### Advance Questions for General C. Robert Kehler, USAF Nominee for Commander, United States Strategic Command

### **Defense Reforms**

The enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms brought about fundamental change in the manner in which the Department of Defense and the Services carry out the mission of national security.

Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?

Yes.

# What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms?

The defense reforms clarified military operations by defining responsibilities for each Combatant Commander for mission planning, preparation and execution of forces across traditional Service boundaries. The clear chain of command from National Leaders to Combatant Commanders is both effective and efficient. The focus on joint doctrine, assignments, professional military education and strategic planning led to an improvement in joint military operations.

What is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented?

I believe the DoD has successfully implemented these reforms.

The goals of the Congress in enacting the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations defense reforms, as reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control over the military; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; enhancing the effectiveness of military operations; and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

Do you agree with these goals?

Yes.

Do you foresee the need for additional modifications of Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment and possible revisions to the national security strategy?

No.

#### **Duties**

# What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U. S. Strategic Command?

The Commander, USSTRATCOM is responsible for the plans and operations for U.S. forces conducting strategic deterrence and DoD space and cyberspace operations. These responsibilities include the following missions: deter attacks on U.S. vital interests, ensure U.S. freedom of action in space and cyberspace, deliver integrated kinetic and non-kinetic effects in support of U.S. Joint Force Commander operations, synchronize global missile defense plans and operations, synchronize regional combating weapons of mass destruction plans, provide integrated surveillance and reconnaissance allocation recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and advocate for assigned capabilities.

# What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

*My thirty-five year career includes assignments and responsibilities* involving operational and staff assignments in the Air Force, Strategic Air *Command, the Joint Staff and USSTRATCOM. I commanded at the squadron,* group, wing and major command levels and have a broad range of operational and command tours in intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) operations, space launch, space operations, missile warning and space control. As the Deputy *Commander, USSTRATCOM, I gained experience in delivering effects with the* broad range of strategic capabilities for Combatant Commanders engaged across the spectrum of conflict around the world. As the Commander, Air Force Space Command for the past three years, I organized, trained and equipped space, cyberspace and ICBM forces in support of the missions of USSTRATCOM, North American Aerospace Defense Command and other Combatant Commands. In this role, I led planning and activation activities for a new numbered Air Force dedicated to providing cyberspace capabilities to U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). If confirmed, I will leverage my experience to lead USSTRATCOM in fulfilling its responsibilities.

Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, U. S. Strategic Command?

I will seek to continue to enhance my expertise in USSTRATCOM's broad range of missions. If confirmed, I look forward to working with all the Combatant Commanders and the many organizations USSTRATCOM depends on for continued success, many of whom I worked with during my tour as the Deputy Commander, USSTRATCOM. I intend to establish clear lines of communication, define relationships and become more familiar with these organizations (e.g. Department of Homeland Security, Department of Energy-National Nuclear Security Administration, Missile Defense Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Nuclear Weapons Council) and their contributions to mission success.

### **Relationships**

Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U. S. Strategic Command, to the following officials:

#### The Secretary of Defense

Pursuant to Title 10, U.S. Code, section 164, subject to the direction of the President, the Commander, USSTRATCOM performs duties under the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense and is directly responsible to the Secretary for the preparedness of the command to carry out assigned missions.

#### The Deputy Secretary of Defense

In accordance with Title 10, U.S. Code, section 132, the Deputy Secretary of Defense will perform such duties and exercise powers prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Secretary of Defense will act for and exercise the powers of the Secretary of Defense when the Secretary is disabled or the office is vacant. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy Secretary on appropriate matters.

#### The Under Secretaries of Defense for:

The Under Secretaries of Defense, as the principal staff assistants (PSA), provide advice, assistance and support to the Secretary of Defense in managing the Department and in carrying out such duties as prescribed by the Secretary or

by law. Within their areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Under Secretaries in the areas of their responsibilities.

#### • Policy

The Under Secretary for Policy is the PSA and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives.

#### • Intelligence

The Under Secretary for Intelligence is the PSA and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters regarding intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities and other intelligence-related matters.

#### Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

The Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics is the PSA and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters relating to the DoD Acquisition System; research and development; modeling and simulation; systems integration; logistics; installation management; military construction; procurement; environment; services; and nuclear, chemical and biological programs.

### The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs under the authority, direction and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, serves as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on homeland defense activities, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, Western Hemisphere security matters and provides overall supervision of homeland defense activities of the DoD. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security and Americas' Security in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on matters in the area of U.S. Strategic Command.

# The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Programs

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Programs advises the Secretary of Defense on nuclear energy, nuclear weapons and chemical and biological defense; serves as the Staff Director of the Nuclear Weapons Council; and performs such additional duties as the Secretary may prescribe. If confirmed, I will work closely with this office and the Nuclear Weapons Council in support of the nuclear deterrence mission.

### The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Title 10, U.S. Code, section 163, clearly establishes the Chairman as the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council and the Secretary of Defense. In this role, he is the most senior ranking member of the armed forces but does not exercise command over any military forces or serve in the Chain of Command between the President and Secretary of Defense and Combatant Commanders, although the President may transmit communications through him. By law and as directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman consults with the Combatant Commanders, evaluates and assists in achieving their requirements and plans. The Chairman provides a vital link between the Combatant Commanders and other elements of the DoD. If confirmed, I will keep the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense promptly informed on matters for which I am personally accountable as Commander, USSTRATCOM.

#### The Secretaries of the Military Departments

Under Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 165, subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the Combatant Commanders, the Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands. The authority exercised by a Combatant Commander over Service components is quite clear but requires close coordination with each Secretary to ensure there is no infringement upon those lawful responsibilities which a Secretary alone may discharge. If confirmed, I look forward to building a strong and productive relationship with each of the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

### The Chiefs of Staff of the Services

As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Service Chiefs no longer serve in the operational chain of command. They now serve to provide organized, trained and equipped forces to be employed by Combatant Commanders in accomplishing their assigned missions. Additionally, these officers serve as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and have a lawful obligation to provide military advice. Individually and collectively, the Service Chiefs are a tremendous source of experience and judgment. If confirmed, I will work closely and confer regularly with the Service Chiefs.

### The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office

The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is a DoD organization engaged in the research and development, acquisition, launch and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems necessary to meet the needs of the Intelligence Community and of the DoD. According to the Unified Command Plan, USSTRATCOM is the responsible Combatant Command for both space operations and for planning, integrating and coordinating intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in support of strategic and global operations, as directed. In these capacities, the Commander, USSTRATCOM must maintain a close relationship with the Director of the NRO to coordinate and represent requirements in these mission areas. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Director of the NRO on matters of shared interest and importance.

### The Combatant Commanders, particularly Commander, U. S. Northern Command, and Air Force Global Strike Command and U.S. Cyber Command

The Commander, USSTRATCOM has both supported and supporting relationships with other Combatant Commanders, largely identified within the Unified Command Plan (UCP), the Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, specific command arrangement agreements, Operations Plans and Concept Plans. Air Force Global Strike Command is an Air Force major command that provides combat ready forces to USSTRATCOM to conduct nuclear deterrence and global strike operations as directed. U.S. Cyber Command is a subordinate unified command to USSTRATCOM. U.S. Cyber Command plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes and conducts activities to direct the operations and defense of specified DoD information networks. USSTRATCOM supports U.S. Northern Command's mission to conduct homeland defense to secure and defend the United States and its interests. In many cases, USSTRATCOM is a supporting Combatant Commander for other UCP assigned missions. If confirmed, I look forward to working with other Combatant Commanders to broaden and enhance the level and range of these relationships.

#### The Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration

According to Title 50, U.S. Code, section 2402, the Department of Energy's Under Secretary for Nuclear Security serves as Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration. The Administrator is responsible for all Department of Energy programs and activities related to nuclear weapons, including the stockpile stewardship program. Although the Administrator serves outside the DoD's operational control, he does serve on the Nuclear Weapons Council and executes duties which closely concern and support USSTRATCOM. If confirmed, I will work closely and confer regularly with the Administrator.

#### The Director of the Missile Defense Agency

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) serves as the missile defense systems engineering and development organization for the DoD. It provides the research, development, testing and evaluation of the missile defense and associated systems that would be employed by Combatant Commanders. The current Unified Command Plan charges USSTRATCOM with synchronizing planning for global missile defense operations, including developing and advocating for missile defense and warning capabilities desired by Combatant Commanders. Given these closely aligned responsibilities, both the Commander, USSTRATCOM and its Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense must continue their close working relationship with MDA. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Director of MDA to ensure that Combatant Commanders' required ballistic missile defense and warning capabilities are appropriately and effectively represented to MDA.

#### The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation

Title 10, U.S. Code, section 139, provides for a Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, who serves as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics on operational test and evaluation in the DoD and the principal operational test and evaluation official within the senior management of the DoD. The Director, as allowed by law and departmental regulations, formulates policy, provides guidance, coordinates, reviews, monitors and makes recommendations regarding test and evaluation matters under his purview. If confirmed, I will work closely with and seek the advice of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation in assessing the progress of command programs of interest.

#### **Major Challenges and Problems**

### In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, U.S. Strategic Command?

The missions of USSTRATCOM are at the heart of U.S. national security and that of our allies and friends abroad. Today's national security environment is far more complex and diverse than ever before. Wider access to advanced technology, newly assertive states with rising aspirations regionally and globally, and still emerging vulnerabilities created by transnational linkages all fuel threats requiring synchronized efforts of many departments and agencies and other countries as well. Ensuring mission readiness and the proper policies, decision authorities and organizational relationships are in place to rapidly respond to complex and diverse threats will be a major challenge.

# Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If confirmed, I will work with other federal departments, agencies and allied partners to advance the policies and relationships needed to enhance a cooperative and collaborative approach. I will assess the USSTRATCOM organizational structure and work to streamline processes and enhance flexibility, effectiveness and efficiency.

#### What are your priorities for the U.S. Strategic Command?

The first priority is to provide a safe, secure and effective strategic nuclear force providing strategic deterrence for the U.S. and its allies. USSTRATCOM has a unique responsibility regarding the country's deterrent force in setting requirements and translating national guidance into operational readiness. Second, ongoing combat operations require many of the capabilities provided by USSTRATCOM and, if confirmed, I will consult with the Commander, U.S. Central Command and the other Combatant Commanders to provide capabilities for today's conflict. Third, in line with the new National Space Policy, USSTRATCOM must preserve U.S. access to space and freedom of action in space by improving awareness and providing resilient capabilities for the joint fight. Fourth, relationships across federal agencies with cyberspace responsibilities need to be defined to enhance the Nation's cyber security and support to joint operations.

#### **Strategic Threats**

# In your view, what are the most serious strategic threats facing the United States today?

As outlined in the National Security Strategy, the pursuit of nuclear weapons by violent extremists and their proliferation to additional states is the greatest strategic threat facing the U.S. Beyond this, a profound strategic challenge is defining strategic relations to ensure stability involving new and emerging powers. Additionally, the pace of technology is rapid, which is a serious concern in space and cyberspace. Finally, traditional and non-traditional threats pose serious consequences, some of which are not yet fully understood in these domains, and the U.S. is in the beginning stages of addressing these issues.

#### What future strategic threats should the United States prepare for?

Surprise is a problem in a constantly changing world environment. In my view, the future requires adaptive and flexible capabilities to respond to unanticipated threats.

### **U. S. Strategic Command Missions**

In an overarching sense, how do you define the U. S. Strategic Command mission?

USSTRATCOM promotes global security for the U.S. and its interests through strategic deterrence, ensuring U.S. freedom of action in space and cyberspace and through dedicated planning, advocacy and operational execution efforts to advance our warfighting priorities.

U. S. Strategic Command has absorbed multiple new missions since its creation, with the most recent addition being the establishment of the Cyber-Command, as a sub-unified command of the Strategic Command.

How successful has U. S. Strategic Command been at integrating these new missions and acquiring the expertise needed to perform them?

My sense is that USSTRATCOM is on track with integrating mature missions, like space, while emerging missions, like cyberspace and missile defense, continue to advance. There is still more to be done among all the Services, and recruiting, training and retaining the personnel with the right expertise is very important. If confirmed, I will move quickly to assess the scope of all mission areas, integration and expertise, and take appropriate action as needed.

What organizational challenges remain at U. S. Strategic Command related to these new missions? Specifically, what additional work, if any, remains to be done and what expertise, if any, needs to be acquired for these new missions?

Cyberspace capabilities and capacity are still maturing across the DoD and the national security enterprise. If confirmed, I will assess the status of capabilities and determine the proper course of action to align personnel and resources to address the issues. If confirmed, would you recommend or support any changes in the missions currently assigned to U. S. Strategic Command? If so, what changes would you recommend?

Not at this time. As my understanding of the missions evolved and integration matured, I would assess command mission effectiveness and recommend changes as appropriate.

### Are you aware of any additional new missions that are being contemplated for the Strategic Command?

No.

### **Organization**

In addition to the Cyber-Command, the Command is organized into a series of joint functional component commands that correspond to the mission areas of the Strategic Command.

If confirmed, would you anticipate maintaining or modifying this structure?

I would not anticipate any immediate changes; however, as relationships across federal agencies are defined and cyberspace capabilities are matured, there may be a need to make organizational changes. It is important to keep a flexible organizational structure that is capable of responding to a constantly changing threat environment and technology advances.

#### **Ballistic Missile Defense**

How do you view the roles and responsibilities of the Commander, U. S. Strategic Command, related to ballistic missile defense?

The UCP charges USSTRATCOM with responsibilities for synchronizing and planning for global missile defense operations, including developing and advocating for missile defense characteristics and capabilities desired by Combatant Commanders. If confirmed, I will ensure USSTRATCOM and its Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD) continue their close working relationship with MDA and that they continue their work with the Geographic Combatant Commanders to integrate capabilities across Combatant Command boundaries.

### What do you believe is the appropriate function of the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense?

The JFCC-IMD was established to optimize planning, execution, and force management to deter or defend against attacks against the United States, its

territories, possessions and bases, by planning, integrating and coordinating global missile defense operations and support for missile defense. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the current activities of JFCC-IMD to ensure that this is the most appropriate function for today's national security environment.

### If confirmed, would you recommend or support any changes in the authorities of Commander, U. S. Strategic Command, as they relate to ballistic missile defense?

As of today, I would not make any changes. If confirmed, I will continue the close working relationships with the Combatant Commanders and the Missile Defense Agency and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense regarding the appropriate authorities to support the defense of the U.S. and its allies.

# If confirmed, what role would you anticipate playing in the assessment of the military utility of U.S. ballistic missile defenses against short-, medium-, intermediate-, and long-range ballistic missiles?

DoD regulations require USSTRATCOM to direct, coordinate and report the Military Utility Assessment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). I understand that the last report was developed and submitted in 2010, and I plan to continue this important effort until such time as the BMDS architecture has matured and all elements have transitioned to their respective Services.

If confirmed, what role would you anticipate playing in representing and advocating for the views and needs of the combatant commanders for missile defense capabilities, and how do you believe that warfighter perspective should inform our missile defense program?

The Ballistic Missile Defense Program exists to meet the limited defense of the United States and the theater defense needs of Combatant Commanders. USSTRATCOM participates in the missile defense Warfighter Involvement Process and manages the development of the missile defense Prioritized Capabilities List, to account for and prioritize Combatant Command requirements. If confirmed, I will consult fellow Combatant Commanders and advocate for their mission needs, always mindful of the joint warfighter.

# Please describe your view of the appropriate roles for the Joint Staff and the Missile Defense Executive Board in guiding decisions on the development, acquisition, and deployment of effective missile defense capabilities.

The Joint Staff is responsible for defining required systems interoperability and operational architectures while validating joint theater missile defense capabilities through both simulation and technology demonstrations. The role of the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) is to provide oversight and guidance in a collaborative mode involving all missile defense stakeholders in the DoD and other agencies and departments. Important considerations for both entities include the necessary transition of tested systems from MDA to a military Service to be organized, trained, and equipped for eventual Combatant Command employment.

### Do you agree that any ballistic missile defense systems that are deployed must be operationally effective and cost-effective?

The joint warfighter requires fielded systems with military utility. I agree with the Secretary of Defense Ballistic Missile Defense Report that establishes the metrics to measure ballistic missile defense systems cost effectiveness through comparison with available options, affordability, and comparison of incurred vice avoided costs.

Do you agree that ballistic missile defense flight tests need to be operationally realistic, and that operational testing is necessary, in order to demonstrate the capabilities of our systems and provide confidence that they will work effectively?

I agree with the Missile Defense Agency testing approach outlined in the June 2009 Integrated Master Test Plan. If confirmed, I will support this approach and assess the capabilities of ballistic missile defense systems.

# What are your views on the relationship between ballistic missile defenses and nuclear deterrence?

Ballistic missile defenses protect the U.S. against the threat of a limited ICBM attack by a regional actor such as North Korea or Iran. Through deployment of limited defenses, the U.S. seeks to dissuade such states from developing an ICBM, deter them from using an ICBM if they develop or acquire such a capability, and defeat an ICBM attack by such states should deterrence fail. Ballistic missile defenses will also defend U.S. deployed forces from regional missile threats while also protecting our allies and partners and enabling them to defend themselves. Present plans for missile defense do not contemplate protection of the U.S. against large scale nuclear strikes. The U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent force of ICBMs, bombers and ballistic missile submarines will remain the primary deterrent of nuclear attacks against the U.S., our allies and partners.

### Do you support the policies and priorities stated in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review report of February 2010?

Yes.

Do you support the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe, and do you believe this approach will provide a timely and effective capability to address existing and emerging ballistic missile threats to Europe?

Yes. The work is ongoing and, if confirmed, I will continue to assess our progress and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

Do you support the development of the Two-Stage Ground-based Interceptor as a technological hedge in the event the proposed development and deployment of the SM-3 IIB interceptor is not achieved within the planned 2020 timeframe?

I agree with the BMDR that we should continue development and assessment of a two-stage ground-based interceptor and continue investing in SM-3 IIB development to enable the U.S. to stay ahead of the emerging longrange ballistic missile threat.

### What role do you believe Strategic Command should play in the development and implementation of the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe and other regions?

USSTRATCOM's role is to optimize planning, execution, and force management to deter or defend against attacks against Europe and other regions, by integrating and coordinating global missile defense operations and support for missile defense.

Do you believe it is in our interest to cooperate with Russia on ballistic missile defense, including the possibility of sharing radar early warning data?

Yes. To quote the BMDR, "The United States will also continue in its efforts to establish a cooperative BMD relationship with Russia...The Administration is committed to substantive and sustained dialogue with the leadership of Russia on U.S. missile defenses and their roles in different regions...Our goals are to enlist Russia in an new structure of deterrence that addresses the emerging challenges to international peace and security posed by a small number of states seeking illicit capabilities."

# What do you believe are the most promising opportunities to work collaboratively with Russia to address emerging ballistic missile threats?

As agreed by President Obama and President Medvedev at the July 2009 Moscow Summit, the most promising opportunity to work with Russia is in the joint assessment of the ballistic missile threat.

#### Cyber Security

#### What are your priorities for the U.S. Cyber Command?

Our reliance on cyber capabilities, the many and varied threats, and the rapid rate of technological change all demand we place an initial and enduring focus on defense of our information networks. Priorities beyond defense include assuring the warfighting mission, strengthening and expanding partnerships in the domain, building capability to conduct full-spectrum cyberspace operations and developing processes to integrate cyberspace capabilities into Combatant Command operations and plans across the DoD.

# In your view, what are the most important unmet priorities for the development and deployment of cyber security tools and capabilities?

U.S. Strategic Command, as a Global Combatant Command, is in a unique position to favorably influence two essential priorities in this area. The first is to advance the development of a multi-service cadre of cyber professionals, with emphasis on technical and tactical competence. This includes continuous training and education and focused career path development. The second is to accelerate the fielding of shared cyber situational awareness tools, taking advantage of emerging technologies to know friendly and threat activity within the network while understanding intent; and display and disseminate that information in an operationally relevant manner.

# If confirmed, what role will you play in establishing policy for U.S. Cyber Command?

If confirmed, I will engage and advise senior leaders within the Department of Defense, federal agencies and with members of Congress to advocate for the appropriate policies regarding cyberspace. There is still a lot of work to do regarding cyberspace, including policy development. It is important to focus on interagency relationships, authorities and building flexible and responsive capabilities.

# If confirmed, what role will you play in establishing requirements for the military services to be able to support the U.S. Cyber Command?

Each Service Component brings a set of core competencies to U.S. Cyber Command. The challenge is integrating those capabilities as part of ongoing operations and determining future requirements by balancing Service competencies with those of other government agencies to minimize duplication of effort, promote efficiency and harness synergy.

#### <u>Space</u>

### What is your view on the responsiveness of current space systems to meet warfighter needs and what are the opportunities for the Operationally Response Space program to meet military and other space requirements?

National Security Space systems are responsive to warfighters needs, but as the speed of warfare increases and military decision cycles decrease, space systems need to continue to evolve in their ability to deliver capability sooner. Operationally Responsive Space will be an important program to respond to this environment, by providing augmentation capability, meeting urgent needs or leveraging developed technology for future warfighter capability.

# What is your view of the ability of the DOD to develop and deploy space systems in a cost-effective and timely manner?

The DoD and, in particular, the Air Force have worked extensively to reverse troubling acquisition trends. Significant strides are being made with a concentration on program stability, increasing the quantity and quality of the acquisition workforce and strengthening the requirements process to allow for incremental system development and increased technology maturation. The result is recent operational certification of new on-orbit systems with additional new systems preparing to launch to fulfill Combatant Commander needs.

# What steps, if any, do you believe might be necessary to improve the responsiveness of current space systems?

Responsiveness, as measured by the speed, capacity and fusion of data to the warfighter, are important in the evolution of warfare to counter adaptive adversaries. Providing the warfighter with dynamic situational awareness, such as for tailored Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, while optimizing stressed communications and networks, will increase the value of current space systems.

# In your view, what are the most important unmet requirements for space systems?

Guaranteeing mission assurance, which includes resilience and space protection, is critical. Central to this is developing adequate Space Situational Awareness in a domain that is increasingly competitive, congested and contested. Geographic Combatant Commanders require a sustained emphasis on meeting Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance needs and satisfying increased military satellite communication requirements in support of global military operations. Do you believe any urgent needs or capability gaps exist? If so, please specify in detail.

Urgent needs and capability gaps will exist in a constantly changing battlespace and a fiscally constrained environment. If confirmed, I will work through the Service components to mitigate capability gaps and responding to Combatant Commanders' urgent needs. With the pending launch of ORS-1, USSTRATCOM is demonstrating its ability to respond to a USCENTCOM identified gap for an Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capability.

# What do you believe should be done to meet those requirements, and what space programs should be accorded highest priority?

If confirmed, I will articulate national and joint warfighter imperatives, including a judicious blend of alliances, partnerships and commercial relationships. I will also press for improved space situational awareness and ensure the highest priority is accorded to meeting continuing needs for assured communications, uninterrupted missile warning, persistent GPS and overhead Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). Additionally, I will advocate through the Services for greater investments in scientific and technical advancement to maintain our space systems advantages well into the future.

# How important, in your view, is persistent surveillance? What programs do you believe are best able to provide this capability?

Combatant Commanders identify persistent surveillance as an enduring priority needed to detect, collect, disseminate, and characterize activity in the battlespace. Space, airborne, maritime, and terrestrial programs contribute to ISR, but where persistent surveillance can be achieved is through integration of sensors on multiple platforms, with space-based ISR providing unique contributions over deep and denied areas.

# What is your view on the effectiveness of efforts to cooperate with the commercial space sector to improve space situational awareness and how could this effort be expanded and made more successful?

The Space Situational Awareness (SSA) Sharing Program is a strong effort to share SSA information with commercial partners. Currently USSTRATCOM supplies high fidelity information to over 41,000 users from 141 countries. The Secretary of Defense's authority to conclude agreements with commercial entities was delegated to USSTRATCOM in September 2010. Since then, USSTRATCOM has concluded 17 agreements with major commercial providers and is in the process of concluding additional agreements. So far in 2010, 64 satellites have maneuvered to avoid potential on-orbit collisions based on the information shared. The opportunity exists for USSTRATCOM to build relationships with individual operators to begin two-way exchanges of information. If confirmed, I will advocate for the continued development of expanded sharing opportunities with the commercial sector and improve SSA services, while protecting our national security interests.

In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Congress approved a national policy to support two space launch vehicles, or families of launch vehicles, capable of launching national security payloads into space. The two launch vehicles have been combined into one company to provide launch services to the U.S. Government with the expectation that this would improve both the efficiency of space launch and reduce the cost.

# What are your expectations with respect to future space launch efficiencies and cost savings?

The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program was the first step in gaining launch efficiencies as a replacement for expensive heritage systems. Today, the Launch and Range Enterprise Transformation initiative takes the next step with targeted reinvestment to enable efficient execution of the EELV program and serve the many diverse interests of the national ranges through 2030.

In the next several years the rate of space launches is expected to increase, what new approaches to space launch, in your view, should be implemented to handle this increased rate of launch?

Recent improvements in the range manifest and scheduling process, such as the concept of matching boosters with satellites when there is a higher confidence of being ready for launch, will maximize the probability of meeting launch demands consistent with national priorities.

# What, in your view, should the United States do in the future, and what steps would you take if confirmed, to ensure continued reliable access to space?

I will continue to advocate for cooperative development of launch and range transformation initiatives between the Air Force, NRO, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Recently, these agencies signed a Letter of Intent pledging cooperation in initiatives for, among other things, stabilizing the launch vehicle industrial base, controlling cost growth, and leveraging commercial launch providers when their systems demonstrate operational reliability to support national missions.

# Do you believe that the nation should sustain redundant space launch capabilities?

Robust access to space is a national imperative requiring flexible capability to ensure continuity of access. The Air Force commitment to mission assurance in the management of the EELV program has delivered a perfect launch record for more than a decade. Additional commercial capabilities are emerging. If confirmed, I will continue to review the viability of this approach to assure the nation's access to space.

Recent decisions, and probably future decisions, about launch capabilities made by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration will impact national security space launch cost and capacity.

What in your view, should the Strategic Command do to coordinate civil and national security space launch?

Assured access to space is a national imperative that, in a fiscally constrained environment, could benefit from a whole-of-government approach. The Letter of Intent between the Air Force, NRO, and NASA is a first step to commitment and cooperation that, if confirmed, I will advocate building upon this commitment.

In your view, what are the most significant challenges that the U.S. faces in military and national security space programs and policy?

Our challenges are rooted in the increasingly congested, contested and competitive nature of the space domain with potential far-reaching impacts to U.S. interests. The challenge is to assure the required strength in the industrial base, work force and acquisition processes and ensuring an innovative edge.

Training of U.S. military personnel to understand and to incorporate space assets into all aspects of operations is critically important to future military success.

While much has been done to incorporate space assets into all aspects of military operations, in your view are there additional steps that should be taken to address this challenge?

There is opportunity to leverage recent combat experience with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to determine more efficient and effective ways to provide space capabilities to Joint Force Commanders. In addition to taking advantage of technological improvements of space systems, the U.S. military must create innovative ways of leveraging existing capabilities, and to communicate these efforts and availability of capability from the strategic to tactical levels.

# What role does the National Security Space Institute play in the training process, and how could their training programs be improved?

The National Security Space Institute (NSSI) is a key element of the Space Professional Development Program and the advancement of space expertise. Recent upgrades to NSSI courses refined the operational focus, instructional methodology and content accuracy. Given growing requirements from the other Services and international partners, NSSI programs could be enhanced by added capacity to meet this increased demand.

# What, in your view, are the priorities for improving space situational awareness?

There are three primary needs to support orbital safety, threat mitigation and effective space operations. First, there is a need to integrate, exploit and share space situational awareness data. Second, it is important to improve the ability to detect, track and identify objects. Third, it is critical to improve the ability to characterize events such as breakups and potential collisions.

# What programs and policies, in your view, should be changed or added to ensure adequate space situational awareness?

Space situational awareness improvements are critical in a competitive, contested and congested domain. First, existing sensors and the space surveillance network need to be sustained, other organizations' sensors need to be integrated to augment SSA, and finally gaps need to be closed through new programs like Space Fence and the Joint Space Operations Center Mission System.

# What are your views on how military and national security space should and could be better integrated?

Significant synergy exists in those common, underlying "enablers" such as the space industrial base, research and development, science and technology and the space workforce. If confirmed, where feasible and achievable, I will advocate effective integration of military and national security space where a "whole-of-government" approach can best meet the needs of the nation.

# In your view, what role should the National Security Space Office play in integrating military and national security space?

The functions assigned to NSSO are under review as part of a broader discussion of space management. Some functions have been recommended for realignment. If confirmed, I will assess whether additional adjustments would be useful

### In your view, should the role of the National Security Space Office be modified or expanded in any way?

There are a number of changes underway regarding National Space Management. If confirmed, I will participate in on-going discussions and reviews.

### **Cruise Missile Defense**

In your view, how serious is the vulnerability of our nation and deployed military forces to the cruise missile threat?

*Cruise missiles represent a credible threat to our nation and forces abroad.* 

What role do you believe U. S. Strategic Command should play in the cruise missile defense of our nation?

USSTRATCOM, as the Air and Missile Defense Integrating Authority, should continue advocating for cruise missile defense capabilities desired by the warfighters.

### **Prompt Global Strike**

In your view, how adequate are current efforts to establish requirements and develop a prompt global strike capability?

The Department is developing requirements and investing in development and testing of prompt global strike capabilities. As these technologies mature, the Department will evaluate acquisition and deployment. If confirmed, I look forward to becoming more involved in this process.

### Nuclear Deterrence

If confirmed as Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, you would be involved in implementing the new Nuclear Posture Review and the reductions under the New Start Treaty when it enters into force.

Do you support the New START Treaty?

Yes.

### Do you believe that a commitment to modernize the nuclear weapons complex should be a prerequisite to ratification of the New START treaty?

Regardless of treaty ratification, the nuclear weapons complex needs modernization. The Strategic Posture Commission described the nation's plutonium and uranium facilities as "decrepit." To provide a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent, we must invest in the facilities, equipment and personnel dedicated to sustaining and managing the nuclear weapons program.

In your previous position as Commander of Air Force Space Command you were responsible, until just recently, when the Air Force Global Strike Command was established, for the intercontinental ballistic missiles.

# What in your view are the most pressing modernization requirements for the Minuteman III ICBM, following completion of the current upgrades?

The Air Force is conducting sustainment programs to take the Minuteman III ICBM to 2030 as directed by Congress. If confirmed, I will advocate to sustain life extension programs as required and continue to monitor the status of the Minuteman III and make recommendations as issues arise.

### Do you support the development and fielding of a follow-on program to the Minuteman III ICBM? If so, when will a decision be necessary for pursuing the development of a follow on ICBM?

Land-based ICBMs are an integral and enduring part of the nuclear triad, and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review includes a commitment to begin an initial study of alternatives in fiscal years (FY) 2011 and 2012. The Air Force is initiating a Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) and will closely follow with an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). The CBA and AoA findings will shape the plan and resource strategy to recapitalize our ICBM force beyond 2030.

### Do you support and intend to advocate for the modernization of all legs of the triad of nuclear delivery vehicles?

Yes. The nuclear triad has attributes that provide the President with multiple options for a variety of scenarios. The value of the triad lies with its flexibility for command and control of the force in a degraded environment, responsiveness to a changing world environment, technical failure of any one system or warhead type or breakout of another nation's deployed weapons.

# In your view, is there a relationship between U.S. nuclear deterrence policy and nonproliferation policy? If so, please describe the relationship.

*Yes. Extended nuclear deterrence has provided a strong and attractive alternative for states considering whether to develop their own nuclear capability.* 

The extended protection provided by U.S. nuclear forces reassures allies they do not need to seek or develop independent capabilities. The requirements for extended nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation further buttress the need for safe, secure and effective weapons and operationally effective forces.

### **Nuclear Weapons Council**

### If confirmed you would become a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council.

### What would your priorities be for the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC)?

If confirmed, I would encourage vigorous and persistent attention to the sustainment and life extension of the nuclear weapons enterprise. This must include sufficient attention to scientific and technical personnel.

# What changes if any would you recommend to the organization, structure, or function of the NWC?

None at this time. The NWC is composed of the appropriate members to provide effective oversight of the nuclear weapons enterprise.

# What role is the NWC playing or should it play in the discussion with respect to any future nuclear arms control treaties?

*NWC principals should provide policy, military, and technical recommendations.* 

#### Maintaining a Safe, Secure and Reliable Stockpile

If confirmed you would play a major role, in conjunction with the National Nuclear Security Administration, to maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S stockpile of nuclear weapons. What are your priorities for implementing that responsibility?

If confirmed, I will continue, in conjunction with the National Nuclear Security Administration, to conduct assessments, determine requirements and establish priorities for stockpile management. It is imperative to ensure unfailing excellence in the proper care and performance of nuclear weapons. If confirmed, I will ensure proper priority is given to this mission by insisting that the people performing the mission unfailingly observe procedures and have the equipment to accomplish the mission; that standards are clear and upheld; and that evaluation measures are in place to assure the mission. The Strategic Command is an integral part of the annual certification process for nuclear weapons. Would you recommend any changes in the Strategic Command's role in the annual process or the process generally?

Not at this time. If confirmed, I will closely monitor this process and its outcome to recommend any changes that may become necessary.

### Stockpile Stewardship Program

What is your view of how well the Stockpile Stewardship Program is proceeding towards its goal of being able to continuously assess and annually certify the U. S. enduring nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable, without the need for underground nuclear testing?

The Stockpile Stewardship Program appears to be effective at present and this will require continuous assessment.

### In your opinion, what are the biggest challenges for the Stockpile Stewardship Program?

The Stockpile Stewardship Program's most significant challenges are to understand the stockpile as it ages, confidently certify without underground nuclear testing, and respond to technical issues in a timely manner.

Do you believe that all nuclear weapon life extension methods, refurbishment, reuse, and replacement, should be given equal consideration?

I fully support the Nuclear Posture Review's position regarding weapon extension options. It is important to study all options to determine the best solution.

#### Military-to-Military Cooperation Programs

The U.S. Strategic Command has a long history of conducting military-tomilitary exchanges and discussions with its counterparts in Russia, but in recent years these exchanges and discussion have stopped for the most part.

If confirmed, would you seek to continue or expand this dialogue?

If confirmed, I would consult extensively with the Secretary of Defense, the State Department and the Commander, U.S. European Command to see what steps would be appropriate to engage Russia.

# Would you seek to establish military-to-military programs to include other countries, such as China?

If confirmed, I would consult extensively with the Secretary of Defense, the State Department and the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command to see what steps would be appropriate to engage China.

#### **Strategic Forces and Missions**

During the Cold War, the primary mission for strategic forces was to deter the Soviet Union from using its nuclear weapons and, more broadly, to contribute to U.S. efforts to contain the Soviet Union. Strategic forces were therefore synonymous with nuclear forces. This isn't the case today, as the wide-ranging missions assigned to U.S. Strategic Command make clear.

# What, in your view, is the primary mission for U.S. Strategic Forces today and in the future?

Our strategic forces are no longer synonymous with our nuclear forces. Consistent with the missions assigned to USSTRATCOM, I see strategic forces as including our Global Strike forces (nuclear and conventional), space forces, cyber forces, global Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance forces and ballistic missile defense forces. These forces serve to assure allies and deter, dissuade and if necessary, defeat adversary attacks on the U.S. or its allies.

### Should we think differently about the use of strategic forces today?

Yes, because the scope of those forces and their contributions to our security have expanded significantly since the Cold War.

# Given the mission for strategic forces, as you define it, what capabilities are still needed to carry out that mission?

Required strategic deterrence capabilities include warning, attribution, assured command and control, forces, weapons, and the infrastructure to sustain them. The Triad is the cornerstone of deterrence and strategic stability. Sustainment and recapitalization of strategic space, cyber, and nuclear forces, National Command and Control systems, nuclear weapons, and stockpile infrastructure are required to deter adversaries, assure allies and manage risk. The nuclear weapons in Europe are under the command of the Commander of European Command.

# How would you plan to work with that command with respect to nuclear weapons security, and policy?

If confirmed, I will consult with the Commander, U.S. European Command to assess his needs and collaborate on how to best provide safe, secure and effective nuclear weapons. This includes advocating for the needs of European Command and planning, executing and assessing security cooperation activities supporting strategic deterrence.

#### **Nuclear Weapons Security and Handling**

What in your view are the most challenging aspects of maintaining security in the handling of nuclear weapons?

Absolute denial of unauthorized access is a national security imperative. Meeting this standard is a multi-faceted challenge and if I am confirmed, it will have my utmost attention. Enhanced awareness and training, improved physical security, and intrinsic weapon security features are crucial.

### What role do you think the Strategic Command should play in ensuring that nuclear weapons are securely stored, transported, and handled when in control of the military services?

USSTRATCOM has a critical oversight role spanning operations, maintenance, training and inspections by Service components as well as the conduct of exercises. If confirmed, I will advocate for increased resources to improve all aspects of weapons handling and security.

#### **Congressional Oversight**

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, U. S. Strategic Command?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.