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**AETC Commander's Report  
to the Secretary of the Air Force**

**Review of Major General Woodward's  
Commander Directed Investigation**



**2 November 2012**

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## **Executive Summary**

This report is the culmination of Air Education and Training Command's (AETC) effort to correct deficiencies identified in the report of the commander directed investigation (CDI) led by Maj Gen Margaret Woodward, USAF.

As an increasing number of allegations against military training instructors (MTI) assigned to basic military training (BMT) came to light, suggesting that they had engaged in misconduct ranging from unprofessional relationships to sexual assault of trainees and/or students, AETC's leadership made four commitments: (1) to thoroughly investigate all allegations of misconduct; (2) to care for the victims of the misconduct; (3) to hold perpetrators of misconduct accountable while protecting due process for those accused, and; (4) to correct the underlying problems that led to the misconduct.

At the time of this report, 23 alleged offenders have been identified. Five MTIs have been court-martialed for sexual assault or unprofessional relationships with trainees or students. All five of those MTIs were convicted. More MTIs are pending charges or are under investigation. Additionally, one MTI received nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 of the *Uniform Code of Military Justice* for an unprofessional relationship that did not involve touching. At the time of this report, 48 alleged victims have been identified. Of those, 35 are alleged victims of an unprofessional relationship with an instructor—physical contact was involved with 26 alleged victims, and no physical contact was involved with nine alleged victims. The remaining 13 are alleged victims of

sexual assault; six were assaulted by a single MTI who was convicted of those assaults.

In concert with AETC's aggressive internal efforts to address misconduct, the AETC commander appointed General Woodward on 20 June 2012 to conduct an independent CDI into matters relating to misconduct between faculty/staff and trainees/students in the BMT and technical training (TT) environments and identify recommendations for corrective actions. This report documents AETC's response to the external CDI, giving context to the weaknesses and contributing factors in the BMT environment highlighted by the findings. Most importantly, it outlines those actions the command has taken or intends to take with regard to the CDI recommendations.

The CDI team members conducted 215 in-depth interviews, surveyed more than 18,000 personnel, and conducted focus groups with BMT trainees and with MTI spouses. They visited BMT at Lackland AFB, Texas; four TT bases; Air Force Officer Training School at Maxwell AFB, Alabama; and the US Army's basic combat training at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Additionally, the team conferred with leaders responsible for US Navy and Marine Corps basic training.

Upon conclusion of the 60-day CDI effort, General Woodward's team produced 22 findings categorized into five major areas: (1) leadership, where deterrence was found to be hindered by insufficient leadership oversight; (2) the MTI selection and manning process, where the MTI corps consisted of members with minimal leadership experience and too much power resident

with a single MTI; (3) MTI training and development, where the MTI culture and training did not adequately emphasize noncommissioned officer (NCO) responsibilities; (4) reporting and detection, which addressed barriers that exist in reporting by MTIs, trainees, and students, and; (5) policy and guidance, where enduring institutional safeguards are necessary. Associated with those CDI findings are 46 recommendations for action.

Given the nature of the BMT environment, the opportunity for abuse of power must be understood and eliminated. To guard against misconduct, BMT incorporates institutional safeguards to dissuade, deter, detect, and hold accountable individuals who engage in unprofessional conduct. The CDI report highlighted weaknesses in those safeguards and flaws in the leadership oversight and MTI culture that enabled the weaknesses to be exploited.

The AETC Commander draws three overarching conclusions from General Woodward's CDI: (1) over time, weaknesses developed in each of the previously described institutional safeguards; (2) leadership failed to detect and prevent these weaknesses, and; (3) our MTIs did not sufficiently police themselves.

Of these three, leadership stands out as the most important area to address. Strong leadership can overcome weaknesses in institutional safeguards and/or weaknesses in the MTI culture. Average or weak leadership will struggle to successfully navigate through the unique challenges that exist in the BMT environment.

Given the singular importance of leadership in maintaining an effective, safe, and secure BMT environment, AETC is taking aggressive action in this area as recommended by the CDI.

Training squadron commander positions will be filled with high-potential officers. AETC will increase the number of leadership positions within the squadrons by adding operations officers and flight commanders to the rosters. AETC will increase the experience level of leaders by upgrading the squadron first sergeant positions from master sergeant to senior master sergeant and the squadron superintendent positions from senior master sergeant to chief master sergeant. Leadership preparation will also be strengthened considerably through an expanded leadership orientation course that will place additional emphasis on the potential for abuse of power, sexual assault, unprofessional relationships, and maltreatment or maltraining. Finally, AETC is instituting a set of policy changes to ensure that leadership receives timely notification of potential misconduct, that credible allegations of misconduct result in immediate removal from the training environment, and that more appropriate thresholds are set for the temporary or permanent removal of an MTI from the instructor corps. Taken together, these actions directed at strengthening the leadership team will provide the most effective means of ensuring that we are well positioned to address the critical issues impacting BMT today, and that we maintain this position of strength for the long run.

A second set of initiatives that will pay significant dividends involves placing MTIs in a stronger position to successfully execute their duties. In this

regard, AETC believes that the single most important decision they can make is to reduce the MTI duty day, which can extend as long as 16 hours for weeks at a time. To this end, AETC will assign two MTIs to each BMT flight, which will allow splitting the duty day in half. AETC will also increase the required grade level for MTI duty to technical sergeant, which will bring more experience and maturity to the MTI corps. MTI initial qualification and supplemental training will also be improved through changes in the qualification training course and the establishment of a deliberate development program.

AETC's goal is to raise professionalism in BMT to the highest level possible. The command cannot achieve this goal unless it selects the most highly qualified Airmen for MTI duty and then provides them with high-quality training and a reasonable workday. The changes AETC is making concerning MTI selection, professional development, and work period will contribute significantly to enhancing the ability of MTIs to execute their duties professionally.

Along with leadership and MTIs, there is a third group of people who are an instrumental part of the solution set for strengthening the effectiveness, safety, and security of the BMT environment. This group is the trainees, who play a critical role in the ability to detect and deter misconduct. Moreover, we must do better at taking advantage of the unique opportunity afforded in BMT to prepare our newest Airmen to deal effectively with sexual assault and unprofessional behavior throughout the remainder of their Air Force careers.

This process of increasing the capacity of our trainees to be part of the solution set will begin before they enter BMT. From their recruiter, they will receive a briefing that covers sexual assault, sexual harassment, unprofessional relationships, maltreatment and maltraining, and the reporting of misconduct during BMT. This briefing will be repeated after the trainees arrive at BMT.

Additionally, AETC will increase the number of sexual assault response counselors (SARC) in BMT. This will not only provide more trainee contact with SARCs but also increase the portion of the sexual assault prevention training curriculum instructed by SARCs.

Feedback from trainees is another area where we must improve. AETC has improved feedback mechanisms through better positioning of critique boxes and improved survey mechanisms, and will add hotline phones for direct connection to the SARC.

A significant policy change concerning trainee safety is expansion of the wingman policy, which now requires trainees to be accompanied by another trainee any time they are outside a group setting. This single policy change dramatically decreases the potential for sexual assault or misconduct since these types of activities almost always occur in a one-on-one setting.

As recommended by the CDI, AETC is taking other actions to repair the deficiencies discovered in BMT's institutional safeguards and to strengthen its leadership team—while revitalizing the MTI culture. These additional actions, as well as the actions mentioned above, are described in the report and are



grouped by changes directed toward leadership, the MTI culture, and institutional safeguards.

Of the CDI's 46 recommendations for corrective action, 14 are associated with strengthening leadership; 12 are associated with strengthening the MTI culture; and 20 are associated with strengthening the system of BMT institutional safeguards. AETC intends to fully or partially implement 45 of these recommendations. The single remaining recommendation, which suggests adjusting the length of BMT, will not be implemented as part of the current effort.

While AETC has thoroughly reviewed and responded to the CDI report with an effective action plan, the command's leadership also believes—based upon its overall comprehensive assessment—that there is even more that can be done to ensure that the conditions which contributed to the breakdown of good order and discipline at BMT do not reoccur in the future. Therefore, AETC's actions go beyond those recommended by the CDI report. The establishment of a quarterly oversight council, implementation of metrics, and the upgrading of BMT squadron superintendents to chief master sergeants are a few examples of additional improvements under way at basic training.

The misconduct discovered at BMT tears at the foundational trust and core values that hold the Air Force together. AETC is fully committed to enduring solutions for the BMT environment and a zero-tolerance standard for misconduct or abuse of power in this key training program.

## **Introduction**

The US Air Force and Air Education and Training Command (AETC) will not tolerate sexual assaults, sexual misconduct, unprofessional relationships, or behavior that places trainees or students at risk and violates our core values. This document describes AETC's response to the AETC commander directed investigation (CDI) final report on basic military training (BMT) and technical training (TT) faculty or staff misconduct with trainees or students. The CDI investigating officer (IO) was Maj Gen Margaret H. Woodward, USAF, who was and continues to be assigned to an organization that is not under AETC authority. The IO was appointed on 20 June 2012 with the concurrence of her supervisor. She completed her report and provided the AETC commander (AETC/CC) with that report on 22 August 2012. The AETC/CC accepted the report as final when delivered.

The necessity for a CDI arose when a then-increasingly and serious number of allegations of misconduct by military training instructors (MTI) with trainees or students were identified. MTI misconduct that led to the CDI was first identified above the squadron commander level in June 2011 when a squadron commander at BMT was informed that a basic military trainee told a fellow trainee she had been sexually assaulted by an MTI. Once the squadron commander learned of the allegation, the MTI was immediately relieved of duty, and an Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) investigation was initiated. At that time, the allegation prompting the investigation, while very serious, was believed to involve only one MTI.

More investigations began in November 2011 when three MTIs reported overhearing three fellow MTIs discussing having had unprofessional relationships with trainees. When questioned by investigators, the alleged victims initially denied the allegations. They recanted their denials in late January or February 2012. By March 2012, investigations had produced statements from alleged victims against three more MTIs. Subsequently, in April 2012 following the court-martial of an MTI who—after his conviction—was granted immunity in exchange for additional testimony, investigations expanded again into alleged misconduct of five more MTIs. Criminal investigations continue in some of those cases, along with the investigation of additional MTIs.

Sexual assault is a crime and an egregious offense whenever and wherever it occurs. If it occurs in the armed forces, it betrays the trust that holds service members together in the defense of our nation. Sexual assault allegations comprise a significant minority of allegations against MTIs.

Most MTIs convicted or under investigation for sexual misconduct are alleged to have violated AETC policy, which prohibits the existence and pursuit of unprofessional relationships between MTIs and basic trainees or TT students. Although this activity otherwise occurs with the consent of both parties under the *Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)*, AETC policy specifically prohibits it and treats it as a violation of Article 92, *UCMJ, Failure to Obey an Order or Regulation*. AETC takes the violations of this policy seriously as they undermine the professionalism of the training environment.

According to AETC Instruction 36-2909, *Professional and Unprofessional Relationships*,

Do not establish, develop, attempt to develop, or conduct a personal, intimate, or sexual relationship with a trainee, cadet, student, or member of the immediate family of a trainee, cadet, or student. This includes, but is not limited to, dating, handholding, kissing, embracing, caressing, and engaging in sexual activities. Prohibited personal, intimate, or sexual relationships include unprofessional relationships conducted in person and/or via cards, letters, e-mails, telephone calls, instant messaging, video, photographs, or any other means of communication.

The number of allegations identified by April 2012, whether sexual assault or the more prevalent unprofessional relationships, indicated to leadership that the recent problem of alleged MTI misconduct was significantly greater than the historic two or three cases per year that the Air Force addresses through nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 or courts-martial under the *UCMJ*. In fact, from 2006 to 2010, a total of 11 MTIs were held accountable through courts-martial or Article 15 for unprofessional relationships with trainees or students. By April 2012, 12 MTIs were under investigation or in a stage of disciplinary proceedings for allegations of sexual misconduct occurring mostly between the spring of 2010 and the summer of 2011.

### **AETC's Four Commitments**

As AETC leadership at all levels became aware of the allegations, we made four commitments. First, we would **thoroughly investigate all allegations of misconduct**. Second, we would **care for the victims of misconduct**, regardless of their consent to the activity. Third, we would **hold**

**perpetrators of misconduct accountable** for their actions while protecting due process for those accused. Fourth, we would identify and **correct the underlying problems** that permitted the misconduct to occur.

**1. Thoroughly investigate all allegations of misconduct:**

Regarding our first commitment, since misconduct allegations were reported, security forces investigators and AFOSI have been engaged in collecting facts and evidence; interviewing alleged perpetrators, victims, and witnesses; and screening former trainees who were instructed at BMT by the alleged offenders. Since April 2012, as many as 53 primary investigators or agents are/were involved full time. Additional support has been provided by more than 231 other personnel, including criminal analysts, psychologists, and personnel from 39 different Air Force bases. That work continues today with investigators conducting interviews, analyzing data, and pursuing leads. These investigators have completed thousands of hours of investigative work and will complete many more before their task is complete. A summary of the investigative level of effort and resources is attached (appendix C).

In April 2012, I directed the commander, Second Air Force (2 AF), who is responsible for oversight of BMT and nonflying TT programs, to begin an internal review of the BMT environment. To date, that review has produced 13 significant changes specific to BMT, with 14 additional actions being considered for implementation. A description of the changes made to date as a result of the internal review is attached (appendix D).

On 20 June 2012, I appointed General Woodward to lead an independent and external CDI into the alleged misconduct uncovered in BMT at Joint Base San Antonio (JBSA)–Lackland. The CDI was the next stage in AETC efforts to deeply and deliberately evaluate the BMT and TT environments.

As previously stated, the focus of this report is to describe the AETC response to General Woodward’s CDI report, including the actions AETC is taking as a result of the IO’s recommendations to improve BMT. More discussion of General Woodward’s investigation continues below.

## **2. Care for the alleged victims:**

Our second commitment was and remains caring for the alleged victims. We have identified 48 alleged victims. Before analysis of that number, it is important to understand the meaning of the words used in this discussion because they differ in some degree from the use of these words in other contexts and/or are terms seldom used outside the training environment. This report previously introduced the terms “sexual assault” and “unprofessional relationships.” Throughout this report, an unprofessional relationship with physical contact means actions such as consensual sexual intercourse, oral sex, kissing, or other consensual touching. It does not include nonconsensual contact. Unprofessional relationships with no physical contact are social media or telephone interactions with a sexual component, such as “sexting.”

AETC uses the term “victim” more broadly than other organizations which limit “victim” to someone who has been subject to nonconsensual

conduct such as rape or sexual assault. AETC's use of the word "victim" includes someone involved in unprofessional relationships, regardless of consent.

Of the 48 victims, 26 were in BMT at the time of the alleged misconduct (trainees). Twenty-two were TT students during the time of the alleged misconduct. Thus, they were not under the authority of the MTI at the time of the offense. Of the 48 alleged victims, 35 are alleged victims of an unprofessional relationship with an instructor. Of those 35, 26 were alleged victims of an unprofessional relationship with physical contact (12 trainees and 14 students). There are nine total victims (three trainees and six students) of an unprofessional relationship with no physical contact. The remaining 13 victims (11 trainees and two students) are alleged victims of sexual assault. Of those 13, six were the trainees assaulted by the convicted and imprisoned MTI Luis Walker.

All 48 alleged victims have been contacted and offered support from base agencies under the Air Force's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response program. Other support services, such as legal assistance, were also offered, regardless of the victim's consent to unprofessional relationships. We will continue to provide this support to all future victims identified as a result of our investigations. Additional information on services provided to alleged victims is attached (appendix E).

### **3. Hold perpetrators accountable:**

Our third commitment was to hold perpetrators of misconduct accountable for their actions while protecting due process for those accused. For those individuals under investigation, our commanders are required to protect their constitutional rights to due process, which hold that we do not prejudge the accused, who are presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.

The vast majority of our MTIs have *not* engaged in criminal misconduct or demonstrated unprofessional behavior. Rather, they exemplify our Air Force core values. The number of MTIs being investigated constitutes 4 percent of our MTI corps.

To date, five courts-martial have been completed. Each resulted in conviction. Additional MTIs are pending charges, and others are under investigation. In addition to the courts-martial cases, one MTI received nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 for an unprofessional relationship that did not include physical touching. All of the accused are presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.

Given the extensive nature of our continuing investigative work, it is possible that additional alleged offenders will be identified. If so, they too will be held accountable for their actions, if proven guilty. A summary of MTI accountability actions taken to date is attached (appendix F). Additionally, I examined the responsibilities and actions of leaders regarding the breakdown of good order and discipline reflected by this unacceptable MTI misconduct.



Accountability actions have also been taken against some of those leaders (appendix G).

#### **4. Identify and correct underlying problems:**

Our fourth commitment was to identify and correct the underlying problems that permitted the misconduct to occur. To further support this end, I directed the CDI. I was determined to employ this external investigation as an additional means to evaluate our Air Force's enlisted training environment. It was conducted with no constraints, other than the requirement to complete the investigation within 60 days.

I appointed General Woodward to conduct an independent review into matters related to misconduct between faculty/staff and trainees/students in the BMT and TT environments and identify recommendations for corrective actions. Specifically, I asked General Woodward to identify all current and historical cases of reported sexual misconduct and maltreatment or other forms of abuse of power by faculty/staff with trainees/students in BMT and TT environments; assess the efficacy of AETC's actions in response to those cases; identify the root causes of the misconduct; assess the efficacy and completeness of AETC's strategy to address misconduct; determine if AETC is in compliance with applicable laws and policy with respect to faculty/staff misconduct; and consider whether gender-segregated training would be a more effective model to mitigate MTI misconduct.

Under my authority, General Woodward hand-selected a team of 38 Air Force officer, enlisted, and civilian personnel, based upon their particular skills and experience levels. Her CDI team members were detailed to her and under her sole authority. They included representatives from the Air Force Judge Advocate General's Corps as well as personnel from security forces, the inspector general, former MTIs, the medical community, and the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office.

The CDI team conducted 215 in-depth interviews of commanders, instructors, trainees, and students as well as trainee, MTI, and MTI spouse focus groups. They built and conducted one of the largest surveys ever undertaken at AETC. This survey was voluntary and anonymous and captured inputs from 99 percent of basic training trainees, instructors, and staff. TT students and instructors also responded to the survey at a response rate of 89 percent and 71 percent, respectively. This totaled more than 18,000 trainees, students, and faculty. The CDI team also established a 24-hour hotline for current and former trainees to report allegations, receiving more than 100 calls, which led to 17 allegations forwarded for further investigation.

In addition to numerous site visits to BMT at JBSA-Lackland, General Woodward's team also visited our four largest TT bases during the investigation. These visits were conducted at Keesler AFB, Mississippi; Goodfellow AFB and Sheppard AFB, Texas; and TT programs colocated with BMT at Lackland. To benchmark with other programs, they visited Air Force Officer Training School at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and Army basic combat

training at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. They also conducted video teleconferences with senior leadership at Navy basic training at Great Lakes Naval Training Center, Illinois, and Marine leadership at Parris Island, South Carolina.


General Woodward completed her investigation and provided me with a final report and outbrief on 22 August 2012. General Woodward's report contained 22 findings with 46 associated recommended actions (appendix A). With the concurrence of the chief of staff of the Air Force and the secretary of the Air Force, I, my staff, and subordinate commanders subsequently conducted a 60-day review to thoroughly assess the findings of the CDI report, analyze its recommended actions, consider those actions for implementation, and develop an action plan to install enduring solutions at BMT.

This report is the summary of AETC's response to the CDI report, where we are in regard to the BMT environment, and what remains to be accomplished.

## **Background: The Basic Military Training Environment**

**BMT** is an environment that **is highly vulnerable to the abuse of power** because of the significant power imbalance that exists between instructors and trainees. Because of the damage that can occur when power is abused, we have **established a set of institutional safeguards to prevent instructor misconduct**. These **safeguards** are designed to **dissuade, deter, and detect misconduct** and to **hold perpetrators fully accountable**.

If we were to visualize BMT as a physical structure (fig. 1), the institutional safeguards would be the four “pillars” supporting the structure itself, with leadership having overall responsibility for managing the safeguards and the MTI culture providing a strong reinforcement.



**Dissuade:**

In dissuading misconduct, we seek to strengthen the inclination of training instructors toward professional behavior. This process begins when we select instructors with strong records of performance and discipline. The instructors also undergo psychological screening before completing a four-month training program where professional conduct is stressed at every level.

Success in the “dissuade” safeguard means our instructor corps will be strongly inclined toward upholding the Air Force’s core values of integrity, service, and excellence and will have the inner resiliency to resist the temptation toward misconduct that often exists in an environment with a significant power imbalance. The vast majority of our instructors are dissuaded from unprofessional conduct.

**Deter:**

For those few instructors who are not dissuaded and are still inclined toward inappropriate behavior, we must deter them from acting inappropriately by convincing them that the risks associated with unprofessional behavior are greater than the rewards they seek. Effective deterrence is based on a reasonable probability of detection and a perception that there will be strong negative consequences after detection occurs. Those consequences range from MTI peer pressure to formal accountability methods.

**Detect:**

Detection in the BMT environment results in an ability to catch those who are not dissuaded or deterred from committing sexual assaults, sexual misconduct, unprofessional relationships, or behavior that places basic military trainees at risk and violates our core values. It can be accomplished through elements such as a video surveillance system, trainee feedback, peer awareness and intervention, and leadership engagement.

**Hold Accountable:**

Finally, accountability tools include administrative actions such as counseling, removal from MTI duty, denial of end-of-tour medals, downgraded performance reports, and punitive actions such as nonjudicial punishment and court-martial.

When the institutional safeguards are working properly, most instructors will be dissuaded from misconduct. The few who are not dissuaded will be deterred from unprofessional behavior, and those who are not deterred will be detected and held accountable in a way that further strengthens dissuasion and deterrence. Each of these safeguards reinforces the others, and a properly working system will strengthen itself over time.

This system of safeguards is one of the principal tools that leadership uses to maintain good order and discipline in the BMT environment, and as such, **leaders play a critical role because they must constantly monitor these safeguards for weaknesses and make corrections as necessary.**

Additionally, the **training instructors** themselves **have a responsibility** to keep the institutional safeguards strong. They are in the best position **to hold themselves accountable** for embodying Air Force core values and detecting those who violate our standards. **A strong training instructor culture is the essential foundation** to the effectiveness of the institutional safeguards.

## **The Commander Directed Investigation Report:**

### **Findings**

The report contained **22 findings categorized into five major areas:** (1) **leadership**, where deterrence was found to be hindered by **insufficient leadership oversight**; (2) the **MTI selection and manning** process, where the MTI corps consisted of members with **minimal leadership experience** and too

much power resident with a single MTI; (3) **MTI training and development**, where the MTI culture and training **did not adequately emphasize noncommissioned officer (NCO) responsibilities**; (4) **reporting and detection**, which addressed **barriers that exist in reporting** by MTIs, trainees, and students, and; (5) **policy and guidance**, where enduring **institutional safeguards are necessary**.

In her outbrief, General Woodward elaborated on each of these areas.

### **1. Insufficient leadership oversight:**

The CDI team concluded that the vast majority of training commanders work tirelessly to ensure mission success. However, the investigation found that there was insufficient oversight of BMT squadrons, which consist of as many as 1,000 staff and trainees. One officer—the commander—was insufficient. Interviews with convicted and immunized perpetrators revealed that in their view, a lack of oversight by some unit leadership contributed to their ability to avoid detection and to their belief that they would not be discovered.

The CDI also highlighted that with only one instructor assigned to a flight of 50 trainees, not only is there considerable stress on that instructor, who averages 85–100 hours of work per week, but there is also inherent opportunity for an individual instructor to abuse his/her power.

## **2. Inexperienced MTIs:**

In examining the MTI selection process, the CDI team found that some MTIs were relatively too inexperienced to effectively exercise the authority and power they were given over trainees. Interviews revealed that some MTIs had little to no previous supervisory experience. This lack of experience was considered particularly relevant in an environment where a single MTI is typically responsible for a flight of 50 or more trainees.

## **3. Lack of priority on NCO responsibilities:**

From an MTI training and development perspective, the independent review identified an MTI culture that emphasized MTI duties above the professional responsibilities of an NCO. The CDI report concluded that this departure from Air Force core values ultimately created an environment that emphasized fear and power over trust and respect. For some MTIs, the power they hold over impressionable young men and women, and access to those same people, may tempt them to consider unprofessional conduct.

## **4. Barriers to reporting and detection:**

The investigation also revealed that in the eyes of faculty and staff, the combination of the reporting process for both trainees and instructors, coupled with poor detection methods, contributed to a culture where misconduct appeared to be tolerated by leadership. However, the CDI's survey also indicated that recent command emphasis has been markedly effective in this



area. Results indicated that 93 percent of trainees felt comfortable reporting misconduct and that more than 95 percent believe that leadership made reasonable efforts to stop sexual assault.

#### **5. Policy and guidance are understood but must be enforced:**

Lastly, after reviewing considerable policy and guidance and interviewing hundreds of witnesses, including perpetrators, the CDI concluded that commanders, supervisors, instructors, and trainees understood applicable regulations and guidance regarding professional conduct. However, inconsistent punishment of some contributed to the perception that unprofessional behavior would be tolerated by at least some in authority.

### **AETC's Conclusions and Actions in Response to the Commander Directed Investigation's Recommendations**

I draw **three overarching conclusions** from General Woodward's CDI: (1) over time, **weaknesses developed in** each of the previously described **institutional safeguards**; (2) **Leadership failed to detect and prevent these weaknesses**, and: (3) our **MTIs did not sufficiently police themselves**.

Of these three, **leadership stands out as the most important area to address**. Strong leadership can overcome weaknesses in institutional safeguards and/or weaknesses in the MTI culture. Average or weak leadership will struggle to successfully navigate through the unique challenges that exist in the BMT environment.

**Actions to strengthen BMT leadership:**

Given the singular importance of leadership in maintaining an effective, safe, and secure BMT environment, we are taking aggressive action in this area as recommended by the CDI.

Training squadron commander positions will be filled with high-potential officers. We will increase the number of leadership positions within the squadrons by adding operations officers and flight commanders to the rosters. We will increase the experience level of leaders by upgrading the squadron first sergeant positions from master sergeant to senior master sergeant and the squadron superintendent positions from senior master sergeant to chief master sergeant. Leadership preparation will also be strengthened considerably through an expanded leadership orientation course that will place additional emphasis on the potential for abuse of power, sexual assault, unprofessional relationships, and maltreatment or maltraining. Finally, we are instituting a set of policy changes to ensure that leadership receives timely notification of potential misconduct, that credible allegations of misconduct result in immediate removal from the training environment, and that more appropriate thresholds are set for the temporary or permanent removal of an MTI from the instructor corps. Taken together, these actions directed at strengthening our leadership team will provide the most effective means of ensuring that we are well positioned to address the critical issues impacting BMT today, and that we maintain this position of strength for the long run.

### **Actions to improve MTI effectiveness and professionalism:**

A second set of initiatives that will pay significant dividends involves placing our MTIs in a stronger position to successfully execute their duties. In this regard, we believe that the single most important decision we can make is to reduce the MTI duty day, which can extend as long as 16 hours for weeks at a time. To this end, we will assign two MTIs to each BMT flight, which will allow us to split the duty day in half. We will also increase the required grade level for MTI duty to technical sergeant, which will bring more experience and maturity to our MTI corps. MTI initial qualification and supplemental training will also be improved through changes in the qualification training course and the establishment of a deliberate development program.

Our goal is to raise professionalism in BMT to the highest level possible. We cannot achieve this goal unless we select the most highly qualified Airmen for MTI duty and then provide them with high-quality training and a reasonable workday. The changes we are making concerning MTI selection, professional development, and work period will contribute significantly to enhancing the ability of our MTIs to execute their duties professionally.

### **Actions to strengthen trainee awareness, safety and institutional safeguards:**

Along with leadership and MTIs, there is a third group of people who are an instrumental part of the solution set for strengthening the effectiveness,

safety, and security of the BMT environment. This group is our trainees, who play a critical role in our ability to detect and deter misconduct. Moreover, we must do better at taking advantage of the unique opportunity afforded in BMT to prepare our newest Airmen to deal effectively with sexual assault and unprofessional behavior throughout the remainder of their Air Force careers.

This process of increasing the capacity of our trainees to be part of the solution set will begin before they enter BMT. From their recruiter, they will receive a briefing that covers sexual assault, sexual harassment, unprofessional relationships, maltreatment and maltraining, and the reporting of misconduct during BMT. This briefing will be repeated after the trainees arrive at BMT.

Additionally, we will increase the number of sexual assault response counselors (SARC) in BMT. This will not only provide more trainee contact with SARCs but also increase the portion of the sexual assault prevention training curriculum instructed by SARCs.

Feedback from trainees is another area where we must improve. We have improved our feedback mechanisms through better positioning of critique boxes and improved survey mechanisms. We will add hotline phones for direct connection to the SARC.

A significant policy change concerning trainee safety is expansion of the wingman policy, which now requires trainees to be accompanied by another trainee any time they are outside a group setting. This single policy change

dramatically decreases the potential for sexual assault or misconduct since these types of activities almost always occur in a one-on-one setting.

As recommended by the CDI, we are taking other actions to repair the deficiencies we discovered in our institutional safeguards and to strengthen our leadership team—while revitalizing the MTI culture. These additional actions, as well as the actions mentioned above, are described in the following pages and are grouped by changes directed toward leadership, the MTI culture, and our institutional safeguards.

The CDI produced 46 recommendations, and we will implement 45 of them, with the 46th recommendation undergoing review in a separate forum (appendix B). Although the CDI recommendations will immeasurably assist in our efforts to strengthen BMT, it is also critically important that we continue to seek additional ways to address current deficiencies and prevent future problems. I will discuss our approach to these challenges following the descriptions of our actions to address the CDI recommendations.

## **Additional Details of AETC’s Actions in Response to the Commander Directed Investigation’s Recommendations**

### **Leadership**

- Issue: Installing top-quality and experienced leadership oversight

CDI Recommendation(s):

A5: Ensure access to the highest-quality candidates across all career fields to be considered for training squadron commanders.

A1: Add an officer director of operations and officer flight commanders to BMT squadrons to improve oversight.

A2: Increase officer leadership presence throughout all hours and phases of training.

A3: Ensure every BMT squadron has a diamond-wearing first sergeant with at least one year of experience as a first sergeant.

Implementation Decision: Fully Implement  
Status: In Work

Five BMT squadron commander positions are turning over in the summer of 2013. Positions will be filled by high-potential officers. Estimated completion date (ECD): August 2013.

Operations officer billets were added to unit manpower documents (UMD) for all seven BMT “street” squadrons (squadrons that “push” trainee flights). Billets will be filled during the summer of 2013 permanent change of station move cycle. Prior to the summer of 2013, the billets will be filled via temporary duty assignments. ECD: August 2013.

Flight commander billets will be added to the squadron UMDs and filled by the summer of 2013. ECD: August 2013.

We have increased the presence of existing leadership via frequent, random visits, to include during nonduty hours and weekends through all phases of training. Additionally, implementation of the recommendation to add operations officers and flight commanders will further increase officer presence to an acceptable, effective, and sustainable level.

BMT first sergeant position requirements have been upgraded from master sergeant to senior master sergeant with at least one year of experience as a first sergeant. Filling of billets is in progress. ECD: April 2013.

In addition, AETC has further strengthened BMT leadership experience levels by upgrading BMT squadron superintendent positions from senior master sergeant to chief master sergeant. Filling of billets is in progress. ECD: August 2013.

- Issue: Enhancing leadership training

CDI Recommendation(s):

A4: Develop a leadership training course for BMT commanders that includes an understanding of the unique challenges present in the training environment.

A25: Develop formal training using scientifically developed sexual assault, sexual harassment, unprofessional relationship, maltreatment, and maltraining indicators and lessons learned from training environment veterans. Implement this training for leadership, faculty, and staff prior to their arrival in BMT.

Implementation Decision: Fully Implement

Status: In Work

The 737th Training Group (TRG) is drafting lesson plans for an expanded BMT leadership orientation course, in consultation with sister services and behavioral specialists. The expanded course includes BMT training philosophy; appropriate use of power; stress inoculation strategies; wrongful sexual contact, including sexual assault; sexual harassment; unprofessional relationships; and maltreatment/maltraining lessons-learned case studies from the training environment. ECD: May 2013.

- Issue: Leadership policy changes

CDI Recommendation(s):

A6: Develop a clear policy requiring wing commanders to be informed immediately of all allegations of sexual assault, sexual harassment, unprofessional relationships, maltreatment, and maltraining.

A45: Require that the wing commander be informed of all allegations of sexual assault, sexual harassment, unprofessional relationships, maltreatment, and maltraining reported in the end-of-course (EOC) surveys.

A7: Require squadron commander consultation with the local legal office upon discovering allegations of sexual assault, sexual harassment, unprofessional relationships, maltreatment, and maltraining and direct consultation prior to taking administrative or disciplinary action.

A44: Establish standardized procedures, including trend analysis, for analyzing and reporting survey data. Report results and analysis quarterly to group, wing, and numbered Air Force (NAF) leadership.

Implementation Decision: Fully Implement

Status: Complete

2 AF/CC issued a policy memorandum requiring that all maltreatment, maltraining, hazing, unprofessional relationship, and sexual misconduct allegations be reported to the 2 AF/CC through a newly created mandatory misconduct reporting requirement. In furtherance of the 2 AF/CC's policy

memorandum, the 37th Training Wing (TRW)/CC issued an order to report allegations of all MTI misconduct, in which trainees may be involved, to the squadron, group, and wing commander (in addition to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate). This reporting must occur within 24 hours of discovery. Furthermore, all intended case dispositions, including any punishments, must be reported to the wing commander before being issued to the member. Additionally, consultation with the servicing staff judge advocate is required before any such action is taken.

In coordination with command, the servicing legal office established a staffing system to ensure expeditious and accurate information flow among all levels of command, law enforcement, and judge advocates. The process has significantly increased command and staff judge advocate awareness of alleged incidents of wrongdoing, and has ensured greater accountability that is both more consistent and timely.

737 TRG consolidates, analyzes, and reports EOC survey feedback quarterly to group, wing, and NAF leadership.

Note: Four more CDI recommendations centered on policies for actions by BMT leadership following receipt of allegations of unprofessional relationships, maltreatment, or maltraining by MTIs. Recommendations included requirements to decertify, retrain, and recertify MTIs, maintaining documentation in the MTI's training record and personal information file (PIF).

A8: Immediately remove an MTI from the training environment when an allegation of sexual assault, sexual harassment, or unprofessional relationship involving a trainee or student is made. If the allegation is substantiated, remove the MTI permanently from the career field and take other disciplinary action as appropriate.

A9: If the allegation against an MTI involves maltreatment or maltraining, immediately remove him or her from the training environment. Require retraining and recertification in accordance with the recommendations in Finding 10.

(Finding 10: Earlier action by commanders and a well-thought-out plan—including decertification, anger management training, and behavioral analysis at the first sign of behavior that includes uncontrolled anger—might have rehabilitated the member. It certainly would have given the commander critical information to determine whether or not to eliminate the MTI from the MTI corps or to administratively discharge the member from the Air Force.)

A22: Decertify and accomplish remedial training prior to recertification and reinstatement for all instructors found to have been engaged in



maltreatment or maltraining. Require squadron commanders to review and sign documentation ensuring that remedial training was accomplished.

A23: Mandate documentation of the incident and remedial training in both the members' training records and PIF to ensure proper tracking of personnel with disciplinary issues.

Implementation Decision: Implement; maltreatment/maltraining definitions are under review.

Status: In Work

The 737 TRG/CC directed squadron commanders to immediately suspend an MTI from the training environment upon notification of allegations involving sexual assault, sexual harassment, or unprofessional relationships; and if substantiated, to remove the MTI from the career field. This action is complete.

Allegations of maltreatment or maltraining are assessed by the squadron commander on a case-by-case basis. When warranted, MTIs are suspended from the training environment while allegations are investigated. Factors considered when suspending an MTI from the training environment include, but are not limited to, the nature and seriousness of the allegation, any past history of substantiated misconduct by the MTI, determination of whether or not the misconduct was directed at a trainee, and determination of whether or not the MTI self-identified.

In cases of substantiated maltreatment or maltraining, the squadron commander, in consultation with the group commander, decides to decertify the MTI pending required retraining or permanently remove the MTI from special duty. The commander reviews the Air Force Enlisted Classification Directory (AFECD) retention criteria for the 8B (MTI) special duty (SD) identifier and refers to applicable regulatory guidance. This AFECD and regulatory guidance are being rewritten for greater clarity on the triggers to warrant permanent removal from MTI SD vice temporary decertification, subsequent retraining, and recertification. ECD: February 2013.

If an MTI is being retrained, the squadron commander will determine the specific retraining required based on the nature of the incident. In addition, 737 TRG has published policy that squadron commanders document remedial training due to misconduct in members' Air Force training records and PIFs for personnel with disciplinary issues. This action is complete.

### **MTI Culture**

- Issue: MTI selection criteria

CDI Recommendation(s):

A12: Update MTI selection to include the following requirements:

- a. Candidates must be at least a staff sergeant (E-5) with a minimum of one year time-in-grade.
- b. Applicants must have demonstrated leadership ability during previous tours of duty and must have demonstrated a capability to perform in positions of increased responsibility as junior/senior NCOs in the Air Force.
- c. Applicants must complete Airman Leadership School (ALS) prior to applying.
- d. Applicants must have no record of disciplinary action throughout their entire career.
- e. Commanders must review the applicant's leadership skills and supervisory experience and include their assessment in the recommendation.
- f. The applicant's local group superintendent must interview the applicant and provide feedback on the member's suitability for the MTI corps, including an assessment of whether the applicant has sufficient maturity to avoid entering into unprofessional relationships with trainees.
- g. Only the training group commander (TRG/CC) can authorize waivers for deviations from these criteria.

Implementation Decision: Fully Implement

Status: In Work

AETC is updating the AFECD to require candidates to be at the grade of technical sergeant, with waiver authority to hire staff sergeants withheld to the 737 TRG/CC for those staff sergeants with at least one year time-in-grade after ALS graduation. Additionally, the squadron commander and wing command chief must verify that applicants have demonstrated leadership ability during previous tours of duty (based on records review and personal interview) and a capability to perform in positions of increased responsibility as junior/senior NCOs in the Air Force. ECD: December 2012.

- Issue: Mental health assessment process in selecting MTIs

CDI Recommendation(s):

A14: Establish specific mental health criteria for qualification, and distribute the standards to mental health providers at each Air Force base to ensure that the process is standardized.

A13: A working group of mental health experts (including Behavioral Analysis Service personnel) should collaborate with MTI recruitment personnel to review and revise the mental health screening portion of the MTI application to ensure that the interview questions and psychological testing adequately assess suitability for MTI duties.

A15: Update the spouse portion of the MTI selection process to include feedback from current MTI spouses to ensure the currency of information addressing realistic stressors associated with MTI life.

Implementation Decision: Implement; MTI spouses do not undergo a mental health evaluation.

Status: In Work

The AETC surgeon general (SG) established a working group to review the current psychological test, interview, and screening process with a focus on the benefits and risks of a centralized and decentralized evaluation process. This working group includes subject-matter experts involved with Air Force special operations; instructors of survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) and parajumper/pararescueman (PJ) training; 737 TRG; and mental health staff from the 559th Medical Group's Behavioral Analysis Service. The group will establish the qualifications required for MTI duty, ensuring that the interview questions and psychological testing assess suitable individuals for MTI duty. The group will provide recommendations by December 2012.

The working group is also updating the incoming MTI spouses' information to include current MTI spouses' feedback. ECD: December 2012.

We are placing two operational psychologists and two mental health technicians within BMT in order to implement the SERE psychological support model. ECD: August 2013.

- Issue: MTI manning

CDI Recommendation(s): Note: Seven recommendations address manning issues, including MTI instructor-to-flight ratio, female MTI manning, MTI nonvolunteer policy, maximum MTI tour length, MTI follow-on assignments, MTI SD incentives, and assessment of MTI manpower.

A16: Immediately increase manning to fill all authorized positions (currently 508) to meet a trainer-to-trainee ratio of four certified MTIs per two flights with one female MTI per team. This will require a female target of 25 percent of total MTI manning.

A46: Strengthen the current integration model by creating MTI teams of four instructors per two flights, with a minimum of one female instructor per team, regardless of the gender of the trainee flights.

A17: An effective MTI nonvolunteer selection process must be developed to fill authorized positions if either total authorized or female quotas exceed qualified volunteers.

A19: Shorten the MTI tour length to a maximum of three years, and do not allow follow-on SD assignments.

A20: Prior to returning to MTI duty, Airmen should spend a minimum of four years in their career field.

A21: Develop and institutionalize a more effective incentive program for MTI duty.

A18: Conduct a thorough manning assessment that addresses the recommendations above, accounting for MTIs in an ineffective status.

Implementation Decision: Implement

Status: In Work

Manning adjustments are under way to create MTI teams of four instructors per two flights. ECD: December 2012.

Manning adjustments are under way to ensure that a minimum of one female instructor is assigned to each team of four instructors. ECD: November 2013.

Shortening the maximum MTI tour length to 36 months is under evaluation. ECD: February 2013.

AETC is updating the AFECD to require Airmen to spend a minimum of four years in their career field prior to returning to MTI duty. ECD: December 2012.

AETC supports the Air Force Enlisted Force Development Panel's (EFDP) review of all SD programs to include MTI duty. Enlisted deliberate development is a priority, and breadth and depth of experience are key factors in a career of sustained performance. Under force development principles, SD is recognized as a positive career enhancer. Future SD incentives—specifically, potential impact on promotions, assignments, and pay—are additional areas that the EFDP is currently exploring. MTIs performing “street” duty receive SD “incentive pay” at the top rate for the Air Force. AETC is also coordinating with the EFDP for the way ahead in

determining the most effective means of assigning and selecting MTIs to achieve long-term sustainment, whether by nonvoluntary selection or a nominative process through the major commands. ECD: July 2013.

AETC has assessed MTI manpower in conjunction with internal 37 TRW manning adjustments and the actions and considerations described above. We plan to add 55 enlisted student manpower authorizations to account for MTIs who are in training status vice those actually assigned to trainee flights. The Air Staff is currently developing a resource plan to source the additional manpower. ECD: December 2012.

- Issue: MTI development programs

CDI Recommendation(s):

A26: Continue to develop, resource, and institutionalize MTI development programs that promote a culture of mutual respect and correctly balance both instructor proficiency and NCO professionalism.

Implementation Decision: Fully Implement

Status: In Work

AETC will implement this by emphasizing leadership as a core competency in the MTI qualification training course and increasing the focus on mentorship. A focus on development and policy enforcement is also being added in the MTI supervisor course. Additionally, AETC is developing a BMT deliberate development program, adding three positions to BMT to support this program and continuation training requirements. ECD: July 2013.

### **Institutional Safeguards**

- Issue: Preparing trainees to be part of the solution set

CDI Recommendation(s):

A42: Develop an informational briefing and require the military entry processing station (MEPS) NCO to brief all recruits on what constitutes sexual assault, sexual harassment, unprofessional relationships, maltreatment, and maltraining and how to report such instances when recruits arrive at BMT.

Implementation Decision: Fully implement

Status: Complete

AETC has developed a briefing that will be delivered to all new recruits as the final processing action taken by the recruiter prior to shipping through the MEPS outbound to basic training. The briefing complements and expands upon the Air Force Recruiting Service “Bill of Rights” briefing provided by recruiters to applicants on professional relationships, sexual harassment, and unwanted contact, including sexual abuse in relation to the recruiting process. The material is covered in a one-on-one session with the recruiter and applicant to ensure full understanding and is revisited throughout the enlistment process. The “Bill of Rights” will serve as the basis for the final briefing, also done one-on-one; each incoming trainee will be briefed on instructor abuses of power (sexual assault, sexual harassment, unprofessional relationships, maltreatment, and maltraining) as well as how to report during BMT and TT. Because accurate and consistent information on this subject is so important, we are implementing a process whereby this one-on-one briefing will be repeated and documented at BMT and TT. The record of the performance of these briefings will travel with trainees throughout their training experience and provide a tool for program oversight.

- Issue: Institutionalizing the trainee wingman policy at BMT

CDI Recommendation(s):

A37: Institutionalize new wingman procedures by incorporating them into training group instructions.

Implementation Decision: Fully Implement

Status: Complete

737 TRG expanded its wingman policy to ensure that trainees are never without a wingman. This is codified in the updated BMT group instruction/policy, which details procedures and accountability at all levels for leaders, MTIs, and trainees.

- Issue: Reassuring trainees and improving reporting and critique monitoring

CDI Recommendation(s):

A34: Training regarding how to report MTI misconduct should reassure trainees that there will be no negative training or career consequences for reporting allegations of sexual assault, sexual harassment, unprofessional relationships, maltreatment, or maltraining.

A43: Create a standardized and anonymous survey, separate from other EOC surveys, to effectively capture training environment misconduct.

A33: Implement secure processes that track and analyze BMT comment box critiques that are suitable for reporting allegations of misconduct. Use Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Regulation 350-6, *Enlisted Entry Training Policies and Administration*, as a benchmark to develop specific guidelines for investigating and responding to comment sheets.

Implementation Decision: Fully implement

Status: Complete

Comprehensive leadership briefings are presented to trainees. The 737 TRG/CC and a lawyer from the servicing legal office brief trainees during arrival week. The squadron commander briefs trainees during the first week of training on the importance of reporting and his or her personal commitment that there will be no negative consequences for reporting.

737 TRG administers anonymous surveys throughout training to collect data from a statistically significant sample of trainees.

737 TRG has increased trainee access to critique boxes by repositioning boxes (42) on the first level in all dormitory stairwells that are out of direct MTI line of sight. Civilian staff members collect and process the trainee critiques, which are provided to the group, wing, and 2 AF weekly. Survey feedback is tracked and analyzed quarterly.

In addition, AETC's partnership with RAND will develop an integrated survey process to encourage full reporting of all misconduct, especially by those who fear retribution.

- Issue: Improve trainee access to SARC and chaplain resources and reporting hotlines

CDI Recommendation(s):

A36: Install in each dormitory a 24/7 hotline phone that directly connects to the SARC.

A35: Increase the physical presence of SARC personnel and the chaplain in BMT squadrons to facilitate access to reporting mechanisms.

A28: The SARC should teach all training curricula on sexual assault prevention and response to both trainees and MTIs.

A27: Add scenario-based training (led by the SARC or chaplain) on sexual assault, sexual harassment, unprofessional relationships, maltreatment, and maltraining into week four of the BMT curriculum. Administer a test at

the end of this training, and immediately correct all wrong answers. Track and trend results.

A41: AETC should maintain the 24/7 hotline (initiated by the CDI) to allow for continued reporting.

Implementation Decision: Implement. Evaluating the best week in BMT for SARC training.

Status: In Work

Multimenu/hotline phones (24/7 direct connect to the SARC) will be added/installed in dayroom hallways in the recruit housing and training facilities, and dayrooms in the new Airman training centers (dorms), providing trainees immediate access to phones. ECD: March 2013.

Increasing chaplain presence in BMT will facilitate reporting mechanisms, contribute to the societal development of trainees, and provide commanders another set of eyes and ears to assist with measuring the health of the command.

AETC agrees that establishing opportunities for interaction between SARC staff members and BMT trainees through increased physical presence, based on location and contact time, will increase opportunities for reporting. AETC also agrees that SARC experts should teach the training curriculum on sexual assault prevention and response to both trainees and MTIs. To that end, three SARC positions are being added to BMT. ECD: August 2013.

AETC has already moved sexual assault prevention and response training from BMT week seven to week five. The command is exploring moving this training block to the fourth week of training and incorporating a test/progress check at the end of the class. BMT-specific scenario-based training is under development. ECD: May 2013.

Upon deactivation of the CDI team, the 24/7 hotline that was established transferred to 2 AF, which continues its maintenance and operation. The hotline for reporting sexual misconduct is broadly advertised to all trainees and staff.

In addition, AETC has embarked on casting a broader net than first employed by the CDI team, which partnered with the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) to contact (using current/last-known e-mail address) all graduates of BMT and TT since 2009. This was done in order to make graduates aware of the existence of the hotline. In a new effort, AETC collaborated with AFPC to canvass graduates of BMT and TT to January 2002, notifying them of the hotline's existence. This massive outreach effort began 15 October 2012. Results of this effort may be limited due to the



statutes of limitations for military justice actions, but any information received will continue to inform command action.

- Issue: Eliminating detection weaknesses

CDI Recommendation(s):

A38: Eliminate weaknesses in existing detection measures by improving surveillance, charge of quarters (CQ), and entry-control procedures.

Implementation Decision: Fully Implement

Status: In Work

AETC/737 TRG completed a comprehensive review of all detection and control procedures to eliminate weaknesses that could facilitate misconduct. Numerous measures have been implemented to ensure the safety of trainees and deter inappropriate behavior: utility doors have been removed from dorm room closets; policy now mandates two permanent-party personnel in the squadron area 24/7 to ensure compliance with policies and procedures; strict key controls were implemented where all facility keys are signed out/in from CQ; MTIs are restricted from seeing off their graduated Airmen to their TT school (the instructor supervisor now oversees); group/squadron leadership and the standardization/evaluation office conduct unscheduled compliance and security checks during nonduty hours and weekends. All of these actions are complete.

AETC is evaluating additional video surveillance improvements recommended by the Electronic Systems Center at Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts. ECD: July 2013.

- Issue: Denying MTI access to trainees' private information

CDI Recommendation(s):

A40: Deny unnecessary access to trainee private information by prohibiting social media contact, restricting control of trainee cell phones, and strengthening guidance to restrict tattoo inspection.

Implementation Decision: Fully Implement

Status: Complete

BMT squadron commanders brief graduating BMT Airmen that they are prohibited from contact with any MTI while in TT and that they must report to their TT military training leader (MTL) any attempt by their MTI to contact them. BMT policy now completely prohibits MTIs from handling trainee cell

phones. Only the instructor supervisor, first sergeant, superintendent, or command will distribute, monitor use of, and secure trainee cell phones—with keys controlled by the CQ. Policy also restricts tattoo inspection to visual checks in standard clothing uniform combinations.

- Issue: Developing behavioral awareness

CDI Recommendation(s):

A24: Use behavioral-skills specialists to determine and design an indicator set specifically related to detecting sexual assault, sexual harassment, unprofessional relationships, maltreatment, and maltraining.

Implementation Decision: Fully Implement

Status: In Work

Headquarters AETC/SG and 737 TRG, with contract support, are consulting with sister services and mental health subject-matter experts to identify an indicator set related to wrongful sexual contact, including sexual assault, sexual harassment, unprofessional relationships, maltreatment, and maltraining. In addition, AETC has partnered with RAND on a study to improve processes associated with monitoring the BMT environment, including trainees, instructors, and leadership. Recommendations from all sources will be evaluated with final recommendations for implementation by August 2013.

- Issue: Investigative purview, training, and lessons learned

CDI Recommendation(s):

A29: Adhere to existing Air Force policy to determine investigative purview over allegations of unprofessional relationship and sexual assault.

A30: Train investigators to understand the challenges of investigating sexual offenses in the training environment.

A31: Apply benchmark investigative procedures and lessons learned from successful investigations.

Implementation Decision: Implement, pending Headquarters USAF (HAF) guidance.

Status: Headquarters actions in work.

There is new Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) guidance that identifies the AFOSI as the sole investigative agency to investigate

allegations of sexual assault within the Air Force. Accordingly, HAF is updating the AFOSI and security forces matrix found in AFI 71-101, *Criminal Investigations Programs*, to reflect AFOSI as the sole investigative authority within the Air Force for allegations of sexual assault. ECD: TBD.

AFOSI has developed a sexual assault investigators' course to train its agents on assault "victimology" and investigative techniques. It was noted in the CDI report that "the course was recently held for the first time."

AFOSI also has an extensive lessons learned program in place to benchmark investigative procedures and lessons learned from successful investigations.

- Issue: Dedicating sufficient security forces investigative manpower to BMT

CDI Recommendation(s):

A32: Dedicate additional Security Forces Office of Investigation (SFOI) manpower to the training mission based on trainee population and unique operating environment.

Implementation Decision: Implement

Status: In Work

The Capability-Based Manpower Standard (CMS) for Security Forces, *43XSSS—Manpower and Organization Security Forces Squadron*, 6 December 2007, specifically excludes basic military trainees at JBSA-Lackland in the manpower standard for security forces investigators. This implementation effort requires change of the CMS to remove the exclusion of BMT trainees at JBSA-Lackland. We will add two security forces investigators for BMT. ECD: August 2013.

- Issue: Tracking and archiving MTI misconduct actions

CDI Recommendation(s):

A10: Develop a tracking tool that allows wing, group, and squadron commanders to consolidate, track, and trend allegations of misconduct and disciplinary/administrative actions throughout an MTI's career.

A11: Archive the data collected to use in disciplinary actions, performance reports, termination actions, and so forth, and when determining whether or not to accept people wishing to return for another SD assignment, such as an MTI, MTL, or technical training instructor (TTI).

Implementation Decision: Fully Implement

Status: In Work

37 TRW and 737 TRG have developed a spreadsheet to track alleged misconduct, disciplinary, and administrative actions for MTIs. The 737 TRG is in the process of updating its training administration database (the Basic Training Management System) to automate this process and maintain a record of MTI disciplinary actions for future decision making. ECD: March 2013.

Additionally, effective 1 November 2012, AETC is implementing PIFs to document general misconduct, substandard performance, and other derogatory information on members in all AETC units. In order for an MTI to return later in his/her career to an MTI leadership position, a positive recommendation will be required on enlisted performance reports while assigned as an MTI.

- Issue: Length of the BMT program

CDI Recommendation(s):

A39: Adopt the BMT-developed 7.5-week training program to eliminate “white space” in the training schedule.

Implementation Decision: Do not implement as part of this effort.

BMT is currently an 8.5-week program. The predominant issue concerning the length of the program is the course content. Course content is under review via a separate initiative, and the appropriate BMT course length will be determined as part of that review.

## **Gender-Integrated Training**

One of the tasks I assigned to the CDI team was to consider whether gender-segregated training would be a more effective model to mitigate MTI misconduct. After comparing the current Air Force BMT model with the segregated approach used by the Marine Corps and the fully integrated approaches used by the Army and Navy, and after thoroughly evaluating BMT infrastructure and policies, the CDI team concluded that integrated training

remains the best option for the Air Force. I support this finding, which is consistent with the principle of training the way we fight together as Airmen.

### **The Way Ahead: Establishing Enduring Solutions**

AETC is thoroughly committed to correcting the underlying problems that permitted misconduct to occur at BMT. The corrective actions we are taking as a result of our own internal review, as well as the external CDI led by General Woodward, are a good start to the longer-term effort we must undertake to prevent problems from recurring. We cannot make the mistake of believing that the types of challenges we face in BMT will stay fixed over time—they will not. The conditions that led to the abuse of power in BMT are ever-present; thus, our vigilance and engagement must be persistent as well.

To that end, I am directing the establishment of a Military Training Oversight Council, which will be chaired by the AETC vice-commander. The purpose of this council is to review the progress and effectiveness of the actions we are now implementing, provide an expanded perspective on future actions we will take to prevent problems from recurring, and advise the AETC commander on strategic issues affecting Airman safety and the maintenance of good order and discipline in BMT.

Under the vice-commander's chairmanship, the oversight council will be comprised of the commanders and command chiefs of 2 AF, 37 TRW, and 737 TRG; the AETC command chief; the AETC staff judge advocate; the AETC

command SG; and the Headquarters AETC staff directors for manpower and personnel, and for intelligence, operations, and nuclear integration.

One of the first tasks of the council will be to establish a set of metrics to help us better understand the effectiveness of our actions and where adjustments can be made to improve our performance. Effective metrics are a key component to a strong oversight process.

I recognize and fully support the very important role of the Air Force's BMT Triennial Review Committee with regard to its responsibilities as outlined in Air Force Instruction 36-2201, *Air Force Training Program*. The oversight council I am chartering will not preempt that body's role but will contribute an additive element of focused oversight to ensure that our strengthening actions achieve their desired effect and remain sustainable.

The underlying issues associated with misconduct in BMT are not exclusive to the Air Force; these issues impact the basic training programs of the other military services as well. A greater degree of collaboration among the military services will strengthen each of our programs by providing a forum where we can develop a broader perspective on the challenges we face and share best practices. To achieve the type of partnership we seek, I directed the commander of 2 AF to establish a recurring Tri-Service Accession Council with Army and Navy counterparts. We have received positive early support for this council from the other services.

## **Summary**

BMT is foundational to the process of developing Airmen who have the skills and character to defend our nation and our values. Accordingly, those who are charged with the responsibility of leading and training in the BMT environment must exemplify the highest levels of professionalism at all times. There can be no wavering on this requirement for absolute professionalism.

Although the vast majority of our leaders and trainers have performed admirably in one of the most demanding duty assignments in the Air Force, a relative few have not met our expectations, and this is not acceptable. We have taken aggressive action to fix the deficiencies we uncovered in BMT.

Most importantly, we are strengthening our leadership teams by not only adding more leaders but also increasing leader experience levels, rank structure, and training. We are also strengthening our MTI corps by selecting more experienced Airmen for this challenging duty, shortening their duty day, and providing them with more and better training.

The strengthening of our institutional safeguards is a third line of effort that will produce significant dividends. We not only have improved the physical security of the BMT campus (e.g., improving surveillance and entry-control procedures) but also have increased focus on the most important and effective institutional safeguard—our trainees. By increasing the quantity and improving the quality of the training we provide trainees on sexual assault awareness and response, by directing that no trainee is ever alone outside a group setting, and by providing better and more opportunities for trainee feedback, we will better

prepare our trainees to help deter and detect sexual assault and misconduct in BMT and throughout the rest of their Air Force careers.

Our goal is to make BMT the most professionally executed training program in the world. The 45 recommendations we are implementing from the CDI led by General Woodward will help us take a significant step toward that end. We are moving forward quickly in this regard. We have already implemented 13 of the CDI recommendations and are on track to implement 31 of 32 others by August 2013 and achieve end state implementation of the last single remaining action by November 2013.

Although I am confident that we are taking prudent steps today to address the deficiencies we have found in BMT, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge that we have been here before. Most of what we found in BMT is not new. Sexual attraction, power, and money are three of the most corruptive elements of the human condition, and two of these three are present in the BMT environment. If we do not take steps to address these corruptive elements persistently and positively, we will find ourselves in the same situation at some point down the road. To prevent this from happening, I am establishing the BMT Oversight Council and the Tri-Service Accession Council, whose purposes will be to maintain the appropriate level of leadership attention on the challenges inherent in executing BMT.

As we move forward, we will continue to focus significant resources on eliminating sexual assault, unprofessional relationships, maltreatment, and maltraining from our ranks. This is an absolute priority. The actions we are



taking will overcome the flaws that crept into BMT and enabled a small number of individuals to cast a shadow upon the image of the MTI corps and BMT. Our basic military training program must and will be one of the finest examples of good order and discipline in the world.

**APPENDIX A**

**Commander Directed Investigation Report**

*Developing America's Airmen:*

*A Review of Air Force Enlisted Training*

**22 August 2012**

(Attached separately)

## APPENDIX B

### List of Commander Directed Investigation Recommendations

Ref.	Recommendation
A1	Add an officer director of operations and officer section commanders to BMT squadrons to improve oversight.
A2	Increase officer leadership presence throughout all hours and phases of training.
A3	Ensure that every BMT squadron has a diamond-wearing first sergeant with at least one year of experience as a first sergeant.
A4	Develop a leadership training course for BMT commanders that includes an understanding of the unique challenges present in the training environment.
A5	Ensure that the highest-quality candidates across all career fields are considered for command of training squadrons.
A6	Develop a clear policy requiring that wing commanders be informed immediately of all allegations of sexual assault, sexual harassment, unprofessional relationships, maltreatment, and maltraining.
A7	Require squadron commander consultation with the local legal office upon discovering allegations of sexual assault, sexual harassment, unprofessional relationships, maltreatment, and maltraining and direct consultation prior to taking administrative or disciplinary action.
A8	Immediately remove an MTI from the training environment when an allegation of sexual assault, sexual harassment, or unprofessional relationship involving a trainee or student is made. If the allegation is substantiated, remove the MTI permanently from the career field and take other disciplinary action as appropriate.
A9	If the allegation against an MTI involves maltreatment or maltraining, immediately remove him or her from the training environment. Require retraining and recertification in accordance with the recommendations in Finding 10.
A10	Develop a tracking tool that allows wing, group, and squadron commanders to consolidate, track, and trend allegations of misconduct and disciplinary and administrative actions throughout an MTI's career.
A11	Archive the data collected to use in disciplinary actions, performance reports, termination actions, and so forth, and in determinations of whether or not to accept people wishing to return for another special duty assignment, such as MTIs, MTLs, or TTIs.
A12	Update MTI selection to include the following requirements: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Candidates must be at least a staff sergeant (E-5) with a minimum time-in-grade of one year.</li> <li>b. Applicants must have demonstrated leadership ability during previous tours of duty and must have demonstrated a capability to perform in positions of increased responsibility as junior/senior NCOs in the Air Force.</li> <li>c. Applicants must complete ALS prior to applying.</li> <li>d. Applicants must have no record of disciplinary action throughout their career.</li> <li>e. Commanders must review the applicant's leadership skills and supervisory experience and include their assessment in the recommendation.</li> <li>f. The applicant's local group superintendent must interview the applicant and provide feedback on the member's suitability for the MTI corps, including an assessment of whether the applicant has sufficient maturity to avoid entering into unprofessional relationships with trainees.</li> <li>g. Only the TRG/CC can authorize waivers for deviations from these criteria.</li> </ul>
A13	Direct a working group of mental health experts (including Behavioral Analysis Service personnel) to collaborate with MTI recruitment personnel to review and revise the mental health screening portion of the MTI application to ensure that the interview questions and psychological testing

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	adequately assess suitability for MTI duties.
A14	Establish specific mental health criteria for qualification and distribute the standards to mental health providers at each Air Force base to ensure that the process is standardized.
A15	Update the spouse portion of the MTI mental health evaluation to include feedback from current MTI spouses to ensure the currency of information addressing realistic stressors associated with MTI life.
A16	Immediately increase manning to fill all authorized positions (currently 508) to meet a trainer-to-trainee ratio of four certified MTIs per two flights with one female MTI per team. This will require a female quota of 25 percent of total MTI manning.
A17	Develop an effective MTI nonvolunteer selection process to fill authorized positions if either total authorized or female quotas exceed qualified volunteers.
A18	Conduct a thorough manning assessment that addresses the recommendations above, accounting for MTIs in an ineffective status.
A19	Shorten the MTI tour length to a maximum of three years, and do not allow follow-on special duty assignments.
A20	Ensure that Airmen spend a minimum of four years in their career field prior to returning to MTI duty.
A21	Develop and institutionalize a more effective incentive program for MTI duty.
A22	Decertify and accomplish remedial training prior to recertification and reinstatement for all instructors found to have been engaged in maltreatment or maltraining. Require squadron commanders to review and sign documentation ensuring that remedial training was accomplished.
A23	Mandate documentation of the incident and remedial training in both the member's training records and personnel information file to ensure proper tracking of personnel with disciplinary issues.
A24	Use behavioral skills specialists to determine and design an indicator set specifically related to detecting sexual assault, sexual harassment, unprofessional relationships, maltreatment, and maltraining.
A25	Develop formal training using scientifically developed sexual assault, sexual harassment, unprofessional relationship, maltreatment, and maltraining indicators and lessons learned from training environment veterans. Implement this training for leadership, faculty, and staff prior to their arrival at BMT.
A26	Continue to develop, resource, and institutionalize MTI development programs that promote a culture of mutual respect and correctly balance both instructor proficiency and NCO professionalism.
A27	Add scenario-based training (led by the SARC or chaplain) on sexual assault, sexual harassment, unprofessional relationships, maltreatment, and maltraining into week four of the BMT curriculum. Administer a test at the end of this training. Immediately correct all wrong answers. Track and trend results.
A28	Direct the SARC to teach the entire training curriculum on sexual assault prevention and response to both trainees and MTIs.
A29	Adhere to existing Air Force policy to determine investigative purview over allegations of an unprofessional relationship and a sexual assault.
A30	Train investigators to understand the challenges of investigating sexual offenses in the training environment.
A31	Apply benchmark investigative procedures and lessons learned from successful investigations.
A32	Dedicate additional SFOI manpower to the training mission based on the trainee population and unique operating environment.
A33	Implement secure processes that track and analyze BMT comment box critiques that are suitable for reporting allegations of misconduct. Use Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Regulation 350-6, <i>Enlisted Initial Entry Training Policies and Administration</i> , as a benchmark to

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	develop specific guidelines for investigating and responding to comment sheets.
<b>A34</b>	Ensure that training regarding how to report MTI misconduct reassures trainees that there will be no negative training or career consequences for reporting allegations of sexual assault, sexual harassment, unprofessional relationships, maltreatment, or maltraining.
<b>A35</b>	Increase the physical presence of SARC personnel and the chaplain in BMT squadrons to facilitate access to reporting mechanisms.
<b>A36</b>	Install in each dormitory a 24/7 hotline phone that directly connects to the SARC.
<b>A37</b>	Institutionalize new wingman procedures by incorporating them into TRG instructions.
<b>A38</b>	Eliminate weaknesses in existing detection measures by improving surveillance, CQ, and entry-control procedures.
<b>A39</b>	Adopt the BMT-developed 7.5-week training program to eliminate “white space” in the training schedule.
<b>A40</b>	Deny unnecessary access to trainees’ private information by prohibiting social media contact, restricting control of trainees’ cell phones, and strengthening guidance to restrict tattoo inspection.
<b>A41</b>	AETC should maintain the 24/7 hotline to allow for continued reporting.
<b>A42</b>	Develop an informational briefing and require the MEPS NCO to brief all recruits on what constitutes sexual assault, sexual harassment, unprofessional relationships, maltreatment, and maltraining and how to report such instances when recruits arrive at BMT.
<b>A43</b>	Create a standardized and anonymous survey, separate from other end-of-course surveys, to effectively capture training environment misconduct.
<b>A44</b>	Establish standardized procedures, including trend analysis, for analyzing and reporting survey data. At a minimum, report results and analysis quarterly to group, wing, and NAF leadership.
<b>A45</b>	Require that the wing commander be informed of all allegations of sexual assault, sexual harassment, unprofessional relationships, maltreatment, and maltraining reported in the end-of-course surveys.
<b>A46</b>	Strengthen the current integration model by creating MTI teams of four instructors per two flights, with a minimum of one female instructor per team, regardless of the gender of the trainee flights.

## APPENDIX C

### **Investigative Level of Effort on Military Training Instructor Misconduct** (as of 19 October 2012)

Bottom Line:

- 91 primary personnel assigned across three fronts (Security Forces, Office of Special Investigations, Commander Directed Investigation) with 231 additional personnel in support
- 4,478 interviews/screenings completed
- More than 40,000 man-hours (estimated) expended to date

Security Forces Office of Investigation (SFOI):

- 14,111 man-hours to date; 544 overtime hours; 16 TDY trips completed
- 28 investigators assigned; 19 TDY augmentee personnel
- Additionally, 39 different Air Force bases were contacted and provided home-station investigation support
- 247 in-person interviews conducted
- 2,314 of 3,750 telephone screening interviews completed

Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI):

- 25 agents assigned; three criminal analysts; two psychologists; 30 TDY trips completed
- Additional support from 187 other agents conducting leads worldwide
- 1,048 interviews conducted
- 654 of 766 telephone screening interviews completed
- AFOSI and Defense Computer Forensics lab analyzing massive amounts of data from seized cell phones

Major General Woodward's CDI:

- 38 CDI team members; more than 17,000 man-hours (estimated)
- 215 interviews; trips to seven locations
- Surveyed more than 18,000 personnel
- More than 100 hotline calls

## APPENDIX D

### Changes Made to Basic Military Training as a Result of Internal Review

#	New Policy	Previous Policy
<b>1</b>	<b>24/7 assigned wingmen.</b> Trainees are assigned a wingman at the beginning of training and must remain with that wingman whenever outside his or her flight's sleeping area (open-bay dormitory). ( <i>Wingman = all trainees move in pairs; no option to deviate outside sleeping area/latrine.</i> )	Wingmen required for appointments during week "zero" and week one only, and during hours of darkness (intent was to keep as many trainees in training to avoid missed training).
<b>2</b>	<b>Two MTIs assigned to CQ.</b> Two permanent-party personnel are required to occupy the CQ office between lights out and arrival of the morning instructor supervisor, seven days a week. Both permanent-party personnel will be present at the CQ desk unless one is performing security checks or other CQ-associated tasks. An instructor supervisor is required to remain in the squadron until lights out and must then perform instructor accountability prior to departure.	One CQ per squadron, with one evening/weekend NCO of the day performing rotating checks throughout all squadrons.
<b>3</b>	<b>Strategic refocus of group standardization and evaluation (stan/eval) team.</b> Commander-directed special-interest items require the training group stan/eval team to perform no-notice inspections on instructor supervisor oversight, CQs, and security/accountability measures during all hours, to include evenings and weekends.	Emphasis on trainee dormitory inspections (e.g., "honor flight" and "warrior flight" distinction criteria) vice evaluating oversight, security, and policy compliance.
<b>4</b>	<b>Key control and accountability.</b> All squadron keys are locked in CQ. All keys must be signed out in a log maintained by CQ and returned every day.	Keys to specific areas held by functional personnel such as physical training monitor and supply NCO while some key personnel had master keys. Other personnel signed-out keys through either the CQ or the facility manager.
<b>5</b>	<b>Engaged, face-to-face leadership at unscheduled times.</b> (Unscheduled visits by group and squadron commander, squadron first sergeant, superintendent, and instructor supervisor into instructor work areas). All leadership levels involved in frequent (daily), unscheduled visits throughout the duty day, with emphasis on evenings and weekends.	Limited level and frequency of face-to-face leadership visits during evening and weekend hours.
<b>6</b>	<b>Established female mentor position.</b> On a weekly basis, a group-level board manages assignment of instructors, to include females, across all squadrons to ensure the best distribution of gender and experience. Depending on timing and manning, the board assigns a female MTI to the instructor team for assigned flights.	No centrally managed corporate body to oversee the balancing of instructor positions within the group.

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#	New Policy	Previous Policy
7	<b>Trainee cell phone handling.</b> MTIs are not authorized to turn on, view, or handle trainee cell phones at any time. Cell phones are controlled (issued and use monitored) by the instructor supervisor, first sergeant, superintendent, or squadron commander and stored in a locked cabinet with keys controlled by the CQ.	MTIs required to control and secure cell phones, and allow supervised trainee usage during one 15-minute phone call per week.
8	<b>No “closed door” counseling session.</b> An MTI is never allowed to be in a closed-door counseling session in a flight office with a trainee. In the rare instance the trainee would need privacy, the MTI will refer the trainee to the instructor supervisor, with his/her wingman.	Instructors permitted to have closed-door counseling sessions with trainees only in the presence of an additional same-gender trainee or another staff member.
9	<b>Trainee hotline card.</b> All trainees are issued a hotline card that identifies a number to call if they have any kind of maltreatment information to report. The card is also posted on all dormitory bulletin boards. In addition, squadron commanders brief all trainees on the card, telling them that if at any time a trainee shows this card to any permanent party member, he or she will be referred to the squadron commander and provided private access to a telephone. At no time will any permanent-party member ask the trainee questions.	Trainees had (and continue to have) a copy of the 24-hour confidential SARC hotline number posted prominently in their study guide (and on all squadron bulletin boards); they have mandatory 15-minute weekly phone call opportunities and access to critique boxes.
10	<b>Added “no MTI contact post-BMT” guidance to the squadron commander’s departure brief.</b> Every week, graduating trainees are informed by the squadron commander that they are prohibited from contacting or accepting contact from any MTI while in TT status. Trainees are instructed to report any attempts by an MTI to contact them while in TT to their MTL or supervisor	No information provided to graduating BMT trainees related to “no MTI contact” during TT.
11	<b>MTIs no longer see their flights off to TT.</b> The instructor supervisor is the individual who sees trainees get onto the correct buses transporting them to TT.	MTIs ship their flights.
12	<b>Added critique drop boxes inside every stairwell in the dormitories.</b> Action based on trainee feedback that highlighted intimidation of placing a critique at the previous locations (in the dining facility) because MTIs had line of sight of the critique box while sitting in the facility.	Critique boxes limited to dining hall entrances and exits, chapel entrance and exit, and the field training dining facility.



#	New Policy	Previous Policy
13	<p><b>Within 72 hours of arrival, all trainees meet the group commander.</b> Training group commander provides a “neighborhood watch” briefing on the Friday of the week trainees arrive. The commander tells them that their training environment is designed to be safe and that no instructor can harm them physically or sexually and that if it does occur, or is threatened to occur, or if they see it occurring to someone else, it is their duty to report it to anyone in their chain of command, through the trainee critique system, chaplain, medical provider, or SARC.</p> <p><i>Added same information to the squadron commander's time briefing in the first week of training.</i></p> <p>Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (four hours) training moved to the fifth week of training.</p>	<p>All trainees meet the group commander within 72 hours of arrival; however, reporting of wrongdoing was not covered, and squadron commanders did not include this information in the squadron commander's time briefing.</p> <p><i>Note: Trainees continue to receive</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. A BMT orientation given by the MTI in the first week of training where trainees are advised on how to report discrimination or sexual advances and referred to the SARC's 24-hour confidential hotline (same information is also provided in the trainee study guide).</li> <li>2. Human Relations I training (two and one-half hours) in the first week, which includes professional and unprofessional relationships.</li> <li>3. Human Relations II (two hours) in the second week, which includes hazing and sexual harassment.</li> <li>4. Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (four hours) in the seventh week to prepare trainees for the transition to TT; includes culture of responsible choices.</li> </ol>

## APPENDIX E

### Care for Victims

<p><b>Victim:</b> AETC uses the term “victim” for circumstances not only alleging sexual assault but also including those BMT trainees or TT students alleged to have been involved in unprofessional relationships (UR) with MTIs, regardless of consent.</p>
<p><b>Demographics:</b> As of the date of this report, 48 alleged victims have been identified. Twenty-six were in BMT as trainees at the time of the alleged misconduct, and 22 were students in TT. Thirty-five are alleged victims of UR with an instructor (16 trainees, 19 students). Of those 35, 26 were alleged victims of UR with physical contact (12 trainees, 14 students), and nine were alleged victims of UR with no physical contact (three trainees, six students). The remaining 13 (11 trainees, two students) are alleged victims of sexual assault. Six of those 13 were trainees assaulted by the convicted/imprisoned MTI Walker. All alleged victims are female, ranging in age from 18 to 35 years; the average age is 21 years, and the most common age (mode) is 19 years. Thirty were in active duty Air Force status, 10 were affiliated with the Air National Guard, and eight were with the Air Force Reserve. Eleven requested and were assigned victim advocates.</p>
<p><b>Services Made Available to Every Victim</b></p>
<p>Health and safety needs assessed</p>
<p>Option to choose restricted or unrestricted reporting</p>
<p>Victim advocate assigned at victim’s request</p>
<p>Wing vice-commander, appropriate first responders, and command SARC informed for action</p>
<p>Referrals to on-/off-base providers and agencies as needed</p>
<p>SAPR case closed only at victim’s request</p>
<p><b>Additional Services Available to All Trainees and Students at Any Time</b></p>
<p>Victim Witness Assistance Program</p>
<p>Installation and Department of Defense safeline/hotlines widely publicized as a means of 24/7/365 access to information and assistance</p>
<p>Legal assistance</p>
<p>Chaplain services</p>
<p>Medical and mental health services</p>
<p>Inspector general</p>
<p>Referrals to on-/off-base providers and agencies as needed</p>
<p>May request temporary or permanent expedited transfer to another duty location based on a credible report of sexual assault</p>
<p>Direct access to commander/first sergeant 24/7 if/when requested</p>

**APPENDIX F****Military Training Instructor Accountability Actions**

(Allegations against 23 MTIs, as of 30 October 2012)

<b>NAME</b> <i>Subjects are presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.</i>	<b>ALLEGATIONS</b> <i>Allegation descriptions are general and based on information provided by ongoing investigations and records reviews. Descriptions for ongoing cases are not, and should not be interpreted as, direction or guidance to subordinate CCs or their advisors as to how cases should be disposed.</i>	<b>FORUM AND DISPOSITION DATE</b>	<b>PUNISHMENT</b> <i>As adjudged by court-martial or by a commander for Article 15</i>
VEGA-MALDONADO, SSgt	Convicted at special court-martial (SPCM) after pleading guilty to one specification of unprofessional relationship (UR) in violation of AETC policy with a technical trainee and one specification of violating a no-contact order with the same trainee. After immunity, he admitted relationship began during BMT and admitted additional URs with other trainees. Five total TT students victims confirmed.	SPCM 6 April 2012	Reduction to E-2, 90 days confinement (conf), forfeiture of (FF) \$500 x four months, 30 days hard labor w/out conf, 30 days restriction
WALKER, SSgt	Convicted at a general court-martial (GCM) on seven charges, 28 specifications, including rape, adultery, obstruction of justice, attempted aggravated sexual contact, multiple counts of aggravated sexual assault, violating a training group instruction, and violating a lawful order regarding URs. Allegations involved 10 BMT trainees.	GCM 21 July 2012	Reduction to E-1, dishonorable discharge, 20 years conf, total FF. GCM convening authority waived automatic FF of pay/allowances for six months for the benefit of his dependents. Beginning 4 August 2012, dependents receive his pay and allowances for six months at the E-1 reduced rate
SMITH, TSgt	Convicted at a SPCM of two specifications of URs with two BMT trainees, specifically seeking to develop and conduct personal and intimate relationships with one trainee and carrying on a personal social relationship with another	SPCM 1 August 2012	Reduction to E-3, 30 days conf

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	trainee. Found not guilty of an additional specification of UR and a specification of obstruction of justice.		
Unnamed TSgt	Found guilty through nonjudicial punishment proceedings after he engaged in URs with BMT trainees. Specifically, while two trainees were in his office, he looked at Facebook photographs of the trainees in bathing suits. He also texted with his dorm chief, a BMT trainee.	Article 15 15 June 2012	Reduction to E-5 and reprimand
LEBLANC, SSgt	Accused of sexually assaulting a female BMT trainee; URs with that same trainee and another BMT trainee; UR with a third technical school student; violating multiple no-contact orders; AWOL; obstruction of justice; making false official statements; adultery; and maltraining. <i>He is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.</i>	GCM arraigned 9 October 2012	Pending court—trial date to be decided (TBD)
ESTACIO, SSgt	Convicted at a GCM of UR with a female BMT trainee, violating a no-contact order, and obstruction of justice. Acquitted of separate sexual assault allegation.	GCM 13 September 2012	Reduction to E-1, bad conduct discharge, 12 months conf
MANKO, SSgt	Convicted at SPCM after pleading guilty to two specifications of UR with a female technical school student.	SPCM 24 September 2012	Reduction to E-3, 45 days conf, \$500 FF x three months, 30 days hard labor w/out conf, 30 days restriction
16 enlisted subjects	TBD—Open Investigations pending resolution.	TBD	Open Investigations

## **APPENDIX G**

### **Leadership Accountability Actions**

- BMT group commander and one squadron commander relieved from command
- Six additional commanders served with administrative disciplinary actions
  - o Two Letters of Reprimand
  - o Four Letters of Admonishment
  - o Each member has due process rights to respond and have his response carefully considered before final decision. As such, administrative actions are not complete and are subject to change.
- Further information available upon request once all actions are complete
- Information protected under the Privacy Act