

Advance Questions for General Mark A. Welsh, III, USAF
Nominee for the Position of Chief of Staff of the U. S. Air Force

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

No. I completely agree with the goals of those defense reforms; they remain essential to the effective employment of our Nation's Armed Forces. Most importantly, they have yielded a demonstrated improvement in the joint warfighting capabilities of the United States military.

If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

I have no suggested modifications to the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. However, if confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity to assess Goldwater-Nichols from the vantage point of a Service Chief.

Do you believe that the role of the service chiefs under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?

Yes. Over the two plus decades since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols, "Jointness" has been institutionalized in the Armed Forces of the United States. Service Chiefs have been integral to that success. Their roles and responsibilities remain critical to further progress. I believe Goldwater-Nichols appropriately establishes those roles and that existing policies and processes allow their fulfillment. If confirmed, I will be able to assess Goldwater-Nichols from the vantage point of a Service Chief for the first time. I'll also welcome the opportunity to share my thoughts and ideas with the Committee as appropriate.

Do you see a need for any change in those roles, with regard to the resource allocation process or otherwise?

No, although I'd like to reserve judgment until after I've experienced the resource allocation process from a Service Chief's perspective. If confirmed, I will welcome the opportunity to share my thoughts and ideas with the Committee as appropriate.

Relationships

Section 8033 of title 10, United States Code, discusses the responsibilities and authority of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Section 151 of title 10, United States Code, discusses the composition and functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including the authority of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to submit advice and opinions to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. Other sections of law and traditional practice, also establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force to the following officials:

A. The Secretary of Defense.

The Secretary of Defense serves as the principal assistant to the President on all Department of Defense matters. Senior Air Force leadership operates subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed as a Service Chief and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will work closely with the other members of the Joint Chiefs to provide the best possible military advice to the Secretary of Defense, particularly with regard to matters of air, space, and cyberspace operations, policy and strategy.

B. The Secretary of the Air Force.

The Chief of Staff of the Air Force is directly responsible to the Secretary of the Air Force and performs duties subject to his authority, direction, and control. For the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff is responsible for providing properly organized, trained, and equipped forces to support the Combatant Commanders in their mission accomplishment. The Chief of Staff oversees members and organizations across the Air Force, advising the Secretary on plans and recommendations, and, acting as an agent of the Secretary, implementing plans upon approval. If confirmed as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, I will work very closely with the Secretary to ensure our ability to rapidly provide forces tailored to meet the needs and objectives of our combatant commanders.

C. The Under Secretary of the Air Force

The Under Secretary of the Air Force is authorized, subject to the Secretary of the Air Force's direction and control, to act for and with the authority of the Secretary of the Air Force on all matters for which the Secretary is responsible; that is, to conduct the affairs of the Department of the Air Force. If confirmed, I will foster a close working relationship with the individual serving as the Under Secretary.

D. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will work with and through the Chairman in formulating military advice as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by advising him on Air Force capabilities and our preparations to support the Combatant Commanders in the conduct of military operations. I look forward to performing the duties assigned by law to the Chief of Staff to provide properly organized, trained, and equipped forces as needed by the Combatant Commanders and to provide military advice on matters within my expertise, as required.

E. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Vice Chairman has the same statutory authorities and obligations of other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When performing duties as the Acting Chairman, the Vice Chairman's relationship with the Combatant Commanders is exactly the same as that of the Chairman. If confirmed, I will assist the Vice Chairman to execute the duties prescribed by law or otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. The Chiefs of the other Services.

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chiefs of the other Services to capitalize on our individual strengths, complement our capabilities and enhance mutually beneficial relationships as we carry out our responsibilities as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. My goal will be to work with each of them to enhance joint interoperability and other joint warfighting capabilities in order to provide the force mix desired by the Combatant Commanders

G. The Commander, U. S. Transportation Command.

I am keenly aware of the importance of a strong close working relationship between Transportation Command and the Air Force, its primary source of airlift. The Air Force remains a key contributor to TRANSCOM's success in meeting national military requirements. If confirmed, I will work to further enhance the Air Force's support to the Commander of TRANSCOM.

H. The Commander, U. S. Strategic Command.

A very close working relationship with the STRATCOM commander will be essential to identifying and implementing effective and enduring solutions to any issues with the Air Force's ability to support our Nation's nuclear deterrent capabilities. If confirmed, I will ensure the STRATCOM commander is constantly apprised on readiness of the Air Force air, space, and cyberspace forces required to support STRATCOM's missions. I will strive, in particular, to, keep a clear focus on Service

efforts to maintain the highest standards of performance in the nuclear arena, as well as the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) mission and cyberspace mission areas.

I. The other combatant commanders.

If confirmed as the Chief of Staff, I will work with the Secretary of the Air Force to ensure that the Air Force is properly organized, trained, and equipped to provide the capabilities the Combatant Commanders need to execute their missions. That requires a clear understanding of their requirements. I will personally engage in a forthright and direct dialogue with the Combatant Commanders to ensure that I do understand.

J. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition.

The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition serves as the Air Force's Senior Acquisition Executive. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Air Force and the Assistant Secretary on matters affecting the acquisition of the resources needed to train and equip the Air Force. I'll also ensure military expertise is readily available to assist them in accomplishing their acquisition-related responsibilities.

K. The General Counsel of the Air Force.

The General Counsel (GC) is the senior civilian legal advisor to Air Force senior leaders and all officers and agencies of the Department of the Air Force. The GC serves as the chief ethics official. I have great respect for our current GC and the responsibilities and difficulties of his office. If confirmed, I look forward to developing an even stronger working relationship with the General Counsel and his staff.

L. The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force.

The Judge Advocate General (TJAG) is the senior uniformed legal advisor to Air Force senior leaders and all officers and agencies of the Department of the Air Force and provides professional supervision to The Judge Advocate General's Corps in the performance of their duties. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing my strong working relationship with The Judge Advocate General and the TJAG staff.

M. The Superintendent of the U. S. Air Force Academy.

I have a strong affinity for the United States Air Force Academy. It is a bedrock institution in the development of tomorrow's Air Force leaders. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Superintendent to address issues faced by the Academy and to promote the Academy's sustained commitment to excellence and fulfillment of its very important character building mission.

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force?

The Chief of Staff of the Air Force fulfills a number of duties and functions. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he serves as a military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chief of Staff is also subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Air Force, providing plans and recommendations to the Secretary, implementing policy, and overseeing the Air Staff and other members and organizations of the Air Force. He is a principal advisor to the Secretary. Working for and through the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff is responsible for providing properly organized, trained, and equipped forces to support the Combatant Commanders' accomplishment of their missions.

Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Secretary of the Air Force would prescribe for you?

If confirmed as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, I would expect the Secretary of the Air Force to assign me duties consistent with the responsibilities outlined above to ensure that the Air Force is appropriately organized, trained, and equipped to meet its institutional obligations and force provider responsibilities.

What changes, if any, would you recommend to section 8034 of title 10, United States Code, relating to the Air Staff and its composition and functions?

None, although I may have a different view after I have observed Air Staff performance and am able to make an assessment from the vantage point of a Service Chief.

What do you believe are your qualifications to assume this office?

During my thirty-six years on active duty in the Air Force, I have served in a range of positions and have enjoyed a variety of opportunities and experiences which have helped prepare me to fulfill the duties and responsibilities commensurate with appointment as the Air Force Chief of Staff. Throughout my tenure in the Air Force, I have been privileged to serve with and learn from a host of exceptional service men and women, including members of our sister Services, many in Joint positions of trust and leadership.

Prior to my current assignment, I served in positions that involved direct and routine contact with the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, other Service Chiefs, Directors of DoD Agencies and Heads of non-DoD federal agencies on an array of major issues confronting our Nation and our military. My past assignments at the USAF Academy and Air Education and Training Command allowed me to better understand, confront, and resolve the challenges facing our service in the areas of education and training.

Most recently, as the USAFE Commander, and Commander NATO Air Component Command, Ramstein, I've been on both the "giving" and the "receiving" ends of the efforts of Air Force leaders to organize, train, and equip the great men and women of our Air Force. This position gave me a broad leadership perspective on the interaction of the Department of Defense, the Combatant Commands, and our Services in executing our National Military Strategy. It also helped me better understand the critical partnerships with European and African Air Forces, U.S. Components to both U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command, and our NATO and European partners. These experiences and perspectives will be invaluable if I am confirmed to serve as Chief of Staff.

Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force?

If confirmed as the Chief of Staff, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Air Force to identify, assess, and address all challenges. I will ensure the readiness and relevance of our Air Force along with the safety and well-being of our people.

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Chief of Staff of the Air Force?

The next Chief of Staff must lead the world's finest Air Force, ensuring it is properly organized, trained, and equipped in order to provide for our Nation's defense, winning today's fight, and preparing our force for an uncertain security environment. One of the major challenges is to do this while playing our part in helping to reduce our Nation's financial deficit.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If confirmed, I will immediately focus on continuing to recruit the very best people we can and giving our Airmen the best training in the world. We must also continue modernization efforts so that our force is equipped to meet the challenges of today and of the future.

What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force?

The most serious problem facing our Service is the ability to properly balance our force in a fiscally constrained environment while keeping our critical core capabilities in order to provide the *Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power* required by our Joint teammates as well for as the American people.

If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

If confirmed, I will prioritize and focus on these concerns and develop solutions along with our Joint and other partners to ensure we are a ready and capable force.

Priorities

If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish?

My priorities are: 1) continuing to strengthen the nuclear enterprise; 2) partnering with the Joint and coalition team to win today's fight; 3) developing and caring for our Airmen and their families; 4) modernizing our air, space, and cyberspace inventories, organizations, and training; and 5) recapturing acquisition excellence. If confirmed, my emphasis will be to provide *Global Vigilance*, *Global Reach*, and *Global Power* to the Nation through America's innovative Airmen.

Personnel and Entitlement Costs

The cost of personnel, including health care, compensation, and retirement continues its steep upward growth and is becoming an ever increasing portion of the DOD budget.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to control the rise in the Air Force's personnel costs?

Military compensation is, and must remain, highly competitive to sustain the recruitment and retention of high caliber men and women to meet readiness requirements and accomplish our national security mission. If confirmed, I will remain committed to this goal. However, in light of the current economic crisis and overall reductions in defense spending, we must look at balancing personnel costs to avoid reductions to force structure and modernization efforts critical to support the warfighter and the defense of our Nation. I look at management of our force structure as being a key element in controlling our personnel costs. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Air Force continues to make difficult, but fiscally responsible decisions to implement force management programs that allow us to remain at authorized end strength levels. Additionally, I will pursue legislative and policy changes needed to ensure that the Air Force is able to operate as a Total Force with the most effective use of resources.

Unified Medical Command

The Government Accountability Office found in its 2011 report on "Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue," that the Department could save between \$281 million and \$460 million annually by realigning DoD's military medical command structures. The Committee is aware that, in spite of the growing cost of health care within the Department, the Air Force has historically objected to the establishment of a unified medical command.

What is your understanding of the reasons for the Air Force position on the Unified Medical Command?

From my understanding of the recommendations by the Military Health System Task Force, comprised of leaders from OSD, JCS and the Services, a Unified Medical Command will not streamline operations, achieve cost savings, improve synergy, or improve patient outcomes.

A Unified Medical Command will require very expensive new systems and organizational structures to oversee a new combatant command headquarters and new subordinate commands. Some worry that a Unified Medical Command may not be as responsive to the needs of Service warfighters as is the current oversight by the Services, which already provide the best care with the highest survival rate in the history of warfare.

I believe the Services should continue to integrate common medical platforms with the goal to reduce redundancy and lower costs. The Air Force fully supports the establishment of the Defense Health Agency as directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. This effort will consolidate oversight of common support functions (facilities planning, contracting, logistics, and research and development) in the new collocated medical headquarters. Adoption of a single Service accounting system to allocate Defense Health Program dollars and improve accountability would do more to reduce costs than a Unified Medical Command.

If confirmed, how would you evaluate proposals and options for improving efficiency of the military health care system that involve consolidation of common functions, including command functions?

If confirmed, I will support Deputy Secretary of Defense Carter's initiative to improve efficiency. I know our Air Force Surgeon General is actively engaged in this planning effort to help identify the organizational structures, services, and business processes to establish all elements of a Defense Health Agency, and to provide specific recommendations on activities managed under shared services constructs.

Should readiness as well as costs be a factor in such evaluation, and if so, how would readiness metrics be applied?

I believe the top two criteria used by the Military Health System Task Force evaluation focused on medically-ready forces, and a trained and ready deployable medical force. These two criteria aggregated to 65 percent of the total "weight", and these criteria were at the forefront of all Service deliberations. Based on these readiness weighted criteria, the Air Force is confident that the recommendations appropriately considered readiness.

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)

The airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets developed and operated by the Air Force form an indispensable part of the Nation's overall intelligence architecture. These assets are often referred to as high demand, low density systems because of the extensive number of requirements and high operational tempo on their systems and crews. This year, we also see the Air Force trying to divest itself of the Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft, a system that the Air Force has been using to meet high altitude ISR demands.

In your view, will the Air Force have sufficient airborne ISR assets even after the removal of the Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft to meet current and projected requirements?

As the Air Force continues to leverage our entire ISR enterprise to meet combatant commander requirements, the current requirement for high-altitude ISR is being satisfied with the Air Force's fleet of 27 U-2 aircraft and its advanced multi-intelligence sensors. Today, we operate 57 medium altitude remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) combat air patrols (CAPs) and are posturing our ISR enterprise to support 65 CAPs. We are currently undergoing sustainment and modernization efforts on our JSTARS aircraft and upgrading the RC-135 to provide a direct link into our global distributed common ground station network. This full complement of efforts will ensure the Air Force meets its current and projected requirements despite the planned divestment of Global Hawk Block 30.

What changes would you recommend, if confirmed, to current plans for the development and acquisition of airborne ISR platforms?

The Air Force's FY13 budget expands our RPA fleet, improves our U-2 capabilities, continues the MC-12, and upgrades the RC-135 and JSTARS. We will continue to improve and mature capability-based planning and analysis across the Air Force ISR enterprise to ensure a balanced mix of platforms, sensors, and analysis. We must continue to improve our ability to utilize data across all domains (air, space, and cyberspace) in all operating environments. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Air Force continues to review long-term intelligence information requirements to guide future capability development.

Will these changes remove ISR platforms from the "high demand, low density" category?

The Air Force is sizing the force to account for combatant commander requirements, to include high- and medium-altitude airborne capabilities, as well as processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities (which are a cornerstone of the overall capability). We will continue to develop all domain capabilities in order to meet the needs of our combatant commanders and our national leadership. We can only affect the "density," not the "demand."

Former Secretary Gates publicly complained that the Air Force had not put sufficiently high priority on fielding unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to provide ISR support for the forces operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. General Schwartz took a number of steps to address that issue.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the Air Force continues to provide greater priority to providing ISR support of field operations?

The Air Force places high priority on ISR support to combatant command operations. The Air Force increased the number of medium altitude RPA CAPs, deployed the MC-12 Project Liberty in record time, and deployed Blue Devil I, a first of its kind multi-source intelligence (multi-INT) platform. In addition, we developed advanced sensors, such as Gorgon Stare and Airborne Cueing and Exploitation System Hyperspectral (ACES HY), to meet requirements in Afghanistan. We will continue to improve and grow ISR capabilities as required. If confirmed, I will also ensure that lessons learned and practical experience inform our Science and Technology investment, as well as research, development, and acquisition programs.

Due to insufficient ISR capacity provided by the Air Force, the combatant commands have frequently turned to expensive contracted airborne ISR solutions to meet their most pressing and immediate needs.

Do you believe additional growth in Air Force ISR capacity should take into account combatant command ISR requirements that are currently being met through contracted services?

ISR requirements and current shortfalls should and do account for combatant command requirements while considering additional growth in ISR capacity. The Air Force adheres to a rigorous planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process to ensure our ability to meet the highest priority mission requirements in a fiscally constrained environment. That said, the Air Force is well postured to address many ISR shortfalls identified by the combatant commands, but the solutions need to be considered in a Joint context. While the Air Force has incredible capability, we need to ensure that the Nation is fully utilizing the investment all of the Services have made, particularly with respect to ISR. As we begin to draw down forces in Afghanistan, we will begin to shift assets and personnel currently engaged in the Central Command area of responsibility to other combatant commands in accordance with the priorities set forth within the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP).

Do you believe it is appropriate for combatant commanders to contract for some portion of their airborne ISR requirements?

Air Force ISR is “all in” in its support of the combatant commands subject to the allocation and apportionment decisions through the GFMAP process. The demand for ISR exceeds our current capacities, and with shrinking defense

budgets, this shortfall will likely continue for the foreseeable future. With that in mind, I believe it is the combatant commander's prerogative to address any shortfalls with the means at his disposal within applicable legal and operational constraints.

Making effective use of ISR data requires sufficient processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) capabilities. Currently, much of this PED capability is provided by contractors.

Do you believe the Air Force should develop additional "in-house" PED capabilities to reduce its reliance on contractors?

In response to the rapid increase of intelligence data received from ISR platforms since 2001, the Air Force has added an additional 2,158 billets to its Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) enterprise in the last three years. This increase will ensure our ability to maintain and increase our processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED) obligations to the combatant commanders as their operational requirements ebb and flow in current and future engagements. The Air Force is also adding analytical tools that help in processing vast volumes of information as another way to help meet the demand. However, the increased billets within the DCGS enterprise will likely have little to no effect on the reliance on contractors currently supporting operations in Afghanistan, as the global demand will continue to outstrip supply. If confirmed, I will ensure we continue to support warfighter requirements in the most cost effective way possible.

Special Operations Enabling Capabilities

The Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has highlighted the critical nature of Service-provided Combat Support and Combat Service Support enabling capabilities to the activities of special operations forces.

If confirmed, how would you ensure appropriate Air Force enabling capabilities for special operations are maintained, especially in light of increasing budget pressures?

If confirmed, I will ensure the Air Force remains committed to providing the appropriate support to all combatant commands, including USSOCOM. The Air Force is prioritizing readiness over force structure to avoid a hollow force. We are also leveraging Total Force contributions to operations plans (OPLANs) and contingencies by building an appropriate and sustainable active/reserve component force mix. We have also prioritized and increased our capability to execute and support irregular warfare, which will provide essential support to special operations forces for the foreseeable future.

If confirmed, how would you ensure the availability of such enabling capabilities is synchronized with the training and deployment cycles of special operations forces?

First and foremost, we will continue to work closely with USSOCOM and its Special Operations Force Generation model. We are exploring a new expeditionary construct for the Air Force which streamlines presentation of our Total Force team—active, Guard, and Reserve—with inputs from all major commands. The new teaming construct will synchronize appropriate training and deployment of Air Force special operations forces in order to meet global requirements now and in the future.

Special Operations Personnel Management

Some have argued that the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) should have greater influence on special operations personnel management issues including assignment, promotion, compensation, and retention of special operations forces. One proposal would modify section 167 of title 10, United States Code, to change the role of the USSOCOM Commander from “monitoring” the readiness of special operations personnel to “coordinating” with the Services on personnel and manpower management policies that directly affect special operations forces.

What is your view of this proposal?

It is clearly in our best interest to have very robust and capable special operations forces. In the Air Force’s role to organize, train, and equip our forces, we must make sure that our efforts synchronize with USSOCOM and that we have a coordinated approach to providing forces. DODD 5100.01, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, ensures we do this. Further, the Air Force established an agreement with USSOCOM to comply with the current directive by coordinating personnel management policy and plans with USSOCOM.

Independence of the Judge Advocate General

What are your views about the responsibility of the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force to provide independent legal advice to the Chief of Staff and the Air Staff, particularly in the areas of military justice and operational law?

I believe it is critical for the Chief of Staff to receive independent legal advice from his senior uniformed judge advocate. Our senior uniformed lawyers bring a wealth of experience and perspective shaped by years of working with commanders in the field. TJAG’s ability to provide independent legal advice is statutorily guaranteed and vitally important to Air Force senior leader decision making. Generally, I believe senior leaders are better informed to make the best decisions when they are aware of both The Judge Advocate General’s advice and the advice of the Air Force General Counsel.

What are your views about the responsibility of staff judge advocates throughout the Air Force to provide independent legal advice to military commanders in the field and throughout the Air Force establishment?

Staff judge advocates (SJAs) are essential to the proper functioning of both operational and support missions. SJAs have a major responsibility to promote the interests of a command by providing relevant, timely, and independent advice to commanders, and this independence is reflected in statute (10 U.S.C. § 8037(f)(2)). Convening authorities are required by statute (10 U.S.C. § 806) to communicate with their SJAs on issues related to military justice matters, which is critical to disciplined mission execution. In addition, commanders and other leaders rely on their staff judge advocates for advice on all types of legal and policy matters. SJAs offer legal advice independent of any particular agenda. I believe it is very important for commanders to continue to receive uniformed legal advice.

Air Force Future Total Force Planning

Historically, the Air Force has been credited for having a very good relationship with its reserve components and relying more heavily on the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve than the other military departments. With the presentation of the Air Force's fiscal year 2013 proposals for making force structure reductions, however, the Air Force appears to have decided against relying as much on the Air National Guard to provide tactical fighters and airlift capability.

What criteria should we use in assessing the proper mix of active Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve in planning for our future force structure?

The first and most important criterion must be the ability of the Total Force to generate the capabilities needed to meet the demands of combatant commanders in executing the National Defense Strategy during all phases of operations, from shaping the strategic environment in phase zero to rebuilding the peace in phase five. The second criterion is the ability to sustain the force, including readiness, training, overseas presence, and the symbiotic manpower relationships between the active and reserve components. The next criterion is cost. As good stewards of our Nation's resources, we must accomplish our missions in the most effective and efficient manner possible. Finally, all of the criteria above must be evaluated to understand and characterize the risk associated with each Air Force core function. The members of the active duty Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard are teammates and remain critical partners as we move forward as a Total Force.

Do you agree with the fiscal year 2013 budget proposal to cut proportionally deeper in the Air National Guard, as compared to personnel reductions proposed for the active Air Force or Air Force Reserve?

I believe the Fiscal Year 2013 (FY13) Presidential Budget proposal seeks to provide the best alternatives for the Total Force in order to generate the capabilities needed to meet the demands of the National Defense Strategy and the combatant commanders during all phases of operations, from shaping the strategic environment in phase zero to rebuilding the peace in phase five. While some may see the choices the Air Force made in the FY13 budget proposal through a different lens, I believe this proposal would effectively support the National Defense Strategy. The Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve are valued members of our Total Air Force team. I fully recognize the significance of the Air National Guard's contributions to our Nation and our states. If confirmed, I will continue to explore combat ready options that meet the needs of our combatant commanders and preserve domestic response capabilities.

Part of the rationale apparently comes from the perceived need to support peacetime rotations to overseas bases such as those in Europe.

Why shouldn't we consider making more substantial reductions in Air Force force structure in Europe, particularly in view of the shift in strategy toward the Asia/Pacific arena?

The global force posture requirements are established by strategy and the needs of the combatant commanders and we strive to meet those needs. In the case of Europe, given my current position as the USAFE Commander, this is a question that I have wrestled with often. Our current Air Force presence in Europe is a very small fraction of what existed during the Cold War. Assuming the FY13 budget actions are carried out, our conventional warfighting forces in Europe will consist of only six fighter squadrons, one tactical airlift squadron, a rescue helicopter squadron, and one tanker squadron. Those fighters also are responsible for fulfilling other commitments to the NATO alliance. This region is home to some of our most reliable allies and borders many of the world's trouble spots in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa. Maintaining interoperability through joint training with our allies, operational basing structure, and forward presence for deterrence and quick response is vital to our national interest.

Having said that, I believe we should consider reductions and consolidation opportunities in Europe. I think that planning must begin with a careful assessment of the enduring missions in Europe...those things that the Nation will expect us to be able to do regardless of the scenario that develops in the Middle East, the Levant, or elsewhere in Europe or Africa. The facilities and infrastructure required to support those enduring missions should also be considered enduring. We should focus our reduction and consolidation efforts on the force structure and facilities that remain. Our planning for those should be driven by logic, not emotion. It should be shaped by which options our National leadership believes need to be available for rapid response to emerging crises or events (e.g., opposed Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations in the Levant or Africa) and the timeframe in which they would need to be able to execute them. Knowing those two things would allow the Air Force to present proposed

adjustments to European force structure and facilities in a reasoned, operationally sound way to allow an objective discussion informed by operational, fiscal and Partner perspectives.

Air Force End Strength

In the context of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, both the House-passed bill and the Senate Armed Services Committee reported bill would restore certain Air Force reserve component force structure that the Air Force and the Department had proposed to cut. General Schwartz has urged Congress to provide the personnel and resources necessary to man and equip force structure retained in excess of the budget proposal, and both bills attempt to do so.

What is your assessment of the level of personnel and funding needed to fully man and equip force structure restorations in the House and Senate Committee bills?

The Air Force will require \$8.7 billion dollars across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to fully fund the restoration of 286 aircraft. In addition to funding, the Air Force would require the restoration of approximately 9,900 manpower authorizations. This would fund the operations, sustainment, and manpower to man and operate these weapons systems.

If such funding is not provided, and the Congress requires us to keep force structure in excess of the FY13 PB proposal, we will inevitably see a loss of readiness, or fail to sustain key modernization needed to deal with future challenges and recapitalize our older-than-desired aircraft.

Individual Ready Reserve

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves has found that accessing the IRR as a viable source of manpower for the war was problematic, and that using the IRR as a solution for unit manning is a failed concept.

What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the All Volunteer Force?

The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) is a valuable source of Airmen who are subject to recall to active duty in time of war or national emergency. Airmen who are members of the IRR are required to participate in an annual screening for mobilization readiness and the Air Force catalogs their military and civilian skills for possible employment during mobilization.

Although mobilization access on a wide spectrum could be problematic, if the Air Force needs to access a very specialized career field, the IRR provides a reach back capability to access trained Airmen to augment our active component when necessary.

Transformation

If confirmed, you would play an important role in the process of transforming the Air Force to meet new and emerging threats.

What do you believe should be the goals for Air Force transformation?

Confronted by the Department of Defense's new fiscal reality, the Air Force made hard choices to align with the new strategic guidance. As we move forward, we must avoid creating a hollow force that is unable to execute the missions entrusted to it. We must also keep faith with the Airmen who carry out our Nation's business, sometimes at great cost to themselves and their families. Though we will be a smaller force, our goal is to remain the world's premier air, space, and cyberspace force. We must maintain the agility, flexibility, and readiness required to engage a full range of contingencies and threats.

We will continue to provide our nuclear deterrent forces as two-thirds of the Nation's nuclear triad, competently and credibly providing the foundation of global stability and underwriting our national security, maintaining our alliance and treaty obligations, and assuring our allies and partner nations as part of a Joint team. Our Air Force must be able to gain control in the air and space, and maintain assured access to cyberspace. We provide unique capabilities in mobility, strike, and ISR which enable Joint and multinational forces to conduct operations, and permit surface forces freedom of action without the threat of attack from above. Significant and sustained modernization of ISR and the long-range strike family of systems will extend today's ISR and power projection capabilities into contested battle spaces.

It is imperative the Air Force maintain the air and space power advantages that will enable our entire Joint Force to deter and defeat aggression, operate effectively in space and cyberspace, defend the homeland, and conduct stability operations. If confirmed, I will ensure we continue to provide the Nation with *Global Vigilance*, *Global Reach*, and *Global Power* employable across the spectrum of operations with which we are tasked.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

Numerous cases of sexual assault involving service members in theater have been reported over the last several years. Many victims and their advocates contend that they were victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive or inadequate military treatment. Meanwhile, Secretary Panetta has announced several new initiatives aimed at curbing sexual assaults in the military and improving victim support.

What is your assessment of the Air Force's implementation of the Secretary's new policies, including his decision to withhold initial disposition authority over certain crimes to the general court-martial convening authority?

The Air Force appreciates the Secretary of Defense's leadership and supports his decision. Withholding the initial disposition authority at the Special Court Martial Convening authority level reassures Airmen that we are taking the issue of sexual assault very seriously.

What is your understanding of the resources and programs the Air Force has in place in deployed locations to offer victims of sexual assaults the medical, psychological, and legal help that they need?

In areas of operation, Air Force Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs) have the appropriate resources to offer support to sexual assault victims. Air Force Central Command ensures that trained primary and alternate providers are available, or that Memorandums of Understanding are in place to provide appropriate sexual assault medical service. Additionally, Air Force forward deployed mental health assets are available to provide necessary consultation, assessment, intervention, and referral for mental health issues, to include support in cases of sexual assault.

The Air Force has also forward deployed judge advocates to provide complete legal support to the Air Force and Joint missions. Coupled with a dynamic reach back capability, this ensures robust, full-spectrum legal services are available to commanders and Airmen. Legal services available to victims at their home station are equally fully available to victims in deployed locations, to include legal assistance, defense services, victim witness assistance, or other legal needs.

What is your view of the steps the Air Force has taken to prevent additional sexual assaults at deployed locations as well as at home stations?

In the Air Force, the majority of the reported sexual assaults occur at home station and not at deployed locations. However, prevention efforts apply equally at both locations. For the last two years, the Air Force has focused on bystander intervention as a prime prevention effort. We've provided mandatory training in this area and our Airmen know and it is their responsibility to intervene when they recognize a potentially unsafe situation. We simply must provide our Airmen a climate of dignity and respect and create an environment where trust and accountability are ever present. This will help victims feel comfortable coming forward and ensure perpetrators of this vicious crime know they will be held accountable.

What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the Air Force has in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

Air Force installation level Sexual Assault Response and Prevention Coordinators (SARCs) and Victim Advocates (VAs) receive extensive initial training before assuming their positions. Additionally, both SARCs and VAs receive annual refresher training.

All Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) special agents receive extensive training in the handling of violent crime investigations, including specific handling of sexual assault investigations. In 2009, the Air Force funded

24 additional civilian special agents to focus on sexual offenses at locations with the highest incidence of sexual assault. AFOSI also recently developed a two-week advanced training course, dedicated exclusively to sexual assault investigations.

The Judge Advocate General is fully committed to aggressively addressing allegations of sexual assault and ensuring that commanders, victims, and accused Airmen are appropriately advised on the legal issues. The Air Force is committed to training prosecutors and defense counsel to the highest standards. Base staff judge advocates work closely with the AFOSI special agents to ensure comprehensive investigations. Through the Senior Trial Counsel (STC) program, 16 highly trained and experienced trial counsel assist base legal offices in all aspects of evaluating and preparing sexual assault cases and are detailed to represent the United States as the prosecutor in these cases. Seven of these STCs are dedicated to specializing in prosecution of sexual assault cases. Senior Defense Counsels provide assistance to local defense counsel and representation of accused Airmen at trial. The Judge Advocate General believes that fully training and equipping both the prosecution and defense in these cases offers the best hope of optimal fact finding and professionalism in adjudicating sexual assault cases.

Do you consider the Air Force’s current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?

Current Air Force policies and procedures, particularly those on restricted reporting, are effective, available both at home and in deployed locations, and do more than allow victims confidential access to medical care. When coupled with the new victim to victim advocate privilege, the policies address many of the concerns victims have about coming forward and help protect the victims’ confidentiality. The policies preserve the possibility of future prosecution by allowing victims to anonymously receive Sexual Assault Forensic Examinations (SAFEs), which are held for five years. Victims may convert their confidential restricted report at any time and participate in the military justice process. Restricted reporting allows for the preservation of evidence that would otherwise be unavailable and the Air Force is able to offer victims care and treatment that victims may have not accessed without this confidential option.

What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in which the confidential reporting procedures have been put into effect?

Sexual assault victims who seek medical care or Sexual Assault Forensic Examinations (SAFEs) in some states (i.e., California) cannot make a restricted report because state laws mandate reporting to law enforcement by healthcare providers. This limitation creates a “have and have not” reporting situation amongst military victims.

What is your view of the appropriate role for senior military and civilian leaders in the Secretariat and the Air staff in overseeing the effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating to sexual assault?

Senior military and civilian leaders at all levels, beginning at the Secretariat and the Air Staff, must focus on promoting an environment that prevents sexual assault. Eliminating this horrible crime is absolutely critical. The Secretary of the Air Force directed a Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Executive Steering Group (ESG) comprised of all the senior functional stakeholders to continually assess the program and provide advice for improvements in policy and procedures. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and these leaders to maintain a very clear focus on this issue.

Family Support

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues in the Air Force, and, if confirmed, what role would you play to ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced?

The ones I hear most from my Airmen and their family members are financial management, predatory lending, relocation and transition assistance, child care availability, access to quality education, the Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP), and manpower and staffing for our family programs.

If confirmed, I plan to ensure sufficient staffing and training for family readiness staff as we partner with community organizations to continue building support for our Airmen and their families. My wife and I have spent a lot of time on Family Readiness issues in my current job; we will continue to do so wherever we serve.

How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing and lengthy deployments?

If confirmed, I will continue to strengthen the programs that the Air Force has established to support Airmen and their families. They include the Airman and Family Readiness Center programs, Key Spouse programs, and various child and youth programs.

Our Airman and Family Readiness Centers serve as a resource hub for our military families. From the beginning of every deployment, the Airman & Family Readiness Center is in contact with dependents to ensure they are aware of all available resources.

Key Spouses become crucial partners as they keep families aware of unit and community support events through the deployment. And Child and Youth Program Directors work to ensure organized programs, resources and a “sympathetic ear” are available to our children as they work through the multi-faceted issues associated with separation from a deployed parent.

If confirmed, how would you ensure support of reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and family readiness, as well as active-duty families who do not reside near a military installation?

Our relationship with the Reserve Component in this area has developed over the years, but I believe it needs to be stronger. The Air Force provides resources and support to all components through various Airman & Family and Child & Youth programs. These support programs are sustained through continued collaboration with the State Joint Base Board and other services.

Geographically separate service members (and their families) have immediate access to many resources online that enable them to remain connected to their units and support services. If confirmed, my intent is to empower our Services professionals to develop new and innovative ways for deployed Airmen and their families to connect with the support infrastructure they need, and with each other. I've been there...it makes a difference.

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are critical to enhancement of military life for members and their families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments. These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users, including active duty and reserve personnel, and their eligible family members.

What challenges do you foresee in sustaining and enhancing Air Force MWR programs and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to achieve?

Our MWR program exists to provide Quality of Life (QOL) programs and services to our Airmen and their family members. We recognize, particularly in light of frequent and lengthy deployments, the correlation between QOL, readiness, and resilience.

Our top priority is to develop and care for our Airmen. I don't foresee any change to that focus. Our MWR programs are currently undergoing an enterprise-wide transformation to right-size and ensure currency and relevancy for our Airmen and their families.

Without a doubt, MWR programs and services for all Airmen and their families are critical to Air Force readiness and mission capability. As we advance MWR transformation, I will advocate that we continuously seek partnership opportunities with local communities to help ensure we provide the best support possible for our team while embracing efficiencies and innovative ways of doing business.

If confirmed, I will fully support the ongoing MWR transformation efforts which are a model of innovation, efficiency, and resource stewardship, geared toward meeting the needs of our Airmen and families now and in the future.

Medical Personnel Recruiting and Retention

The military services continue to face significant shortages in critically needed medical personnel in both active and reserve components.

What is your understanding of the most significant personnel challenges in recruiting and retaining health professionals in the Air Force?

The most significant challenges we have in recruiting and retaining health professionals continues to be competition with the private sector and other federal agencies for talented professionals from career fields where shortages exist. Adding to this challenge are issues such as pay disparity with the civilian sector and deployments. Some examples of career fields where we face such competition are general surgeons, family medicine, mental health, and nursing.

The Air Force addresses these challenges in a three-pronged approach to enhance (1) education, (2) compensation, and (3) quality of practice/quality of life. Regarding education, the Air Force Medical Service depends on programs like the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS), Health Professions Scholarship Program (HPSP), Inter-Service Physician Assistant Program (IPAP), and the Nurse Enlisted Commissioning Program (NECP) to grow health professionals. Special pay and incentives are used to help offset some of the pay disparities between military and civilian sector compensation packages. And in terms of quality of practice, many of our specialists have been at the forefront of medical innovation in the last decade of war as they cared for wounded warriors. Many health care professionals enjoy taking care of the population who volunteer to serve this Nation. These individuals self-select to stay in beyond their education commitments.

If confirmed, would you undertake a comprehensive review of the medical support requirements for the Air Force?

As readiness requirements for our warfighters evolve, so will the need for medical support. Our healthcare team provides superb care, as proven in our most recent operations, and we have the responsibility to provide the highest quality of care for the future. If confirmed, I will continue to review our support requirements to ensure our Air Force provides a ready and clinically superb deployable force.

If confirmed, what policies or legislative initiatives, if any, are necessary in order to ensure that the Air Force can continue to fulfill ongoing medical support requirements?

The Air Force Medical Service partners with other Air Force and Department of Defense stakeholders to optimize the use of monetary incentives and educational and developmental opportunities for our health profession officers. Continuing to provide sufficient resourcing for education, training, and special and incentive pay

is critical to fulfilling ongoing medical support requirements. If confirmed, I will fully support ongoing medical support requirements by encouraging the policies that provide for these partnerships and programs.

Air Force Policies Regarding Drug and Alcohol Abuse

What is your understanding of the Air Force's policy with respect to disciplinary action and administrative separation of airmen who have been determined to have used illegal drugs?

The Air Force does not have any policy per se on disciplinary actions with respect to particular criminal offenses. However, I know each drug case is investigated by law enforcement personnel and the report of investigation is provided to the Airman's commander to review the evidence for appropriate disposition. Each case is evaluated on its merits, including the type of illegal drug used, the facts and circumstances of the use or uses, the military record of the Airman, and the strength of the evidence.

The Air Force has a policy on administrative separation for illegal drug use found in our administrative separation instruction. It states that drug abuse is incompatible with military service and Airmen who abuse drugs one or more times are subject to administrative separation for misconduct. In fact, administrative separation processing is mandatory for drug abuse unless a waiver is granted.

Do you agree with this policy?

Yes, I do. And I believe it works well for our Service. The Air Force takes illegal drug use very seriously due to the nature of our business—we have no margin for error as we maintain and operate aircraft, spacecraft, and key components of our Nation's nuclear arsenal.

What is your understanding of the Air Force's policy with respect to rehabilitation and retention on active duty of airmen who have been determined to have used illegal drugs or abused alcohol or prescription drugs?

Only in very limited circumstances does the Air Force retain Airmen who we determine have used illegal drugs, including illegal use of prescription drugs. In order to be retained, Airmen have the burden of proving that retention is warranted by meeting a number of criteria, to include such drug use was a departure from the Airman's usual behavior and is not likely to recur, does not involve recurring incidents, and does not involve distribution.

The Air Force does have a robust Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment (ADAPT) Program. The primary objectives of the ADAPT Program are to promote readiness, health, and wellness through the prevention and treatment of substance misuse and abuse; to minimize the negative consequences of substance misuse and abuse to the individual, family, and organization; to provide comprehensive education and treatment to individuals who experience problems attributed to substance misuse or abuse; to restore function and return

identified substance abusers to unrestricted duty status or to assist them in their transition to civilian life, as appropriate. The Air Force provides appropriate treatment for Airmen who are undergoing disciplinary or administrative separation proceedings for drug or alcohol abuse.

The Air Force does provide some limited protection for Airmen who self-identify their drug use for the purpose of seeking treatment in that they may avoid criminal prosecution, but will still face administrative separation.

Do you agree with this policy?

Yes. I think we have struck an appropriate balance between rehabilitation and retention and the need to enforce good order and discipline. Our goal is to help these Airmen deal with their drug or alcohol problem and, if appropriate, return them to duty.

Do you believe that the Air Force has devoted sufficient resources to implementation of its rehabilitation policies and objectives since 2001?

Yes. The Air Force maintains a comprehensive and dynamic drug detection and response program that includes rehabilitation as a key element. We invest in and care for our Airmen, and we have trained alcohol and drug counselors and medical providers at each installation to provide evaluation and outpatient treatment services. For Airmen needing more intensive inpatient treatment, our medical teams arrange for these services through TRICARE with local community medical centers.

If not, in what ways?

N/A

Religious Guidelines

The DOD Independent Review Related to Fort Hood observed that “DoD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or self-radicalization” and recommended that the policy be updated.

What is your view of the need to clarify the policy regarding religious accommodation in the Air Force?

I believe the Air Force policy on religious accommodation is clear. I also think it’s consistent with the DoD policy. Current Air Force policy ensures that requests for religious accommodation are welcomed and dealt with fairly and consistently...throughout the Air Force. Requests for accommodation should be approved, unless approval would have a real (not hypothetical) adverse impact on military readiness, unit cohesion, standards or discipline and, therefore, disapproval of the accommodation request is in furtherance of a compelling government interest. We also specifically instruct our commanders to consult with their installation chaplain and staff judge advocate on requests for religious

accommodation. However, consistent with the Air Force Fort Hood Follow On Review recommendations, the Air Force is reviewing and considering updating our policies to address prevention, identification and response to religious-based disrespect, harassment and discrimination.

Are you concerned that the attack at Fort Hood could lead to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the Air Force?

I think there has been enough time since the Ft Hood tragedy that it is no longer likely to be the trigger event that engenders violence against Muslims in the Air Force. Nor am I aware of any on-going harassment against Muslims or any other religion in the Air Force. I expect all Airmen to act in a professional manner. I'm committed to ensuring all Airmen are treated fairly, with dignity and respect. And I believe other Air Force leaders share that commitment. I will continue to ensure that leaders at all levels create an environment that does not tolerate unlawful discrimination or unlawful harassment.

What is your view of the adequacy of current Air Force strategies that address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the Air Force?

The Air Force will not condone harassment or violence in the workplace against any of our Airmen. Current Air Force policy is, and will remain, zero tolerance.

Do Air Force policies regarding religious practices in the military accommodate, where appropriate, religious practices that require adherents to wear particular forms of dress or other articles with religious significance?

Our current policy is to ensure that requests for religious accommodation are welcomed and dealt with as fairly and consistently as practical throughout the Air Force. Requests for accommodation should be approved, unless approval would have a real (not hypothetical) adverse impact on military readiness, unit cohesion, standards or discipline, and therefore, disapproval of the accommodation request is in furtherance of a compelling government interest. Requests for accommodation involving the outdoor wear of religious head coverings that are not concealed under military headgear and those impacting grooming and personal appearance (e.g., hair length and style, tattoos, and "body art") must be approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower, Personnel and Services.

In your view, do these policies accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?

Yes. Air Force leaders are responsible for protecting the free exercise of religion for all Airmen and avoiding the appearance of an official endorsement of any particular religion. By promoting free exercise of religion in a manner that is respectful to other individuals' rights to follow their own belief systems, the Air Force creates a climate conducive to good order and discipline and maximum mission accomplishment.

Supporting the right of free expression relates directly to the Air Force core values and the ability to maintain an effective team. All Airmen are able to choose to practice their particular religion or subscribe to no religious belief at all.

In your opinion, do existing policies and practices regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious beliefs and the rights of other service members with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs?

I do believe the Air Force has the proper balance. Within the performance of a chaplain's primary, official duties with regard to spiritual or religious matters, there are no restrictions. With regard to public prayer, Air Force policy is that public prayer should not imply government endorsement of religion and should not usually be a part of routine, official business. Mutual respect and common sense should always be applied, including consideration of unusual circumstances and the needs of command. Further, non-denominational, inclusive prayer or a moment of silence may be appropriate for military ceremonies or events of special importance when its primary purpose is not the advancement of religious beliefs.

Aircraft Recapitalization

At times, approximately one third of the current Air Force aircraft inventory has been under some type of flight restriction, mainly due to aging aircraft problems.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the Air Force recapitalizes its aircraft inventory and how would you prioritize the recapitalization effort?

I would continue to stress that our most significant aircraft recapitalization priorities are the F-35A, the KC-46, and the long range strike bomber. In order to keep our legacy air, space, and cyberspace systems viable in the future, we must responsibly ensure funds saved through ongoing efficiency efforts are available to subsidize recapitalization efforts. We must invest in preferred munitions, modify legacy aircraft, maintain our enablers, and replace aging space assets. We need to continue our collaborative partnership with industry to make sure our requirements are clearly identified and our funding streams are consistent. Industry needs to do their part by staying on time and cost. Proceeding with these investment efforts will remain a challenge, but they are vital to the continued relevance of your Air Force.

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)

The President' FY 13 budget requested two additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) rounds, in FY13 and FY15. It is widely believed that the Air Force was the service driving this request. The Congress has chosen to not include

authorization for additional rounds of BRAC in either the House or Senate Committee version of the NDAA. Senate report language states that additional rounds of BRAC are premature until we have a better understanding of our overseas force posture and the results of the recently completed 2005 BRAC.

Do you believe additional rounds of BRAC are warranted at this time?

During BRAC 2005, I know the Air Force fell short of its goal to reduce excess capacity. Since then, we've lost approximately 500 aircraft through force structure reductions. Although I haven't been involved in the related studies, I would assume that we still have excess infrastructure. The only way I know to effectively eliminate excess infrastructure is to close installations. Therefore, if confirmed, I would fully support the Department of Defense's request for additional rounds of BRAC.

If so, how do you quantify the Air Force's excess capacity driving your decision?

DoD's 2004 report to Congress stated the AF had 24 percent excess capacity. BRAC 2005 only closed seven minor installations. That fell short of the Air Force goal for reducing capacity. In the seven years since, we've reduced our force by approximately 500 aircraft without any accompanying installation closures. Should Congress authorize additional rounds of BRAC, I will ensure that the Air Force conducts an updated capacity analysis to determine a current figure for its excess infrastructure.

Air Force Science and Technology

If confirmed, what direction would you provide regarding the importance of innovative defense science in meeting Air Force missions?

The Air Force Science and Technology (S&T) Program plays a vital role in creating compelling air, space and cyberspace capabilities for precise and reliable global vigilance, reach and power. Drawing from the Defense Strategic Guidance published in January of this year, the Air Force Strategic Plan, and the Air Force S&T Plan, and in concert with the Air Force S&T Executive, I will provide direction which focuses our S&T Program on supporting the Air Force capabilities fundamental to deterring and defeating aggression, projecting power in anti-access and area denial environments, operating in the space and cyberspace domains, and maintaining a safe, secure and effective strategic deterrent.

Do you believe the current balance between short and long-term research is appropriate to meet current and future Air Force needs?

I do. The Air Force needs high-payoff technologies to sustain our air, space, and cyberspace superiority in an increasingly competitive environment, so we invest in a broad portfolio that is balanced across the warfighter's need for near-term, rapid-reaction solutions; mid-term technology development; and revolutionary, far-term capabilities.

If confirmed, what role would you play in ensuring research priorities that will meet the needs of the Air Force in 2020?

As outlined in the Defense Strategic Guidance and other strategic analyses, the future security environment will undoubtedly require a range of agile and flexible military capabilities. To remain the world's most capable Air Force, we must correctly anticipate the emerging S&T advances that have the greatest military potential. I recognize that, if confirmed, I will play a vital role in this process through my oversight of the Air Staff and Air Force Major Commands, and as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In the face of rising acquisition costs for programs such as the Joint Strike Fighter, and programs to support space operations, if confirmed, how would you plan to ensure the protection of funding for long-term science and technology investments?

The Air Force S&T Program is a key element in making mature technologies available for transition into development programs. If confirmed, I will provide direction that focuses S&T funding investments that mature and advance the state-of-the-art in areas critical to continued United States dominance of air, space, and cyberspace.

Technical Workforce

The Air Force Research Laboratory relies on a strong technical workforce to conduct research for development of new weapons systems, platforms, and capabilities to meet its mission of: "leading the discovery, development, and integration of affordable warfighting technologies for our air and space force."

Are you concerned about the current or future supply of experts in defense critical disciplines, particularly personnel with appropriate security clearances, to hold positions in defense laboratories?

I am always concerned about maintaining an adequate supply of experts and Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM) professionals in the critical defense disciplines needed in our laboratories and elsewhere in our acquisition enterprise. In the last five fiscal years, the Air Force has been able to meet our needs by accessing more than 3,100 engineers, physical and analytical scientists. The use of Congressionally-authorized personnel and hiring authorities has improved the Air Force's ability to compete on levels of compensation and speed of hiring.

Air Force Test and Evaluation Capabilities

Over the past few years, the Air Force has proposed taking measures to significantly reduce its test and evaluation capabilities – both infrastructure and workforce. These efforts have, in general, been overturned by the Department of Defense and Congress.

Do you believe that the Air Force has test and evaluation capabilities that are excess to Department of Defense needs?

No. The Air Force strives to ensure we use and organize our test and evaluation (T&E) capabilities as efficiently as possible to meet Air Force and DoD needs within a fiscally constrained budget. We have and will continue to balance Air Force T&E capabilities, Air Force and DoD needs, the available budget, and our National interest to propose feasible and prudent adjustments.

What steps will you take to ensure that the Air Force has the appropriate testing infrastructure and qualified test workforce?

If confirmed, I will work with DoD and industry to help shape the future of our Nation's infrastructure and workforce. We will continue evaluating our T&E infrastructure and workforce requirements to identify potential efficiencies; support workforce recruiting, training, and retention programs; and focus our test infrastructure on supporting the current and future needs of the DoD acquisition community and broader National interests. Air Force T&E codifies these budget and workforce assessments annually through budget certification reports to the Test Resource Management Center in OSD.

General Officer Management Issues

Incidents of misconduct or substandard performance and findings of inspectors general and other command-directed investigations are documented in various ways in each of the services. Procedures for including and forwarding adverse and alleged adverse information in connection with the promotion selection process are set forth in title 10, United States Code, and in DOD Instruction 1320.4.

How is the Air Force ensuring compliance with requirements of law and regulation regarding review of adverse information?

We are required by law and DoD policy to present all adverse information of a credible nature to general officer promotion and Federal recognition boards. The Air Force Inspector General initiates a review of Air Force, DoD, and other government investigative files for potential adverse information on everyone meeting these boards. If substantiated adverse information is discovered, a summary of the information, plus any written comments from the officer, are placed in a senior officer unfavorable information file and attached to the officer's selection record. If the officer is selected for promotion or Federal recognition, this file stays with the officer's nomination package through its coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the White House, and the Senate.

If substantiated adverse information is discovered about an officer after selection for promotion or Federal recognition, this information will be presented to a promotion review board. The promotion review board will consider the adverse information and make a recommendation to the Secretary of the Air Force whether to continue to support the officer for appointment to the next higher

grade. If the Secretary continues to support the officer, the information will be added to the nomination package.

What standards and procedures are in place in the Air Force to ensure that allegations of adverse information relating to a nominee for promotion are brought to the attention of the Department and the Committee in a timely manner?

As stated earlier, any substantiated adverse information accompanies an officer's nomination through the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the White House, and the Senate. We perform additional checks for adverse information following the selection board, and every 60 days throughout the nomination process.

If allegations of adverse information arise after the board is complete the Air Force typically will separate the officer's name from the promotion list until the investigation is complete. If the allegations are substantiated, the Secretary will convene a promotion review board to determine if the individual should continue to be nominated for (or, if after confirmation, appointed to) the next higher grade. The Air Force always includes substantiated adverse information with its nomination packages through the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the Senate.

For three- and four-star nominations, substantiated adverse information is included in the nomination packages and the Air Force performs adverse information checks every 60 days throughout the nomination process.

Readiness Levels

What is your assessment of the current readiness of the Air Force to execute its assigned missions?

Our Airmen are the principal reason we're the world's best Air Force. They're ready for today's fight. They've performed superbly in sustained combat operations for over 20 years. But all those operations come with a cost, and we've seen a gradual decline in full-spectrum readiness since the early 1990s. The operations tempo has impacted some communities more than others, with effects most pronounced in our high demand/low supply capabilities.

What do you view as the major readiness challenges that will have to be addressed by the Air Force over the next 4 years, and, if confirmed, how will you approach these issues?

With a smaller force, the Air Force must maintain the highest possible state of readiness across the Total Force. To achieve this, we must invest to maximize full-spectrum training, reduce stress on personnel, improve fleet health and modernize and acquire critical weapons systems. Unrelenting global operational demands could limit opportunities to reset, retrain, and recover full-spectrum readiness levels for both our Airmen and the weapon systems we use to perform our missions. A reduction in operations tempo is a prerequisite to readiness recovery. The fiscal environment will add to the challenge, and tough decisions

will be required to prevent any possibility of a “hollow force” – a force structure that looks adequate on paper but in reality lacks the readiness to perform its assigned mission due to deficiencies in resources, training, or equipment. This will require a strategy-based balance between readiness, force structure, and modernization.

Investment in Facilities and Infrastructure

Air Force Leadership recently stated in testimony, "MILCON is an essential enabler of Air Force missions; however, due to fiscal constraints, we must reduce funding and accept greater risk in facilities and infrastructure in order to continue our efforts to recapitalize and modernize our aging aircraft and equipment."

In your opinion, at what point is the reduction of funding for facilities and infrastructure too much of a risk for the Air Force?

Installations underpin all Air Force operational capabilities, and serve as the platforms from which we fly, fight, and win in air, space and cyberspace. The health of those installations – the facilities, the infrastructure, and the environment that comprise our garrison and expeditionary operating locations – directly impacts operational readiness. Therefore, I believe it is important to build sustainable installations that enable Air Force core operational capabilities.

The Air Force made difficult decisions in our FY13 Budget submission in many areas, to include military construction and facilities. As part of our broader strategy, we took a deliberate pause in funding for military construction while assessing the impact associated with the force structure decisions we proposed. Our budget request also included accepting some risk with funding facility restoration and modernization at 90 percent of historic levels, and sustainment funding at slightly more than 80 percent of the Office of the Secretary of Defense-modeled requirement. Anything less than this level of investment represents significant risk to our installations.

As we look forward into FY14 and beyond, we will closely evaluate the impact of our 80 percent sustainment level to determine if we are on target and adjust as necessary. Recognizing the many upcoming combatant commander, new mission, and recapitalization needs of the Air Force, we will evaluate potential minimum funding levels for both military construction and facility restoration and modernization levels that ensure we balance investment in our installations to support the Defense Strategy by building sustainable installations that enable our core operational capabilities.

If confirmed, would you support goals established by the Department of Defense for certain levels of funding dedicated to the recapitalization and sustainment of facilities?

The Air Force must ensure that investments in the installation platforms from which we accomplish our diverse missions are balanced and sustainable. If

confirmed, I will welcome the opportunity to work in partnership with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Congress to determine sustainable levels of investment for the recapitalization and sustainment that ensure our installations are viable in the years ahead.

Unmanned Systems Management

Promotion rates for operators of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) have been on a consistently downward trend. Over the course of the last 5 years, promotion percentages from Majors Promotion Boards have declined from 96 percent to 78 percent, compared to a consistent range of between 96 and 91 percent for their peers. Education rates also consistently lag behind those for manned aircraft pilots at all levels.

Given these trends, what actions, if any, do you believe that the Air Force should take with regard to the RPA pilot career field?

Because of the rapid growth of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) capability, RPA pilots have accomplished the mission under challenging circumstances. It is concerning that promotion rates for RPA pilots are lower than the Air Force average.

The Air Force established the RPA pilot career field in May 2010. The pilots flying RPAs today come from three distinct backgrounds: "traditional" pilots from manned airframes such as F-16s, C-17s, etc.; combat systems officers; and new accessions trained specifically for this mission. The Air Force has worked to identify important milestones and career broadening opportunities for progression in the RPA career field. Recognizing that professional military education is an important part of officer development, we have re-allocated some additional professional military education slots for RPA pilots. We are also increasing the training pipeline as much as possible to expand the inventory of RPA pilots. Doing so will allow increased opportunities for career broadening.

Finally, I believe instructions given to promotion boards emphasize the fact that RPA pilots possess unique skills critical to National security and to our success in today's global environment. Those instructions also makes clear that the needs of the Air Force and combatant commanders may not have allowed RPA pilots to experience the same development opportunities and career progression as their peers.

If confirmed, I will review these issues and take actions, as necessary, to ensure we maintain a high quality RPA pilot force.

Air Force Global Strike Command

The Air Force Global Strike Command was stood up as a result of the Air Force nuclear weapons handling incident in 2007.

What areas of improvement do you believe are needed for the Air Force Global Strike Command?

The organizational changes made to reinvigorate the nuclear enterprise, especially the stand-up of Air Force Global Strike Command, have resulted in steady improvement over the past four years. Air Force Global Strike Command, as the lead for our core function of nuclear deterrence operations, has taken a proactive role in reestablishing a focus and culture of precision and reliability in the Air Force's nuclear enterprise. Their efforts have also resulted in substantial improvements in sustainment and programming. Recently, the Air Force further improved the organizational structure by transferring responsibility for the nuclear weapon storage areas from Air Force Material Command to Air Force Global Strike Command.

Air Force Global Strike Command, along with the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center and the Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration Directorate on the Air Staff, continue to mature. As we move forward, I am concerned about the resources needed to sustain and modernize our intercontinental ballistic missile and bomber forces. The strategic forces of Air Force Global Strike Command, both conventional and nuclear, need our collective support to ensure the gains which have been made since 2008 aren't temporary and to ensure the continued credibility and capability of our forces.

Lieutenant General Kowalski, the Commander of the Air Force Global Strike Command, has put a high priority on the B-52 Connect System and the SR2 radar replacement.

Do you support his efforts to have them funded in the FYDP?

To meet higher priorities in the FY13 PB, the Air Force terminated the legacy B-52 Strategic Radar Replacement (SR2) program and restructured the CONECT program to address critical sustainment issues for visual displays.

The Air Force elected to maintain the current B-52 APQ-166 radar for the near-term versus investing in a replacement radar. Analysis indicates the current B-52 radar system is sustainable through the B-52's service life (2040). If confirmed, I will revisit the feasibility of funding the SR2 program in future POMs given the anticipated increase in sustainment costs of the radar.

In the FY13 PB, the DoD restructured the B-52 CONECT program to only include replacement of critical visual displays. The B-52 Developmental Systems Office continues the baseline CONECT program development efforts.

Do you support replacing the Long Range Cruise Missile?

Yes. The Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) weapon is the follow-on to the Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) and will fill capability gaps documented in the Airborne Strategic Deterrence ICD (Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved May 2011). Initial LRSO efforts are fully funded through the Future Years Defense Program. LRSO is currently undergoing an analysis of alternatives to determine a material solution. The analysis of alternatives remains on track for completion in FY13.

Are you satisfied with the progress of the Family of Beyond Line of Site Terminals for the B-52 and B-2 and using a VLF system for secure hardened communications?

Not really...but I agree with the decisions made based on competing priorities for resource allocation. The Air Force restructured the family of beyond line of site terminals program in FY12, delaying terminal deliveries to the bomber fleet beyond the Future Years Defense Program. The B-52's secure, survivable communication capability is currently provided by their very low frequency radio. In FY13, the Air Force will begin a program to deliver a similar very low frequency capability to the B-2 fleet by 2017. Therefore, based on the reality of the resource picture, I'm satisfied with the progress of this program.

Given April 2012 Air Force Inspector General's concerns on the helicopter support to the missile fields, do you support replacing the UH-1N fleet of support helicopters?

Not at this time. A cost benefit analysis of missile field security determined that it was possible to make improvements while deferring a replacement helicopter. We've been able to decrease operational risk with investments in missile security and surveillance upgrades. In addition, we're in the process of acquiring an additional 22 UH-1Ns from the Marine Corps. We are also planning modifications to modernize and help sustain the aircraft, realigning resources to meet demand, and evaluating adjustments to tactics and procedures to maximize effectiveness.

Air Force Ability to Respond to Worldwide Contingencies

What impact, if any, do you see on the Air Force's ability to respond to worldwide contingencies as a consequence of the demands of current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Over the past 20 years of combat operations in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, the Air Force has carefully maintained the ability to respond to worldwide contingencies. We've demonstrated our ability to respond in multiple operations such as tsunami support in Southwest Asia, earthquake support to Japan, combat operations over Libya in Operation ODYSSEY DAWN, and continued airspace control alerts over the United States in Operation NOBLE EAGLE. Maintaining this capability has required the Air Force to accept some risk, as combatant command requirements exceed DoD-wide capacity for specific capabilities at times. The activity of the past 20 years has had significant impact

on the Air Force in terms of costs related to increased equipment usage and the impact of high operations tempo on Air Force personnel. Current readiness levels reflect the cumulative impact of this demand.

The Air Force remains committed to supporting global contingency requirements through the Joint Staff-led Global Force Management process and we continue to provide highly skilled, trained and ready Airmen to support the combatant commanders. We are doing this by balancing our required reset period following drawdown from Afghanistan and Iraq with the National security risk posed by global events requiring U.S. military response.

How much additional risk, if any, is the United States assuming in this regard?

The Secretary of Defense directed the implementation of Global Force Management within the DoD in 2005. One of the goals of this program is to manage and make informed decisions relative to risk, both to the services ability to sustain the force and the combatant commanders' ability to support National military objectives.

In order to mitigate these risks, we must continue to modernize our force and strengthen our alliances and partnerships. We work with allies and partners around the world to build their capacity to promote security. As the Air Force works to mitigate budget cuts over the next 10 years, we must continue to closely watch risk trends to ensure we remain responsive and effective.

Believability of Requirements

In June 2006, the Army and Air Force signed a memorandum of understanding regarding the merger of two separate small cargo aircraft programs into the C-27 Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) program. Subsequently, the Air Force testified that the Air Force had to participate in the C-27 program because only the C-27 would allow the Air Force to meet the direct support logistics requirements of the Army. This year, the Air Force testimony is that the C-130 fleet can handle the Army direct support requirements just fine without any contribution from any C-27 aircraft. Just last June, then-Under Secretary Carter certified, as part of a Nunn-McCurdy breach in the Global Hawk program that the Global Hawk Block 30 program was both essential to national security and there was no other alternative that would provide acceptable capability to meet the joint military requirement at less cost. This year, the Air Force is proposing to cancel the Global Hawk Block 30 program.

Why should the Congress put any particular faith in assertions by Air Force officials about needs and requirements when there have been such remarkable reversals in unambiguous Air Force positions on large programs?

Air Force Requirements are driven by the critical capabilities necessary to fulfill our Service mission in support of the National Military Strategy. Specific programs to meet these requirements are routinely reviewed based upon balancing risk across all 12 of our core functions within the context of the fiscal environment. In the case of the C-27J and Global Hawk Block 30, in context of the new strategy and the limitations imposed by the Budget Control Act, the Air Force made the determination that these two requirements – direct support to the Army and high altitude ISR - could be sufficiently met at lower overall cost by using the C-130 and continuing the U-2 program.

Force Provider for Cyber Command

The Commander of U.S. Cyber Command testified that his Command is far short of the number of trained personnel needed to support the Command's offensive missions. He and other officials have expressed the belief that some additional personnel for Cyber Command can be harvested through the consolidation and rationalization of the thousands of sub-networks operated by the military services and defense agencies.

What is your understanding of the personnel requirements, both military and civilian, of Cyber Command, and how do you intend to provide the needed personnel to Cyber Command?

I am not familiar with those new requirements yet, but I understand the Commander's concerns about the number of cyber specialists available to support U.S. Cyber Command missions. I will ensure the Air Force works with the Joint Staff and Cyber Command during the FY14 Program Budget Review to make available to the Command as many trained personnel as we can, based on the validated manpower requirement and our available inventory.

The Air Force's cyber component, 24th Air Force, is only about 85 percent manned. The Air Force has increased the throughput of our training pipeline to provide qualified personnel, but it will still take time to fill the need.

Do you expect that network consolidation could free up significant numbers of cyber personnel currently engaged in defensive and network management tasks to support Cyber Command's offensive missions?

Network consolidation efforts have already freed up significant numbers of cyber personnel. They have already been repurposed within the Air Force to support both offensive and defensive cyber operations roles. Although additional enterprise-level consolidation efforts will free up more personnel, we can best support US Cyber Command by first applying these savings to the existing shortfall at the Air Force cyber component.

Do you think that additional recruiting and retention authorities may be needed, and in the case of civilian personnel, additional hiring authorities, and if so what approaches would optimize the Air Force's ability to recruit and retain needed cyber specialists?

Based on current recruiting and retention rates, the Air Force has the authorities it needs to meet military cyber requirements. For civilians, we have made significant use of the Schedule-A Authority granted by the Office of Personnel Management to the DoD to staff certain cyber security positions. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the appropriate parties to further define roles, responsibilities and required manning for this emerging and complex area.

Cyber Command and Control

What is your view of the complexities involved in, and the appropriate roles of, the Geographic Combatant Commanders and the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, respectively, commanding and controlling cyberspace operations that take place in or through a Geographic Combatant Command Area of Operations when the interests of more than one Command are implicated?

Cyberspace is a man-made domain through which actions can be instantaneous and global in nature. The complexities which evolve from this domain require a delicate balance between U.S. Cyber Command's global cyber mission and its requirement to provide direct support to regional combatant commanders, whose focus requires integration of effects across all domains within their area of responsibility. We are addressing this complexity and balance through a transitional cyber command and control model which places U.S. Cyber Command cyber elements within each combatant command, allowing proper U.S. Cyber Command synchronization of cyber effects globally, while also allowing the regional combatant commanders to integrate cyber with kinetic and non-kinetic effects in support of their missions.

All of this is done in the same domain where other government entities routinely operate. Coordination, deconfliction, and synchronization are very difficult to achieve and the missions being conducted can be conflicting in nature. National cyber policy is not yet mature and there is huge potential for disagreement and disruption. While I believe all players would agree with the primacy of the Combatant Commander to make decisions relative to cyber activity and effects in a war zone, I believe they would also stipulate their support only if those effects were limited to that commander's area of operations...something that is almost impossible to guarantee in the cyber domain.

In terms of the networks provisioned and operated by the military services, what are your views about the respective roles of the military service and U.S. Cyber Command in commanding actions on those networks to determine threats and to react to them?

For example, should Cyber Command headquarters have the same level of insight into network status and configuration as the service component, and should operational orders always be executed through the service components?

Our Service role is to build and maintain Air Force networks to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Chief Information Officer standards, specifications and management guidelines, and operate and defend networks to U.S. Cyber Command standards. The Service components (in our case 24th Air Force/Air Force Cyber) maintain situational awareness of their networks, monitor those networks for threats, and respond to those threats according to standards and orders from U.S. Cyber Command. It is the responsibility of the Service component to provide situational awareness to U.S. Cyber Command, ensuring Service-specific missions and impacts are properly considered. Therefore, operational orders from U.S. Cyber Command should be executed via the Service components. Service responsibilities are two-fold: 1) to provide cyber forces through the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance to U.S. Cyber Command; and 2) to organize, train, equip, and protect networks to support Service functions.

Actions of Air Force Officials

Over the last several years, senior Air Force officers are reported to have publicly advocated the funding of a number of programs that were not included in the President's budget and for which there was no currently validated joint requirement. These programs include the procurement of additional C-17s, the continuation of the C-130J multi-year contract, and the multi-year procurement of additional F-22 aircraft. Senior Air Force officers are also alleged to have advocated a legislative proposal that would overturn a decision of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission relative to Joint Basing.

What is your view of the propriety of efforts by senior Air Force officers to advocate the funding of programs that are not included in the President's budget and for which there is no currently validated joint requirement, other than in response to a congressional request for their personal views?

Other than those occasions when individuals appear before appropriate committees of Congress and are asked to give their personal views, the military Services cannot function effectively and credibly if senior officers advocate for programs or funding of requirements that are not a part of the President's budget. While there is room for and a need for healthy debate of options and alternatives, once official decisions are made the official expression or advocacy of alternate positions must end. Otherwise, the confusion and consternation that result inhibit our ability to fund and field the approved programs.

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to curb such efforts?

If confirmed as Chief of Staff, I would work closely with the Secretary of the Air Force both to foster a healthy debate within the Air Force on the allocation of valuable resources and to ensure an understanding that only established processes and procedures for advocating program funding and priorities outside the Air Force will be used.

Strategic Nuclear Stockpile

A recent report by Global Zero, an organization advocating for the elimination of nuclear weapons, suggested that the United States could reduce the strategic nuclear stockpile to 900 warheads and eliminate the land based leg of the triad of nuclear delivery vehicles. General Norton Schwartz in response to the study stated that he disagreed with both the assessment and the study.

What is your view on the findings and recommendations of the Global Zero study?

I agree with the conclusions of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. I believe our Triad of nuclear delivery systems should be retained. As we consider future reductions in our nuclear forces, we must continue to strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries, strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and China, and assurance of our allies and partners. Toward these ends, the Nuclear Posture Review called for follow-on analysis to set goals for future nuclear reductions below the levels set in the New START. Further study, informed by the increasing complexity of the emerging 21st Century security environment, and a strategy-based analysis of the attributes needed to achieve these ends, is crucial.

Do you support the sustainment of the Minuteman III fleet through 2030?

Yes, I support sustaining the Minuteman III fleet through 2030 as mandated by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2007. The President's Fiscal Year 2013 Budget reflects the Air Force's continued commitment to invest in the enduring and compelling attributes the Nation needs for a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent force. The strength and responsiveness of the intercontinental ballistic missile force produce stability needed in today's security setting.

Do you support the effort to design and develop a next-generation land-based deterrent to replace the Minuteman III at the end of its current service life?

Yes. As the President stated in 2010, nuclear modernization requires investment for the long-term, and even in light of the new fiscal realities of the Budget Control Act, the Administration continues to pursue these programs and capabilities. The President's Fiscal Year 2013 Budget reflects the Air Force's continued commitment to invest in the enduring and compelling attributes the Nation needs for a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent force. The Air Force fully funded and is conducting the material solution analysis required to

identify the options for a follow-on intercontinental ballistic missile system. The material solution options include enhancement of the existing system, replacement of the existing system (keeping the current infrastructure), and development of a new system.

Do you believe the United States should consider unilateral nuclear reductions?

No. I believe that further U.S. nuclear reductions should be pursued within the context of negotiations—whether bilateral or multilateral. This approach is consonant with the Resolution of Ratification of the New START Treaty that calls for addressing the disparity between the tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles of the U.S. and Russian Federation by seeking a verifiable agreement. It is also in keeping with our requirements under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to pursue negotiations as the means to fulfill our nuclear obligations. Finally, negotiations provide the means to achieve assured desired reciprocal actions, verification and transparency mechanisms (which will become increasingly important as reductions continue), and provide an important venue for discussion/interaction with other nuclear-armed nations.

Acquisition Policy and Management

Despite success in awarding a contract for the procurement of replacement aerial refueling aircraft, the Air Force’s recent attempt to award a \$355 million contract for light attack aircraft for the Afghan military suggests that major challenges in how the Air Force conducts source selections persist. Members of Air Force leadership, including the Air Force Chief of Staff, have expressed serious concern about how the Air Force awarded this contract.

Do you believe that anomalies that have been identified in connection with this source selection may be indicative of systemic problems in how the Air Force procures goods and services?

No. Although I am not familiar with the details of the Light Air Support (LAS) source selection process nor the concerns with the decision itself, I do know that, as part of the Commander Directed Investigation associated with the LAS acquisition, the AF reviewed two source selections from each Air Force Materiel Command Product Center and Air Force Space Command’s Space and Missile Center to assess quality and consistency of source selection procedures implemented in other Air Force systems acquisition programs. The anomalies found in the Light Air Support source selection were not pervasive. Nonetheless, the AF is reinforcing source selection training and file management requirements enterprise-wide in support of current and future source selection decisions

If confirmed, what specific changes, if any, do you believe need to be made to the Air Force’s acquisition culture that would help ensure acquisition excellence?

Our Air Force must continue improvements, such as those that have been taken under our recapturing acquisition excellence initiative; to ensure we deliver to the warfighter those systems needed to support Joint and coalition operations in the face of significant budget reductions. Cultural changes must continue to be made internally and will take time, but we shouldn't be patient.

The Air Force and its acquisition enterprise need to be committed to a culture of efficiency and productivity in execution while pursuing robust business process improvements. This includes cultivating a culture of personal accountability while providing tools and training to the workforce that increases its business acumen, provides the Air Force with better business deals, and enables us to be better stewards of tax payer money.

The Air Force must ensure that its programs continually address affordability across their lifecycles. Our acquisition community must foster a culture of teamwork with the requirements and resource communities to ensure the programs we start have firm cost goals in place, appropriate priorities set, and the necessary analysis to make informed trade-offs to keep our programs within affordable limits. The Air Force has begun to put measures in motion to achieve these process improvements.

These are challenging times, and continuing to conduct business as usual is not an option. If confirmed, developing and improving weapon systems and automated information systems, as well as developing and retaining a professional workforce to execute the acquisition mission will remain a priority.

In April 2012, the Defense Business Board (DBB) recommended that the chiefs of the military services should be more engaged and accountable in the acquisition process.

Do you see a need for any change in the role of Chief of Staff of the Air Force in the requirements determination, resource allocation, or acquisition management processes of the Department of the Air Force?

Within the acquisition system, the Service Chiefs are responsible for development and validation of requirements and recommending the proper allocation of resources across competing portfolios to satisfy these requirements. This is firmly established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. I believe the CSAF should be personally involved in the requirements approval/change process for major weapons system programs.

What do you see as the potential advantages and disadvantages to giving the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the other service chiefs more authority and responsibility for the management and execution of acquisition programs?

The advantage of the Chiefs' expanded involvement is the opportunity to gain insight into how acquisition strategies and solutions are meeting the requirements

of the operational forces. This insight would improve the Chiefs' ability to attest to requirements affordability in order to improve program cost or schedule in a manner consistent with desired operational capability. A disadvantage is the potential blurring of the Service Acquisition Executive and the Chiefs' principle acquisition roles which might hinder the overall Service responsibility for oversight, reporting, and execution of acquisition programs. These new roles may also take away from the Chiefs' focus on military operational needs and resourcing.

What do you believe is the appropriate role of the combatant commanders in the requirements, acquisition, and resource-allocation processes?

The current role of the combatant commanders in the requirements process is appropriate. Each year, the combatant commanders submit integrated priority lists characterizing required capabilities to execute their missions. They then participate in the adjudication of actions taken on these lists through the Joint Staff's Capability Gap Analysis process. Additionally, they are standing members of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the Deputies Management Advisory Group.

Do you see a need for any change in the structure or functions of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) or the role played by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force in the JROC?

No. I believe the current structure and function of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the roles played by both the Chief and Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force are appropriate.

What is your assessment of recent revisions made by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System (JCIDS)?

I support the recent Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) revisions made by the Vice Chairman. The Air Force was energetically involved throughout the process that shaped the final outcome. At the start of the revision process, the Air Force made specific recommendations to the Chairman regarding JCIDS and has been incorporating analogous recommendations to our own processes in parallel to the JCIDS revisions. We have made significant progress, but more work needs to be done to better prioritize Joint requirements.

Test and Evaluation

What do you see as the appropriate role of the developmental and operational test and evaluation communities in the rapid acquisition, spiral acquisition, and other evolutionary acquisition processes?

I believe the role of developmental test/operational test is the same in any type of acquisition. We plan, resource and execute the most efficient blend of modeling, simulation, analysis, laboratory, and open range testing required to ensure the

contractor met its contractual obligations, the system meets its required specifications, and that the system is operationally effective and suitable. Testers are involved early in acquisition planning and requirements analysis to ensure the acquisition program baseline and requirements are feasible, executable, and effective. For rapid acquisition, this requires close coordination. These are fundamental principles that do not change regardless of the type of acquisition.

Are you satisfied with the Air Force's test and evaluation capabilities?

I am. The Air Force develops the most advanced systems in the world. Test and evaluation verifies these capabilities work before we ask our Airmen to risk their lives with them in combat. Furthermore, I expect the Air Force to maintain continuous improvements in test and evaluation. One example is in the area of rapidly emerging threats and technologies. The threat is rapidly changing. Therefore technology cannot wait and must keep ahead of the bow wave. Test and evaluation gives us assurance that we remain ahead and effective.

In which areas, if any, do you feel the Air Force should be developing new test and evaluation capabilities?

Emerging technologies and threats are opening up in areas like hypersonics and cyber warfare, both offensive and defensive, just to mention a couple of examples. Existing capabilities cannot fully exploit breakthroughs in these areas. Full exploitation requires test and evaluation capabilities above and beyond the systems they are testing and a concerted coordination effort between the Air Force, DoD, other government agencies, industry, and even foreign partners.

Section 102 of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) established a new Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental Testing (DASD-DT&E) to help ensure that the operational and developmental testing organizations in DOD and the military services are adequate to ensure an appropriate level of testing, and testing oversight, on major defense acquisition programs. Section 835 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 built on this provision by establishing new organizational and management requirements for developmental testing on major defense acquisition programs. Section 803 of the committee-reported National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 would clarify the oversight and supervisory responsibilities of the DASD-DT&E over the chief developmental testers and lead developmental test evaluation organizations of the military departments, including the responsibility for establishing policies and guidance for, and monitoring and reviewing the performance of, all developmental test components of the Department of Defense (DOD).

If confirmed, would you help ensure that the Air Force adheres to relevant guidance established by the DASD-DT&E and ensure that the Air Force promptly transmits any records or data directly to the DASD-DT&E upon request?

Yes. I'm told the Air Force has a very good working relationship with the DASD-DT&E and that we've seen great improvements in the robustness and quality of developmental testing resulting from establishment of this office. I will fully support DASD-DT&E's mission in all respects and will support the already established AF policy for this.

Some have argued that testing takes too long and costs too much. Others contest this view pointing out that testing and evaluation is an essential tool to assist in the development of weapon systems and ensure that they perform as intended. The Armed Services Committee has expressed concern that problems with weapons systems have been discovered during operational testing and evaluation that should have been discovered during developmental testing and corrected during subsequent development.

Do you believe that major defense acquisition programs are helped or hurt by cutting tests budgets and reducing the time available for developmental testing?

Overall, programs are hurt by cutting test budgets and reducing the time available for developmental test and risks are increased. Test expenditures have repeatedly been shown to consume approximately 3 percent of overall acquisition costs. Even with that small amount, we've taken steps to improve testing with statistically-based test designs and integrating the efforts of all testers to squeeze out greater efficiency.

What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Air Force's program management community and the testing and evaluation community work collaboratively and effectively in a way that maximizes the likelihood that developmental testing and evaluation will detect and identify problems timely in software and hardware to provide opportunities to correct them before production and before operational testing and evaluation begins?

Our test and acquisition communities have an overall smooth working relationship. There is a natural, healthy tension between the testers and program management which brings testers into decision making and acquisition strategy design in the earliest phases of new programs. Our integrated test teams have created increased communication and trust between testers and program managers when all information is out in the open. The benefit of this is that test and evaluation review processes and foster earlier designation and involvement of development test organizations and responsibilities. If confirmed, I will press forward with institutionalizing integrated testing as a key test design strategy.

Joint Strike Fighter

To date, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program has gone through several major restructurings that have helped reduce near-term acquisition risks by lowering annual procurement quantities within the Future Years Defense Plan and

allowing more time and resources for developmental testing. While GAO, for the second year in a row, finds that these restructurings, which most recently concluded with the completion of a technical baseline review, “should lead to more achievable and predictable outcomes”, GAO also believes concurrency change management, software development and long-term affordability remain major issues for this program.

What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in the management of the JSF program?

Should I be confirmed as CSAF, my primary role regarding the JSF will be to integrate it into the USAF, and to fulfill my Title 10 responsibilities to organize, train, and equip forces to support the combatant commanders.

While the JSF Program Office has the primary responsibility for managing development and production of the JSF, as CSAF I will retain program influence by setting USAF priorities and recommending program funding levels. I will continue to receive recurring program updates and guide USAF integration as did my predecessor. The Vice Chief and I will coordinate USAF JSF-related issues such as aircraft beddown, support, and associated USAF training. And I will very closely monitor any changes to existing requirements that drive program cost or schedule.

If confirmed, what criteria would you use in helping to determine an initial operating capability (IOC) date for the Air Force's variant of this aircraft?

The Air Force will declare IOC when the Commander of Air Combat Command determines we have achieved the appropriate milestones in aircraft and training device capability and availability, air and ground crew training and proficiency, and the development, verification, and documentation of training, tactics and maintenance procedures.

In your view, what are the major management issues associated with the development and production of the Air Force's version of this aircraft?

The major management issues, in my view, are software development and performance, concurrency change management, affordability, schedule and production quality.

The JSF software development plan is funded, is realistic, and has sufficient reserve, but there is still some risk associated with the plan. Past and present performance suggests that software is at risk of delivering late with less than planned capability. The whole air system capability (onboard flight systems, mission systems, offboard ALIS and its interfaces) is critical to meet operational requirements.

Effective management of the concurrency changes, lowering life cycle cost, and the delivery of affordable full service life jets are critical for the USAF. Changes are driven by design maturity discoveries concurrent with the production/delivery

of aircraft. The JSF Program Office is currently pursuing cost-sharing arrangements during the on-going negotiations for LRIP Lot 5 and will continue to pursue similar cost sharing language in all future contracts.

Problems with initial quality are yielding higher production costs now. Focused effort is being applied to improve quality and reduce cost. Improving quality and reducing production costs is imperative for the US and our partners.

To what extent do you believe that the Air Force may need to buy additional quantities of legacy aircraft to hedge against further slips in this program's scheduled delivery of air craft to the Air Force?

The Air Force chose to modernize and sustain 4th generation fighters as a bridge to 5th generation delays. Examples include the F-16 Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) and Combat Avionics Programmed Extension Suite (CAPES), which are more cost effective than a new F-16 purchase. Pending the results of ongoing fighter durability tests, we will continue this approach for a relatively small, but scalable, number of F-16s.

JSTARS

The Air Force has stated that JSTARS re-engining program will result in significantly improved mission capability, increased safety of flight margins, and will pay for its development and procurement costs by Air Force's own determination when including fully burdened costs, by 2018. The Analysis Of Alternatives (AoA) for ground moving target indicator capability also concluded that JSTARS alternatives are unaffordable in the near term and that the Air Force intends to continue operating the E-8C JSTARS aircraft until at least 2025—further validating the value of re-engining the JSTARS fleet. Section 146 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (P.L. 112-81), enacted into law on December 31, 2011, requires the installation of least one new engine shipset on an E-8C JSTARS operational fleet aircraft. The law also cites concerns about the significant reprogramming of funds that were specifically authorized and appropriated for the JSTARS re-engining program and directed an audit of all JSTARS funds as well as direction to spend authorized and appropriated funds for the purposes that they were intended. Moreover, the audit found that \$160.5 million was reprogrammed or the Air Force let them expire. Additionally, the Air Force Audit Agency also identified \$38.8 million of unexpended funds for JSTARS re-engining. The audit states that the Air Force estimated cost to complete the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) and to install one new engine shipset on a E-8C JSTARS aircraft totals \$35 million.

If confirmed, will you comply with the requirements of section 146 which requires the Air Force to install at least one new engine shipset on a E-8C JSTARS operational fleet aircraft?

I have not been involved at all with this issue and do not sufficiently understand the details. If confirmed, I will become familiar with the requirements of Section

146 and address congressional concerns with Air Force compliance within the requirements of that section.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress? Yes

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power? Yes

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force? Yes

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees? Yes

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic communications, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents? Yes