“This expansion [of NATO] would bring the biggest military grouping in the world, with its colossal offensive potential, directly to the borders of Russia. If this happens, the need would arise for a fundamental reappraisal of all defense concepts on our side, a redeployment of armed forces, and changes in operational plans. [Such an eastward expansion of NATO would spark] the restructuring of the armed forces, a reconsideration of the structure of the theaters of military activity, the creation of additional infrastructure, the relocation of major military contingents, and changes in the character of combat training. . . . NATO today is not the NATO of the Cold War period, but this does not remove the question of the military-security interests of the Russian Federation.”
Yevgeni M. Primakov, chief of Russia’s intelligence service, at a November 25, 1993, press conference condemning proposals to extend NATO membership to former members of the Warsaw Pact.
Command of US Forces
“I construe [it] as not restricting my constitutional responsibility and authority as commander in chief, including my ability to place US combat forces under the temporary tactical control of a foreign commander where to do otherwise would jeopardize the safety of US combat forces in support of [United Nations missions]. Such US combat forces shall, however, remain under the operational command and control of US commanders.”
President Bill Clinton, November 11, 1993, in an official statement of reaction to an act of Congress, sponsored by Sen. Robert C. Byrd (DW. Va.), intended to stop him from placing US combat troops under United Nations command.
Nunn Sees Warning Lights
“I am concerned about the impact of [budget] reductions on our near-term readiness and on our ability to maintain our qualitative and technological edge. We will depend on these advantages around the world in any kind of confrontation we may have. With the reductions called for in the defense budget over the next several years, and with the reduction we have made this year to the President’s budget, . . . we have to begin to be concerned about the ability of our military forces to carry out their assigned missions. The warning lights are flashing in terms of our military strategy vs. our resources and . . . our commitments vs. our capabilities. This is something we are all going to have to watch very carefully.”
Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, in a November 17, 1993, floor speech during Senate debate on the Fiscal 1994 Pentagon budget.
Foothold for Further Conflict
“With eighty percent of the world’s population [living] within 500 miles of international waters, US naval forces are frequently the preferred force for managing international instability or for creating a foothold for further, more substantial conflict requiring our Army and Air Force.”
Adm. Frank B. Kelso II, Chief of Naval Operations, in the July 1993 report “Force 2001: A Program Guide to the US Navy.”
North Korean Nukes
“The Administration is pursuing a dangerously weak policy toward North Korea. North Korea continues to stymie the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct inspections of its nuclear facilities. The Administration responds with offers of carrots rather than sticks to induce better behavior in a renegade government that is eagerly looking for weakness in our response. We should show North Korea that testing our resolve is not a productive exercise. We should insist that North Korea discontinue its nuclear weapons programs immediately; these efforts are a threat to the entire Pacific region. We should insist that North Korea comply with the inspections required under the NPT [1970 Nonproliferation Treaty]-and comply immediately. Economic and trade sanctions should be considered seriously. We should not cancel planned military exercises with our South Korean allies. . . . Proliferation is far too dangerous a threat to US interests to be underestimated by accommodating diplomacy.”
Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), Senate Armed Services Committee, in a November 17, 1993, floor speech on the danger of nuclear proliferation.
Russian Doctrine
“The Russian Federation has jettisoned the old doctrine of ‘no first use.’ Frankly, the United States and its allies never took the old Soviet doctrine as a serious indication as to what the USSR might actually do with its massive arsenal of nuclear weapons. In the new doctrine, Russia has said essentially that it will not use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapon states who are parties to the NPT. In fact, the nuclear doctrine announced in this statement is not very different from our own.
“Let me comment on the aspect of it relating to the deployment of Russian troops outside of Russia itself. . . . The doctrine also makes provisions for Russian troops to operate in certain situations, presumably in terms of peacekeeping along the periphery of the old Soviet Union. Our preliminary understanding is that this new doctrine has a very important proviso: . . . such operations-that is, operations by the military along the borders of Russia-will be only in cooperation with the other states involved. . . . Russia must be part of the solution and not part of the problem with respect to the regional conflicts. Nothing that we have seen in this new doctrine-as I say, we’re just beginning to study it-contradicts that crucial principle.”
Secretary of State Warren Christopher, November 4, 1993, reacting to reports of a new Russian military doctrine that sanctions use of troops beyond Russia’s borders and abandons a pledge not to make first use of nuclear arms.