former Air Force Chief Software Officer.  

“I built the entire architecture to be able to run anywhere from a backpack to a cloud, to run air-gapped, to run on classified systems,” Chaillan told Air & Space Forces Magazine. Ask Sage provides a secure interface, or virtual wrapper, around multiple commercial generative AI models, so that data can be loaded once and then used with multiple models without any additional charge, Chaillan said.  

“The platform provides a layer between the user and the model which enables data to be identified, tagged and associated with its user … on a very granular basis,” he said. The system tracks access permissions, so that only those entitled to access certain data can get to it.  

“We’re the only product that has that kind of zero trust, data centric security stack,” Chaillan said.  

Ask Sage has FedRAMP high clearance and is authorized for both Controlled Unclassified Information and Secret and Top Secret classification levels, achievements that Chaillan called “A very heavy lift” including penetration testing and red teaming.  

The company announced a $10M deal to expand its military user base last week, extending the Army Enterprise LLM Workspace to the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and all Combatant Commands. 

Risk and Reciprocity  

Banning NIPRGPT on Army networks highlights a challenge long recognized by software providers: the lack of reciprocity among government users when it comes to the Authorization to Operate (ATO) in government IT systems. An ATO is a prerequisite for any software program or service to run on a government network. 

Defense Department policy encourages reciprocity among its myriad agencies and commands, but it doesn’t require system owners to recognize ATOs issued elsewhere in the department, a former technical advisor to the Air Force told Air & Space Forces Magazine. The former advisor asked for anonymity because their current employer had not authorized them to speak to the media about Air Force issues. 

“You can, by policy, choose to reject somebody else’s ATO and forbid stuff from your system,” the former technical advisor said.  

Within the Air Force, some authorizing officials were “known to be more strict or less strict, or more forward thinking, or more traditional” than others. Still, banning something with an ATO from another service was “a big lever to pull,” the former technical advisor said: Though “not unheard of, it is a little bit out of the ordinary.” 

But John Weiler, a long-time advocate for IT modernization and procurement reform in the Pentagon found the block surprising: “I’ve been in this business 35 years and I’ve never heard of anything like this ban,” he said. “It’s unprecedented.”  

Data driven decision 

Chiulli said a key driver behind his decision was the discovery that Soldiers were using experimental LLM chatbots in ways that created risks to army data.  

The Army surveyed personnel about their daily use of NIPRGPT, CamoGPT and other generative AI models in a research study called Project Athena.   

Survey respondents “gave us use cases that made me just want to make sure that—if they’re doing those type of things with Army production data … then I want to make sure that I can give them that capability as an Army system provider,” he said. 

Guidance given to NIPRGPT users was not clear, Chiulli added. “There’s a lot of different disclaimers on the homepage for NIPRGPT,” he said, “a lot of different Do’s and Don’ts,” which might leave Army personnel confused about “whether they actually are allowed to do that stuff.”  

The login page of NIPRGPT is considered “Controlled Unclassified Information” and not accessible to the public. Air & Space Forces Magazine was unable to independently verify this statement.  

The Army wanted to ensure there was clarity and consistency in rules about how to use AI, Chiulli said.  

“We were worried about duplicative [and divergent] guidance,” he said. “I might give guidance out from an Army perspective, about Army data, and it may be in conflict with Air Force [guidance], right?” 

The Army was also concerned “to ensure we have some policies out there for records management,” he said, so that generative AI chatbots could be responsive to FOIA requests and other records retention mandates. “When someone calls up and says, ‘I need to know what someone did [on this issue],’ We need to have all [those records] ready to go.” 

Issuing guidance would not have been a sufficient response, Chiulli said, noting “Soldiers will soldier: They’ll go and use stuff that’s useful whether or not they’re supposed to use it, as long as they can get to the website.” 

Turning Off the Spigot 

Other than security, the biggest factor in the move away from NIPRGPT was cost, Chiulli said. 

NIPRGPT was free to the users from every service, but there were doubts that the funding model was sustainable, and concerns about what would happen if and when NIPRGPT had to transition from R&D dollars to sustainment dollars. 

The Army feared that the Air Force might pull the rug out from the program.  

“I don’t know when that spigot was going to turn off,” he said of the free access to NIPRGPT, “There’s always a bill. We need to be very cognizant of the cost model. Whether it’s free for one year or six months or seven years, at some point, you have to pay.” 

More importantly, said Chiulli, Army users needed to understand that—even if they weren’t paying—the service did cost money. “I think there needed to be a general understanding across our users that AI is not free.” 

A new cost model 

Chiulli said that one of the cost advantages of the Army Enterprise LLM Workspace is the flexible way Ask Sage is billed. 

Most Software-as-a-Service offerings, like Ask Sage, are billed by the “seat.” The military service or agency buys a certain number of user licenses—each representing the right of one person to use the service.  

But Ask Sage bills by the token—the units that Generative AI puts together to form the sentences it produces. The tokens can be assigned to anyone and reassigned if necessary, Chaillan said. They can also be used at any classification level, so if a customer has bought tokens for an unclassified system and then finds they need classified access, they can use the same tokens. Either way, the costs are born by individual users based on their volume of use.  

Iran, Proxies Still Threaten US Troops Despite Setbacks: CENTCOM Nominee

Iran, Proxies Still Threaten US Troops Despite Setbacks: CENTCOM Nominee

Iran and its proxy groups across the Middle East remain a threat to American troops in the region despite being weakened by conflicts on multiple fronts over the past few years, the nominee to run U.S. Central Command said June 24.

Protecting American troops will remain the command’s top priority in the wake of U.S. airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities over the weekend, as well as the potential for retaliation by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, CENTCOM Deputy Commander Vice Adm. Brad Cooper told the Senate Armed Services Committee at his confirmation hearing on Capitol Hill.

Tehran still possesses “considerable tactical capability,” he said, pointing to Iran’s June 23 attack on the U.S.-Qatari Al Udeid Air Base, and its proxies are still capable of antagonizing U.S. assets and interests.

“You see the blood that’s on the hands of the Iranians . . . with hundreds of attacks against American service members,” he said. “They have, and they continue to be, threats to the United States.”

But Iran is strategically “weakened” and tactically “degraded,” Cooper added. He characterized its proxies, particularly Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon, as “significantly degraded.”

“It would be a priority of mine to deter conflict through both the deterrence of Iran and those proxies,” Cooper said. “I think we’re going to have to continue to watch them very closely.”

Cooper—who would be promoted to admiral if confirmed—is next in line to command U.S. troops in the Middle East at the region’s most volatile moment in years. His remarks are among the earliest public assessments by U.S. defense officials of Iran’s current military standing as it begins a fragile ceasefire with Israel following nearly two weeks at war.

Israel and Iran on June 24 publicly committed to pause fighting after Israel’s surprise attack on Iranian military leaders, nuclear facilities, and scientists sparked 12 days of airstrikes that killed several hundred people across both countries. U.S. stealth bombers hit three Iranian nuclear facilities June 21, and Tehran launched a brief retaliatory volley of short- and medium-range missiles against Al Udeid two days later. 

Air defenses intercepted that incoming fire; President Donald Trump said no Americans or Qataris were harmed.

This month’s escalation marks the most intense period of conflict between Israel and Iran in years after decades of tension that has occasionally turned deadly.

Israel continues its campaign to eliminate Iran-linked Hamas from the Gaza Strip in response to the group’s 2023 attack that killed around 1,200 Israelis and took more than 250 civilians hostage. More than 56,000 Palestinians have died in the war so far, according to Gaza’s health ministry. Israel has also continued bombing Lebanon after a November ceasefire ended its 14-month war with Hezbollah, another Iranian proxy.

In Yemen, the Iran-backed Houthi militia attacked American ships and drones “about 500 times,” as well as Israeli targets, in retaliation for the war in Gaza before agreeing to stop in May, Cooper said.

Though Iran continues to supply the Houthis extremely well, Cooper said, it’s up to the rebels to uphold their end of the ceasefire.

CENTCOM has introduced “dozens of specific measures” to protect U.S. troops at sea and on bases across the Middle East, he said.

“If I look back specifically toward the Tower 22 incident and the ensuing now 17 or 18 months, we’ve made considerable improvements across the board—layered defense employing both kinetic capability and nonkinetic capability,” Cooper said, referring to the January 2024 drone attack on a U.S. military outpost in Jordan that killed three American soldiers and injured nearly 50 others. The U.S. has blamed an Iranian proxy for the attack. 

“We really are leaps and bounds ahead of where we were before,” Cooper said.

He warned that the next fight against Iran’s network may be underground, as the militias turn to subterranean tunnels and compounds that are harder to find and destroy.

“This is a serious issue that we will have to look at in the future,” he said.

Greater investment in sensors and munitions can help address that problem, Cooper said. He also called for faster delivery of counter-drone equipment to guard U.S. assets.

“Our role from a military perspective is to remain ready for a wide range of contingencies and protect our people, and that’s exactly what we’re doing,” Cooper said.

Military officials also worry about the growing cooperation between world powers that have traditionally been at odds with the United States. As Iran’s military might has faltered, its leaders have sought closer ties with Russia, China, and North Korea, creating a “troubling” new axis that warrants more attention, Cooper said.

“We’ve certainly seen the tactical implications of support from Iran to Russia,” he said, referring to military aid powering Moscow’s war in Ukraine. “We’ve seen tactical implications of Chinese companies providing sensors and weapons and components to Iran, who ship them to the Houthis, who shoot them at Americans. I think we need to call those types of things out more, but clearly that emerging foursome . . . is one that we need to pay attention to.”

He pledged to call out China’s efforts to bolster Iran’s economy through oil purchases and its military aid to the Houthis.

“They’ve had a 10-year period of three ships in the Gulf of Aden,” he continued. “They’re there for counter-piracy, but they haven’t caught a single pirate. They’ve turned a complete blind eye to the years of flow of weapons into the Houthis that have ended up getting shot at Americans. I think that’s unacceptable.”

The U.S. will continue partnering with friendly forces in Syria, Iraq, and at sea to curb weapons transfers to groups that plan to use them against American troops and civilian shipping vessels, he said.

Air Force Lt. Gen. Alexus G. Grynkewich, the Joint Staff’s operations director who is nominated to run U.S. European Command and serve as NATO’s top officer, told senators at the hearing the U.S. should keep an eye on Iran’s supply of drones to Russia for use in Ukraine as well. 

The partnership among America’s adversaries opens the possibility of a war on multiple continents against countries with complementary military capabilities, he said.

“As we start to think about potential conflicts against great powers, we do need to worry about the potential for simultaneity of those conflicts and think about how we posture ourselves and our allies to help deal with that,” he said.

Northrop Exec: Industry Can Create Surge Capacity—If It’s in Contracts

Northrop Exec: Industry Can Create Surge Capacity—If It’s in Contracts

The Pentagon can get the weapons production surge capacity it wants, but it has to be willing to pay companies to create it, according to a top executive with Northrop Grumman, which builds the B-21 bomber.

Tom Jones, Northrop Grumman’s corporate vice president and president of the company’s aeronautics sector, said the Pentagon has to make any surge capacity requirement an allowable cost on contracts. Lacking that compensation, it would be hard to justify, he said June 24 at a Center for a New American Security panel on the future of the defense industrial base.

“The fastest way” to add surge capacity—whether for munitions, aircraft, or other items—“would be to have spare factory space sitting around that you could go into and utilize,” he said.

But “the way the system is set up right now, none of that is allowable cost. So, for a contractor to build a spare building on speculation that someday it might be needed, it actually ties up a bunch of cash [and] you aren’t actually able to recoup the cost of that.

The question is not academic—funds to surge production are being debated in the reconciliation bill before Congress, which would add $4.5 billion to the B-21 program for what lawmakers called “expansion of the production capacity” of the aircraft, “including tooling and expansion of the supplier base.” While lawmakers want the funds to go toward “the purchase of aircraft only available through the expansion of production capacity,” they did not specifically calling for an increase in planned B-21 production.

Northrop Grumman CEO Kathy Warden, in an April 22 call with reporters,  said the company took a charge of $477 million in the first quarter, part of which was to set up accelerated B-21 production. The changes to the manufacturing process, she said, “positions us to ramp to the quantities needed in full-rate production” and “ramp beyond the quantities in the program of record.”

The Air Force hasn’t revealed what the maximum rate of B-21 production will be, but former Pentagon acquisition and sustainment chief William LaPlante has said the program was deliberately set up with a very low production rate to protect it from budget cuts. Sources have said the rate is likely to be about seven aircraft a year. By contrast, the B-2 production line was set up to build 132 airplanes at about 20 aircraft per year.  

“It really comes down to, in the case of aircraft … it’s the factories, it’s floor space, it’s tooling. Once you get that running—and your supply chain—I think you have a lot of ability to look at how you can scale, ramp production surge,” Jones said.

“So I think number one, we need to look at how we can get the allowability of surge capacity in there,” Jones said. He also said he’s “bullish on advanced manufacturing techniques” and “determinate manufacturing.”

Determinate manufacturing refers to designing parts with such precision that they go together without the need for a lot of tooling or adjustment on the assembly line.

“You’re not going to get completely away from tooling, but anything that can reduce the amount of tooling, again, goes into reducing the lead time that you need to set things up,” Jones said.

Another way to defray the cost of having greater production capacity is to use the additional space “to do prototype manufacturing so that the factory is basically full, maybe not with the end product, [but] where you had a factory that was generating revenue.”

Jones also said new programs need to incorporate surge into their thinking about parts.

“Think about how we deal with diminished manufacturing sources, or DMS. There’s a cost trade there that says, ‘if I’m towards the back end of my production, I’m probably just going to make a lifetime buy’” of parts. But if more are needed later, “you have to [do]…redesigns around that. So maybe making more conscious decisions as we’re in production … to make sure that if we ever need to step on the gas, we don’t have a 12-month or 18-month redesign cycle in there, because we bought enough for 100 and now suddenly there’s a need for 150 and we don’t have enough parts.”

He also said industry is getting good at training unskilled workers to perform very complex assembly line tasks, which he said has been done “pretty successfully on the B-21 program,” and this can also help accelerate or surge production on programs.

Workers can make “a phenomenal living in the trades, in the right neighborhood,” he said.

“I like to say the B-21 is put together by bartenders, babysitters, and baristas,” he added. “Why do I say that? Because when I go out and walk the floor and I talk to people out there, I go, ‘what was the last job you had before you came here?’ And those are the answers I get; ‘I was a server at TGI Fridays.’ Right now they’re putting together the most sophisticated aircraft in history of the world, right? And doing a hell of a good job at it.”

Industry now knows “how to take those people in, how to train them, how to give them skills, how to put the infrastructure and make sure the quality is there, and you can have a lifetime career.” So as far as surge production, “I think that we can get there again. It gets back to, you need a clear sign that we’re doing this. You need to budget like we’re going to do it, and we need to have constancy in that demand.”

US Needs Troops in Syria to Stop ISIS Comeback, CENTCOM Nominee Says

US Needs Troops in Syria to Stop ISIS Comeback, CENTCOM Nominee Says

The Islamic State militant group remains a threat in Syria and a U.S. military presence is still needed there to deal with it, Navy Vice Adm. Brad Cooper said in his confirmation hearing to become the next head of U.S. Central Command.

The Pentagon has already decided to significantly reduce the number of troops in the country from 2,000 to fewer than 1,000. But Cooper told the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 24 there is a continued need for at least some presence. And he argued that the complex situation in Syria needs to be weighed before making additional troop cuts.

“Presence is indispensable in the execution of the counter-ISIS mission today,” said Cooper, who currently serves as the deputy commander of CENTCOM, which oversees U.S. forces in the Middle East. “We have led it. We lead it today, and I anticipate we’ll lead it into the future. Every decision made on force posture is going to be conditions-based as I look to the future.”

Pentagon officials declined to say how many U.S. troops are currently in Syria in response to queries from Air & Space Forces Magazine.

U.S. troops were sent to Syria to advise and support the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, which helped collapse the ISIS self-styled caliphate in 2019 and is now trying to prevent the group’s resurgence.

The U.S. and the SDF stayed clear of Syria’s civil war, which led to the overthrow of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who fled to Russia.

The country’s new president is Ahmed al-Sharaa, who led the Islamist rebel group Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) that swept to power last December and has vowed to establish a tolerant, multi-ethnic state.

After months of deliberation, the U.S. has thrown its support behind the new Syrian leader. President Trump announced last month that he would lift sanctions on the country, a decision he made with encouragement from Saudi Arabia while Trump was in the Middle East.

Syria, however, is still coping with sectarian violence. In March, hundreds were killed, according to nongovernmental monitoring groups, in an attack in western Syria largely aimed at the Alawite sect, to which Assad belongs.

That has led to concern that the Islamic State group might seek to exploit tensions as it attempts to make a comeback. On June 22, Syrian authorities blamed the Islamic State group for blowing up a church outside Damascus, which killed at least 25 people.

“We are focused on this problem set every single day,” Cooper said when asked about the church bombing by Sen. Joni Ernst (R-Iowa). “ISIS remains a threat, and as we look to the future, and if confirmed, I will remain nose down on this threat. It is an absolute priority.”

Despite the tenuous situation in the country, Cooper said the U.S. was right to back Sharaa and that he was a vital partner in the campaign against ISIS.

“ISIS thrives in chaos,” Cooper said. “If the government of Syria, now seven months into their existence, can help suppress that ISIS threat, along with the U.S. forces in the region, that stability helps create our own security.”

U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack, who has also taken on the duties of the U.S. envoy to Syria, has been trying to support the new Syrian government. And the involvement of Sharaa’s government in the campaign against ISIS may determine if further U.S. troop cuts can be made safely in the months and years ahead.

“I think, given the dynamic nature of what’s happening today, that assessment [of required U.S. troops in Syria] in the future could look different than it does today, perhaps,” Cooper said.

Secretive Space RCO Plans to Launch First ‘Full-Up’ Satellites Soon

Secretive Space RCO Plans to Launch First ‘Full-Up’ Satellites Soon

As the Space Force races to embrace its space control mission, its Rapid Capability Office is expanding from simply developing payloads to delivering complete satellites. 

Much of the work done by the Space Rapid Capabilities Office is classified, but director Kelly D. Hammett told AFA’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies on June 24 that “in the next year or so, we’ll be launching our first full-up satellites.” 

Hammett didn’t specify what those satellites will do, but in an unusual twist, he said the SRCO will control the spacecraft through launch and early operations under an agreement with Space Operations Command.  

The office has launched payloads on classified missions before. But the move to launch and operate entire satellites hints at a growing role for the Space RCO. It’s also part of an “evolving story” in how the office handles programs, Hammett said—following through from developing technologies and into production and fielding. 

Product Lines 

The Space RCO is charged with delivering “timely and operationally relevant space superiority and resiliency capabilities.” As Hammett put it more simply at April’s State of the Space Industrial Base Conference: “We work on space control.”  

That includes “about a dozen” programs centered on Space Control, what the service’s newest mission. Space Control refers to the ability to protect U.S. space assets and defend U.S. forces from space-enabled attack. 

At that conference, Hammett said his team was working with Space Systems Command, USSF’s primary acquisition command, to develop “product lines” from those programs: different satellite components for orbital warfare that can be plugged into systems as needed 

At the Mitchell Institute, he expressed interest in the ability to “pick those product line buses off the line and add the special payloads and whatever else is required.”

Hammett added, “It’s a vision we’ve been discussing for a couple of years.” Now Space RCO will be more involved in the acquisition and fielding process. The office transfers programs to SSC for full-scale production, he said, and it’s now working on more program “transitions.” 

“Transition is where we actually field something. Like, we’re only going to buy a few of these, and we’re going to then transition to … Space Operations Command,” he said. “And then it’s their job to go out and place systems.” Yet control and fielding of satellite product lines “is probably a little bit more where we are going to head,” Hammett added. 

Maneuvering Satellites 

Hammett’s interest in satellite buses is key to space control. In order to dodge threats and pursue targets in geosynchronous orbit, “we have to pursue high-thrust, high Delta V bus capabilities,” he said. 

The Space RCO recently solicited industry for input on a “Dynamic Space Operations bus” designed for such maneuvers. The request for information is classified, but Hammett hinted at what could be the key to making it work: “I think you want to have some refueling or replenishment capability,” he said. “The term we should probably be using is maneuver and logistics. Space warfighting logistics is what you want—and whatever it takes to get there.” 

Astroscale is among the companies pursuing development of a refueling satellite, such as the APS-R in this rendering.Astrosclae

The Space RCO is one of several Pentagon organizations to invest in satellite refueling demonstrations, Hammett added. 

“We have funded a refueler to go dock with one of the systems that we have, actually systems that have both ports, so that we can demonstrate the feasibility of both,” he said. “We can then make trades on cost and complexity and all those types of things from the warfighting perspective.” 

He did not say whether that refueling operation will include satellites the Space RCO controls. Regardless, flying satellites in orbit will likely help Space RCO refine and develop its R2C2 command and control software. 

“We are now building out the R2C2 platform and the services that you need to fly systems at GEO: mission plan, deconflict, and then go out,” Hammett said. 

Challenges 

As the Space RCO prepares for its first flight operations, it will face challenges. “One is having a cadre of experienced flight planners and operators that can extend our mission space from ‘we designed it, we delivered it, we tested it,’ to now, ‘launch it, and then go through the launch and early ops and those stages,’” Hammett said. “We don’t have a stable of folks to do that. We are trying to onboard a team that is larger and has more experience in that area.”  

That raises questions about how soon the office will be able to take on such tasks. “That just gets back to policy questions that we’re going to have to get through,” he added. “A number of the capabilities we are delivering are not things that we do right now. So if we make those visible, that will tip our hand in some cases.” 

CMSAF Says 2-Mile PT Test ‘Likely’, but Final Changes Still Uncertain

CMSAF Says 2-Mile PT Test ‘Likely’, but Final Changes Still Uncertain

Changes are coming to the Air Force physical fitness assessment, but the service is not yet revealing what those are or when Airmen might expect to see them.

“The Air Force is finalizing updates to its Physical Fitness Assessment following a comprehensive 10-month review,” an Air Force spokesperson told Air & Space Forces Magazine.

A message from Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force David A. Flosi to other enlisted leaders hinted that the new test will include a two-mile run, and that Airmen will take the assessment twice a year rather than once a year. A portion of the message was shared on the unofficial Facebook page Air Force amn/nco/snco, and Air & Space Forces Magazine obtained the full text and verified its authenticity.

Flosi told the enlisted leaders that Airmen must be physically fit for combat, which they might face at any time.

“Any day could be the day—that’s what has been on my mind and the focus of your AF leadership this past couple weeks,” he wrote, referencing recent deployments to Europe and the Middle East as part of the U.S. response to rising tensions between Israel and Iran.

“At a basic level, America’s Air Force exists for very a simple capability—‘to kill people and blow s— up,’” Flosi added. “I am not being bold, this is not a soundbite. It is the reality of being an Airman in the Profession of Arms—we must be ready. Yes, PT changes are coming (not publicly released—this is for you to effectively communicate with your team)—to most of you this is no surprise.”

Three of the likely changes, Flosi wrote, include:

  • Twice a year tests for the entire force, “not as a punishment for our fit Airmen … as an acknowledgement that fitness is a readiness issue and it makes a difference if ‘today is the day,’” the chief wrote. Airmen currently take the test once a year.
  • A two-mile run “via updated scoring measures better aligned to joint force.” Airmen currently get to choose between a 1.5 mile run or a 20-meter high-aerobic multi-shuttle run (HAMR) for the test’s cardio portion.
  • Scoring body composition via updated height-to-waist ratio charts. The Air Force announced its shift to the waist-to-height radio in January 2023, about three years after the service abandoned the abdominal circumference assessment, better known as the tape test, in 2020. 

With the new body composition test, Airmen divide their waist by their height in inches. For example, an Airman who stands 69 inches tall and has a waist of 36 inches would have a waist-to-height ratio of 0.52. A cardiologist with expertise in obesity-related measurements told Air & Space Forces Magazine last year that the waist-to-height ratio is a more accurate health gauge than the Air Force’s previous methods, such as abdominal circumference and body mass index (BMI).

The pending changes come four years after the Air Force last updated its physical fitness test. In 2021, the service rolled out options for Airmen to choose how they test their cardio, arm, and abdominal strength.

Airmen can choose between the 1.5 mile run and 20-meter HAMR for cardio; between push-ups and hand-release push-ups (where Airmen lower their chest all the way to the ground and extend their hands out to the sides before pushing up again) for the arm portion; and between sit-ups, reverse crunches, and forearm planks for the abdominal portion. Before 2021, the only options were the 1.5 mile run, push-ups, and sit-ups.

An Air Force spokesperson said the changes align with a military-wide review of fitness standards directed by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth on March 12. The service lowered its minimum fitness requirements across every age category for both men and women in May 2021. 

“The Air Force acknowledges that post-COVID changes made in recent years did not effectively prepare Airmen to meet the demands of the current and future operational environments and is actively working to reverse that trend,” the spokesperson added. “Updates to the program will be formally released once the guidance is finalized.”

The Air Force is not the only branch reevaluating its PT assessments. On June 1, the Army officially adopted the Army Fitness Test, where Soldiers in combat jobs must pass a higher, sex-neutral standard while Soldiers in non-combat jobs must meet lower minimum scores that are separate for men and women.

Lawmakers Urge Air Force, SOCOM to Collaborate on New Long-Range Surveillance Drones

Lawmakers Urge Air Force, SOCOM to Collaborate on New Long-Range Surveillance Drones

House lawmakers are encouraging the Air Force and U.S. Special Operations Command to work together as each pursues long-range, long-endurance reconnaissance drones.

Both entities are investing in unmanned assets that can slip into highly defended areas, loiter over a particularly valuable target for days at a time, and traverse multiple continents or the vast Pacific with little logistical footprint as part of their broader push for more dispersed operations. Members of Congress are sweetening the pot by offering the Air Force $15 million to explore possible solutions that could meet the needs of both organizations. 

“While the requirements between the two organizations are not completely aligned, the Committee believes closer cooperation is critical to fielding a capable and cost-effective platform,” lawmakers wrote in a report accompanying the House Appropriations Committee’s version of the 2026 defense spending bill.

While the report doesn’t specify which programs the Air Force and SOCOM should consider merging, the Air Force last month contracted with dronemaker General Atomics to design a stealthy, autonomous aircraft dubbed “GHOST” that can fly ultra-long distances for reconnaissance and strike missions. 

GHOST may become a next-generation option to replace mainstays of the Air Force’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance enterprise that are slated for retirement:

  • The U-2 Dragon Lady spy plane, whose pilots have captured photos of sensitive military sites since the 1950s.
  • The RQ-4 Global Hawk, the long-endurance surveillance drone that was set to take over the U-2 mission but is now being phased out.
  • The MQ-9 Reaper, the Air Force’s workhorse hunter-killer drone that redefined combat in the Global War on Terror.

The Air Force Research Laboratory is also exploring long-range drones through its ULTRA project, short for Unmanned Long-Endurance Tactical Reconnaissance Aircraft. The program has produced a drone that can fly for more than three days straight while carrying over 400 pounds of surveillance equipment. ULTRA, a commercial sport glider outfitted for military use by DZYNE Technologies, was photographed on the flight line at Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates last year.

An Air Force spokesperson told Air & Space Forces Magazine neither the service nor Air Force Special Operations Command “have any background” on the House provision.

SOCOM operates its own shadowy long-endurance aircraft program, comprised of the Air Force’s MQ-9, the Army’s MQ-1C Gray Eagle drone, and an unmanned version of the Pipistrel Sinus powered glider. 

The Long-Endurance Aircraft family of systems “employs relatively low-cost, long-endurance unmanned aircraft operated in austere and permissive environments” to provide intelligence to the special operations community, SOCOM spokesperson Lt. Cmdr. Kassie Collins said in an email.

In 2021, The War Zone reported the command had worked with the Air Force Research Lab to convert Sinus aircraft into unmanned aerial systems. The drones, operated by the Virginia-based technology company TSC, offer a maximum endurance of over 40 hours in flight up to 17,000 feet, according to TSC’s website.

“SOCOM has been assessing this platform as an option as we work with our military services and industry partners to identify low-cost, high endurance airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance solutions,” the command told the publication at the time.

SOCOM piggybacks on acquisition programs run by the services but also pursues its own equipment as needed. In 2020, the command launched its own search for an armed overwatch plane after the Air Force’s nearly three-year effort to procure a similar light attack aircraft ended short of a full buy.

Lawmakers also told the Air Force in that case to coordinate with SOCOM on its light attack experiments while encouraging it to transfer some of the project’s funding to special operations. Air Force Special Operations Command went on to buy a modified crop duster to serve as the new OA-1K Skyraider II, envisioned to fly counterterror missions in regions without advanced air defenses that could down the plane.

House appropriators are also calling for Air Force Secretary Troy E. Meink and SOCOM boss Gen. Bryan P. Fenton to provide an update on their efforts to develop unmanned long-endurance platforms, those program requirements, and whether pursuing a common aircraft might be more efficient. That briefing is due within 90 days after the appropriations bill is enacted.

F-15EX and Its Electronic Warfare Suite Both Face Supply Chain Issues: Watchdog

F-15EX and Its Electronic Warfare Suite Both Face Supply Chain Issues: Watchdog

Editor’s Note: This story was updated June 26 with additional comment from industry sources.

Supply chain issues are causing headaches for the Air Force’s new F-15EX fighter and its accompanying electronic warfare suite, the Government Accountability Office said in a recent report—even as Congress plans to pump an extra $3 billion into the program.

In its annual review of major weapons programs released June 11, the GAO acknowledged that the F-15EX—an advanced version of the F-15E fighter—has achieved full-rate production and initial operational capability. But the watchdog noted that risks remain, including parts shortages and previous quality deficiencies, as well as questions about whether the fighter will have the necessary cyber resiliency.

Separately, the GAO looked at the Eagle Passive/Active Warning and Survivability System, the electronic warfare suite that will equip all F-15EXs and retained F-15Es, and concluded that it is suffering from vanishing vendor syndrome supply issues and difficulty installing the system on legacy aircraft.   

The Air Force originally planned to buy 144 F-15EXs but has reduced that figure—first to 104 in the fiscal 2023 budget request, then to 98 in the 2025 budget request. In the reconciliation bill now pending in Congress, lawmakers have proposed adding $3.1 billion for F-15EX procurement, without specifying a number of units. That amount would buy around 25 aircraft—likely a full squadron—based on previous lot prices.

F-15EX costs have come down; the GAO noted that the overall program has declined eight percent, from $13.3 billion to $12.3 billion, and unit costs have declined two percent, from $128.1 to $125.4 million. Those numbers are based on the 98-aircraft plan.

For the F-15EX aircraft itself, the GAO outlined three risks:

  • Boeing will have to double its production rate “from one to two aircraft per month by April 2026 to meet its future delivery requirements.”
  • “Parts shortages—including display screens, a gun system, ejection seat propellant devices, and titanium components—remain a production risk,” the report states.
  • The F-15EX “may not meet” Air Force cybersecurity requirements because the aircraft was originally designed for Qatar, which did not have such a requirement, and was adapted to USAF use.

The watchdog agency noted that Boeing “experienced quality deficiencies” on early F-15EX fuselages “which required time-consuming rework.” However, the report said Boeing has “taken steps” to mitigate the problem—which had to do with improperly drilled holes—and reduced rework from 25 percent in August 2023 to eight percent a year later. Still, the program office told GAO that “further reductions are needed.”

The program office also told the agency that it continues to engage with suppliers to negotiate “prioritization” of F-15EX parts orders and the purchase of remaining supply stocks.

Meanwhile, cyber vulnerability testing has begun and is set to continue this year “to further characterize and mitigate this risk.” A plan is being developed to assess the aircraft for cyber resiliency, the GAO said.

“The cyber survivability evaluation will continue with Lot 2 aircraft due to planned changes in the fielding configuration and will be included” in follow-on test and evaluation,” GAO reported. The office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation is “currently analyzing the results of the survivability studies” and will report on its findings in mid-2025.

One of the chief differences between the F-15EX and a similar version offered for export is its electronic warfare suite, the EPAWSS. The Air Force awarded a $616 million contract for full-rate production in January.

The EPAWSS “continues to experience installation schedule and supply risks,” the GAO said. The program reported that Boeing “made improvements to address delays installing EPAWSS modifications on F-15E aircraft, but it faces bottlenecks in the process due to workforce issues and legacy aircraft issues discovered during the modification process.” The program is now “challenged” to achieve a “predictable installation schedule.”

The Air Force started installing EPAWSS during F-15E depot maintenance last year, but the program suffers from “diminishing manufacturing sources” problems. The program office told GAO it is dealing with that issue in part by planning to use a modular open systems approach for the EPAWSS signal processor, which should streamline upgrades.

 The program office told GAO that “due to legacy maintenance issues and poor contractor performance” there will be a new delivery schedule for eight F-15Es being fitted with EPAWSS.

“Another two aircraft are proceeding on or ahead of their modification schedules, with the first delivery expected in spring 2025,” the GAO said.

Industry sources said the GAO’s annual report information can lag program status. Boeing said it delivered the first F-15EX of Lot 2—comprising 12 aircraft—in April, and that all of the lot is expected to be delivered this calendar year. Lot 3 jets will begin delivering in 2026. BAE said it is not experiencing supply chain issues on EPAWSS and “is currently delivering ahead of production needs for both F-15EX and F-15E jets.” The company said it is “making updates to EPAWSS now to address future diminishing manufacturing sources” and has “procured all EPAWSS materials to address [DMS] to meet the current forecasts and agreed-upon quantity through full-rate production Lot 6.”

Technical Sergeant Promotions Surge in 2025, to 1 in 4

Technical Sergeant Promotions Surge in 2025, to 1 in 4

Competition eased considerably for Airmen looking to make technical sergeant in 2025, as about 1 in 4 eligible staff sergeants were picked for promotion.

The Air Force selected 7,884 individuals for promotion out of 30,776 eligible staff sergeants, a rate of 25.62 percent, the Air Force Personnel Center said in a June 23 announcement. The rate is a big step up from the 19.57 percent selection rate of the 2024 cycle, when far more Airmen were eligible (35,328) and fewer were selected (6,914).

The 6.05 percent jump is the biggest year-over-year increase in promotion rates for E-6 since 2016-2017. It also marks the second year in a row of increased promotion rates since the historically tough 2023 cycle, which set a 27-year low: 5,354 selected for 14.5 percent.

The technical sergeant list will be posted on the Air Force Personnel Center public website on June 26 at 8 a.m. CDT. Senior raters, the Airmen who assess their colleagues for promotion, will receive access on June 24.

E-6s are the latest rank to enjoy an improvement in promotion rates this year. The rate of selectees for master sergeant ticked up from 18.65 percent in 2024 to 23.42 percent in 2025, while the rate for senior master sergeant rose slightly from 11.44 percent to 11.64 percent.

The across-the-board jumps reflect that the force has changed since 2021 and 2022, when the economic uncertainty of the COVID-19 pandemic drove a surge in retention and tough competition for career advancement. The Air Force also slowed down promotions at the time because officials warned the branch had too many noncommissioned officers without enough experience. 

Lt. Gen. Caroline M. Miller, the Air Force deputy chief of staff for manpower, personnel, and services, told lawmakers last year that retention had returned to pre-pandemic levels. Miller said in April the Air Force was keeping 90 percent of Airmen overall this year, thanks to slight increases in both officer and enlisted retention—93 and 89 percent, respectively.

Airmen usually serve between 10 to 12 years before becoming eligible for the rank of technical sergeant, the last stop before Airmen enter the ranks of senior noncommissioned officers. E-6s are technical experts capable of “fostering a positive culture of trust within the organization,” according to Air University. 

YEARSELECTEDELIGIBLERATE
20257,88430,77625.62
20246,91435,32819.57
20235,35436,91314.5
20225,43033,93516
20219,42234,97326.94
20208,24628,35829.08
20199,46729,32832.28
20188,41627,55530.54
20178,16725,55231.96
20167,50133,56922.35
20158,44635,86323.55
20146,68438,34417.43
20135,65437,60815.03
20128,51837,40222.77
Sources: Air Force news releases, Air Force Times