Support System
In the article: “The Future of NATO” [July/August, p. 26] Lt. Gen. Jason Hinds, commander of USAFE is quoted as saying, … the capability “to fight, enter the combat zone, land at a different location, refuel, potentially even rearm.”
The article went on to talk about a Gripen fighter that had been refueled and rearmed by a small team in less than 20 minutes, the kind of operation envisioned by U.S. forces.
From 1996-99, I was the senior logistician for what was then called AIRCENT (Allied Air Forces Central Europe) and one of my responsibilities was aircraft cross-servicing across the whole of Europe. The words about the Gripen’s refuel and rearm reminded me of that responsibility.
Cross-servicing back then meant refueling and refueling and rearming. We trained teams from all over Europe to service aircraft from other nations, so that when a Belgian F-16 landed somewhere in Germany, a team from the Luftwaffe would perform the cross-servicing, and get the airplane back in the fight. So, crews in various countries had to be trained on aircraft of other countries, and on other than their own type of aircraft.
There were two methods for training ground and aircrew:
Exercise Ample Gain—missions flown between two nations, evaluate and train ground crews on aircraft cross-servicing duties, familiarize aircrews with alternate air base facilities, and exercise NATO airfield support.
Exercise Ample Train—held twice a year to exercise cross-servicing program, bringing NATO nations together at one location to conduct combined training on a variety of aircraft, promote closer relations between members, most economical way to meet operational cross-servicing requirements.
I had heard these exercises had been discontinued, but now it sounds like we are getting back on track.
Col. Frank Alfter,
USAF (Ret.)
Beavercreek, Ohio
Commissioning Tracks
I am interested in the recently announced U.S. Space Academy [See, “What to Watch from Trump’s US Space Academy Commission,” Daily Report, Aug. 31]. To be successful, the Academy must have an effective commissioning program. I believe that a useful model is the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, which provides the option to be commissioned as a Naval Reserve officer, while serving in the civilian maritime sector. The Space Academy could provide similar options in the space sector.
I suggest that the U.S. Space Academy adopt a three-track commissioning program. The three tracks would be the Military Track, the Dual Track, and the Federal Civilian Track.
The Military Track would be a conventional military academy program, similar to that of the U.S. Air Force Academy. Graduates of the military track would receive a regular commission in the U.S. Space Force and would receive initial assignments to Space Force units.
Graduates of the Dual Track commissioning program would receive Reserve commissions in the U.S. Space Force and would receive initial assignments as federal civilian employees in space-related agencies. These assignments would include such agencies as NASA and NRO. As Space Force reservists, these officers would be subject to recall to Active duty in the Space Force, if ordered to do so.
Graduates of the Federal Civilian Track would not be commissioned as military officers. Upon graduation, they would be assigned to federal government civilian positions. They might be assigned to a civil space agency, like NASA, but could also serve at a defense-related agency, like NRO. They would also be eligible to fill civilian positions in Space Force units.
This track may appeal to cadets who are interested primarily in space exploration. It would also be a good option for cadets who, because of physical limitations, do not meet the criteria for commissioning as military officers.
The output of each of these commissioning tracks is critical. Therefore, every applicant to the U.S. Space Academy should be required to commit to one of these tracks—and to an alternate choice if appropriate.
Lt. Col. Geoff Goodman,
USAF (Ret.)
Centennial, Colo.
Strategic Plan
1. Strategic Attack
This is essential to weakening or defeating an enemy and Ukraine is finding a way to implement this without an air force. Ukraine is using UAVs and drones to hit strategic targets from oil refineries to bombers.
2. Russia’s 10,000 Tanks
At a tactical level, Ukraine has used quadcopter and other UAVs to negate the 10,000 Russian tanks … a gigantic tactical success. In fact, the “Unmanned Forces” of Ukraine cause 90 percent or more of Russian casualties in personnel and equipment. This “unmanned element of attack” is something the USAF does but could expand on.
3. Ukraine Spiderweb Attack on Russian Bombers
The imaginative Ukrainians attacked and destroyed bombers thousands of miles behind the front line by using unsuspecting Russian truck drivers to get their quadcopters close enough to attack bombers. The USAF could pack 50 to 100 quadcopters in the shell of a 600 gallon fuel pod on an F-15 and hit a similar enemy airfield 700-1,000 miles behind the front lines and take out 50-100 enemy planes with individually flown quadcopters using a Starlink comm link.
4. No-Go Zone for Iranian Nuke Bomb Sites
Using the “Ukrainian unmanned attack element of attack” combined with the USAF Rapid Dragon capability, the U.S. could declare a “no go zone” of 10 square miles around the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ nuke bomb sites such as Isfahan and Fordow.
Any personnel or equipment entering these zones would be bombed with standoff weapons such as Extended
Range Attack Munitions (range 280 miles) or Anduril Barracuda 500 (range 570 miles) dropped from C-130s or C-17s flying over Kuwait.
This would prevent the nuke sites from being restarted and would be similar to the decade long “no fly zone” over Saddam’s Iraq.
The combo of manned USAF planes and unmanned attack vehicles has huge potential.
William Thayer
San Diego
Always Do Your Best
I commissioned on Nov. 9, 1977, age 34, eight days before my 35th birthday. I would never have been commissioned if it was not for Gen. Chappie James [“Heroes/Leaders: Daniel ‘Chappie’ James Jr.,” May/June, p. 176]. During 1974 to 1975, I finished my four years of college under USAF’s Bootstrap program.
I had orders for Officer Training School (OTS) in September 1975, but in July these were canceled because I was a “Liberal Arts major.” I was offered a classified civilian clothes assignment in Australia and because my wife was Australian (we met on a classified tour in Australia in 1968) I accepted the assignment. In June 1977 my unit received a priority message that I was to report to OTS Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, Aug. 3, 1977.
My commander and I could not understand why I was finally going to OTS because there had been no mention of this in prior two years. After two weeks at OTS, the commandant called me in for a discussion. He informed me that I was accepted at OTS because General James sent a letter to the Air Force Chief of Staff recommending “immediate steps be started for my acceptance at OTS.” Also, so I could be commissioned before my 35th birthday.
I was shown the confidential letter, in which General James stated that based on my past record in the U.S. Army, CIA where I was assigned from 1967 to 1971, and USAF I was the most outstanding and highly qualified NCO in USAF for acceptance at OTS.
My USAF organization was not under General James’ command nor had I ever met General James. I never found out why he selected me for OTS. Sadly, he died on Feb. 25, 1978, while I was attending a USAF Officer Intelligence Course and I never got to send him a letter thanking him for his letter to CSAF USAF.
I did graduate as a Distinguished Graduate of OTS. Because of injuries, hazardous duties and being a paratrooper, I had to retire in 1987 (I am now VA 100 percent totally and permanently incapacitated with 12 VA disabilities since 1998).
I have never forgotten what General James did for me, and I only wish I could have met him to personally acknowledge his support for me. He truly was a great American general.
Capt. William Mega,
USAF (Ret.)
Queensland, Australia
Basic Training is Not Basic
Reading the September/October issue [“Reinvigorating USAFA’s Summer Training,” p. 34], I had to laugh when I saw in the beginning of the article about the Academy’s summer training the revelation that some of the cadets woke up early to avoid the mad rush to get shipshape.
When I went through basic training at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, as an enlisted troop back in 1986, after the first week or so of the mad morning rush to make the bed, dress, and get prepped, I naturally began to wake about 10 to 15 minutes before 0600 every morning.
My body clock was kicked into fighting shape, I guess. Never needed an alarm! It gave me plenty of time to get dressed and have my bed halfway done (to bounce that quarter!) by the time the lights went on. As the days went on, more and more of the flight followed suit.
At first, one of the other recruits was bent out of shape at me, alleging that I was going to get us all in trouble. As the weeks wore on, he was up a little early as well. … It just made too much sense. I was really amazed at my body’s accuracy, down to plus/minus five minutes after eight or so hours sleep.
At the end of our six weeks, almost the entire bay was up and quietly busy before 0600 every day.
Also In the September/October issue, two of the articles deal with defending our air bases [“ACES’s Defensive Blind Spot,” p. 42 and “Defeating the Drones,” p. 47], a critical and underresourced component of our operations these days.
Strangely enough, no mention is made of the RAF Regiment, a unit of the U.K. Royal Air Force that has specifically dealt with these issues since the second world war. Apparently, the Brits took a lot of losses of aircraft on the ground in the beginning of the war and formed the RAF Regiment to deal with air and ground threats to their air bases.
The Regiment grew to a total size of 80,000 personnel by the end of the war, and so was really a corps-sized outfit of numerous detachments. It seemed to be a combination of Security Police, light armored cars, and AAA defenses.
Nevertheless, I would be intrigued to see how the RAF Regiment today plans to deal with the same threats that we face.
MSgt. Chris Dierkes,
106th Rescue Wing, NYANG
Westhampton Beach, N.Y.
Logjam
The conflict in Iran seems to confuse the best strategists and politicians on both sides of the aisle. Most confusing is President Trump’s rationale to hold off destruction of the Islamic regime of Iran and his off and on rationale for a peaceful resolution with the regime.
As a former Air Force intelligence officer of 20 years (1967 to 1987), I can only guesstimate the cause for this confusion. First of all, the U.S. does not have an unlimited supply of applicable munitions, such as rockets, missiles, and bombs. Additionally, and perhaps, more critical are shortages of fuses and, weapons/munitions guidance systems, which have limited shelf life.
These resources are distributed to the theaters and are ultimately managed by the COCOM commanders who must ensure they can defend their theaters in case of attacks by their potential adversaries and terrorists. Continuous transfer of these resources to U.S. and allied warfighters against Russia and Iran is currently impracticable.
Without these resources, the U.S. forces cannot fully utilize the multitude of intelligence that is collected by signals, geospatial (imagery, surveillance, and photographic) measurement, human and other technical intelligence systems.
With the abundance of at least two generations of Farsi (Iranian) language speakers in the U.S. who can interface with pro-freedom Iranians in-country, we should not be lacking information on the location of appropriate critical targets. The Air Force would do well to reestablish a human intelligence capability that could directly support Air Force warfighters.
Finally, though not directly Air Force related, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps would do well to reestablish a robust ground force capability that would give the commander in chief a resounding ground attack force that could be supported by a capable Air Force air-to-ground support which is basically being wasted in the Iran conflict.
As a former air-to-ground support officer, I am sure the COCOM commander could use armored forces (e.g., tanks and self-propelled artillery), demolitions and other covert attack capabilities that are well-supported by air forces.
Lt. Col. Russel A. Noguchi,
USAF (Ret.)
Pearl City, Hawaii
Hat’s Off to You
When I was serving “back in the day,” I loved the uniform but hated to wear a hat and took every opportunity to uncover if I thought no officer or NCO could see me! And serving on a SAC base there was also the dreaded encounter with Gen. Curtis LeMay checking out the ground maintenance—there WERE such encounters and you better have a hat!
So I open the magazine [“The Future of NATO,” July/August p. 27], and what do I see? Four Airmen strolling down the flight line, no hats in sight! Well, as an old NCO I see them!!
I appreciate their service and wish them well (it’s rumored that General LeMay is retired!)
Peter Hansen
Jacksonville, Fla.