

Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee of

Dr. Edward L. Warner, III

Secretary of Defense Representative to the New START Negotiations

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished Members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to speak today regarding the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. I served as the Representative of the Secretary of Defense on the New START Treaty negotiating team and was involved in the effort from the beginning of our discussions with the Russians in late April 2009 through to the signing of the Treaty almost a year later.

The leadership of the Department of Defense stands firmly behind this Treaty. The agreement will strengthen strategic stability, enable the United States to modernize its Triad of strategic delivery systems, and protect our flexibility to develop and deploy effective missile defenses and conventional prompt global strike capabilities. Because of this, the Treaty has the support of the U.S. defense leadership—including the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs, and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, the command responsible for the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent.

In light of my role in the negotiation of New START Treaty, I would like to focus my remarks today on the national defense-related aspects of the agreement and on the inspections framework for the Treaty, which I was responsible for negotiating on the U.S. side.

As the Representative of the Secretary of Defense for the talks, I had a particular responsibility to ensure that the national defense interests of the United States, as viewed by the leadership in the Department of Defense, were properly incorporated into our negotiating positions and in any provisions that were agreed for inclusion in the Treaty and its supporting documents. I am confident that we did so. Throughout the negotiations, my colleague representing the Joint Staff and I were in close contact with Defense Department leadership, and we did not agree to the inclusion of any provisions without securing their approval. Indeed, the final Treaty, Protocol, and supporting annexes very much reflect the input of senior DoD leaders to an effective government-wide process, including the personal involvement of the Secretary of Defense and Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at key junctures in the negotiation of the Treaty.

Let me address some of the key national defense-related issues in the Treaty and how the U.S. side handled them.

First, the United States sought to conclude a treaty that would limit U.S. and Russian strategic offensive arms while preserving strategic stability in a manner that provides predictability and is supported by an effective verification system.

While pursuing stabilizing reductions in strategic offensive forces, the U.S. negotiators sought to protect our ability to field a flexible, effective strategic Triad composed of ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers, and to enable modernization of our strategic delivery systems and the nuclear weapons they carry. The U.S. negotiators also sought agreement on ceilings on strategic warheads that were lower than those in the Moscow Treaty, but sufficient to meet the needs of the Nation as established by the Nuclear Posture Review.

We achieved these objectives. The New START Treaty will entail stabilizing limits on deployed strategic nuclear forces and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers, as well as associated verification measures. We agreed to these limits based on analysis conducted in the Nuclear Posture Review prior to and during the course of the negotiations, which determined that the ceilings would be sufficient to allow us to meet U.S. strategic deterrence requirements and to maintain the Triad of delivery systems. The agreement of the Defense Department leadership to the limits was also conditional upon Russian agreement to allow removal of converted B-1Bs, cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), and any future conventional-only B-52Hs from accountability under the New START Treaty. We achieved agreement on these points as well.

Second, the Treaty affords us the freedom to deploy, maintain, and modernize our forces as we determine appropriate in a manner consistent with the central limits of the Treaty. As outlined in the report to Congress issued in compliance with Section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act, 2010, the Administration plans to maintain and modernize all three legs of the Triad. By the time that the Treaty reductions go into effect, seven years after entry into force, the Department intends to field strategic nuclear forces within the central limits of the Treaty that include: up to 420 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs; 240 deployed Trident II D5 SLBMs; and up to 60 deployed B-2A and B-52H heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. Over the next decade, DoD plans to invest over \$100 billion in sustaining and modernizing our strategic nuclear delivery systems, and the Department of Energy plans to invest \$80 billion in sustaining and modernizing the nuclear weapons stockpile and the nuclear weapons complex.

Third, protecting our ability to develop and deploy the most effective missile defenses possible was one of the most important U.S. objectives during the Treaty negotiations, and we clearly did so. Under the Treaty, the United States is free to pursue its current and planned ballistic missile defense programs, as well as any other courses of action we might choose to pursue. The one limitation is the ban on conversion of ICBM or SLBM launchers for use as missile defense interceptor launchers, or vice versa. As previously explained, such a conversion does not make sense on strategic or cost grounds, and is not part of our plans for future missile defense programs. Nothing in this Treaty or in the Russian unilateral statement concerning U.S. missile defenses, which is not a part of the Treaty and not legally binding, will constrain us from developing and deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor will the Treaty impose additional costs or burdens on these efforts.

And fourth, the Administration was also intent on protecting the U.S. ability to develop and deploy conventional prompt global strike systems. We therefore agreed to a “permit and count” regime whereby conventionally-armed ICBMs or SLBMs would be permitted but counted against the strategic delivery vehicle and strategic warhead ceilings. In addition, the United States stated during the negotiations that it would not consider future, strategic range non-nuclear systems that do not meet the definitions of this Treaty to be “new kinds of strategic offensive arms” for purposes of the Treaty. We are confident that this arrangement accommodates our defense requirements regarding the possible development and deployment of conventional prompt global strike capabilities for the lifetime of the Treaty.

Achieving an effective verification framework was another key U.S. and Department of Defense objective in the negotiations. Let me therefore turn now to my role as the U.S. Chairman of the Inspections Working Group during the negotiation of the Treaty. In this capacity, I led the U.S. side in negotiating the inspections framework that will form a central pillar of the Treaty’s verification regime. During the course of the negotiations, we met more than 90 times with our Russian counterparts to hammer out an effective, tailored inspections framework for the Treaty. In this effort, I was aided by a cadre of veteran inspectors who brought many years of combined experience in implementing inspections under the START and INF Treaties to the development of our negotiating positions and to the negotiating table.

The inspections framework that we negotiated with Russia is an essential part of the Treaty’s overall verification regime. Our objectives were to craft an inspection framework that continues the appropriate verification and transparency functions provided for under START, while streamlining the overall process and reducing unnecessary burdens, in line with the July 2009 Joint Understanding signed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev. We achieved these objectives.

The Treaty provides that each Party may conduct up to 18 short-notice, on-site inspections each year. These inspections are divided into two groups. Type One inspections will be conducted at the operating bases for ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers and will include inspections of both deployed and non-deployed systems. Type Two inspections are focused on non-deployed strategic systems, as well as formerly declared facilities, and confirming the results of the elimination or conversion of strategic offensive systems. These inspections will be conducted at places such as storage sites, test ranges, formerly declared facilities, and conversion or elimination facilities. Each side is allowed to conduct up to ten Type One inspections and up to eight Type Two inspections annually. Type One inspections combine many of the aspects associated with two different types of inspections that were conducted separately under START, thus requiring fewer inspections annually at the operating bases while achieving many of the results of the previous START inspection regime with a smaller number of annual inspections.

These inspection activities contribute to the verification of the Treaty’s provisions by confirming: the accuracy of declared data on the numbers of deployed and non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers and of the warheads located on or counted for them; that weapon

systems have been converted or eliminated; and that formerly declared facilities are not being used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty.

Inspections will also help deter cheating. Since the 18 short notice, on-site inspections each year will be conducted at sites selected by the inspecting party, each side knows the other will have a significant capability to uncover discrepancies between what is reported and what is actually happening. If the United States encounters ambiguities or evidence of what appears to be cheating, we will immediately raise the matters in the Bilateral Consultative Commission or, if necessary, at higher political levels, seeking prompt resolution. The use of unique identifiers on each ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber, timely notifications each time a Treaty accountable system changes status, the regularly updated comprehensive database, and the use of national technical means will complement inspections in providing for a robust Treaty verification regime.

In conclusion, the New START Treaty will promote stability, transparency, and predictability in the U.S.–Russian strategic relationship and is effectively verifiable. It will allow us to field a strong Triad of strategic delivery systems, and, if desired, to deploy conventional prompt global strike systems. It will not affect our ability to improve our missile defenses qualitatively and quantitatively to defend the homeland against limited missile attacks and to protect our deployed forces, allies, and partners from growing regional missile threats.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on New START. I would be happy to answer any questions.