Letters

Your recent article, “Into the Desert: Mobilizing for Desert Shield,” [March/April, p. 32] is a real gem and deals with a subject—air mobility—that I have studied and lectured on frequently.

The accounts you document and knit together are quite effective at showcasing the challenges the USAF has executing the airlift mission, often due to internal issues more than anything.

However, I must take exception with this line in your story: “C-141s couldn’t refuel underway but C-5s could.”

By the start of Operation Desert Shield, all C-141s in the fleet were C-141B models. As you noted, the C-141s had undergone extensive modification to repair wing boxes. During that process, they were also stretched to enable greater cargo capacity and aerial-refueling capability was added. The issues related to aerial refueling for MAC (Military Airlift Command) aircraft during the operation were not related to aircraft capability, but to pilot certification and training to perform aerial refueling.

Similar to issues encountered during Operation Nickel Grass in 1973, MAC pilots were not certified to conduct aerial refueling despite a stated requirement to have that capability. During 1973, this certification was waived because of issues with C-5 wing boxes and the thought that aerial refueling would put too much stress on the aircraft.

C-141s, at that time all A models, did not have the capacity to conduct aerial refueling. The lack of this capability in this aircraft combined with the lack of crew qualifications in the C-5 fleet created a significant operational issue for the airlift. Lajes Air Base in the Azores became an essential choke point for conducting the mission because of range limitations. This was also an issue generated by MAC at the time because they routinely did not fly alternate routes that would have needed aerial refueling because of the culture of MAC where they often believed that their wartime mission was their peacetime mission and they would fly normal routes in the event of a crisis, which has been disproven regularly.

The problem with this attitude was the complacency it bred. Thinking creatively about the mission and foreseeing possible alternatives or contingencies was not part of the culture in most places.

MAC learned the lesson and made sure KC-10s could refuel, C-141s were modified, and reinforced the requirement for pilots to be trained and certified to do it. This commitment lapsed in the intervening years more for cultural issues than operational ones as stated above. When I was in MAC, much like in SAC for long periods of time, a sense of routine settled in. Getting the routine missions accomplished and “taking care of our people” by providing crew rest was more important than really thinking strategically about the mission.

Both C-141s and C-5s could conduct aerial refueling during Desert Shield and Storm, but it was a pilot certification issue that limited employment of that option—not an equipment one.

Most of this issue was the result of cultural factors as the need to conduct aerial refueling was routinely waived in favor of flying routes that did not require it and getting crews into crew rest or off flying missions as preferred to being ready for any wartime contingency that might arise. (The other viable factor, as the article points out, was that MAC did not own the tankers, SAC did, and coordinating the use of them was often a hassle. Far easier to waive and forgo than go through bureaucratic hurdles to schedule.)

Lt. Col. John G. Terino, USAF (Ret.)Montgomery, Ala.

Tobias Naegele wrote an excellent article about Hq. MAC moving personnel and equipment in support of Desert Shield/Storm. Prior to activation of the Hq. MAC Crisis Action Team (CAT), MAC airlift aircraft were scheduled by 21st Air Force at McGuire Air Force Base, N.J., concerning movements east of the Mississippi River and 22nd Air Force at Travis Air Force Base, Calif., concerning movements west of the Mississippi River.

With the initiation of Desert Shield, Hq. TRANSCOM needed a single point of contact to issue airlift requirements; thus, the MAC CAT was activated. Maj. Gen. Vernon J. Kondra received a lot of credit for the airlift movements and rightfully so; however, the credit for the actual creation and daily operation of the MAC CAT deservedly goes to Col. Daryl Bottjer.

When Desert Shield activated, Colonel Bottjer was the MAC/DOO in charge of current operations. As the CAT Director, he created the CAT and then took charge of leading the daily operations. As the deputy director for the scheduling of the operational support airlift mission, General Kondra asked me to be his representative on the Operations Desk in the CAT.

It was there that I saw daily, Colonel Bottjer’s leadership not only in deploying equipment and personnel into the theater, but also the ceremonial return of the troops. Colonel Bottjer not only directed the flawless operation of the CAT, but the operation served as an example of how the MAC airlift system could be managed more efficiently. So efficiently in fact, that Hq. MAC leadership took the CAT concept and established the Tanker (tankers were subsequently assigned to Hq. MAC) Airlift Control Center (TACC) at Scott Air Force Base, Ill., that assumed complete management of MAC aircraft scheduling and monitoring.

In doing so, there is now no difference between the management of peacetime and contingency/wartime operations.

Col. William E. Goodwin, USAF (Ret.)Jonesville, S.C.

Reading about Mobilizing for Desert Shield took me back to the late summer of 1990. The majority of our 833rd Air Transportable Hospital flew from Holloman Air Force Base, N.M., to an air base in southwest Saudi Arabia on a C-5 and made one refuel stop at Goose Bay and another at Wiesbaden, Germany.

We were initially placed in a nearby hotel and a few days later into living quarters within aircraft shelters. I’ll always remember walking out of the room and seeing an FB-111 with the name “Crew Chief oops McCoy” written on it. When our equipment arrived, it was an all-hands affair getting things set up. Med techs, nurses, and docs all pitching in setting up temper tents. Proud to have played a small part in a large operation.

Col. John M. Starzyk, USAF (Ret.)Summerville, S.C.

The USAF Commander’s Insignia badge

I question the authorization for the commander’s insignia that is worn on the Air Force uniform. As a former commander in the rank of captain of a “geographically separated unit,” I take exception to the restriction of the insignia only for “major through colonel.” Since the insignia was originally instituted, the “C-prefix” attached to the AFSC and “detachment” commander have been added to the authorization, both of which applied to me, except for the rank.

This correction to the authorization will not affect me personally but would affect hundreds of current and future unit commanders in the rank of captain and under.

Just as many of my counterparts who were first lieutenants and captains from the now defunct Aeronautical Chart and Information Center (ACIC), we were “overseas” detachment commanders, in England, the Philippines, Okinawa, and Japan, who were “geographically separated” from our squadron commanders in Hawaii and Europe and our command headquarters in St. Louis.

Although many other affected commands are now defunct, there are many other junior officers and enlisted personnel of many other commands who face the same predicament today. They deserve better.

In addition to the C-prefix, more importantly, we had to be on orders published by our parent squadron allowing us to be a designated administrative officer so we could publish our own special orders for TDYs. We also had to be on orders to be supply officers so we could have a base supply account. We had to be assigned on orders as finance officers so we could have a base finance account to manage our expenses and finances.

As bona fide unit commanders, we had to comply with all base regulations as tenant unit commanders. Units with commanders who were majors through colonels usually had many junior officers who could be delegated responsibilities of many additional duties. Commanders with no other officers had to perform all of the numerous base additional duties, such as unit security officer, unit safety officer, unit athletic officer, etc.

While I am retired and no longer in any chain of command, I do hope current and former unit junior officer commanders of geographically separated units will support my suggestion to be authorized to wear the unit commanders badge.

Lt. Col. Russel A. Noguchi, USAF (Ret.)Pearl City, Hawaii

I was saddened to learn about Gen. John Shaud’s passing [March/April, p. 25]. As a first lieutenant I interacted with him maybe once a week for only a year at the 92nd Bombardment Wing. Yet he left a lasting impact on me. I wanted to be just like him. He treated his Airmen with respect, while ensuring we all met Strategic Air Command’s high standards.

Among my memories are at one weekly staff meeting he related that he went out to the maintenance area around midnight and found E-9s were drinking coffee inside while the junior Airmen were fixing aircraft in the cold. He told the staff to get out there and see what’s going on at night and fix the problems.

On another occasion, I recall an officer came in with a cake to “celebrate” the one year anniversary of a Buff “hangar queen.” I can’t remember what he said, but without embarrassing the officer, he made the point that we don’t celebrate readiness failures.

Fast forward almost nine years later at the Pentagon. He greeted me by my first name and asked how my wife, Katie, was doing. Incredible! Moreover he was genuinely thrilled that his former lieutenant was about to brief the Chief of Staff of the Air Force on worldwide threats.

Years later as a squadron, group, and wing commander I got out there at night, stressed the need for readiness, and did my best to treat every Airman with respect just as I had learned from General Shaud.

Rest in peace, sir. And thank you for your leadership all those years ago.

Lt. Col. Roger Gaebel, USAF (Ret.)Woodinville, Wash.