Early Influencer.
Ed Lansdale was one unusual Airman. Not a flyer, he joined the Army in World War II and became an intelligence officer. He worked for the storied OSS—Office of Strategic Services—and, essentially, became a spy. In 1947, Lansdale transferred to the Air Force and would become a major general while concurrently serving as a high-ranking CIA officer.
Upon entering the Air Force, Lansdale was dumped into the education field—teaching new intelligence agents. He wrangled a change and took an assignment that would change his life and have a major impact on Asian affairs.
Lieutenant Colonel Lansdale arrived in the Philippines in September 1950 to study its ongoing insurrection. The “Huks” were communists bent on overthrowing the democratic government and were a serious threat. For the next five years, Lansdale would study the insurgency, its leaders, and methods and would also turn a perceptive eye on the Philippine government itself.
He realized the Huks had legitimate grievances. The Manila government was corrupt; the elections were rigged; the leaders were leeches; taxes were high; and justice was unequal. Change was essential if the Huks were to be defeated. An exception to this dismal picture was the defense minister, Ramon Magsaysay. Lansdale knew he was scrupulously honest, a dedicated patriot, and committed to reform. Because of this, Magsaysay was viewed as a threat by many—on both sides. After an assassination attempt, Lansdale insisted that Magsaysay and his family move into his own quarters in the protected U.S. military compound. There, the two would stay up late and discuss the country’s problems and what could be done to solve them.
Although the Huks were a serious threat, there were other concerns. The army was untrained and undisciplined. Money earmarked for equipment, housing, and rations was pocketed by bent commanders. Most importantly, the people were oppressed as the Huks claimed. The military took advantage of the people they were ostensibly there to protect.
Magsaysay began unannounced visits to military outposts all over the island. He would breeze in with Lansdale in tow, inspect, fire a commander or two, harangue the men regarding the values of democracy and the rule of law, and then get back in his jeep and depart. Word soon spread.
Late-night talks produced new tactics and ideas such as psychological warfare and “civil action”—the concerted effort by the military and government agencies to travel the countryside, talk to the people, hear their complaints, and do positive things such as help with farming and build bridges, schools, and hospitals. Appeals were made to the Huks to lay down their arms, acquire land, and become productive citizens. Over time the population realized that Magsaysay was sincerely interested in the fate of their country, and defections increased dramatically.
In 1955 the reforms of the Magsaysay/Lansdale team culminated and the Huks were defeated. Magsaysay then ran for president and won by a landslide. Lansdale was self-effacing about these years, claiming he was nothing more than a catalyst to bring people and good ideas together. Magsaysay thought he was far more than that.
His job finished, Lansdale returned to Washington, but was soon sent back to Asia, this time to Vietnam. Now a colonel, Lansdale hoped to replicate his success in the Philippines, but South Vietnam was a different country with different people and different problems. Lansdale did become good friends with President Ngo Dinh Diem, who like Magsaysay, learned to trust and value the American’s advice.
This connection would prove insufficient. Ideas and programs that had worked in the Philippines did not translate in Vietnam. Partly, it was the rampant corruption at all levels, but it was deeper than that. Although Lansdale saw Diem as a sincere and honest patriot, he had not the charisma to dominate people and events as could Magsaysay. Worse, American advisers in South Vietnam, mostly Soldiers, saw little use in the ideas of an Airman who preached a new type of war requiring innovative tactics and programs. They thought Lansdale naïve and ignored him. The war would be fought by conventional Soldiers using massive firepower.
Lansdale retired as a major general in 1963 but continued with the CIA for another eight years, part of that time back in Vietnam. It is tempting to speculate on what could have happened had he been heeded. The dominant voices, in Washington and Vietnam, spoke instead of military action, consisting of big forces and search and destroy missions. That did not work. It is unfortunate that Lansdale’s success in the Philippines has not been studied more closely. A communist insurgency was decisively defeated. That story needs to be remembered.
Lansdale wrote his memoirs after retirement, “In the Midst of Wars” (Harper & Row, 1972), but focused almost exclusively on his years in the Philippines. A more complete, interesting, and satisfying biography is that of Cecil B. Curry, “Edward Lansdale, The Unquiet American” (Houghton Mifflin, 1989).
