

Advance Questions for Lieutenant General Douglas M. Fraser, USAF
Nominee for Commander, United States Southern Command

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

ANSWER: No.

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

ANSWER: I do not have any recommendations for modifications to the Goldwater-Nichols provisions. If confirmed and if I see a need for modifications, I will not hesitate to make appropriate recommendations.

Relationships

Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U.S. Southern Command, to the following:

The Secretary of Defense

ANSWER: The Commander is responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for accomplishing the military missions assigned to him and exercising command authority over forces assigned to him by the Secretary of Defense.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

ANSWER: The Deputy Secretary of Defense performs duties as delegated by the Secretary and exercises the duties of the Secretary in his absence. The Commander communicates regularly with the Deputy Secretary and provides the information and support the Deputy Secretary needs to accomplish his job.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

ANSWER: The Commander does not have a direct command relationship with the Under

Secretary of Defense for Policy. The Commander routinely interacts with, exchanges information, and coordinates with the Under Secretary on strategic policy issues.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

ANSWER: The Commander does not have a direct command relationship with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. The Commander does interact with, exchange information, and coordinate with the Under Secretary as needed to set and meet intelligence requirements for the command's area of focus.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

ANSWER: The Commander does not have a direct command relationship with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, but routinely exchanges information and coordinates on issues of mutual concern.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities

ANSWER: The Commander does not have a direct command relationship with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. The Commander routinely exchanges information and coordinates on issues of mutual concern.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America's Security Affairs

ANSWER: The Commander does not have a direct command relationship with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America's Security Affairs but routinely exchanges information and coordinates on homeland defense matters.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

ANSWER: The Chairman serves as the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense and is a key communication link between the Combatant Commanders and the President. The Southern Command Commander keeps the Chairman apprised of significant events and issues in his area of focus to enable the Chairman to perform his critical role.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

ANSWER: The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping forces in their departments for assignment to the Combatant Commanders. They are responsible for the administration and support of these forces. The Commander does not have a direct command relationship with the Service Secretaries, but routinely exchanges information and coordinates on issues of mutual concern.

The Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps and Chief of Staff of the Air Force

ANSWER: The Service Chiefs are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping forces for assignment to the combatant commands. The Commander routinely discusses issues and concerns with the Service Chiefs and works closely with them to understand service capabilities, discuss combatant command requirements, and effectively employ service capabilities in

conducting the U.S. Southern Command mission.

The other Combatant Commanders, particularly U.S. Northern Command

ANSWER: The Commander, U.S. Southern Command maintains a close relationship with the other Combatant Commanders, especially U.S. Northern Command, closely coordinating issues of mutual concern, maintaining frequent contact, and exchanging information. When directed or specified by the Secretary of Defense, the relationship between Combatant Commanders becomes formal for the planning and execution of specific operational plans.

U. S. Chiefs of Mission within the U. S. Southern Command area of responsibility

ANSWER: The Commander does not have a formal relationship with the Chiefs of Mission. The respective U.S. Ambassador is responsible for directing and supervising all U.S. government activity in the host nation, with the exception of those military activities under the Combatant Commander's direction. The Geographic Combatant Commander routinely discusses and coordinates issues and concerns of mutual interest with the Chief of Mission within the host nation. The Combatant Commanders direct and coordinate U.S. military activity throughout their areas of responsibility, negotiating force protection arrangements with Chiefs of Mission, as appropriate. If confirmed, I intend to maintain close coordination and contact with the Chiefs of Mission throughout the U.S. Southern Command area of focus. In addition, I will continue to host annual sub-regional conferences with the Chiefs of Mission to exchange regional information and perspectives.

Director of National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President

ANSWER: The Commander does not have a direct command relationship with the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. The Commander interacts with, exchanges information, and coordinates with the Director as needed to set and meet counter-narcotics requirements and policy for the command's area of focus.

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. Southern Command?

ANSWER: The Commander, U.S. Southern Command is responsible for directing the missions assigned by the President and the Secretary of Defense, to include conducting military operations, logistical support, and joint training of assigned military forces. The Commander, U.S. Southern Command is responsible for conducting these operations within his assigned area of focus which includes 31 nations and 10 territories.

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

ANSWER: I am honored the President nominated me to be the Commander, U.S. Southern Command. Over the past three and a half decades, I have served in a variety of Air Force and joint assignments, in both operational and staff positions. If confirmed, these experiences have prepared me well to meet the challenges and opportunities of commanding U.S. Southern

Command.

I commanded a fighter squadron in the Pacific, a combined air operations group in the U.S., including periods of combat operations during Operation Southern Watch, a combined air wing supporting worldwide airlift and providing forces for combatant command operations, the Space Warfare Center, and simultaneously commanded four organizations in Alaska, including a bi-national NORAD region, a PACOM sub-unified command, a NORTHCOM joint task force, and a USAF numbered air force. My current position has given me the experience and insight of helping to direct the operation of a geographic combatant command. In addition to this experience, I served in various staff positions on the Headquarters, U.S. Air Force staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff, the U.S. Pacific Command staff, and the Air Force Space Command staff. These jobs have enabled me to observe and participate in joint, international, and interagency strategy and policy development as well as have given me the opportunity to engage with international partners across the Asia Pacific, to include military engagement with representatives from Chile and Mexico.

In addition to military experience, I lived in Bogota, Colombia for three years and graduated from high school there. While I need to regain proficiency, I have a working level knowledge of Spanish. As a result of my time in Colombia, I have maintained a life-long interest in and affinity for Latin America and the Caribbean. I also visited Central America while assigned to Twelfth Air Force in the mid-1980s and visited Central and South America in early 2002 as part of a CAPSTONE trip.

Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, U. S. Southern Command?

ANSWER: If confirmed, I will engage with key leaders and personnel within the Executive and Legislative branches of the U.S. government to better understand United States policies and interests in the U.S. Southern Command area of focus. I will engage with government and military leaders of the nations throughout the region to understand their perspectives and concerns. I will engage with experts in academia, the media, and think tanks around the U.S. and in Latin America and the Caribbean to understand the complexities of the issues impacting the region. I will engage with the commanders of other U.S. combatant commands to better understand operational integration across combatant command seams. Finally, I will continue to study and enhance my proficiency in Spanish and familiarize myself with Portuguese.

Major Challenges

If confirmed as the Commander of the U. S. Southern Command, you will be responsible for all military operations in that region. These include operations supporting homeland defense and security, the Department's counter-narcotics efforts in the source nations and transit zone, detainee and interrogation operations at Guantanamo Bay, security of the Panama Canal, and development of democratic values within the military organizations of the region. If confirmed, you will be pursuing these missions amidst an economic downturn and the threat of a pandemic, and at a time when the region appears to be

moving away from democracy in some nations and growing increasingly unstable in other nations.

In your view, what are the major challenges and problems you would confront if confirmed as the next Commander, U. S. Southern Command?

ANSWER: I do not foresee any imminent conventional military threat to the United States in the region. However, other security challenges are present, including narco-terrorism, illicit trafficking, crime, and natural disasters. In addition, transnational radical extremist organizations in the region are actively engaged with fundraising and logistics support for their parent organizations.

Narco-terrorist networks are active throughout the region. These networks include domestic narco-terrorists, such as the FARC in Colombia and the Shining Path in Peru. These groups undermine democratic governments, terrorize populations, impede economic development, and hinder domestic and regional stability.

Global illicit trafficking remains a significant transnational security threat in the region. Illicit trafficking undermines domestic and regional stability in much the same manner as narco-terrorism.

Islamic radical terrorist networks are also active, primarily involved in fundraising and logistical support for parent organizations based in the Middle East, such as Hizballah and Hamas.

Still another challenge to watch is the nexus between these two groups in which well resourced narco-traffickers coordinate their activities with terrorist networks and vice versa..

Underlying the security challenges mentioned above, poverty, income inequality, and lack of opportunity drive social unrest and corruption, fostering many of the region's public security challenges. These conditions make societies vulnerable to the influence of illicit activity – such as drugs, crime, gangs, and illicit immigration. Such conditions are aggravated by the region's economic downturn.

If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges and problems?

ANSWER: If confirmed, I will work with the U.S. interagency and partner nations to enhance our mutual capability to address the region's security challenges. The challenges we face affect all the nations in the region and require collaborative, interagency and international solutions. I will continue to evaluate, assess and execute the U.S. Southern Command's comprehensive regional plan to address the illicit trafficking problem plaguing the region. I will continue to reach out to the militaries in the region, encourage regional engagement and train, exercise, and partner as appropriate, to address regional security concerns. In addition, I will continue to reach out to those militaries in countries that have been distancing themselves from the U.S. to encourage military engagement.

Finally, if confirmed, I will maintain a command focus on the detention facility in Guantanamo

Bay to ensure all laws, regulations, and policies are followed until the last detainee departs the facility and the detention facility is closed.

What actions would you propose to counter the growing threat to democracy in the region?

ANSWER: I think the key to countering the threat to democracy in the region is continuing to improve the security, stability and adherence to the rule of law by nations in the region. U.S. Southern Command can improve security and stability in the region by continuing to build partner nation security capacity consistent with the command's Theater Security Cooperation program. Improving security and stability creates the conditions necessary for improving adherence to the rule of law, which in turn fosters and preserves democracy. U.S. Southern Command is only a part of the solution, however, because effectively countering threats to democracy requires the U.S. to continue a whole-of-government approach. If I am confirmed, I will work closely with the other federal agencies and our regional partners to support and encourage the continued growth of democracy in the region. In addition, I will constantly evaluate and assess the command's Theater Security Cooperation program, adjusting it as required, to support U.S. and regional efforts to support democracy. My intent, if confirmed, will be to continue the command's efforts to make U.S. Southern Command an indispensable regional partner.

What is your assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of military-to-military exchange programs and contacts in the U. S. Southern Command area of responsibility (AOR)?

ANSWER: I think U.S. Southern Command maintains a strong military-to-military exchange program. They use the full set of available tools to conduct their program, including a robust State Partnership program, an innovative Partnership of the America's maritime engagement operation, and continuing military exchanges, totaling 845 events in 2008. If confirmed, I will work hard to enhance and increase these important military-to-military programs.

Interagency Organization Model

The SOUTHCOM command structure was reorganized into an interagency model, where officials detailed from other agencies, such as the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), are embedded as staff members within the command. U.S. Africa Command has adopted a similar organizational structure.

Please discuss your views of this new command structure model?

ANSWER: From my understanding, U.S. Southern Command reorganized to become a more interagency-oriented command in order to better meet its mission. Many of the underlying challenges in the region fall under the lead of other U.S. agencies and the complexity of coordinating and working to address these challenges only reinforces the need for coordinated interagency solutions.

As I understand it, this new organization enables U.S. Southern Command to collaborate proactively with U.S. executive branch agencies and departments and with partner nations in the

region—improving collective responses to regional and transnational security challenges. The new structure also created the position of Civilian Deputy to the Commander, who is a Senior Foreign Service Officer from the State Department and a former Chief of Mission from the area of focus.

In my view, this new command structure assists U.S. Southern Command in synchronizing its activities with ongoing whole-of-government approaches in the region, and ensures it continues to conduct military operations with an unbroken and capable military chain of command and authority.

Based on your understanding of this new interagency command structure, if confirmed, what changes, if any, would you consider making regarding the command structure and what metrics would you use to make a determination?

ANSWER: If confirmed, I will examine the organization closely to understand its operation and assess its effectiveness. My study of U.S. Southern Command indicates the command, through a directorate specifically designed to assess its processes and activities, regularly evaluates its effectiveness and makes changes as needed to improve its capability to direct its operations.

Counter-Narcotics Efforts

Each year the Department of Defense spends several hundred million dollars to counter the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, yet the availability of drugs on the street has not been significantly reduced, and some countries continue to face internal security challenges in responding to this threat. Much of these funds are executed within the SOUTHCOM AOR, and some have questioned the effectiveness and focus of our counter-narcotics programs.

What is your assessment of the ongoing counter-narcotics operations within the SOUTHCOM AOR?

ANSWER: As I understand it, while many challenges remain, counter-narcotics operations in the U.S. Southern Command area of focus are providing a positive impact on the comprehensive U.S. government program.

If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose?

ANSWER: If confirmed, I will regularly assess the situation and evaluate ways to improve U.S. Southern Command's role in the program. Based on my initial impression, I will continue U.S. Southern Command's work to strengthen its already strong coordination and communication with U.S. federal agencies and with partner nations. I will continue to engage with our partner nations and help them improve their counter-narcotics capabilities. I will continue to build on command successes to date, continue to enhance our national and international efforts to anticipate and adjust to changes in illicit drug activity, and continue to improve counter-narcotics cooperation and focus across the region, as well as with other combatant commands.

How would you recommend that the success of the Department's counter-narcotics programs be measured?

ANSWER: No single DoD measure can effectively gauge the success of a counter-narcotics program which encompasses diverse elements from across the U.S. and international governments. As the lead agency for counter-narcotics detection and monitoring in the source and transit zones, the DoD concentrates on successful detection of illicit drug activity and, as appropriate, supports resultant endgame operations. Last year, for example, U.S. Southern Command's Interagency Task Force stopped more than 228 metric tons of cocaine and helped facilitate the capture, by U.S. law enforcement or partner nation organizations, of 317 drug traffickers. In addition, the DoD trained and provided logistical support to partner nations' militaries and law enforcement agencies, substantially improving their counter-narcotic capabilities. While such efforts are only part of a comprehensive program, they demonstrate the positive impact the DoD is making in regional counter-narcotics efforts.

Do you believe that the current programs that the Department is pursuing are the most effective for the region, or should the Department's efforts focus elsewhere?

ANSWER: The Department of Defense constantly evaluates its programs and seeks ways to improve results. DoD's focus is on detection and monitoring operations. Its programs complement other U.S. programs, such as the Department of State's eradication and economic development programs. All these programs must complement and support each other to work across the entire illicit narcotics enterprise--production, transportation, consumption, treatment, and education--to produce effective results. I think the current Department of Defense programs are appropriately synchronized with other agency efforts, but if confirmed, I will continue to explore ways to improve coordination and increase DoD's efficiency and effectiveness working across interagency requirements.

Compared to other missions that you would be responsible for as Commander, U. S. Southern Command, if confirmed, where would you rank counter-narcotics in terms of its contribution to our national security and the ability of the Department of Defense to make a meaningful contribution?

ANSWER: One of my top priorities, if confirmed, will be supporting the broad U.S. struggle against violent extremism. My understanding is that some of the drug trafficking networks in Latin America have extremist group affiliations, and at least a portion of drug trafficking profits may be transferred by extremist network members to their parent terrorist groups. Because of this, the counter-narcotics mission and the struggle against violent extremism are intertwined. I think the Defense Department should continue to support U.S. and partner nation drug enforcement efforts, working to deny narco-traffickers the capability to maintain terrorist group affiliations through their narcotics trade.

West Africa has emerged as a key player in the trafficking of drugs from Latin American to Europe. Latin American drug cartels are taking advantage of poor countries like

Guinea Bissau that have weak central governments, as well as corrupt and inept law enforcement agencies, that are unable to control their coasts and ports.

In your view, what is the most effective way for U.S. Africa Command and SOUTHCOM to collaborate along this seam between your respective Commands?

ANSWER: From what I've studied, over the past year JIATF-S worked closely with U.S. Africa Command to share information and help them build an effective counter-narcotics organization. Additionally, in an effort to directly improve the coordination between U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Africa Command, the two commanders and staffs recently held staff talks that brought together all levels of both commands, from action officer through senior leadership, to discuss this issue along with several other topics. Staff counterparts across the commands work on a one-to-one basis on everything from actionable drug interdiction information to collaborative papers. If confirmed, I intend to continue this close collaboration and information sharing, and where it makes sense, coordinate activities between the two combatant commands.

There has been a surge in drug-related violence in Mexico over the past year, which has increased the risk of cross-border violence into the United States. Much of the drug supply comes into Mexico across its southern border. While Mexico is in the U.S. Northern Command AOR, the rest of Latin America is in the SOUTHCOM AOR. So the security situation in Mexico is an example of the need for a well-coordinated effort between NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM.

What is your vision of how SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM could work together in a fully coordinated and seamless fashion with respect to Mexico and other security challenges?

ANSWER: The drug-related violence in Mexico remains unsettling. As indicated, the flow of drugs starts in South America and passes through Central America. I'm told that U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Northern Command collaborate regularly to deal with this and other security issues. For example, the two commands held a major coordination conference last year, use liaison officers for daily collaboration, have a Joint Operating Area through JIATF-S where they collaborate in real time on illicit trafficking interdiction, and share information on countries of mutual interest under the new Unified Command Plan. If confirmed, I will continue the close coordination between U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Northern Command to address illicit trafficking and other security challenges.

The United States and Mexico announced in 2007, the start of a multiyear, bilateral security agreement called the Mérida Initiative. This Initiative aims to combat drug trafficking and other criminal activity along the U.S.-Mexican border, as well as in Central America. The U.S.-Mexican border is viewed as especially important for U.S. counternarcotics efforts because Mexico is currently the primary point of entry for cocaine and other drug shipments smuggled into the United States.

What is your understanding of the Mérida Initiative as it relates to Central America and the role of U.S. SOUTHCOM?

ANSWER: My understanding is that in addition to providing assistance to Mexico, Mérida provides assistance to Central America, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The Central America portion of the Merida Initiative is a comprehensive public security package that works to tackle insecurity in Central America by more effectively addressing criminal gangs, improving information sharing between countries in the region, modernizing and professionalizing the police forces, expanding maritime interdiction capabilities, and reforming the judicial sector in order to restore and strengthen confidence in those institutions by the citizens in the region. The U.S. Southern Command's specific role in Mérida is improving maritime security capacity with such things as improved radios and interceptor speed boats. If confirmed, I will continue to support these programs to help build the capacity of partner nations to improve regional security and counter illicit trafficking activities.

U.S. assistance has focused mainly on four strategic pillars: (1) eradication of coca and opium poppy crops, (2) illegal drug interdiction, (3) alternative development to provide coca and opium poppy farmers other sources of income, and (4) institution-building to train security forces and to strengthen democratic governance capacity. Supporters of the program argue that U.S. assistance has been vital to building foreign government counter-narcotics capacities. Critics often question the program's effectiveness to reduce the amount of cocaine and heroin entering the United States, because the Andean region still accounts for the production of virtually all of the world's cocaine and increasing amounts of high-quality heroin. Some also criticize the program for excessively emphasizing supply-side eradication and interdiction, especially in Colombia, without sufficient focus on economic development, institution building, and public and private sector reform.

What is your assessment of this issue and, if confirmed, where do you believe the funds dedicated to combating the narcotics trade in the SOUTHCOM AOR can most effectively be used?

ANSWER: The counter-narcotics effort requires a whole-of-government approach; no one pillar alone can accomplish the job. While U.S. Southern Command through JIATF-S and its other components is responsible for counter-narcotics detection and monitoring throughout its area of focus, other U.S. government agencies have the lead on supply-side eradication, interdiction, economic development, institution building, and public and private sector reform. I think the U.S. should continue this multi-pronged approach and continue pursuing coordinated efforts.

If confirmed, how would you work with respective Chiefs of Mission to accomplish your objectives?

ANSWER: If confirmed, I will communicate often and coordinate closely with the Chiefs of Mission to accomplish U.S. objectives in the counter-narcotics effort.

Building Partner Capacity within the SOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility

In the past few years, Congress has provided DoD a number of temporary authorities to

provide security assistance to partner nations. These include the global train and equip authority (“Section 1206”) and the security and stabilization assistance authority (“Section 1207”). Some have argued that security assistance has traditionally been a State Department responsibility and that these programs ought to be transferred from the Department of Defense to the Department of State.

What should be our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations?

ANSWER: U.S. strategic objectives in building partner capacity are to increase the capacity of the armed forces in our partner nations to address the security challenges within their territories, increase their capability to help each other solve cooperative security challenges and promote security cooperation among all partner nations in the region.

Do these objectives differ by region, e.g., do our objectives within the PACOM AOR differ from those in the SOUTHCOM AOR?

ANSWER: In my view, while the specific capacities desired for specific countries or sub-regions within each command’s AOR may differ, the objectives of both programs are the same.

What is your understanding of the purpose of the Section 1206 global train and equip authority?

ANSWER: I understand that Section 1206 authority enables Combatant Commanders, in coordination with U.S. Ambassadors to host nations in which specific 1206 activities are proposed, to build partner nation capacity by rapidly training and equipping their armed forces to conduct counter-terrorism or stability operations against urgent or emergent threats.

What is the relationship of the global train and equip authority to other security assistance authorities, such as DOD counter-narcotics assistance and foreign military financing?

ANSWER: In my view, Section 1206 authority is one of many tools available to Combatant Commanders to use in a whole-of-government approach to their region's security challenges. All these tools are used together to enhance regional security. The DoD counter-narcotics assistance program builds partner nation capacity and coordinates regional counter-narcotic activities to counter illicit drug trafficking. Foreign military financing helps build long-term relationships that provide access and cooperation in the region. Section 1206 builds operational capability in the armed forces of partner nations to enable them to conduct effective counter-terrorism operations within their borders and with other nations to counter emergent threats. In my view, U.S. Southern Command uses its various authorities to coordinate multiple activities with other federal interagency partners and Chiefs of Mission to build an effective whole-of-government approach to regional security challenges.

What should be done to ensure that the global train and equip authority does not duplicate the efforts of these other assistance programs?

ANSWER: Host country funding and FMF plans are included when Combatant Commanders build a Section 1206 proposal. These proposals are coordinated directly with each host nation U.S. Ambassador to deconflict the activities of various assistance programs. If confirmed, I will continue this close coordination between the Defense Department and the State Department to

provide safeguards against duplicating efforts.

What is your understanding of the purpose of the security and stabilization assistance authority (“Section 1207”)?

ANSWER: I understand that Section 1207 provides authority for the Defense Department to transfer to the State Department up to \$100 million per fiscal year in defense articles, services, training or other support for reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities in foreign countries.

Terrorism Threat from Caribbean and Central America

In your view, what is the extent of the current threat of terrorist extremists from the Caribbean and Central America?

ANSWER: Terrorist activity in the Caribbean and Central America is generally limited to fundraising and logistics. While terrorism emanating from the region is rare, the presence of individuals with operational terrorism experience is cause for concern. Such concern is further justified in light of the impending NY trial of individuals from Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana, who allegedly plotted to blow up gas pipelines into JFK Airport. If confirmed, I will keep U.S. Southern Command vigilant to detect and defend against terrorist threats to the U.S. and our partners.

How would you broadly characterize the terrorism threat – low, medium, or high?

ANSWER: I understand that extremist organizations are active in Latin America and the Caribbean, primarily focused on fundraising and logistics support for parent organizations in the Middle East. However, as the alleged plot described in the answer above indicates, there are individuals in the region who are interested in doing harm to the U.S. For that reason, I would characterize the threat as low to medium.

Haiti

The United Nations (U.N.) Security Council voted unanimously on October 14, 2008, to extend the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Haiti for one year. Haiti continues to experience turmoil and instability.

How would you characterize the current military, economic, and political situation in Haiti?

ANSWER: Haiti remains relatively calm, but security challenges continue to impact this fragile democracy. The 2008 hurricane season decimated Haiti with four consecutive tropical weather events. Recovery has been slow, and another such hurricane season could be devastating for the country. The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) continues to perform well and is the major force keeping criminal elements in check. My understanding is that several nations in the region have participated, are actively participating, or are interested in participating in this important UN mission.

How do you assess the security situation in Haiti now, and what is your estimate of how the situation will look in six months?

ANSWER: The potential for violence remains present in Haiti, but because of the successes of the MINUSTAH forces, violence will remain in check. As I understand it, the 7000 plus MINUSTAH troops and 2000 UN civilian police fill the gap left by inadequate force levels and capabilities of the Haitian National Police. As long as MINUSTAH remains in country while police forces are being recruited and trained, violence will remain manageable.

What conditions or indicators do you consider important in determining whether there will be another wave of Haitian emigration?

ANSWER: In the first quarter of calendar year 2009, I understand that migration from Haiti increased when compared to the same period of 2008. This increase in migration was caused primarily by the downturn in the global economy and the ravages of last year's hurricane season. The potential for mass migration from Haiti is largely conditioned by Haitian perceptions of how quickly they will be interdicted and repatriated by the U.S. Coast Guard and/or other U.S. authorities. If they perceive they will be quickly interdicted and repatriated, mass migration, as I understand it, will be lower. Another condition that reduces potential mass migration is Haiti's capability to ensure individual safety and provide jobs.

Cuba

Recently, President Obama announced authorization for unlimited travel and money transfers for Americans with relatives in Cuba and an easing of restrictions on telecommunications.

What is your view of the need for review and, potentially, revision of U. S. policies regarding Cuba?

ANSWER: I think U.S. policy, including our policy toward Cuba, should be periodically reviewed. As appropriate, if confirmed, I will be ready to implement any changes to U.S. policy.

What is your opinion about the need for, and the pros and cons of, military-to-military contact with Cuba?

ANSWER: In general, I think military-to-military engagement with any nation's armed forces is valuable, consistent with U.S. law and policy. Under current Helms-Burton legislation, any significant military engagement with Cuba must be met with Cuban willingness to discuss Defense Policy, military subordination to democratically elected leadership, and military disengagement from domestic economic policy. Currently, the only military-to-military contacts I am aware of with Cuba are administrative "fence-line" meetings conducted by the Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay and his Cuban military counterparts. If confirmed, I will continue to assess the value of military engagement with Cuba, consistent with U.S. law and policy.

Guantanamo Bay

If confirmed as Commander of U.S. SOUTHCOM, what do you see as the major operational challenges to implementing the President's January 22, 2009, Executive Order directing the closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility?

ANSWER: From what I've studied, logistics and security are the major operational challenges of closing the detention facility. The specifics of the logistical and security challenges will be worked as the final placement of detainees is determined. If confirmed, I will ensure U.S. Southern Command continues close coordination with the joint community, the interagency, and multinational partners to provide the safe and humane care, custody, and transport of detainees as directed by the Secretary of Defense, consistent with U.S. law and policy.

Regardless of the outcome of ongoing discussions on closing the Guantanamo Bay detention facility, what is your assessment of the value of this military base? Is it a strategic asset for SOUTHCOM?

ANSWER: The U.S. Naval Station, on which the detention facility is located, is a separate command with a separate mission from that of the detention facility. For example, the Naval Station supports the Department of Homeland Security in the event of a mass migration. The Naval Station, with its airfield and port, remains an important strategic facility for the United States and should remain open long after the detention facility closes.

Venezuela

U. S. -Venezuelan relations have continued to be strained as President Chavez continues to propagate anti-American rhetoric, import increasing amounts of military armament, politicize the Venezuelan military forces, and export his brand of populism to the region.

What is your view of President Chavez's intentions in the region?

ANSWER: I think President Chavez seeks to establish Venezuela as the leader of a broad anti-U.S. populist movement throughout the region and is working to limit U.S. influence and engagement.

How would you characterize the current state of military-to-military relations between the U. S. and Venezuela?

ANSWER: I understand military-to-military relations with Venezuela are minimal, despite U.S. Southern Command efforts to maintain interaction and dialogue. U.S. Southern Command invites Venezuela to regional military events, including international and regional military forums, but they have not attended lately. Joint Interagency Task Force South maintains an opening for a Venezuelan liaison officer; however, Venezuela has chosen not to fill that position for over a year. If confirmed, I will continue to seek engagement opportunities with the Venezuelan military.

What role do you see President Chavez playing in national elections throughout the U. S. Southern Command's area of operations?

ANSWER: I think President Chavez will continue to support political parties, grass-roots organizations and anti-U.S. candidates throughout the region who support his populist program and his anti-U.S. stance. Currently, lower oil prices have limited the Government of Venezuela's ability to support this effort.

How would you assess Venezuelan relations with China, Cuba, Iran, and Russia vis-à-vis the national interests of the United States?

ANSWER: I think Venezuela is strengthening its ties with Cuba, China, Iran, and Russia. President Chavez recently visited China, during which the PRC leadership recognized Venezuela as a "strategic partner." In addition, Iranian President Ahmadinejad has made a number of visits to Venezuela, signing an agreement on military cooperation and agreeing to establish several multi-billion dollar investments. Russia has also been active with Venezuela. During a visit to Venezuela last year, Russian Navy ships conducted a naval exercise of limited scope with the Venezuelan Navy. If confirmed, I will monitor developments in Venezuelan relations closely, particularly as they relate to U.S. national security interests.

Bolivia

In the past few years, Bolivia has experienced extreme political unrest and, lately, President Morales has taken some positions that could complicate U.S. relations with Bolivia.

How do you assess the situation in Bolivia and, if confirmed, how would you seek to accomplish the goals of combating drug trafficking and enhancing military engagement goals?

ANSWER: In October 2008, President Morales declared the U.S. Ambassador persona non grata and also evicted U.S. DEA representatives from Bolivia. Under President Morales, U.S. relations with Bolivia continue to erode while Bolivia's relations with Venezuela, Cuba and Iran improve. In addition, despite earlier cooperation with the U.S. in the interdiction of narcotics, Bolivia is now the world's third largest producer of coca. My understanding is that military-to-military relations with Bolivia continue to deteriorate despite U.S. Southern Command and country team efforts to remain engaged. If confirmed, I will promote limited military-to-military relationships with the Bolivian armed forces, to include educational programs, conferences, and seminars in line with U.S. government policy towards Bolivia.

Panama

How do you assess the current political and economic situation in Panama?

ANSWER: Panama is a stable country with a strong economy.

To what extent do you assess that the Panamanian government attempts to interdict the drug flow out of South America through Panama?

ANSWER: My understanding is that Panama, within the constraints of their resources, actively cooperates with U.S. counter-drug efforts to stem the flow of drugs through their country.

What is your assessment of how Panama is protecting and maintaining the Panama Canal?

ANSWER: The Panama Canal is a significant strategic waterway and plays a significant role in global trade. The complex endeavor of operating and protecting the Canal is a top priority of the Panamanian government. Addressing this challenge, I understand that Panama continues investing in technology and security training to enhance its defensive ability and continues working with regional allies to protect the Canal. As you know, U.S. Southern Command annually conducts Exercise PANAMAX, a joint, multinational training exercise focused on defending the Panama Canal. Last year, PANAMAX was U.S. Southern Command's largest and most comprehensive exercise to date with 20 participating nations.

How vulnerable is the Panama Canal to attack by terrorists, and what would be the consequences of an attack to U. S. national security interests?

ANSWER: The Panama Canal is the most important infrastructure in U.S. Southern Command's area of focus. The Canal is economically important to the world and critical to the people of Panama. Two-thirds of the goods that pass through the Canal are moving to or from U.S. ports. The disruption of Canal operations would create a significant impact on global commerce as well as the U.S. economy.

Securing the Canal is a complex challenge. The Panama Canal Authority Security Division is responsible for securing the Canal. In addition, U.S. Southern Command and many of the armed forces in Latin American work together to ensure the Canal's security. Annually, U.S. Southern Command conducts a multinational exercise, PANAMAX, providing a critical training exercise focused on defending the Canal. It is the primary example of the regional cooperative security efforts focused on keeping the Canal secure.

Forward Operating Locations

One of the elements of the regional counter-narcotics strategy is the United States Southern Command's establishment of forward operating locations (FOLs) in the source and transit zone.

In your view, what is the role that these FOLs play in the Department's counter-narcotics efforts?

ANSWER: Now called Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs), my understanding of U.S. Southern Command's CSLs is that they provide strategic basing for the conduct of regional counter-narcotic detection and monitoring operations. Because forward bases are closer to the narcotic operation source and transit areas, CSLs increase the mission effectiveness of detection and monitoring operations because they significantly reduce aircraft transit time to and from the search areas. The CSLs in Curaçao and Aruba, Netherlands Antilles, and in Comalapa, El Salvador remain critical to the success of the detection and monitoring mission.

In your view, does current use continue to justify the costs of sustaining these locations?

ANSWER: I think the cost of supporting the CSLs is justified. As I mentioned earlier, U.S. Southern Command's task force stopped more than 228 metric tons of cocaine in 2008. In my estimate, if U.S. Southern Command were asked to provide the same results without operating from CSLs, the cost of operations would be significantly higher because the number of aircraft and the number of flight hours required to accomplish the mission would be much higher.

What assurances do we have from host nations that these locations will continue to be available to us, and under what conditions?

ANSWER: Beyond the current ten year agreements, there are no assurances from any of the host nations. My understanding is that our relationships with host countries, the Dutch government (in the case of Aruba/Curacao), the El Salvadoran government (in the case of Comalapa), and the Honduran government (in the case of Soto Cano, JTF-B) are strong. These agreements provide mutual benefit. If confirmed, I support continuing these operating agreements.

Since 1999, the U.S. has operated an Air Force counter drug unit out of a Forward Operation Location in Manta, Ecuador. However, last year, the Government of Ecuador decided the U.S. military was no longer welcome. According to the U.S. Ambassador in Ecuador, all U.S. personnel and equipment must be out of the country before November. At present, no new location for a similar base has been confirmed.

What is your understanding of the status of our transition from Eloy Alfaro Air Base in Manta, Ecuador to an alternative location?

ANSWER: It is my understanding that the Government of Ecuador fulfilled its agreement allowing the U.S. to conduct counter-drug operations out of Manta through 2009. They chose not to renew that agreement. If confirmed, I'll ensure U.S. Southern Command acts as a good tenant and leaves Manta in improved condition. From my understanding, the current turnover plan calls for a cessation of operations by mid-July to allow for an orderly turnover of facilities by the end of September 2009.

I'm told that the base at Manta provided a unique set of capabilities that are difficult to replace in a single location. I understand U.S. Southern Command is looking at several options to mitigate the loss of Manta and, if confirmed, I will review the results of this assessment and work to find the best solutions.

What is your assessment of whether maintaining a presence on the Pacific Coast is critical to U.S. counter-narcotics activities?

ANSWER: As I understand it, the loss of operational reach provided by Manta will impact the detection and monitoring in the Eastern Pacific. Some operations can be conducted from other facilities in the region and will mitigate some of the loss of Manta. However, operating from different locations creates new problem sets, such as increased transit times and operational

costs. If confirmed, I will continue to analyze the options to offset the loss of Manta and work towards the best possible solutions.

Colombia

Plan Colombia has enabled the Colombian government to make significant gains against the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and other paramilitary forces in Colombia, as well as enabled the government to secure many of its previously ungoverned areas. In recent months, there has been much discussion about the impact of the global economic downturn on Latin America. Over the past decade, the U.S. has provided over \$6 billion to help the Colombians secure their country and eliminate domestic terrorist groups. As planned, this funding is declining in the coming fiscal years.

What are your views regarding the current situation in Colombia focusing upon: (1) the current military and political situation in Colombia; (2) the ability of the Colombian military to regain control of its territory; and (3) ongoing DOD programs, including the effects of the caps on U. S. troops and contractor personnel?

ANSWER: From what I see, Colombia has made a great deal of progress in its fight against narco-terrorists. The Uribe Administration has instilled a sense of hope and pride in the country and Colombia is a strong, thriving democracy. Statistics show terrorist attacks, homicides and kidnappings have dropped considerably and the Colombian military is effectively prosecuting their war against the FARC. The FARC has been pushed back and the Government of Colombia now has security representation throughout its 1,098 municipalities. Despite this success, the FARC and other Illegal Armed Groups still remain a threat. While I think U.S. support to Colombia can start moving towards a more “smart power” approach, I think the U.S. should continue strong support to ensure Colombia’s success.

Do you believe the Colombian government is capable of sustaining the last decade’s gains during this economic downturn and the scheduled decline in U.S. security assistance?

ANSWER: In 2007, the government of Colombia launched “Plan Consolidation,” a whole-of-government approach to establish control of the territory and provide social and economic development to all Colombian citizens. To be sure, the current global economic downturn will impact Colombia’s ability to fund this plan, but I think they are capable and committed to sustaining their hard fought gains. If I am confirmed, I look forward to working with the Committee to continue U.S. support to Colombia.

When the U. S. began providing increased support through Plan Colombia for efforts to significantly reduce or eliminate narcotics organizations operating in their country, many expressed concern about the Colombian military’s human rights record.

What is your assessment of the record of the Colombian military with regard to respect for human rights over the past three years?

ANSWER: I am told that, today, the Colombian military is one of the most respected institutions in Colombia and continues to improve its human rights record. The Ministry of

Defense established a comprehensive human rights and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) program. Colombian military forces are required to receive mandatory human rights training, for every officer and soldier at every stage of their military careers. The Colombian military continues to partner with civil society groups, universities, and international organizations to strengthen their human rights programs. These programs have been instrumental in reducing the number of human rights complaints against the Colombian military.

Colombia continues to aggressively address human rights infractions. Recently, the Colombian Army dismissed 27 Army personnel, including three generals, for not conforming to human rights standards. I think Colombia will continue to aggressively pursue and tackle human rights issues, and if confirmed, I will keep human rights as a key element of U.S. Southern Command's interaction with Colombia.

What remains to be done and how would you approach the issue of respect for human rights in the Colombian military?

ANSWER: If confirmed, I will continue to keep human rights as a key element of U.S. Southern Command's interaction with Colombia.

Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation

The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), which replaced the School of the Americas in 2001, has the mission of contributing to theater cooperation activities through the education and training of students in the Western Hemisphere from Canada to Chile.

What is the relationship between U. S. Southern Command and WHINSEC?

ANSWER: WHINSEC does not fall under U.S. Southern Command's authority but is one of many valuable tools available to strengthen military-to-military relations in the region. I also understand the Commander of U.S. Southern Command is a member of WHINSEC's Board of Visitors. If confirmed, I look forward to joining this distinguished group.

In your view, does WHINSEC promote the national security interests of the United States in the Western Hemisphere?

ANSWER: WHINSEC provides important training, education, and relationship building opportunities that are absolutely vital to advancing security cooperation in the Western Hemisphere. These objectives support the U.S. goal of building lasting partnerships and promoting broad national security interests. In my view, the Congress was correct when it wrote in section 1257 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 that WHINSEC "is an invaluable education and training facility which the Department of Defense should continue to utilize in order to help foster a spirit of partnership and interoperability among the United States military and the militaries of participating nations." If confirmed, I will continue U.S. Southern Command's support of WHINSEC.

In your view, how does U. S. Southern Command participate in command oversight and curriculum development?

ANSWER: U.S. Southern Command regularly reviews the curriculum to ensure it matches and supports U.S. Southern Command theater security cooperation objectives and regional priorities. I understand the command recommends changes, as required.

In your view, what more, if anything, does WHINSEC need to do to emphasize human rights in its curriculum?

ANSWER: From what I understand, WHINSEC has a very comprehensive human rights program and maximizes the quality and quantity of human rights instruction in its curriculum. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor and assess the human rights curriculum, stressing the value of WHINSEC attendance for Western Hemisphere militaries and police forces.

In your view, how can WHINSEC improve its outreach efforts to individuals or groups interested in its activities, particularly those who have accused the school of contributing to human rights violations by former students?

ANSWER: From all accounts, WHINSEC is a very transparent institution. In my view, WHINSEC should maintain this transparency and continue its open program of encouraging individuals and groups to visit the school whenever desired. Maintaining a transparent, open program can help minimize accusations against the school.

Iranian Influence in Latin America

In testimony before the Armed Services Committee in January 2009, Secretary Gates expressed real concern about Iranian “subversive activity.” He went on to say “[t]hey’re opening a lot of offices and a lot of fronts behind which they interfere in what is going on in some of these countries.”

What do you assess to be the intent of Iranians in Latin America and are governments in Latin America welcoming the Iranians?

ANSWER: Like Secretary Gates, I am concerned about Iran’s meddling in Latin America. Iran is a state sponsor of terror. I’m told that Iran has increased its diplomatic efforts in the region and has initiated trade relations with many countries in the region. I think Iran’s goal is to decrease U.S. influence in the region and support those countries with an anti-US message.

Most of the governments in the region appear to welcome Iran as a potential economic partner. For example, President Ahmadinejad has had numerous visits to Venezuela, and there have been numerous multi-billion dollar investments between the two countries in recent years.

In your view, is there a connection between the Iranians and the drug trade?

ANSWER: I have not been told of any direct connection between Iran and the drug trade in the U.S. Southern Command area of focus.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response in U.S. Southern Command

Numerous cases of sexual misconduct involving military personnel have been reported over the last several years. Many victims and their advocates contend that they were victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive or inadequate military treatment. They assert that their Command failed to respond appropriately by providing basic services, including medical attention and criminal investigation of their charges.

What is your understanding of the resources and programs in place in U.S. Southern Command to offer victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal help that they need?

ANSWER: I am told that U.S. Southern Command has an active Sexual Assault Prevention and Response program in place that affords victims all the help they need. The command has a Zero Tolerance Policy and ensures all incidents are handled using the exact procedures outlined in DoD directives and policy, which promote sensitive care, confidential reporting for victims of sexual assault, and accountability for those who commit these crimes.

U.S. Southern Command has a dedicated Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC) who is trained to respond to allegations of sexual assault and provide victim advocacy. The SARC is knowledgeable of reporting requirements and victims' rights regarding medical care, investigation, legal assistance and restricted reporting, and maintains direct personal contact with all military assistance providers. Because U.S. Southern Command is located in a large urban area, the SARC also maintains contacts with local social services agencies.

What is your view of steps taken to prevent sexual assaults in U.S. Southern Command?

ANSWER: From my perspective, U.S. Southern Command has a positive command climate that emphasizes civility and mutual respect. The command took specific action to prevent incidents of sexual assault, including establishing a sexual assault prevention training and awareness program, encouraging victims to report incidents of sexual assault without fear, ensuring leaders understood their roles and responsibilities regarding response to sexual assault incidents, and establishing a toll-free help line for reporting Sexual Assault and Harassment. In regards to victim care and response, the command ensures sensitive and comprehensive treatment to restore victims' health and well-being, thoroughly investigates allegations of sexual assault, and takes appropriate administrative and disciplinary action. If confirmed, I will continue U.S. Southern Command's zero tolerance policy, actively support its programs, and regularly monitor and assess its operations and resources.

What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources in U.S. Southern Command to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

ANSWER: I am told that U.S. Southern Command provides its personnel the resources needed to investigate and respond to sexual assault allegations. The Army, as the Headquarters executive agent, uses a comprehensive Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program Training Support Package to provide training to all military personnel, which is further enhanced

by senior leader emphasis. U.S. Southern Command recently participated in the Army's 2009 Sexual Assault Prevention Summit in Washington DC, ensuring that key people received world class training during the summit.

Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?

ANSWER: Yes. I am told that the policies and procedures, outlined above, are effective.

What problems, if any, are you aware of regarding the manner in which the confidential reporting procedures have been put into effect?

ANSWER: In my view the policies and procedures in place are strong.

Mental Health of Servicemembers and Stress on the Force

The Committee is concerned about the stress on military personnel resulting from lengthy and repeated deployments and their access to mental health care to deal with this increased stress. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently said that the shooting of five servicemembers at a stress control clinic by a troubled Army sergeant in Iraq speaks to “the need . . . to redouble our efforts” and “the issue of multiple deployments” and increasing dwell time “to try to improve to relieve that stress.” This tragic incident, as well as increasing suicide rates in every service, are clear reminders that servicemembers, particularly those who have been deployed multiple times, are under tremendous stress and need access to mental health care.

In your view, are there sufficient mental health assets in U.S. Southern Command to address the mental health needs of the military personnel and their families?

ANSWER: As I understand it, the majority of forces that deploy within the U.S. Southern Command region rely on their parent service for medical care during post-deployment, including the very important post-deployment monitoring of mental health. During deployment, the U.S. Southern Command Surgeon closely monitors all command mental health issues and helps ensure that U.S. Southern Command provides necessary immediate support.

The approximately 1500 personnel assigned to the U.S. Southern Command Headquarters have their medical needs met through a small U.S. Army Health Clinic. I have been told that no organic mental health professionals are assigned to this clinic and that patients are referred to civilian providers to address their mental health needs.

If confirmed, what actions will you take to address the mental health needs of military personnel and their families in U.S. Southern Command?

ANSWER: If confirmed, I will continue the emphasis on ensuring that military personnel and their families have adequate access to mental health services, including programs on suicide prevention and substance abuse prevention and treatment. I will work to improve the coordination between HQ U.S. Southern Command’s military doctors and local civilian providers to ensure that we understand and address the mental health needs of our personnel.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is currently pending in the Senate.

What are your views on U.S. accession to UNCLOS?

ANSWER: As an official policy matter, I defer questions associated with the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention to the Chief of Naval Operations. However, as a joint officer, I support the U.S. accession to the Convention.

From a national security standpoint, what do you see as the advantages and disadvantages to being a party to UNCLOS?

ANSWER: The Law of the Sea Convention codifies navigation and overflight rights and high seas freedoms that are essential for the global mobility of our armed forces. From a national security standpoint, UNCLOS does not hinder military forces; rather, it directly supports our National Security Strategy. It is my understanding that as a matter of customary law the U.S. is already in compliance. I also understand that Article 298 of the Convention permits the United States to completely exempt its military activities from dispute resolution.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

ANSWER: Yes, I do.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

ANSWER: Yes, I do.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, U. S. SOUTHCOM?

ANSWER: Yes, I do.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

ANSWER: Yes, I do.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

ANSWER: Yes, I do.