Realistic Expectations for Golden Dome by 2028

The blueprint is coming into focus; the road map remains cloudy.

Golden Dome is one of the most ambitious defense projects ever mounted. It seeks to develop a missile defense shield for the entire continental United States (CONUS) against ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missile threats and to defend against air and UAV threats. To be an effective deterrent, it must also protect U.S. interests outside CONUS (OCONUS), or those locations will be under significant threat.
The Golden Dome concept and capability is hugely important: In enabling such a defensive umbrella, it would free the United States from ever being held hostage to nuclear threats from peer competitors like Russia and China, and diminish the threat posed by rogue nations such as Iran and North Korea. President Donald Trump committed to make significant strides in Golden Dome by the end of the current administration and must, at a minimum, establish a strong baseline for Golden Dome by that point if the program and its objectives are to endure into the next administration.

To defend against the full range of threats, the Golden Dome system will have to be capable of handling different missile types and phases of flight. 

While the United States aspires to creating a protective scheme akin to Israel’s Iron Dome, the scale of the challenge is significantly greater: Israel defends 834 miles of border (664 miles on land and 170 miles on the seashore). By contrast, the U.S. must defend a territory roughly 16 times as large: 13,699 miles of border (7,896 miles on land and 5,893 miles of coastline). Add in Alaska, Hawaii, U.S. possessions and close allies and that balloons to as much as double the territory. The threat picture is also growing with hypersonic missile threats, mass cruise missiles and UAV volleys and UAV swarms that make creating an effective shield that much harder. The three most challenging elements for Golden Dome will be: (1) The ability to intercept concentrated missile volleys attacking small geographic penetration points without exhausting its defensive capabilities; (2) The ability to affordably field enough space-based interceptors to be effective when our adversary can choose the engagement timeline; and (3) The ability to provide an effective battle management command, control & communications (BMC3) capability to handle these complexities.

Golden Dome’s architects do have some marching orders. They have been directed to look at “boost phase” (the brief period after a missile launch, while engine is still firing) and “left-of-launch” intercept (that is, striking prior to launch, when the target is still stationary).  Since orbits are predictable and adversaries can time their attacks to their best advantage, every enemy missile launch site would have to be covered by U.S. interceptors all the time. When added to the fact that our adversary can launch in volleys, this requires a lot of space-based interceptors. While this may be technically possible, it presents a significant financial challenge. While above ground launch systems and facilities are soft and easily negated, “left-of-launch” coverage also raises two other significant challenges: First, is whether the nation is willing to attack an adversary’s territory based on the assumption, even if that is well founded, that an attack is imminent; and second, penetrating  hardened missile silos would be a huge technical challenge.

Two keys lie ahead if the Golden Dome is to be a success. It will require open architecture that can integrate existing technologies and systems as well as future capabilities. Existing assets already in place will be the core of the system at the start, but the importance of integration to assure the current architecture and future additions will all work together seamlessly within a single concept of operations (CONOPS) cannot be overstated.  

Also key is an “all-hands-on-deck” partnership with industry, aligning prime contractors, subcontractors, payload providers, technology vendors, commercial space operators and non-
traditional defense companies.

Golden Dome touches on many players, including the Army, Navy, Air Force, Space Force both Space Systems Command (SSC) and the Space Development Agency (SDA), and the Missile Defense Agency.  While having Gen. Michael A. Guetlein reporting to the deputy secretary and having been vested with independent acquisition authorities to streamline the competition and operate above the bureaucracies was crucial, so too will be building a frequent and close relationship with Congress. To meet tight schedules, some compromises will have to be made. And the support of Congress will be essential. The demands on General Guetlein’s time will be enormous.

While the schedules and costs may be challenging, the capabilities I discuss below are achievable and the technology is available. But the huge number of stakeholders, along with budget and schedule pressures, not technical matters, will be the biggest challenges.

Israel’s Missile Defense 

Israel employs a layered missile defense system designed to intercept a wide range of threats, from short-range rockets to long-range ballistic missiles. The elements of that defense are:

Iron Dome. Designed to intercept short-range rockets and artillery and mortar rounds. Primarily protecting populated areas.
David’s Sling (Magic Wand). A medium-to-long-range system capable of intercepting tactical ballistic missiles, long-range rockets, aircraft drones, and cruise missiles, as well as large-caliber rockets.
Arrow System (Arrow  2 and 3). Developed with U.S. support to intercept long-range ballistic missiles at high altitudes and potentially function as an anti-satellite weapon.  Arrow 3 can operate in space.
Iron Beam. A high-powered laser system is being developed to intercept rockets, drones, and anti-tank missiles at a range of about 4-5 miles.
C-Dome. A naval version of the Iron Dome protecting ships and offshore assets.  
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). The U.S. has also provided support for Israel’s defense, including deploying THAAD systems, which can intercept ballistic missiles both within and above the Earth’s atmosphere. 
TPY-2 Surveillance Transportable X-band (8.55-10 Ghz) Radar. A long range (3000 km), very high altitude active digital antenna array that in Israel supports the Arrow 2 and Patriot Advance Capability 3 (PAC3) interceptor systems.

These systems form a layered defense to provide Israel with a comprehensive shield against aerial threats. However, no missile defense system can guarantee it will intercept 100 percent of incoming rounds; some missiles have breached Israel’s defenses. The high cost of operating these systems, especially Iron Dome, is also a consideration.

Current US Missile Defense Systems

The U.S. has several missile defense systems, including land-based, sea-based, and space-based systems. These include missile interceptors, sensors and radars.

Missile Interceptors

Ground Based Missile Defense (GMD). Originally dubbed the National Missile Defense, GMD is designed to intercept ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase of flight using a hit-to-kill kinetic projectile. The system includes 44 interceptors, early warning sensors, and targeting sensors based on land, sea, and in orbit. Designed to protect the U.S. mainland from an unsophisticated limited nuclear attack, GMD lacks the capacity necessary to defend against an all-out attack, given the limited number and location of deployed interceptors.
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (ABMD). Also known as Sea-Based Midcourse, this system is designed to intercept short-  and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in their midcourse phase. ABMD is part of the Aegis combat system deployed on Navy warships and can use Standard Missile 3 interceptors in the midcourse phase and Standard Missile 2 and 6 interceptors in the terminal phase. 
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). This system is designed to intercept short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, both inside and outside the atmosphere. THAAD is deployed in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. 
Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3). The land-based PAC-3 is one of three tactical anti-ballistic missile systems now in use.  

Sensors and Radars

A combination of sensors and radars on land, in space, and at sea work together, providing early warning in case of attack and to track and discriminate among incoming missiles should an attack unfold. These include:

On the ground: Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs) and mobile phased array AN/TPY-2 radars. 
At sea: Sea-based X-band radar (SBX) and Aegis SPY phased array radars.
In space: Defense Support Program (DSP) and the Space-based Infrared System (SBIRS) satellites. 
“Left-of-launch” sensing, using electronic and signals intelligence, is another valuable source of intelligence.

These assets are operated through integrated command, control, battle management, and communications (C2BMC) systems that integrate sensor data and manage the interceptors. As a multilayered defense network, it faces challenges with emerging threats and is subject to continuous development and adaptation. Primarily designed to defend against ballistic missiles, it is being adapted to also counter cruise and hypersonic missile threats. While tests have shown some success, particularly with the SM-3 Block IIA against an ICBM-class target, effectiveness against large-scale, sophisticated attacks from major adversaries like Russia and China is limited. The system is continuously evolving and being upgraded to counter new threats and technologies. 

Threat Scenarios

Today’s emerging threats include hypersonic and hypersonic glide missile threats that can be launched from anywhere in the world at any time, from submarines, ships, aircraft, and even from space.  These threats can be dim and can fly deep in Earth’s clutter, and because they can maneuver without engine firings, they are very hard to find, fix, and track. Additionally, the space systems that must find, fix, and track these weapons are themselves under threat, as a wide variety of offensive space capabilities are now within the grasp of adversaries, ranging from direct ascent anti-satellite missiles to co-orbital weapons that include direct-impact kill vehicles, kidnapping (grappling a satellite and moving it to a different orbit or spinning it), electronic jamming, spoofing, cyber weapons, and even the potential of nuclear detonation in space. These threats also include ground-based lasers that can dazzle and, in the future, more powerful lasers may be able to damage optical systems.

The U.S. Space Force must not only be able to survive such threats but also counteract various levels of conflict. To defend against even a few of these threat scenarios is a boon to U.S. security, as a partial solution is better than none, even as we move toward a full defense. Costs and funding will always be a factor, so some progress and covering down on these threat scenarios would be progress for our nation as we approach defense against all threat levels.

Five types of nuclear attack scenarios must be addressed:

Level 1—Terrorist  stolen/acquired weapons. Terrorists using captured or built nuclear weapons. Will be limited in number.
Level 2—Attack by nascent nuclear countries (North Korea, Iran, etc.).
Level 3—Theater attack against deployed forces, or against other allied interests outside of the CONUS.
Level 4—Limited nuclear  attack: A peer adversary wants to send a message short of all-out  nuclear war with a limited attack and the implied threat of escalation.
Level 5—Full-scale nuclear war: Large-scale use of nuclear weapons targeting military, economic, and civilian infrastructure, likely leading to widespread destruction. 

Golden Dome must address all five. While the ability to handle all-out nuclear war (Level 5) may not be feasible by 2028, the ability to defend against lower-level threats (Level 1, 2, 3, and 4) is a good goal while we build the future infrastructure to handle Level 5 in the future. And even as we build toward Level 5, we understand that 100 percent success will not likely be feasible, and the costs of getting there may be unachievable. However, having a homeland defense that can protect against even a limited attack adds to both deterrence and assured availability of capability. We must be able to defend against anything (capability) and everything (capacity) that the North Koreans or Iranians could attack us with. And we need the ability to technically defend against anything (hypersonics, FOBs, etc.) that the Russians or Chinese can use and have enough capacity (numbers) to strengthen our deterrence, even if we can only partially negate a Level 5 threat.  It also adds to our ability to control escalation in a theater exchange scenario. Most importantly we need enough capability in place to deter what appears to be both Chinese and Russian coercive strategies.

Additionally, there are multiple phases of the threat that all have different levels of vulnerability and/or complexity. Regarding left of launch (before the missile launches), its major technical challenge is that the missiles are likely in hardened silos, or mobile under the ocean. During boost phase and early midcourse (before Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) and decoys are deployed) is the most vulnerable period for these threats. Late midcourse is complex because the decoys and MIRVs have deployed, so targeting the threats themselves is challenging. And finally, reentry intercept is something we have mastered, but volleys add the cost impact of sufficient interceptors in an affordable fashion.

Planned Systems

In addition to the existing systems, much is going on in the space sensing world. SDA and SSC are pursuing new space-based sensors that are resilient, proliferated, have orbital diversity, and are affordable to populate large constellations for both missile warning/missile tracking (MW/MT) satellites along with missile defense fire control (MDFC) satellites. While still in the early stages this constellation will provide a resilient solution for Space Based MW/MT/MDFC. There could be value in accelerating but the supply chain is the limiting factor in building these satellites.  

As we move to an effective mid-course intercept capability, we will need a space-based discrimination Long-Wave Infrared (LWIR) midcourse surveillance system. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is working on a discriminating LWIR midcourse surveillance system. There are also existing sensing assets for left of launch that exist in the Intelligence Community (SIGINT & ELINT).  As threats become dimmer and more complex, there may be ultimate value on a MEO-based midcourse system.

Gaps and Challenges 

There are gaps in what existing systems can detect and defend against. The U.S. has no low-cost intercept capability to defend against large attack volleys/swarms in a small geographic area. There is no current operational LWIR discriminating midcourse surveillance system. The U.S. currently has no space-based interceptors for boost or early midcourse intercept, and no means to rapidly strike hardened targets immediately prior to launch—left of launch. Additionally, our adversaries have weaponized space putting current and future space-based capabilities at threat,

While U.S. defenses include midcourse ground-based interceptor (GBI) systems, this capability is in need of upgrade with a multiwarhead system (next generation interceptor, known as NGI) being built by Lockheed Martin. NGI should be made transportable to complicate adversary targeting and provide OCONUS capability. Also needed is a method to integrate left-of-launch sensors into the missile defense system.

Another new and challenging capability needed is a BMC3 system capable of handling such a complex system of systems, deployable interceptors for vulnerable overseas bases and facilities, and laser intercept capabilities for short-range targets. Fortunately, the U.S. has the technology to answer these challenges. While the compute power is not available to do this on-orbit as yet, a ground version is well within U.S. capabilities.  When space has the capability to update interceptors in-flight that will become useful.

It is likely that a significant portion of a resilient space sensing layer will consist of proliferated constellations capable of not just finding, fixing, and tracking ballistic, hypersonic, hypersonic glide, and cruise missile threats, but also being able to absorb losses and continue the mission. Stopping incoming threats is the biggest challenge, and doing so efficiently is crucial. 

We need to carefully investigate and analyze the potential of laser interception.  Israel has a short-range laser intercept system capable of short-range intercept (4 to 5 miles) of relatively soft targets.  Lasers have the potential to reduce the number of interceptors required by being able to expend multiple shots from a single laser, but reentry vehicles are hardened to withstand the high temperatures of reentry, and may not be susceptible to lasers given the current state of the art.  We also need to investigate the potential of lasers in space as interceptors.

Building a large, complex structure like a Golden Dome for the U.S. presents numerous challenges, encompassing technological, logistical, financial, and political aspects. 

Strategic Challenges

A Golden Dome system would be vulnerable to a concentrated swarm or volley attack, in which many interceptors are launched over a small geographic area especially in a Level 5 threat. The U.S. will have to prioritize its defenses, requiring choices between cities, for example, and critical infrastructure. Our ability to have an assured and devastating response means missile fields, bomber and submarine bases, and nuclear command and control systems must be protected. The answer to such questions may limit the size and scale of whatever space-based system we deploy. 

To defend against the full range of threats, the Golden Dome system will have to be capable of handling different missile types and phases of flight. To achieve that, we must move GBIs to mobile/transportable TEL launchers with multiple interceptors per vehicle—NGIs—allowing flexibility and agility to adapt to changing threats and the ability to be moved to OCONUS locations that must be defended.  Having interceptors in California and Alaska is not adequate to respond to mobile threats launched from aircraft, submarines, ships, and space itself, which can just as easily target the east, south, and central portions of the country.

Technological Challenges

While the U.S. already has a robust group of interceptors that cover terminal to late midcourse, space-based interceptors for early midcourse and boost phase need to be designed and developed. As threats of swarms/volleys over small geographic areas need to be defended against, some affordable advancement in missile intercept technologies also needs to be developed.  We can certainly build demonstrators of space-based interceptors for boost phase and early midcourse intercept. However, since our adversaries get to select the engagement timeline, they will be minimally effective against major raid sizes but could have useful early midcourse capability and could destroy smaller-sized threats before late midcourse. As we progress to larger constellations of space-based interceptors we can use swarms of intelligent space-based interceptors as well as a mesh, peer-to-peer network with artificial intelligence to maximize effectiveness even against salvos of threat missiles. 

While the U.S. possesses the ability to build space-based interceptors, the number required and the cost per interceptor will be daunting if we must defend against a Level 5 threat. They get to select the engagement timeline; however, this is imminently doable for lower threat levels where this is just one element of a layered defense.  

 Lasers offer potential but may not be feasible against hardened reentry vehicles. Implementation of an Israeli-like Iron Beam with limited range (4 to 5 miles) against drones and soft cruise missiles should be done and can be done with low risk and minimal cost. 

Golden Dome envisions a vast and intricate network of space-based assets (sensing systems and interceptors), ground infrastructure (including current data analysis and distribution), and existing defense systems operating in concert. Providing BM/C3 with such a complex arrangement is a significant challenge. The big decisions will be how much of this must have a person in the loop and how much can be implemented through machine learning or AI. Command and Control is managing a complex system of interconnected space-based assets and ground infrastructure for missile detection and interception requires a highly sophisticated command and control system capable of rapid data processing and decision-making in near real time.  Because of the speed of war, it would be preferable to have the BMC3I capabilities in space, but for now it will have to be in the ground.  

First, the service-oriented architecture (SOA) in space-qualified processors are vulnerable to cyberattacks, jamming, and spoofing. Second, current comm links in space are challenged maintaining the high bandwidth from hundreds of satellites across vast distances. Finally, most importantly, the current SOA in space qualified processors cannot handle the vast amount of incoming data and do the necessary processing to make crucial BM/C decisions in real time.

Logistical and Production Challenges

The backbone for Golden Dome in the early phases will be ground-based radars and interceptors built on current capabilities supplemented by the ever-growing space-based sensing capabilities. As these capabilities get modified to meet Golden Dome needs, space-based interceptors and midcourse surveillance systems will start to come online. However, the increased demand for improved ground-based elements of Golden Dome are likely to be hindered by existing supply chain issues and missile production backlogs. The defense industrial base lacks capacity and may require significant revitalization to meet demand for sensors, interceptors, and other components. 

Cost is another key logistical challenge. Golden Dome will be expensive, with estimates ranging from $175 billion to potentially trillions of dollars. The vast range of estimates underscores the complexity and uncertainty inherent to such a project. Securing sufficient and sustained funding from Congress for such a large-scale project is crucial, and debates over the budget and resource allocation are likely to be significant.  This means that an evolving system that can slowly move from handling Level 1 threats and escalate up the scale as funding permits is the likely path.

With cost comes political headwinds. Maintaining political will and prioritization for Golden Dome across presidential administrations is a key unknown. The program could be terminated by a future Congress or President. Interagency differences will produce their own politics and already faces headwinds from doubters. Golden Dome will have to bridge many programs, agencies, and armed services, requiring effective interagency/interservice coordination and cooperation. Getting Congress and key stakeholders moving in the same direction in tight coordination will be essential for success and will require that the Golden Dome executive office have the appropriate authorities to make and rapidly promulgate decisions.

What Is Possible in 2028 

President Trump has set a goal to have some capability in place before the end of his term, which ends in January 2029. It is unlikely that we will be able to affordably intercept a Level 5 threat of concentrated swarms/volleys over small geographical areas. 

Looking through the next three-plus years, the U.S. should push to develop the basic infrastructure necessary to support a functional Golden Dome system of systems, including a military satellite network capable of tracking numerous incoming missiles. A focus on defending against levels 1, 2, and 3 should be prioritized, with the goal of adding capability for more complex threats over time. 

I believe there is much that can be accomplished by then. We can begin modifying our ground radars, we can begin modifying our ground-based missiles and maybe even get to demonstrate a strong path forward for multiple interceptors per GBI missile. We can start the program for a midcourse surveillance system and be well along to deploying an initial capability and can likely get on orbit a space-based interceptor, and possibly be able to demonstrate a boost/ascent, early midcourse capability.  

Initial traditional interceptor deliveries: MDA is projected to begin delivering initial interceptors for the Next-Generation Interceptor by the fourth quarter of fiscal 2027, ahead of schedule. Expanding GBIs to mobile/transportable platforms for agility and flexibility increases ability to defend overseas interest and include the developing NGI capabilities for multiple interceptors per launcher is also possible by 2028.

With all of that the U.S. can make great progress on Level 1 through Level 3 threat scenarios, meaning the ability to counter limited threats from terrorists, nascent nuclear powers like North Korea, or theater-level attacks against deployed forces. To be able to handle more complex hypersonic or swarm attacks  from the likes of China or Russia will require more time. 

Setting achievable goals over the short term (current administration), midterm (through the next administration), and long term (enduring) will be a journey unto itself.  

Other capabilities within reach:

Continued and escalated development of the Space Sensing layer, getting more MW/MT systems on orbit quickly using current proven technology.
Integrated data systems related to missile warning/missile tracking-Missile Defense, Fire Control Tracking, midcourse surveillance, ground-based midcourse interceptor design and development plan, design, and costs for developing space-based weapons.
A ground based BMC3 system capability.
Upgraded and integrated land- and sea-based air defense systems.
Development of some space-based components integral to Golden Dome, including getting space-based interceptors to leverage boost phase and early midcourse intercept. 
Integration of IC sensors for left-of-launch monitoring. 
Ground based laser system for drones and soft cruise missiles—replicate Israel’s Iron Beam.
Cyber, jamming, spoofing defenses against ongoing and escalating attacks.
The ability to handle lower-level attacks.

What is less likely by 2028 is a fully operational system, certainly on a scale to defend against Level 4 and 5 threats. It will take longer to develop the ability to defend against these more complex and challenging threat levels, including volleys and swarms; space-based interceptors in the volume needed to be effective against the higher levels of threats. Testing, on the other hand, is well within potential reach, provided funding is secured.  

The project’s ambitious timeline and the complexity of developing and deploying a layered missile defense system of this scope will have to overcome a host of challenges, likely surprises, and potential delays and cost overruns. Overall cost considerations will be a long-term challenge.  Yet there is little doubt that a Golden Dome system can increase both strategic stability and deterrence.  A strong missile defense system discourages the lower threat levels and small state and non-state capabilities such as North Korea and Iran to attack.  Along with our major adversaries (China and Russia) from conceiving of first strike risk-taking—as long as the U.S. gets initial Golden Dome capabilities and retains an assured and existential response capability.     

Golden Dome will go a long way to steady the current uncertain nature of the world stage, where China (especially) and Russia can hold U.S. assets and interest at significant threat and risk. This will allow the U.S. to maintain “strategic stability”  (a posture of missile defense combined with a nuclear retaliatory capability that discourages adversaries from risking a first strike on the U.S. homeland). 

I believe that Golden Dome has the right leadership under General Guetlein with the right reporting and acquisition authorities, a strong commitment from the administration, a strong commitment of the other services and agencies that are committed to collaboration and success, and an industry of defense companies and commercial companies ready to go with amazing innovation capabilities. The U.S. can put in place both a significant and impressive near-term capability by the end of 2028, along with the underlying architecture plan necessary to develop an effective long-term system. As long as our expectations are realistic and goals achievable this will be an important and exciting time for the U.S. and will again put  us at the forefront of innovation and again put our nation in a time of assured peace.

Thomas “Tav” Taverney is a retired Air Force major general and former vice commander of Air Force Space Command.