Selfridge Selflessness

I certainly enjoyed Wilson Brissett’s fine article commemorating the 100th anniversary of the Selfridge Air National Guard Base [“A Century of Action,” March, p. 46].

The outstanding record of the host unit, the 127th Wing, is certainly commendable. I am, however, compelled to question the accuracy of: “The six-month stretch was the longest mass deployment of Selfridge airmen since the Korean War,” attributed to wing officials, and describing the wing’s 2015 deployment in support of Operation Inherent Resolve.

In October 1990, the Selfridge-based 927th (then Tactical Airlift Group) deployed eight C-130E aircraft along with several hundred airmen in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The 927th joined its sister 914th TAG with eight additional aircraft and airmen from Niagara Falls, N.Y., to form the 1650th TAW Provisional at Sharjah Airport in the UAE. The deployed base was affectionately named Mirage.

As of February of 1991, the 1650th had flown 10,000 sorties moving 15,000 passengers and 12,000 tons of cargo. Five thousand hours were flown over 3,200 sorties during 42 days of combat coded action.

Just before the initiation of Desert Storm, the tactics officers from the various deployed C-130 units met to plan the air logistics phase of the “left hook” redeployment of ground forces. Over 100 C-130s flew nonstop for three days to complete the critical strategic move to the west. If my memory serves correctly, not a single missed sortie assignment was recorded during the entire six-month deployment of the combined 927th and 914th. The 1650th was reported to be the only AFRES support flying unit deployed to Desert Storm.

Col. Richard Sipp, USAF (Ret.)
Midland, Mich.

Nukes Not for Everyone

I thoroughly enjoyed the feature article “Rebuilding the Missile Force” by Senior Editor Wilson Brissett in the February 2017 issue [p. 20].

I wrote a letter to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Air Force in 2014, based on newspaper [Associated Press] articles; TV shows; interviews with missile crew members on their concerns about missile duty [and the] firing of colonels at the operational wings, in the Air Force Times; and my operational ICBM experience starting in the 1960s.

As some background, I was commissioned in 1962 and was a procurement officer for the first 18 months. Then in 1963 and ’64, the Air Force pulled most of the support officers into the missile field to fill slots for Minuteman, Atlas, and Titan missile crew commander positions. You had to be at least a first lieutenant as a deputy commander, and commanders were senior captains or junior majors (many of whom were on flying status). We were a very important part of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), one of the premier, if not the best, major commands to be in. All of us considered these crew commander positions very important and excellent opportunities for promotion. The flying status officers transferred into SAC from other major commands for the promotion potential.

Do you have a comment about a current article in the magazine? Write to “Letters,” Air Force Magazine, 1501 Lee Highway, Arlington, VA 22209-1198. (Email: letters@afa.org.) Letters should be concise and timely. We cannot acknowledge receipt of letters. We reserve the right to condense letters. Letters without name and city/base and state are not acceptable. Photographs cannot be used or returned.

—THE EDITORS
We were posturing the Minuteman I wing at F. E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming, and I was deputy missile crew commander for over a year. During that time, my first crew commander, in training, was a senior captain (pilot) whom I turned in as not being stable to be in charge of nuclear weapons. This was under the Air Force Human Reliability Program, I think AFR 35-99, maybe now called the Personnel Reliability Program. This was with great risk to me, turning this senior captain into my lieutenant colonel squadron operations officer. Subsequently, he was relieved of his duties and left the Air Force. This point is extremely important. Not all officers are suited to be in charge of nuclear weapons.

I wrote a letter to DOD/AF officials because the Defense Department has, for whatever reasons, degraded the importance of the Air Force ICBM mission as a critical part of our nuclear deterrence strategy. When the Air Force reorganized and SAC was replaced by Space Command and then by Global Strike Command and defused further by Air Combat Command, the premier status of the nuclear strike force crumbled. Instead of seeking and getting the best and brightest officers with extremely high promotion potential, the Air Force demonstrated a lack of importance of the ICBM force, and consequently, problems followed. I do not believe it is only a money issue. It is a perceived nonchallenging assignment with minimal support of the Air Force leadership and with minimal rewards. Why are the academy officers so concerned about getting a missile crew assignment? I do not believe that the two general officer pilots, who were never missile crew commanders, should have been selected to head the investigation of the problems of the ICBM force.

More opportunities, challenging assignments, and promotions are needed for the MM III operational force. There should be a variety of career paths that allow this critical operational force to advance and experience challenging Air Force careers. In your article, there appears to be more career opportunities and wing-wide assignments with effective senior leadership in the 13N career field, which is good. However, there should be an expansion as follows: The junior officers should see multiple paths, while going in and out of the operational MM III positions. This could include related assignments at the MM III Program Office (various acquisition positions), the national targeting organization, depot assignments using their operational experience, operational test launch positions to include more live launches, RV acquisition and depot assignments, and related developmental work at the labs and industry. This is in addition to headquarters and Defense Department positions. This will allow a wide wealth of experience and will ultimately allow advancement into senior level missile operational positions.

Col. Don Damm, USAF (Ret.)
Sumter, S.C.

The Right Stuff

As a cover-to-cover reader of your magazine, usually on the day it reaches my mailbox, and also having been a schoolboy who followed every detail on Project Mercury, it was very gratifying to see the great tribute to John Glenn in the current issue [“Air Force World: John H. Glenn, 1921-2016,” March, p. 22].

I would, however, like to point out a technical error, which seems to be in most of the recent discussions of his mission. In point of fact, the MA-6 mission was not reduced in duration but was scheduled as a three-orbit mission, as was the following MA-7 “proving” mission flown by Scott Carpenter three months later. The confusion has arisen apparently from the radio transmission to Glenn when he reached orbit that his trajectory was “good for at least seven orbits.” That meant only that the Atlas booster had inserted Friendship 7 into the planned orbit.

As described by the legendary flight controller Gene Kranz in his classic book of 17 years ago, Failure Is Not an Option, the mission plan was to have a trajectory good enough for additional orbits in the event it was desired to keep him up longer for some reason. The faulty indication that the heat shield had come loose did create much concern and a change in mission sequence in order to leave the retrorocket package on throughout re-entry, and that with consequent concern for damage to the shield, but it did not cause the mission to be cut short.

Details aside, thanks for all the great articles, especially the tribute to Colonel Glenn.

Joseph Cunningham
Jackson Heights, N.Y.
Out of Their Depth

John Correll’s excellent article gave an in-depth account of the British aerial torpedo attack on the Italian battleships in Taranto Harbor [“The Air Raid at Taranto,” March, p. 60]. This attack occurred more than a year before the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor. Yet it did not lead to actions that could have protected the American fleet.

Mr. Correll reports that Taranto Harbor was 40 feet deep, about the same depth as Pearl Harbor. He also states that when Admiral Ingersoll sent a warning about Taranto to Pearl Harbor, the admirals erroneously listed the depth of the water where torpedoes were dropped at Taranto. He said that they were much deeper—between 84 to 90 feet, with a few runs at 66- to 72-foot depths. This difference in stated depths between Taranto and Pearl Harbor may have caused Admiral Kimmel to not consider the memo relevant to his situation.

Certainly, nearly every source on the Taranto Raid lists its depth as being about 40 feet, and that would make Ingersoll’s memo incorrect. The book on Taranto by Lowry and Wellham is particularly noteworthy because Wellham was one of the pilots in the attack. On p. 68 of the 2000 paperback edition, the book states that Mare Grande is about 45 feet deep.

However, we may need to rethink this depth. Actual hydrographic studies of Taranto Harbor paint a very different picture of Mare Grande. Several have been done, and they agree that Mare Grande is a fairly deep harbor, citing depths of over 100 feet in many locations. Based on the after-action report by Captain Boyd of the HMS Illustrious, all torpedoes were dropped in and all battleships were moored [in depths ranging from 64 to 93 feet]. Based on hydrographic information, then, it appears that we should seriously question the statement that the British Taranto raid took place at Pearl Harbor depths. Where Ingersoll came up with his depth information is unknown, but it appears that he was actually correct.

If Ingersoll’s correct statement of drop depths at Taranto deterred Kimmel from considering the memo as being relevant to Pearl Harbor, that was unfortunately because Taranto was only part of the British aerial torpedo story. As Mr. Correll notes, the British had earlier dropped their torpedoes successfully in water as shallow as 22 feet. That would certainly have gotten Kimmel’s attention.

—Ray Panko
Honolulu

The numerous operational accounts that I have seen on the Taranto attack report an average depth in the outer harbor of between 39 and 49 feet.

The after-action report Mr. Panko cites from Capt. D. W. Boyd, commander of Illustrious, includes information on range and altitude of the attacks but does not mention harbor depth. The approximate point at which the torpedoes struck the water could be estimated from the range and the general direction of approach.

Two of the battleships struck by the torpedoes were left with their decks awash but not completely submerged. Conte di Cavour, with a 40-foot hole in the hull, settled on the bottom with its superstructure above water. This is at odds with the assumption of greater depth. The Italians managed to beach a third battleship to keep it from sinking.

The gist of the advisory from US Rear Adm. Royal E. Ingersoll, assistant Chief of Naval Operations, in June 1941, was to state the threat level warning for aerial torpedoes at 75 feet or deeper. The quality of his assessment was seen six months later when Japanese torpedo bombers attacked the US fleet in 40 feet of water at Pearl Harbor.—John T. Correll

Getting Modern

I enjoyed retired Colonel Meilinger’s article, “Learning the Not-So-Obvious Lessons,” in the March 2017 issue [p. 68], but think that he and the Air Force are both failing to learn an extremely important, but which seems to be the not-so-obvious, lesson about what developments in technology are making possible regarding service roles. Thanks to advances in Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMI) surveillance and moving target precision attack technologies that make it possible to locate and then destroy an enemy army’s vehicles when they are moving deep in enemy territory, US Air Force airpower now has the potential to duplicate the change in roles that naval forces achieved during World War II.

Before Pearl Harbor, the US Navy’s leaders expected that their naval aviation forces would be employed in support of their surface forces, with close combat battleship gunfire being their primary means of defeating the Japanese Navy. However, instead of just locating the opposing fleet, naval aviation proved to be able to defeat that fleet before it could move into gunfire range of our ships. But this change in roles between air and surface forces was not possible on land at that time because of the great difficulties airmen experienced in locating and then hitting an enemy army’s vehicles, especially when they moved at night or during bad weather. As a result, it was necessary to employ airpower in support of our army by attempting to delay the movement of enemy vehicles through the targeting of fixed transportation infrastructure, like bridges and tunnels, and then providing close air support when the two armies had moved into close proximity to each other.

But during Desert Storm, advances in technology revealed the potential to change roles was possible because now we could detect and hit an enemy army’s vehicles, even when they moved at night, well before they could get into close proximity to our land forces. During the Battle of Khafji, which somedays historians will see as the land warfare equivalent of the Battle of the Coral Sea in World War II, Iraqi army vehicles attempting to use the cover of darkness to achieve a surprise attack were detected, located, and targeted by a prototype Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) long before most of these vehicles could move into close proximity to coalition land forces.

The immense importance of being able to detect, locate, and precisely target an opposing army’s vehicles when they are moving results from the fact that movement is how armies achieve the advantages of surprise, favorable position, and superior mass. Moreover, in addition to their mobility, modern armies depend on their vehicles for armored protection, heavy firepower, supplies, and engineering support. By targeting these vehicles when they are moving, the US gains a number of important advantages. Attacks will not be wasted on decoys or previously destroyed vehicles. Since they will be occupied by enemy soldiers, lethal precision air attacks can create such fear that enemy soldiers...
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A Modest Proposal

I enjoyed Mr. Everstine’s article, “Continuous Sandbox Presence,” in the April/May edition of your magazine [p. 30]. However, the employment of a permanent bomber presence in the Middle East was proposed many years ago.

In 1981-82, I was fortunate enough to be selected as a USAF research associate (RA) and spent the year at the Mershon Center, Ohio State University. One of the requirements as an RA was to prepare and present a scholarly paper for the Air Staff. My paper, “Chain of Thunder: B-52D Firepower for America’s Conventional Forces,” purported establishing a permanent Air Force presence in the Middle East by moving two wings of the retiring B-52Ds to Southwest Asia, rather than sending them to the USAF “Bone Yard.” Half of the aircraft would remain flyable and the other half could be used for cannibalization.

Unfortunately, the timing was not good for such a plan. The B-1s were nearing readiness, and funding and maintaining a maintenance-demanding, vintage 1950 aircraft did not appear to meet serious headquarters consideration.

Hindsight is always nice, but what if USAF would have made such a move in the early or mid-80s? Would the presence of a full-time military force using even an old, but viable, weapon system have changed the environment of the Middle East during this period?

It is interesting that 35 years later, B-52Hs, not B-52Ds, are performing the same function for US Central Command that was envisioned in the paper.

Col. Jimmie W. Hanes Jr.,
USAF (Ret.)
Crawford, Texas

They Ain’t Perks

In the January 2017 issue of Air Force Magazine, Megan Scully’s article, “Retention Questions,” touched on a variety of challenges our Air Force and DOD as a whole face, some of them repeats from various decades. On p. 49, Ms. Scully describes the comparison of military service to civilian service as “apples to oranges,” which is a very key observation. However, she describes recent policies that the military has implemented as “perks that go along with military service” to improve retention. Ms. Scully should have used the term “readiness” rather than “perks” because that is what those policies support. As a squadron commander I had to look a female senior airman, who was a single parent, in the eye and order this professional to deploy to Southwest Asia for four months, so I don’t view this policy in military service as a “perk.” Also on p. 49, Ms. Scully states the “biggest challenge is convincing those airmen with six to 16 years”—again, the term “convincing” is misleading. The vast majority of airmen patriotically volunteered to be a member of the greatest Air Force in the world. There comes a point in an airman’s career to weigh the facts when deciding it’s time to separate from military service. Some of those key facts are family needs, medical issues, separation from the family, and pure deployment “burnout.” So, there is no “convincing,” but readiness

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opportunities, to consider. The funding expended on bonuses to pilots and now remotely piloted aircraft operators will continue to be a challenge in meeting retention goals for these career fields.

Congress should put their money where their mouth is since congressional staffers seem to continue to always compare military service to the civilian workforce. My recommendations for military readiness improvements are: provide a program to fund a percentage of military members’ college student loans (those who didn’t attend a service academy or didn’t utilize tuition assistance), institute an allowance program to qualifying service members for child care costs, make the officer and enlisted Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) rates the same or near the same rate, and increase the household goods (HHGs) weight allowance for our enlisted corps at least 60 percent across the board. In the late 1980s, the military changed the policy for TDY per diem for all service members. The old policy entitled officers a higher per diem rate versus our enlisted corps. This didn’t make sense to me because all service members have to eat while TDY, so why should rank factor into this? Now the per diem is the same rate. Our enlisted airmen who qualify for off-base housing need to live somewhere with their dependents, just as officers do. Why have segregated BAH rates? For example, an E-5 with dependents, assigned to the BAH Washington, D.C., area, has a BAH rate of $2,262, versus an O-3 with dependents, same area, having a BAH rate of $2,874. Why shouldn’t the E-5 earn the same BAH as the O-3? Yes, there are all types of factors influencing the BAH rate, but does the E-5 pay less for public utilities than the O-3? This is a readiness concern because when the E-5 has to support a deployment, he/she can deploy, knowing dependents’ housing will be secure. As for the HHGs weight allowance: In comparison to a federal civilian service employee, our enlisted airmen are at a disadvantage. For example, per the Defense Transportation Regulation, Part IV, for civilian employees the authorized HHGs allowance is “18,000 pounds net weight for each employee” who are funded for a move. An E-5 with over 10 years’ time in service earns approximately $38,563 annually in base pay (not factoring in other allowances), in comparison to a GS-6 (Step 7), who earns $38,185 annually in pay (doesn’t include locality pay), and the GS-6 (Step 7), if authorized a move, can ship 18,000 pounds in HHGs, but the E-5 with dependents can only ship 9,000 pounds. The issue is “readiness” not “retention” because if the services jointly advocate to Congress the readiness perspective, present the facts and basis to improve readiness, then our military members, especially our great airmen, will continue to be patriotic and serve a career of 16-plus years.

Col. Steven L. Amato, USAF (Ret.)
Woodbridge, Va.

Good Mag, Bad Mag

You outdid yourselves with the March issue of Air Force Magazine! I found myself reading the whole issue from cover to cover. The clarity and strong statements in each of the articles came through loud and clear. Keep up the great work.

Lt. Col. David Newbern, USAF (Ret.)
Fredericksburg, Va.

As one of the majority of voters who did not vote for President Trump, I would like to take issue with Mr. Leibundguth’s critique of your editorial policies [Letters: Soundly Defeated,” April/May, p. 8]. Please continue to strongly question the policies and actions of the current administration, just as you did of President Obama’s.

Sean M. Mallory
Edinboro, Pa.

Since becoming a member of the Air Force Association in 1968, I have anticipated receiving Air Force Magazine. Hereofore the magazine has been a refreshing alternative to the biases of the mainstream media. The content and tone of the March 2017 issue fell short of the standards set by the magazine for decades. One article in particular stands out as falling far below the standard we members expect.

“Action in Congress: Fasten Your Seatbelts” by Megan Scully [p. 13] is a thinly veiled, pedantic, anti- Trump piece that missed the mark and is an insult to our intelligence.

AFA members, whether or not they voted for the President, do not come to Air Force Magazine to ingest the same biased fodder we see in the mainstream media. We do not expect to see an irrelevant critique of the President’s “tweeting” style. The caption of the picture, “Tweeting the strike fighter,” is sophomoric.

Most, if not all of us, know that the contracting officials and not the President sign the contracting documents. But it is patently naïve to believe that the President, and other politicians, do not impact the decisions on which systems are selected. Where was Scully when Obama and Gates killed the F-22 buy? [See “State of the Arsenal,” July 2009, p. 50.]

Scully writes: “The tweet underscores his aggressive negotiation tactics, but also highlighted his unfamiliarity with some of the intricacies of Pentagon acquisition.” One can argue that the President’s negotiation tactics have proved to be successful in business. Moreover, what has transpired during the last few days to lower the costs of the F-35, since President Trump weighed in, would suggest that the President can and does influence negotiations. Apparently the “intricacies of Pentagon acquisition” that have historically resulted in protracted acquisition and cost overruns did not stymie the President who pledged to voters to drain the bureaucratic swamp.

Scully writes: “The layers of bureaucracy between the President (or any other political figure, for that matter) and the contract officer exist for good reason: to prevent any undue political influence on the process.” What is “undue political influence”? Why does

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Scully think the A-10 is still in service? I doubt that Sen. John McCain or Sen. Mark Levin would agree to her absurd assertion.

The readers of Congressional Quarterly might be accustomed to such journalistic dribble. The readers of Air Force Magazine are not. We can only hope Air Force Magazine will be able to find material that meets AFA standards for the coming issues.

Col. Eldon Devere Henderson
USAF (Ret.)
Gardnerville, Nev.

Senior Staff Changes


NOMINATIONS: To be Major General: Mark D. Camerer, Sean L. Murphy.


CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT RETIREMENT: CMSAF James A. Cody.