‘Here’s the Story’: How an Airman Lied to Cover Up M18 Shooting  

‘Here’s the Story’: How an Airman Lied to Cover Up M18 Shooting  

Airman 1st Class Marcus White-Allen concocted a story to cover up that he fired his M18 pistol into Airman Braden Lovan’s chest, two Airmen from F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyo., testified during summary courts martial proceedings on Oct. 30-31. Lovan died from the gunshot July 20.

In the aftermath, Airman 1st Class Sarbjot Badesha and Airmen 1st Class Matthew Rodriguez pleaded guilty to making false statements about the shooting, the Air Force said Oct. 31 in a statement. The four Airmen served together in 90th Security Forces Group.

White-Allen became the prime suspect in what at first seemed an accidental death and was arrested in early August. On Oct. 8, he was found dead in his dormitory, according to the Air Force. The statement added that legal proceedings had been temporarily suspended. Details surrounding White-Allen’s death remain unclear.

Lovan’s shooting renewed concerns about the M18 pistol, which has been the subject of much speculation and controversy in the law enforcement and gun enthusiast communities. Several lawsuits have alleged that the gun can discharge without anyone pulling the trigger. Given that background, Air Force Global Strike Command temporarily barred troops from using the sidearm following the death.

Within days, however, investigators determined the initial story wasn’t holding up, and Air Force authorities charged White-Allen with involuntary manslaughter, obstruction of justice, and making a false official statement.

In court, according to the Air Force, Badesha and Rodriguez each testified that they “saw White-Allen pull his duty weapon from his holster and point it at Lovan’s chest in a joking manner,” the Air Force statement says. “Each stated they then heard the firearm go off and saw Lovan fallen on the ground.”

Immediately after the shooting, the Air Force statement says, White-Allen told Badesha “Here’s the story; Tell them that I slammed my duty belt on the desk, and it went off.” Rogriguez testified that White-Allen separately told him to tell emergency personnel arriving on the scene that White-Allen’s “holster went off,” according to the Air Force.

The statements initially led investigators to “believe Lovan’s death was a result of an accidental discharge,” the Air Force statement continues.

The cover story aligned with other narratives about the M18, a 9mm pistol made by Sig-Sauer and based on its P320 striker-fired weapon. Multiple lawsuits filed against Sig Sauer, mostly by law enforcement officers, have alleged that P320 pistols discharged unintentionally.

Sig-Sauer defends its design, promising that the pistol cannot “discharge without the trigger first being moved to the rear,” according to a statement on its website.

The Air Force ordered a service-wide inspection of its 125,000 M18s in August and was on schedule to complete that inspection when the government shut down, delaying any announcement of the results. Global Strike Command cleared the pistol to return to use in late August after its own inspections.

Laboratory tests have “determined there were no defects in White-Allen’s duty-issued weapon,” according to the Air Force statement. “Evidence determined White-Allen had his finger on the trigger as he placed the firearm on Lovan’s chest.”

Authorities sentenced Badesha to 30 days in confinement, reduced his rank to E-1 and fined him $1,545. Rodriguez was sentenced to 10 days confinement and 15 days restriction to base. He was also reduced in rank to E-2 and fined $500, according to the statement.

An investigation into White-Allen’s death remains open.

“Our focus is on ensuring that justice is served and that every aspect of this case is thoroughly examined,” Col. Terry Holmes, commander of the 90th Missile Wing said in the statement.

Lawmakers: Secret JATM Missile Not Delayed by Shutdown After All

Lawmakers: Secret JATM Missile Not Delayed by Shutdown After All

The ongoing government shutdown has not slowed progress on the Joint Advanced Tactical Missile, a congressional official said, correcting an earlier statement from lawmakers about the program.

Republicans on the House Armed Services Committee distributed a list of national security programs affected by shutdown, including “a three-month delay in deploying the Air Force Joint Advanced Tactical Missile (JATM) program.”  

But a week after Air & Space Forces Magazine reported the issue, a HASC spokesperson told Air & Space Forces Magazine that the previous statement was inaccurate, the result of a miscommunication between the Air Force, the Pentagon, and Congress. 

Citing information from the Air Force, the spokesperson said that in advance of the shutdown, the JATM program office projected a potential three-month delay to a test event “if the shutdown were to occur and the team was unable to get the necessary support for the event.” 

The Pentagon was able to mitigate the delay, however, and “conduct the prioritized activities”—presumably the test event—the spokesperson said. As a result, there have been no delays to the program. 

The miscommunication underscores just how little public information there is about JATM, a Lockheed Martin missile intended to succeed the AIM-120 AMRAAM as the Air Force and Navy’s primary radar-guided air-to-air missile. The secretive JATM reportedly doubles the AMRAAM’s range, yet fits on existing missile rails and inside fifth-generation fighters’ internal weapons bays. 

The weapon has been in development since 2018, and initial public disclosures suggested it would be operational in 2022-2023. Earlier this year, a top service official told Air & Space Forces Magazine that JATM is not yet operational, citing issues with “integration,” presumably integrating the weapon system with USAF’s fifth-generation fighters, the F-22 and F-35. Another official disputed those comments, however, saying the program is “progressing well,” despite missing its intended IOC date. The missile has been in test since 2020; the first platform expected to employ it will be the F-22. 

Anduril’s CCA Makes First Flight; YFQ-44A Flies Semi-Autonomously

Anduril’s CCA Makes First Flight; YFQ-44A Flies Semi-Autonomously

Anduril Industries’ YFQ-44A Collaborative Combat Aircraft took to the sky Oct. 31, the Air Force announced. The service also confirmed that a production decision on the CCA program is still expected in fiscal 2026, despite the ongoing government shutdown.

In a release announcing the first flight, the Air Force did not release much detail about what the YFQ-44A did, how long it flew, or where it concluded. In its own release, Anduril touted the fact that the flight was semi-autonomous—meaning “no operator with a stick and throttle flying the aircraft behind the scenes,” it said. Rather, the aircraft is monitored by an operator who can direct actions “at the push of a button.”

Air Force Secretary Troy E. Meink, in a post on the social media site X, said the flight marked “continued progress” with the CCA program and shows “how competition drives innovation and accelerates delivery.”

“It also gives us the hard data we need to shape requirements, reduce risk, and ensure the CCA program delivers combat capability on a pace and scale that keeps us ahead of the threat,” Meink added in another post.

Anduril’s emphasis on its semi-autonomous first flight approach differs from General Atomics, which is also competing for “Increment 1” of the CCA program. That company’s YFQ-42A flew for the first time Aug. 27, operated from a ground station. The plan is for CCAs to be semi-autonomous, commanded by pilots in manned fighters flying alongside them. General Atomics has said it started flying with a ground control station as part of a “crawl, walk, run” approach to avoid unnecessary risk and start collecting data as quickly as possible.

An Air Force press release noted that both of the uncrewed craft went from concept to first flight in less than two years.

Anduril flew the YFQ-44A from its facilities at the Southern California Logistics Airport—the former George Air Force Base—in Victorville, Calif. That’s not far from Edwards Air Force Base, where much of the CCA test program is expected to be executed.

Jason Levin, Anduril’s senior vice president of engineering for air dominance and strike, said in a written statement that flight testing “is where we prove that our aircraft meets the mark in terms of speed, maneuverability, autonomy, stealth, range, weapons systems integration, and more. As YFQ-44A climbs higher, we’re proving that it doesn’t merely look like a fighter, but that it performs like one.” He said the time interval between “clean-sheet design to wheels-up” was 556 days, “faster than any major fighter aircraft program in recent history.”

He said the drone—which Anduril has dubbed Fury—is the product of “a relentless commitment to simplicity in design and ease of manufacture, and a devotion to doing the hard things first.”

The Air Force, meanwhile, touted the value of developing both the YFQ-42A and YFQ-44A, the service’s first drones to be designated as fighters.

“By advancing multiple designs in parallel, the Air Force is gaining broader insights and refining how uncrewed aircraft will complement crewed fifth-and sixth-generation platforms in future mission environments,” the service said in a press release.

Developmental flight activities “continue across both vendor and government test locations, including Edwards Air Force Base, where envelope expansion and integration work will inform future experimentation,” the release also stated. The Air Force has stood up an “Experimental Operations Unit,” located at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev., which “will be instrumental in evaluating operational concepts as the program transitions from testing to fielding substantial operational capability for Increment 1 before the end of the decade.”

After an initial program of basic handling qualities, both CCAs are expected to swiftly advance to operational testing, including inert and possibly live weapon releases before the conclusion of the Increment 1 competition. The Air Force has consistently left open the door to carrying both Anduril and General Atomics into the production phase of the CCA program. An Increment 2 phase is expected to be launched in 2026, and will be open to other airframe companies not selected in Increment 1.

Northrop Ready to Start Production on New F-16 EW Suite; First Units Going to Middle East

Northrop Ready to Start Production on New F-16 EW Suite; First Units Going to Middle East

Four years after being selected to provide a self-defense electronic warfare suite for the F-16, Northrop Grumman expects to enter production with the ALQ-257 Integrated Viper Electronic Warfare Suite, or IVEWS, as soon as next year and to field the system in combat in the Middle East as quickly as possible.

The initial production tranche for the Air Force will be on 72 Block 50 F-16s, with more likely to come as production spools up, Northrop vice president of targeting and survivability Jim Conroy told Air & Space Forces Magazine in an interview.

In the reconciliation bill passed by Congress this summer, there was $187 million allocated to “wrap up some of the final stages of [engineering and manufacturing development], some of the formal test activities, and then actually start some initial production,” Conroy said.

The fiscal 2026 appropriations bill—still yet to pass—has $250 million for the “first full-rate production lot,” Conroy added. “So it’s a fully-funded program. We’re ready to start production.”

The initial 72 F-16s are to be fitted under an Urgent Operational Need from U.S. Central Command, which determined the suites are required for F-16s operating in the theater.

U.S. Vipers there have been busy over the past few years. F-16s based in the Middle East in the last two years have shot down Iranian drones fired at Israel, operated above surface-to-air missiles fielded by the regime of former Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad and his Russian backers, faced off Moscow’s warplanes, come under threat from Iran and its proxies, fended off Houthi attacks out of Yemen—and even gone into Iran itself as part of Operation Midnight Hammer. The Houthis in particular have been innovative with their air defenses and downed around two dozen American MQ-9 Reaper drones.

“This is one of many efforts to keep our fourth-gen platforms competitive as the adversary advances,” Lt. Gen. Derek France, the commander of Air Forces Central, told reporters at AFA’s Air, Space & Cyber Conference in September. “That’s the bumper sticker, if you will.”

That bumper sticker was part of a push by France and his team for higher-ups to act fast.

“Both CENTCOM and the Department look at a myriad of competing things to figure out what their priorities are,” France said. “But that’s the push from us. It’s one of several things that we think are important for us.”

The system will work on any of the “post-Block” F-16 aircraft, meaning Block 40 and later, Northrop says. The Air Force has about 600 such fighters, though it has not officially committed to buying IVEWS for all of them.

“So, how fast can we go? How quick can we get them installed? Those are the conversations we’re having with the U.S. Air Force right now,” Conroy said. Final assembly will take place at Northrop’s Rolling Meadows, Ill., facilities, but Conroy said the supply base spans many states. There’s no official timeline for filling the requirement; it’s “as soon as they can … get them,” Conroy said.    

Northrop started flight testing on IVEWS in September 2024, and after 250 hours in the air, the operational assessment finished in April. The system was deemed effective against representative threats, clearing the way for the Air Force to spend money to buy the system. The Urgent Operational Need came in September, and the IVEWS was successfully integrated with the Scalable Agile Beam Radar (SABR) this month, according to an Oct. 27 Northrop press release.

The ALQ-257 is an internal line-replaceable unit, unlike earlier F-16 self-protection electronic warfare systems like the ALQ-131 or ALQ-184 pods, which are mounted on the centerline station under the aircraft. That means the system will free up an external station for fuel or weapons.

The electronic warfare domain is “continuing to advance at an exponential rate,” Conroy said, and the F-16 is in urgent need of a modern, integrated EW suite.

“It is absolutely critical for survivability, given the changing [radio frequency] environment,” he said. A number of international F-16 partners are likely interested as a result. Turkey has already signed up to equip its F-16s with IVEWS when it becomes available.

The threat environment “is not the same … that we had over two decades ago,” when the Air Force last faced a combat opponent with modern air defense systems, Conroy said. In those days, threat installations were mostly fixed.

“You knew exactly where the threat radars were and you could almost pre-plan the missions” to deal with them, he said. “You knew where they were operating and they were always operating the same way. It was a really stable landscape.”

Now, threat radars are largely mobile, and unlikely to reveal their location until just before starting an engagement at close range.

“What’s happening is, they’re waiting until you’re within the weapons engagement zone, and then they turn on. So you can’t just pre-plan how you’re going to execute your mission, because you don’t know where the threats are going to be,” he said.

The radio frequency environment is also more densely populated with cell towers, TV and Wi-Fi stations, satellite radios, “and the adversary uses all this RF noise to hide,” Conroy said.

The IVEWS sifts through all those signals, finds the ones that pose a threat—Conroy called it “the needle in the haystack”—and jams them.

“And just as our systems have become more and more software-dependent … the threat radars have also done that. So you need to have a system that is extensible and is adaptable to that changing environment,” he said.

The IVEWS does not require the F-16’s active electronically-scanned array radar to work, Conroy said. The two systems can use the same portion of the spectrum at the same time without interfering with one another.

“There is no filtering, blanking, or reduction of the radar’s coapabilities while IVEWS protects the platform,” Northrop said in a press release. “The two systems communicate digitally on a pulse-to-pulse basis, so each is aware of what portion of the spectrum the other is using at every moment. Pilots can carry out intense radar tasks without compromising the ability of IVEWS to counter adversary threats.”  

The bulk of IVEWS operational testing—in a “relevant environment”—was completed by the end of 2024, but the two F-16s used in the evaluation have continued to fly out of Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., since, racking up more than 200 sorties and 300 flight hours, Conroy said, “to find the limits of the system.” The system flew in the 2021 exercise Northern Lightning.

Conroy said the IVEWS was not designed to harmonize with other fighter EW suites, like the F-15’s Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System, but they don’t interfere with one another—as seen in USAF exercises—and there’s no reason the data they collect can’t be shared, Conroy said.

The aircraft has “flown in one-v-one conditions, one-v-many … against the most advanced platforms. They’ve gone against ground platforms, surface, and a combination of all of those.”

The IVEWS is not limited to detection, identification, and countermeasures, but can also geo-locate adversary emitters. On some previous systems, geo-location couldn’t be done simultaneously with the other functions. The geo-location happens automatically and is transparent to the pilot.

Northrop is working with Lockheed on supplying IVEWS to foreign customers of the new-build F-16V if they request the system. Installs on new-build aircraft would happen at Lockheed’s Greenville, S.C. facility, but can be done elsewhere as well.  

STRATCOM Nominee Wants More B-21s, Deflects Questions on US Resumption of Nuclear Tests

STRATCOM Nominee Wants More B-21s, Deflects Questions on US Resumption of Nuclear Tests

The nominee to become the next head of U.S. Strategic Command, Vice Adm. Richard Correll, endorsed the production of more than 100 B-21 bombers, echoing his predecessor Gen. Anthony Cotton’s view that 100 B-21 bombers are too few for the nation’s requirements.  

“I agree with Gen. Cotton’s assessment, and I believe he’s been on the record saying between 140 and 150 B-21s,” Correll said, adding: The B-21 is “one of the strongest-performing large acquisition programs we have, and I agree it’s on time and on budget.”

The Navy three-star admiral was also supportive of B-52 modernization, calling the life-extending program “essential … to our strategic deterrent.” The new Rolls-Royce F130 engines provide “world-class” powerplants and, along with the new radar digital backbone, will make the B-52 virtually “a new airplane,” he said. The updates will “almost certainly … improve the readiness rate of those aircraft, going forward.” The B-52 radar upgrade has seen cost and schedule overruns in the last year.

Correll said the U.S. electronic warfare game is not up to snuff, and called for more attention to domain.

The STRATCOM commander “is responsible for reporting on training and understanding of the electromagnetic spectrum capabilities within the joint force, and then advocacy for developing electromagnetic spectrum capabilities,” he said.

There’s “a rich body of lessons learned associated with the Russia/Ukraine conflict that is being applied within the joint force, and needs to continue to inform the way ahead” on electronic warfare.

“We’re not where we need to be, but we’re focused on it and making progress,” he said.

In written answers to questions ahead of the hearing, Correll indicated concern about exercising electronic warfare capabilities.

“As demonstrated in recent exercises, deficiencies continue to be repeated, which range from the lack of the availability of high-end training equipment to the infrequency of training opportunities across the force,” he said. “Training deficiencies, coupled with shortcomings in blue force capabilities, contribute to the force’s inability to maintain previous [electro-magnetic spectrum] advantages.”

Open-air test ranges “are atrophying in both size and transmission authorization,” he added. “Alternate methods to train the force to operate in a contested and complex EMS throughout all domains must be explored.”

Although live, virtual and constructive techniques can help in this area, “they cannot fully capture the true fog, friction, and realism of warfare down to the tactical level,” Correll said.

“Based on cost-benefit analysis, these solutions must be adopted from a modular open systems approach in order to best capitalize return on investment.”

He also said the Joint force not adequately integrated an EMS battle plan into its overall warfare plans.

“While we are making progress … there is still much work to be done. Integrating EMS into our operational plans requires understanding how EMS operations impact all weapons and systems and is a critical component of the EMS Superiority Strategy Implementation Plan. Spectrum-dependent systems are the norm now, and how these systems are employed must be carefully planned to account for any countermeasures’ effect.”

He said the recent “successful launch” of Electromagnetic Battle Management-Joint (EMBM-J) software “is a major milestone in this effort,” and will help “interleave” JEMSO with overall operational plans.

In his written and in-person testimony, he agreed that there must be work done to ensure that commercial spectrum allocations don’t interfere with military uses of certain parts of the spectrum, particularly the S- and X-bands.

“[W]e must prioritize novel and creative ways of sharing spectrum while maintaining reliable and secure uses for the Department,” Correll wrote, urging a “whole of government” approach to “protecting warfighter equities” in spectrum assignment.

“Additionally, EMS operators in coordination with the intelligence community are currently unable to provide the warfighter with a fully informed depiction of the electromagnetic environment due to certain information limitations [and] institutional stovepipes,” Correll wrote. STRATCOM “is working these issues through a multi-directorate collaborative software development path to build an automated and AI-ready capability to bridge some of these gaps.” He pledged to work with other federal agencies to bring the controversy to heel.

Asked in pre-hearing questions about the importance of preserving Air Force Global Strike Command—possibly due to some calling for consolidation of STRATCOM and AFGSC to save general officer billets, which Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has vowed to reduce—Correll offered a robust endorsement of preserving the current command structure.

The AFGSC commander is “essential” because it’s the “single point of contact for two-thirds of our nuclear triad and 68 percent of our Nuclear Command and Control systems,” Correll said.

“The sheer magnitude and scope of the modernization efforts within” the GSC portfolio “ require constant leadership and oversight to ensure all our modernization efforts are synchronized and capable of meeting” national needs.

The ability to talk directly to the person in charge of all that “provides a distinct advantage toward meeting both readiness and operational needs across the world,” Correll wrote.

Correll, however, deflected questions about President Donald Trump’s comments regarding resuming nuclear tests, telling questioners on the Senate Armed Services Committee that he was not yet clear what the president had in mind.

Trump posted on Truth Social, his social media site, that “Because of other countries’ testing programs, I have instructed the Department of War to start testing our nuclear weapons on an equal basis. That process will begin immediately.” He posted the comment Oct. 29, while on an official visit to South Korea.

Pressed by Sen. Mazie Hirono (D-Ha.) on the need for real-world, explosive testing of nuclear weapons, Correll demurred. “Neither China nor Russia has conducted a nuclear explosive test,” he said. “So I’m not reading anything into it or reading anything out.”

Correll said existing simulations for nuclear detonations are sufficient to ensure STRATCOM’s annual certification that the nuclear arsenal is reliable, effective, and credible. The U.S. last detonated a nuclear explosive in 1992. Periodic test launches to ensure that the intercontinental missile arsenal is operable use missiles without nuclear material

Asked pointedly by Sen. Jacky Rosen (D-Nev.) Correll said he is “absolutely confident” in the nuclear arsenal’s ability to function as planned.

Trump told reporters aboard Air Force One that other countries “seem to be doing all the nuclear testing.”

He added: “We’ve halted it … many years ago. But with others doing testing, I think it’s appropriate that we do, also.”

Trump may have been referring to testing of strategic delivery systems—a point made by several SASC members—given that Russian president Vladimir Putin has boasted within the past week of testing a new underwater nuclear weapon and about a new nuclear cruise missile.

Air Base Defense Is Our Duty. It’s Been Ignored Too Long

Air Base Defense Is Our Duty. It’s Been Ignored Too Long

Here is an axiom that may be regarded as Rule 1 for the military way of life: All officers must defend the lives and resources entrusted to them against hostile attack. For civilians, Rule 1 equates to “the right to self-defense.” For us, this “right” is an obligation, a responsibility we must not ignore.  

I reckon Rule 1 applies to all uniformed branches and to the organized military of any country. So, I wonder whether the commanders at Belaya, Olenya, Dyagilevo and Ivanovo Severny were called to Moscow to explain the failure to protect their air bases on the first of June, this year. On that day, Ukraine’s Security Service launched Operation Spider’s Web, using flatbed trucks to transport and launch drones that attacked long-range aviation assets located all over Russia’s vast territory. One base, Belaya, is nearly 3,000 miles from Ukraine. A fifth attack, targeting Ukrainka in Russia’s Far East, failed when the truck blew up. Ukrainka is six time zones from Kyiv.  

We can be sure that these attacks caught Mr. Putin’s attention, even if he doesn’t have a YouTube subscription. Ukrainians say a third of Russia’s cruise missile carriers were destroyed or put out of action for a long time, claiming an estimated $7 billion worth of damage. They did this with just 117 small drones, each having only a 7-pound explosive payload and costing something like $2,000. Do the arithmetic. 

It may be these Ukrainian claims are a bit exaggerated. In any case, the military outcome was eye-catchingly disproportionate. But this should not come as a surprise. The need to defend air bases was made painfully clear at Hickam Field in December 1941. Yet even now we continue to park aircraft in the open, often wingtip-to-wingtip, all over the country and have essentially no way of providing terminal defense against air attack. 

It’s not easy to defend air bases. With the notable exception of aircraft carriers, air bases are fixed targets, their coordinates well known. Even the maneuverability enjoyed by aircraft carriers provides only a fig leaf of protection. Navies no longer “hide” over the horizon; modern reconnaissance methods report ship location in real time. And though movement while underway complicates precision munitions tracking, the relevant question is whether 30 knots is operationally significant speed. Of course, the Navy knows this, which is why so much of a carrier battle group’s combat potential is (rightly) given over to defending the carrier. 

So, to foot stomp the obvious, the Navy has its own really good air force and is signed up to defend the “bases” it operates from. Why doesn’t the Air Force do the same thing? 

Maybe it’s because our bases are unsinkable, in sharp contrast with the sea-going version. Or maybe we count on properly trained and equipped civil engineer squadrons to restore airfield pavements to operational use in hours—versus months or even years needed to repair capital ships. These views are OK as far as they go but miss the point. Today’s target is the airplane, not the base. 

Then, too, we are an offense-minded outfit. Our way of making enemy attacks on our bases a manageable proposition is to attrit his capacity to do it. Take out his production and storage facilities. Attack his airfields. Intercept his aircraft and knock them down as they’re coming at us. In a way, air base terminal defense is a last-ditch maneuver, a desperation move, playing “goalie” against “leakers” that we hope will constitute only a tiny residual threat. This, too, is mostly right, yet also misses the point: The advent of small, cheap drones is a total game-changer. 

Every study ever done (that I know of) has shown the outsized value of air base terminal defense. Accordingly, when I served as chief, I tried twice to fund a small program that would begin equipping elements of our Air Police with Stinger missiles and other off-the-shelf equipment for close-in air defense. Both times, the green eyeshade budgeteers in OSD simply took away the money. I got the message and gave up. 

Many officers of my generation spent time in European assignments where one of our jobs was trying to get so-called Collocated Operating Bases (COBs) up and running. The idea was to preposition equipment and support at many locations and, on call, to disperse aircraft, crews and first line maintenance, reducing the concentration of combat assets on large, traditional bases—a concept not unlike what is now called Agile Combat Employment. Had this worked, it would certainly have complicated Soviet targeting. 

In practice, however, we found that this good idea had rather severe limitations. First, it was not free. Doing it right called for a lot more money than we had. Wheel chocks, tow bars and aircraft ladders are not even a one-club bid. It’s a very heavy lift to preposition fuel, munitions, spare parts—the whole panoply of a ponderous support apparatus—then to move combat aircraft to remote locations (even briefly), and then set up security and communicate intelligence and mission tasking in the middle of what is likely to be a chaotic battle situation. And you will likely still end up parking aircraft out in the open. 

I hope we have discovered workarounds for some of these problems in the intervening years. But during my time the COBs program showed we were agile in the air, as always. On the ground, not so much. 

Happily, at the same time we were working on COBs, NATO put together a big program to construct aircraft shelters. These were individual, meter-thick reinforced concrete structures that eat $2,000 drones for breakfast. When I commanded the 20th Wing at Upper Heyford, we had 72 of these shelters, which kept our F-111 aircraft much better protected (and, more importantly, usable and taskable) compared to if I had tried to disperse them to COBs.  

I was told at the time that NATO’s aircraft shelters cost $1 million each. If so, they were a bargain. Fifty years later, they remain in good use at Lakenheath, and other tourist destinations around Europe. The economic advantages of a shelter were so obvious that even a country as poor as Iraq built many, which Chuck Horner got around to knocking down late in Desert Storm. (Let’s face it: Few targets will withstand a direct hit by a 2,000-pound bomb.) Shelters like those we built in the 1970s and ’80s would likely cost double or triple what we spent then, and we will need larger, even more expensive shelters for aircraft like the B-2 or C-17. So, hardening our bases will take a lot of money and years to do, but in the age of $100 million single-engine fighters, it pencils out, and we should start on it now.  

Perhaps, as some say, close-in air defense is an Army mission. The 1948 Key West Agreement can be read this way. But the committee work done at Key West produced a sort of Frankenstein, the sewed together body parts of a compromise aimed not at settling, but at avoiding what is at bottom a simple question: how to organize the country’s air power. A sensible answer was never possible in the smokey backroom of rice bowl politics. 

Key West was wrong in 1948 and hasn’t improved since. Anyway, claiming it’s somebody else’s job is yet another fig leaf, in this case the exact excuse used more than 30 years ago by the pencil pushers in OSD to take away money I wanted to invest in close-in defense of air bases. To this day I regret not having fought harder. I should have read them Rule 1. 

Nothing done at Key West or since relieves us of our obligation to protect the lives and resources entrusted to us by the American people. It’s time to not only accept, but to welcome that obligation. It’s time to harden and defend our bases. 

Gen. Merrill A. “Tony” McPeak was the 14th Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force. Over the course of a 37-year career, he completed more than 6,000 flying hours, principally in the F-4, F-15, F-16, F-100, F-104, and F- 111.    

Wilsbach Confirmed as Air Force Chief

Wilsbach Confirmed as Air Force Chief

Gen. Kenneth S. Wilsbach was confirmed as the 24th Air Force Chief of Staff Oct. 30 by unanimous consent. Shortly before, his predecessor, Gen. David W. Allvin, was “clapped” out of the Pentagon, 10 weeks after he unexpectedly announced his retirement on Aug. 18, two years into his four-year term.

Wilsbach, a fighter pilot whose last assignment was atop Air Combat Command, takes over the Air Force as it works to overcome readiness challenges and to modernize its aging air fleet. Prior to taking over ACC, the Air Force’s largest command, he headed Pacific Air Forces, the Air Force component of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

Wilsbach stressed readiness and standards at ACC and focused his remarks during his confirmation hearing on readiness and flying time. Soon after arriving at ACC in February 2024, he called out a “discernible decline” in Air Force standards, noting a lack of commitment and enforcement. He directed sweeping inspections to address it. He also developed a new metric to measure aircraft readiness including monthly briefings to him on the health of the fleet. 

Those priorities dovetail with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s emphasis on fitness and grooming standards, warrior ethos, and lethality. Air Force Secretary Troy Meink’s has noted his own concerns about readiness and the need to “rebalance” accounts.

Under previous Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall, Allvin helped champion a reorganization program dubbed “re-optimization for great power competition,” which included creating a centralized Integrated Capabilities Command to oversee Air Force requirements setting; expanding Air Education and Training Command’s mission; and creating “Deployable Combat Wings” to create a more predictable plan for organizing and preparing forces to deploy.

Much of that plan has already begun to unwind. Meink nixed Integrated Capabilities Command and four-stars and the Air Force’s Major Commands pushed back on the deployable combat wings concept.

Wilsbach assumes a large modernization portfolio, including troubled F-35, KC-46, and T-7 programs; the B-21 bomber program, which is thus well regarded; and new fighter programs including the autonomous Collaborative Combat Aircraft and the future F-47 air dominance fighter. Looming over it all is the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program, among the biggest modernization programs in the history of the department and already billions over budget. 

He arrives in the midst of a government shutdown and facing difficult tradeoffs among competing requirements.

“I want to welcome General Kenneth Wilsbach as the 24th Chief of Staff of the Air Force!” Meink wrote in a social media post on X. “With his vast experience in the Pacific and as a commander at all levels, he is the right leader for the Air Force.”

With more than 6,000 flying hours in the F-15C, F-16C, MC-12, and F-22A, Wilsbach has flown 71 combat missions and served as commander of the 7th Air Force in Korea, the 11th Air Force in Alaska, and the 18th Wing at Kadena Air Base, Japan.

Space Editor Courtney Albon and Pentagon Editor Chris Gordon contributed reporting.

End the Standoff, Pay the Troops 

End the Standoff, Pay the Troops 

In the winter of 1777, the American colonies stood at a precipice. The British Army occupied the colonial capital of Philadelphia and George Washington’s Continental Army was huddled at Valley Forge.  

Washington understood the politics of his time, but what mattered most to him was the care and feeding of his troops. The politics of our time are also fraught, but the need to take care of our military remains a sacred obligation.   

In a plaintive letter to Congress and state legislatures, Washington laid bare his troubles that winter: “Not less than 2,898 Men unfit for duty by reason of their being bare foot and otherwise naked,” he wrote. “We shall never have a fair and just prospect for success till our Troops (Officers and Men) are better provided than they are or have been.” 

A nation asks much of its military volunteers, who pledge their lives, if necessary, in defense of their nation. These men and women have a right to a paycheck in return. 

“Providing for the common defence” is, after all, a tough business. The term is cited not once but twice in the Constitution: first in the preamble, defining the principal jobs of government, and second in Article 1, Section 8, which assigns to Congress the job to “pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.” 

The good news is that most Active-Duty military will get paid this week—details remain sketchy, but it looks like the Treasury will find enough money to cover the Active-Duty payroll. It is less clear how the National Guard and the Reserve will fare. Civilian defense employees will not be paid.  

Things will likely get worse when the next military payroll is due, Nov. 15. By then, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has warned, the Pentagon will have run out of flexibility for moving money around.  

Federal civilians are already feeling the squeeze. They haven’t been paid since Sept. 30. In Washington last week, feds emptied a foodbank created for their benefit in just 90 minutes. If it’s that bad after just three weeks without pay, imagine six or eight. That’s where we’re headed if Congress can’t set aside differences.  

The public is beginning to become aware. Morning Consult’s Consumer Confidence index fell this week to its lowest level since July 2024, a drop of nearly 10 percent over the past eight weeks. Things will get worse in November, as aid programs like SNAP and food assistance for women with infant children are suspended. And with federal contracts on hold and small businesses dependent on the military fight for survival, it’s just a matter of time before the fallout impacts the wider economy.  

Charities are insufficient to the payroll need. This is a problem scaled in billions. The military payroll tops $8.5 billion per month; the federal civilian payroll approaches double that. We salute the banks and credit unions that are advancing pay to some federal customers and the charities lining up to help. But let’s be real: There isn’t enough aid to go around, and the most needy, both junior troops and younger feds, will suffer. 

Only Congress can solve this problem. 

If Congress needs more time to work through issues and details, fine. But don’t do it on the backs of our military members and federal employees.    

We must put the needs of the nation—and those entrusted to defend it—ahead of politics. Pay the troops.  

Lt. Gen. Burt Field, USAF, (Ret.), is the President and CEO of the Air & Space Forces Association.

Colorado Sues to Stop SPACECOM Move

Colorado Sues to Stop SPACECOM Move

Colorado’s attorney general is suing the Trump administration in an effort to block the President’s decision to relocate U.S. Space Command headquarters from Colorado Springs to Huntsville, Ala.

The lawsuit, filed Oct. 29 by Attorney General Phil Weiser, alleges that President Donald Trump’s decision amounts to “retaliation” against Colorado for the state’s stance on mail-in voting in violation of the state’s “exercise of its sovereign authority to regulate elections.”  

The suit also alleges the White House failed to issue the proper congressional notification or to follow standard site vetting procedures before announcing its basing decision. It calls for a stop-work order on all efforts to transition SPACECOM headquarters to Alabama.  

The state names President Donald Trump, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, Air Force Secretary Troy Meink, and the Department of the Air Force as plaintiffs.  

An Air Force spokesperson declined comment, stating: “The Air Force does not comment on ongoing litigation.” A U.S. Space Command spokesperson did not immediately respond to questions about how a potential injunction, if granted, might impact the transition timeline. 

The lawsuit is the latest in a yearslong saga over which state should host the command, which is charged with operating the Defense Department’s space capabilities.  

When SPACECOM was re-established in 2019, the headquarters was provisionally placed in Colorado Springs. In January 2021,just before Trump’s first term in office wound down, his White House selected Huntsville to be the command’s permanent headquarters. Two years later, following several reviews, President Joe Biden reversed the decision, declaring the command would remain in Colorado

This past September, however, Trump again weighed in, announcing that SPACECOM would move to Alabama at an Oval Office meeting, where he was flanked by Republican members of Alabama’s congressional delegation. He said then his decision was influenced by Colorado’s mail-in voting laws. 

“When the state is for mail-in voting, that means they want dishonest elections,” Trump charged. “That played a big factor.” 

In the complaint, Colorado officials allege that “President Trump has unlawfully retaliated against Colorado to punish the State for its exercise of sovereign authority to regulate elections.” This is a Constitutional intrusion on the state’s rights, they say: “The President’s decision and threatened future action undermine and violate the Constitution by singling out Colorado for harmful executive action based on its exercise of sovereign powers.” 

The suit also alleges that the Air Force failed to follow proper notification procedures prior to announcing the relocation. Title 10, Section 483, of US Code requires that Congressional defense committees be notified “at each point in the decision-making process … of the decision-making process to be used or the decision-making process used … to select a military installation to serve as the first permanent location for a new major headquarters, covered military unit, or major weapon system.”

The notice should include analysis of the training capabilities available at each location and describe how the decision would impact local communities. 

The law also requires agency heads to wait at least 14 days after submitting such notice before taking “irrevocable action” to implement the basing decision. 

The complaint doesn’t provide details about how the department violated the process or which actions the state considers irrevocable. It’s not clear what notifications the Air Force or the administration provided.

Space Command is leading the transition process for the headquarters move, which could take up to four years to complete. Prior to the lawsuit’s filing, a command spokesperson told Air & Space Forces Magazine the command was “moving as fast as infrastructure and the mission allows,” and expected to announce some initial transition milestones in mid-to-late November.