Joint Punishment
Your editorial on joint assignments [“Giving Joint Assignments Their Due,” December, p. 2] provided a good analysis of the dilemma of serving in joint assignments. I agree that the Air Force needs to “train, educate, develop, and reward folks” for joint assignments. In my 20-year Air Force career I had three joint assignments and one joint school for a total of seven years. After a defense agency assignment as a detachment commander and a one-year defense school, I was promoted to major, one year below the zone. After completing ACSC in residence and during a follow-on U&S command tour, I was passed over twice in the primary zone to lieutenant colonel. Several senior officers advised that promotion boards may have thought I had too many joint assignments. I was lucky to have been recruited by the subordinate Air Force component command (Majcom), which got me promoted a year above the zone. Despite such a tumultuous career, I believe Air Force personnel are needed in joint commands and agencies to provide the Air Force expertise, capabilities, and points of view to enhance both accomplishing the joint organization’s and the Air Force’s missions. This message should be taught to all Air Force personnel from Day 1 and reinforced by all selection and promotion boards. Joint assignments should not be detrimental to a career. My last assignment was at a defense agency whose two-star Air Force director was “fired” for security reasons, so my last OER was signed and endorsed by two Air Force colonels. No offense to the colonels, but I saw the handwriting on the wall, so I retired. I suggest all officer ratings be “automatically” forwarded to a higher echelon when a defense agency director is a two-star officer or lower, or when the senior general officer billet is vacant. I say automatically because Air Force element commanders or personnel officers should not screen personnel of the same rank as themselves.
Lt. Col. Russel A. Noguchi,
USAF (Ret.)
Pearl City, Hawaii
It was great to see “Giving Joint Assignments Their Due,” regarding Air Force efforts concerning joint operations, especially joint task force command positions, and to bring more purple into the force through better training. I was assigned to US Forces Korea as a senior major, and I am sure the fact that I was out of my normal supported command (what was then Air Intelligence Agency) and in a joint position contributed to my not being selected. As was stated in the article, some see the joint world as a parallel universe and unfortunately that includes some members of promotion boards. I hope Air Force efforts have the intended affect and joint assignments become less of a stigma for company and field grade officers.
Maj. Douglas W. McGuire,
USAF (Ret.)
Fredericksburg, Va.
“Giving Joint Assignments Their Due” certainly caught my attention. I found the position of Gen. [David] Goldfein, Chief of Staff, who purports to “strengthening joint leaders and teams” something I had heard during my career. The editorial reports that USAF considers some joint assignments will even be “considered equivalent to command positions at promotion time.” Goldfein says he will ensure that folks get “rewarded” for serving in joint assignments.
I bought that same mantra, popular in the ’80s. I volunteered for and attended the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC), Norfolk, Va., and spent months being trained to work in a “purple” assignment. My major thesis was graded “distinguished” and used in a future course curriculum. Some AFSC students chose not to take a joint assignment, but worked the system so as to return to an Air Force cockpit, something I would have loved to have done, since my previous assignment had been in the F-15 Eagle. However, I remained true to my “calling” to serve in a joint assignment, as the “importance of joint work” was the propaganda of the times.
I was assigned as the only fighter pilot in the Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC) and was first recognized for my analysis of the KAL 007 shoot down by the Soviets on Sept. 1, 1983. I was then chosen to be the executive officer for the J2, a one-star Air Force general in charge of intelligence for the Pacific Command (PACOM). Shortly thereafter, I was selected to be the deputy executive officer and speechwriter to Adm. [William J.] Crowe Jr., the commander in chief (CINC) of PACOM. I served in that capacity until Crowe was chosen to be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), at which time it was important for me to return to the cockpit.
During my time as one of the only rated USAF officers in IPAC, an exec to the J2, and the assistant exec and speechwriter to CINCPACOM, I received “firewalled” officer efficiency reports (OERs). My last two were endorsed by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and every OER stated, “promote ahead of contemporaries.” I fully hoped, based on my career and hard work, that I might make 0-6 one or two years early.
But, when returning to an Air Force unit, though serving in key positions and continuing to get firewalled OERs, my report—a year ahead of the colonel’s board—was sent to a three-star for endorsement (the wing commander wanted to “save” OERs for four-star endorsements, as he thought I didn’t need it—that I was sure to get the early promotion). The Air Force promotion board cared less if I performed well in a joint assignment for a Navy four-star and was endorsed by SecDef. No early promotion.
Then, the Air Force had the gall to ask me to serve in another joint assignment, one that would have required me to quit flying early (and lose thousands of dollars in flight pay), sell my home, put my son in a boarding school (there were no DOD schools where I was to be assigned), and more. I had already served commendably in three joint jobs, but was not “rewarded” for such, as Goldfein (and Major General Killough, the head of Goldfein’s joint leaders task force) purport in the article.
I had a great USAF career and enjoyed my “joint” time, but if we really think that we need more officers and airmen to serve in “purple” jobs, then we need to stand behind the statement that doing so will be “rewarding.”
Lt. Col. Bob Russell,
USAF (Ret.)
Lancaster, Calif.
Namesake: Dyess
I learned of [Lt. Col. Edwin] Dyess and the other Davao prisoners, McCoy and Mellnik, in the book Jersey Brothers (December, p. 64). Of the three Navy brothers, the youngest, Barton, was assigned to the Philippines arriving days before the Japanese struck. He was wounded and endured life as a prisoner of the Japanese but was not one of the 12 who escaped the prison camp. Dyess was admonished not to speak of the conditions in the prison camps. However, after President [Theodore] Roosevelt finally gave approval, the account of the Japanese atrocities was made public and published.
Lt. Col. Robert Rogers,
USAF (Ret.)
Sudbury, Mass.
Non Neutral on Neutron Bomb
I really enjoyed John Correll’s article on “The Neutron Bomb” and his account of the physics and politics behind its history of development, production, and proposed, but never implemented, deployment (December, p. 58). As a physician I have been interested in the differences between the medical effects of fission versus enhanced radiation weapons (ERW) of similar yields. As Correll pointed out, the prompt radiation-to-blast ratio in an ERW is much greater than that of a fission device. He did not mention that the biological effects of neutron radiation (and hence mixed field radiation) differ from those of the primarily gamma radiation produced by a fission device. Mixed field radiation injuries have shorter survival times, a shorter latency period (time between exposure and manifestation of symptoms), increased mortality, and increased delayed healing times for concurrent blast and/or thermal injuries. For survivors, the risk of carcinogenesis from mixed field radiation is considerably elevated as well. The only good news is that the fission product fallout from an ERW is half that of a fission device of similar yield.
The phrase used by the Soviet Union, and certain Western media personnel and politicians, that the ERW is “the capitalist bomb” built to “kill people and preserve property,” is (intentionally?) deceptive. If one states instead that an ERW bomb is built to “kill the aggressor’s invading troops and decrease destruction of the defender’s homeland,” a different impression is created. This was in fact why the ERW was constructed, to defend the West against Warsaw Pact invasion through the Fulda Gap.
Col. Glen I. Reeves,
USAF (Ret.)
Weiser, Idaho
I appreciated learning about the strategy, politics, and presidential decision-making surrounding the “neutron bomb” from John Correll’s article in the December 2017 issue of Air Force Magazine. I’m looking forward to reading a timely sequel on nuclear weapons plans and policy for the Korean Peninsula.
Col. J. Randall Johnson,
USAF (Ret.)
Batavia, Ill.
Century Skepticism
As a lifetime member of AFA, and an avid reader of Air Force Magazine, I wanted to make you aware of an error in December’s article entitled “Commemorating USAF’s 100-Year Units” [p. 31]. The author of the article left out one squadron that is still supporting the USAF’s global operation by flying the MQ-9 Reaper, the 111th Attack Squadron, Texas ANG. As a former member, I can assure you that the 111th started life at Kelly Field, Texas, in 1917, as the 111th Aero Squadron. The unit was transferred to the Texas National Guard in 1924 as the 111th Observation Squadron/36th Division. Over the many decades the 111th has seen action in the MTO, ETO, Korea, (first Air Guard unit to see action in Korea), Air Defense, Operation Noble Eagle, and Operation Enduring Freedom. The unit celebrated its 100th anniversary on August 12. Please add a correction in the next issue.
Capt. Randall Smith,
USAF (Ret.)
Katy, Texas
The “Commemorating USAF’s 100- Year Units” article in December’s Air Force Magazine is a valuable testament to the rich heritage of the service. The number of units that can trace their history back to that period of time should not be surprising, however, since the Army Air Service grew from just one aero squadron in 1916 to 185 aero squadrons by the end of World War I, of which 45 deployed to the European conflict.
However, I noted one omission from the array of squadrons that are currently active and that can trace their ancestry to 1917—the 141st Air Refueling Squadron, a component of the 108th Wing, New Jersey Air National Guard. Although it did not receive the official designation as the 141st Aero Squadron until Jan. 2. 1918, as it was enroute to the European conflict, it was effectively organized on Oct. 8, 1917, at Rockwell Field, San Diego (today’s North Island Naval Air Station).
As an undesignated provisional unit, it drew men from other units and trained on the ubiquitous Curtiss Jenny at Rockwell until they began their eastward trek across the country and then the Atlantic Ocean. After receiving further training in England and France, the 141st Aero Squadron (Pursuit) finally arrived at Gengault (Toul) Aerodrome on Oct. 19, 1918, and immediately entered combat as part of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.
Commanded by Capt. Hobart Amory Hare (Hobey) Baker and equipped with SPAD S.XIIIs, the unit led the 4th Pursuit Group in the number of combat sorties flown, aerial engagements and German aircraft downed. About a month after the armistice, on Dec. 21, 1918, Captain Baker was tragically killed while post-maintenance testing a SPAD the day of his intended return to the United States. The squadron stayed in Europe a bit longer, forming part of the Third Army Air Service’s 5th Pursuit Group’s occupation force, until demobilization in June 1919.
Significantly, on Sept. 8, 1973, the Secretary of the Air Force ordered the reconstitution of the 141st Aero Squadron and allotment to the New Jersey ANG, and consolidation with the then-existent 141st Tactical Fighter Squadron. The consolidated unit was also bestowed the lineage, history, honors, and colors of the 141st Aero Squadron. After flying high-performance fighter aircraft for its entire existence, the unit converted to the tanker mission in October 1991, becoming the 141st Air Refueling Squadron.
Rick Porcelli,
Barnetgat, N. J.
To my amazement, I found multiple units listed as having roots back over 100 years very hard to believe. For example, there are five (yes, five) air refueling units shown. Unfortunately, your article on air refueling on p. 45 indicates the first military air refueling occurred in June 1923. There is one “cyberspace” squadron shown. One space range squadron and finally, the USAF Thunderbirds, which only was founded in 1953, per their own web site.
Me thinks there was considerable “stretching” of the histories.
Col. Michael LaBeau,
USAF (Ret.)
Fort Worth, Texas
As noted in the introduction, the 100 years is based on official Air Force lineage for currently active units. Most units have changed equipment, location, and mission several times, and may have been activated and inactivated more than once.—the editors
I enjoyed perusing and researching your USAF 100-Year Units patch display in your December 2017 edition. I was impressed with the originality, creativity, and artistic skill that went in to creating these impressive historical images. Back in the “good old days” free spirits were allowed to be as expressive as they wanted.
I did some head scratching at some of the units I saw highlighted. A little internet surfing confirmed that each and every one had a story that started over a century or more ago and extends right up to today’s Air Force.
All these units have long and illustrious lineage. Many traveled around more than FedEx trucks on Christmas Eve. For example, the 1st Reconnaissance Squadron has the distinction of being our military’s oldest flying unit, established in March 1913. That unit has been re-designated 16 times and called 26 locations “home” while earning 12 campaign streamers.
It’s good that today’s “PC police” haven’t imposed any social cleansing on any of these unit logos. Surely in today’s patch approval process, mascots like Indian outlaws, hatchet men, red devils, Mohawk warriors, bomber barons, dice men, flying fiends, or Mr. Jiggs might get more bureaucratic scrutiny than they could survive. Likewise, slogans like “kickin’ ass,” “resistance is futile,” and “hat in the ring gang” might be judged as offensive by some.
Back in those early days we had important things to focus on like a world war and no time for a lot of Trumped up things like today.
Col. Bill Malec,
USAF (Ret.)
O’Fallon, Ill.
I’m Not Crying, You’re Crying
I just finished reading the incredible story about “DT” [Israel Del Toro] “Like a Phoenix,” December, p. 26. Shortly after starting the story I was crying like a baby. Just to say I served in the same uniform humbles me. As a former fighter pilot, my combat experience (in an air conditioned climate-controlled environment) pales in comparison to what he and so many others have done to defend our great nation.
Lt. Col Dennis L. Lombard,
USAF (Ret.)
Tucson, Ariz.
Special Tactics
I appreciated the article on AFSOC’s special tactics (ST) and its impressive combat record [“The Rise of AFSOC’s Special Tactics,” December, p. 40]. ST’s rapid, flexible, and lethal force gives special operations planners many innovative force options. I was, however, surprised and disappointed that the AFSOC special tactics history missed some major historical events in the evolution of this force. Specifically, the seminal event to develop a standing national hostage rescue task force was the brilliant Israeli July 4, 1976, Operation Thunderbolt (aka Jonathan) rescuing the hijacked passengers of an Air France airliner at the Entebbe Airport, Uganda. For various reasons that require longer elaboration (but not in this space), Military Airlift Command (MAC) developed a capability to support those rapid reaction missions. This resulted in the prototype special tactics unit unofficially known as Brand X in late 1976. As a member of that unit we stood on the shoulders of combat control team (CCT) experiences from Southeast Asia where CCTs performed front line combat missions. Brand X supported the competing Army capabilities (Blue Light and Delta Force) culminating in the 1980 Eagle Claw “Desert One” failed hostage rescue attempt in Iran. The follow-on 1981 organization of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and the 1987 stand-up of US Special Operations Command provided strength to build and reinforce the current robust organization. Leaving out mention of the “Father” of special tactics Col. John Carney is a glaring error. Carney, with the cover and support of MAC Gen. Duane Cassidy, took on the military bureaucracy and corrected the structural organization. He provided for realistic training, added pararescue and other key operational support, and developed an officer path that is enjoyed today with many senior special tactics officers in key special operations forces (SOF) positions. This also opened up senior NCO positions in key service and joint commands. Brand X veterans look proudly on the modern day inclusion of combat weather, TACP, and forward surgical care that were long overdue, making today’s special tactics a unique and powerful Air Force and SOF capability.
Maj. John A. Koren,
USAF (Ret.),
Euless, Texas
Fill ’Em Up—Worldwide
I was pleased to read the story [“Global Reach, Through Tankers,” December, p. 44]. My first Active Duty assignment was with the 431st Air Refueling Squadron at Biggs Air Force Base in El Paso, Texas, 1962 to 1965, when the squadron was deactivated, retiring the KB-50J from service. To find a picture of one of our KB-50J’s refueling the Thunderbirds brought back many fond memories. The KB-50 was an old workhorse, but it always got off the ground. That probably had something to do with it’s four R4360 engines teamed up with two J47 jets. The squadron motto was “Anywhere, Anytime,” and I still have my original flying red horse patch as seen on the tail of the two planes in the picture.
Our flight line always looked like World War II due to the resemblance to the B-29, but it was a SAC base and included B-52s and KC-135s. It’s interesting to note that the KB-50J squadron was part of Tactical Air Command rather than SAC. Even with the added jet engines the KB-50J was slow, and it was sometimes difficult for modern jet fighters to slow down enough to refuel behind them. I noted it appears that the F-100s seem to have flaps down and spoilers extended. Thank you for this trip back in time.
MSgt. Ted Brown,
USAF (Ret.)
Jacksonville, Ore.
More about One-Way Nukes
The October/November Air Force Magazine article, [“The One-Way Nuclear Mission, p. 104,”] covered much of a little-known Cold War mission, however, there was a rather large omission when talking about aircraft employed. From 1970 until 1991, the 20th Tactical Fighter Wing, flying the F-111E pulled Victor Alert at RAF Upper Heyford (with similar missions supported by the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing at RAF Lakenheath with the F-111F). While the F-111s, with a large internal fuel capacity added to the wing tanks, could fly much longer distances than the other aircraft listed in the article, flight to target distances increased accordingly resulting in many missions, in essence, being one-way missions.
During my two tours at RAF Upper Heyford, crews “pulled alert duty” either Monday through Friday or Friday until Monday. The crews lived at the alert facility during that time but could “expand” to other parts of the base, using specially marked “alert vehicles” which allowed them to return to the alert facility rapidly. I left many dinners half eaten at the officers club when we’d be “scrambled” and have to return to the facility and our aircraft.
As indicated in the article, by that time, we had gone to strict “two-man” control procedures with the two-man crew or a crew member and the crew chief making up the two-man team allowed to enter the aircraft shelter area. Only assigned aircraft commanders and weapon system officers could enter the cockpit and that had to be accomplished simultaneously.
The 20th TFW squadrons (55th, 77th, and 79th) are still in the same wing, however, they are now located at Shaw AFB, S.C. As a side note, the squadrons celebrated their 100th anniversary this year having been formed in 1917.
Lt. Col. Darrel DeLong,
USAF (Ret.)
Austin, Texas
I Can See Clearly Now
Quit complaining about pilot shortages and begin thinking about how we solved that problem during the Vietnam era [“Air Force Association’s Top Issues—2018,” 2017 Air, Space & Cyber Conference Special Edition]. We strengthened the pilot-navigator aviation cadet program.
This program did not require just a college degree to enter either of the training programs. It took more than that. It required someone that had to prove themselves qualified to enter the programs.
Many airmen that had jobs as aircraft crew members, mechanics, and other technical positions turned out graduating a greater percentage of pilots than any other program.
And, having been an aviation cadet, I have learned that a larger percentage of us remain in the USAF than not.
Drop the 20/20-eyesight requirement! Maybe some high-performance aircraft might require it—but most do not. I was a reconnaissance systems officer in the SR-71. Flew with several pilots wearing eyeglasses. If we recall pilots, I am sure that we will see eyeglasses!
Lt. Col. G. T. Morgan,
USAF (Ret.)
Hoodsport, Wash.
Flying the Fishhook
I thoroughly enjoyed reading another one of John T. Correll’s historical articles—my favorite section in the magazine. There was included a great deal of behind the scenes activity leading up to the Cambodian bombings that I’d not run across before [“The Shadow War in Cambodia,” January, p. 54].
I would add a few minor clarifications. I was a B-52 navigator who participated in these early Cambodian raids. According to my private records, on Feb. 28, 1969, we made a 60-ship gaggle raid over four hours (the largest conducted before the Linebacker campaigns) in the Fishhook region just short of the Cambodian border and technically (barely) within South Vietnam. My post-mission private notes say approximately 350,000 pounds of bombs were dropped. It was a tremendous success, with great damage to the enemy. This obviously whetted the leadership’s appetite for more of the same, which we all presumed led directly to the more aggressive first secret over-the-border attack on March 17-18, 1969, as stated by Correll. I was in that second attack as well, which my notes say was another 60-ship gaggle (not 48 as stated). Also, Correll reports that at Andersen AFB, Guam, only “the B-52 pilots and navigators” got the premission briefing. At U-Tapao, all six basic crewmen were included in the brief. Air police officers and men rather pointedly cleared the room of all extra crewmen and staff. The U-T wing commander personally presided over the ceremonies. Only the basic crews (in B-52C and D models only) were allowed to fly the March 17-18 mission.
Robert O. Harder
Chicago