

Senate Armed Services Committee
Advance Policy Questions for VADM Charles Richard, U.S. Navy
Nominee for Appointment to the Position of Commander,
United States Strategic Command

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)?

The Commander, US Strategic Command creates plans and conducts operations to deter strategic attacks against the US and our Allies; and, in concert with the joint force, defeat our nation's adversaries when deterrence fails. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) assigns USSTRATCOM seven specific responsibilities: Strategic Deterrence; Nuclear Operations; Global Strike; Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations; Missile Defense; Analysis and Targeting; and Missile Threat Assessment. These diverse responsibilities are strategic in nature, global in scope and intertwined with Joint Force capabilities, the interagency process, and a whole-of-government approach.

What background and experience do you possess that qualify you to perform the duties and responsibilities of the Commander, STRATCOM?

I have been a Navy officer for over 37 years at every level of command. I have served in multiple capacities within the Pentagon on the Chief of Naval Operations Staff, at the Office of Secretary of Defense, Combatant Command, and numerous operational level tours. In my most recent position I provided advice to NATO strategic commanders on all submarine related issues. My work, especially in key national security nuclear, space, missile defense, electronic warfare, and cyberspace mission areas, and across all domains, gives me a unique perspective for the challenges our Nation faces.

I have had the privilege of serving at U.S. Strategic Command on two separate occasions. First, as the Joint Functional Component Commander for Global Strike and later returning as the Deputy Commander from September 2016 – June 2018. My assignments at USSTRATCOM fully immersed me in all the command mission areas.

I have commanded at all operational levels from individual units to Fleet. I have served as the undersea domain lead responsible for submarine force strategic vision.

I consider it a privilege and an honor to serve this great Nation and fully recognize the complexity our military faces given the present and projected world security situation. I do not possess all the answers, but I will remain open to a wide variety of expert opinions in order to inform and offer my best military advice.

Given the lines of effort set forth in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), what other duties do you anticipate the President or the Secretary of Defense might prescribe for you, if confirmed?

The Joint Force continues to consider ways to improve the combatant commands' ability to achieve military objectives. If confirmed, I will continue the Command's work with senior leaders to review strategic guidance and studies regarding USSTRATCOM's roles and missions and offer my recommendations.

Are there other roles or responsibilities that should be assigned to the Commander, STRATCOM, in your view?

If confirmed, I would only recommend changes in assigned responsibilities after I have had the chance to thoroughly evaluate and assess the command's mission effectiveness in the context of an evolving global security environment.

Do you believe that there are any steps you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of the Commander, STRATCOM?

I am not an expert in all seven USSTRATCOM responsibilities described above. They are extraordinarily diverse. If confirmed, I will work diligently to improve my expertise in USSTRATCOM's broad range of missions. I look forward to working with USSTRATCOM commanders and staff, the other Combatant Commanders and Service Commanders, and the many organizations USSTRATCOM partners with to ensure mission success and maintain our nation's global warfighting capability.

If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure that your tenure as Commander, STRATCOM, epitomizes the fundamental requirement for civilian control of the Armed Forces embedded in the U.S. Constitution and other laws?

The Constitution and applicable laws clearly articulate that we are a nation under civilian control; it is the foundation of our great Nation. If confirmed as the Commander of USSTRATCOM, I will make it my priority to ensure military options are aligned with a whole of government approach and in full support of our civilian leadership. Civilian control of the military is the bedrock principle of our country and I will do everything in my power to ensure it is upheld to the fullest extent.

Chain of Command and Relationships

Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Section 163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may direct communications to combatant commanders through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Do you believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and effective chain of command?

Yes.

In your view, do these provisions properly effectuate civilian control of the military? Please explain your answer.

Yes, the chain of command originates from the President to the Secretary of Defense, and from the Secretary to combatant command commanders. If confirmed, I will be a committed advisor to our nation's leaders and execute lawful orders as directed.

Are there circumstances in which you believe it is appropriate for U.S. military forces to be under the operational command or control of an authority other than the chain of command established under title 10, U.S. Code?

Our armed forces operate under the established Title 10 chain of command. There may be occasions for the President to establish other temporary command relationships for certain sensitive military operations. Regardless of the command relationship, U.S. military personnel are still accountable to Title 10 chain of command and are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Law of Armed Conflict during any operation.

In your view, what factors should be considered in making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the President for the use of strategic forces and capabilities?

Any recommendation to the Secretary of Defense and the President for a decision to employ such capabilities would only be considered in extreme circumstance to defend the vital interests of the United States, its Allies and partners. It would follow a thorough and deliberative process involving expertise from across the U.S. government. Such recommendations will take into account the Law of Armed Conflict with its principles of military necessity, distinction, proportionality, and the prevention of unnecessary suffering.

The law and traditional practice establish important relationships between the Commander, STRATCOM and other senior officials of the DOD and the U.S. Government. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, STRATCOM, to each of the following officials:

The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense as established in Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 163. In this role, he is the most senior ranking member of the armed forces but does not exercise command over any military forces or serve in the chain of command between the President and Secretary of Defense and Combatant Commanders, although the President may transmit communications through the Chairman. The Chairman consults with the Combatant Commanders, and evaluates and assists in achieving their requirements and plans. The Chairman provides a vital link between the Combatant

Commanders and other elements of the DoD. If confirmed, I will keep the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense informed on matters for which I am personally accountable as Commander, USSTRATCOM.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment

The Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment is the principal advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for DoD acquisition; modeling and simulation; systems integration; logistics; installation management; military construction; procurement; environment; services; and nuclear, chemical and biological programs. USSTRATCOM works closely with Acquisition and Sustainment to sustain current and advocate/field future capabilities. The Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment also chairs the Nuclear Weapons Council and the Commander, USSTRATCOM is a member. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment on all these matters specific to USSTRATCOM.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is the principal advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for defense strategy and policy. The Under Secretary for Policy formulates and coordinates national security and defense policy, integrates DoD policy and plans and performs oversight of defense policy goals to achieve national security objectives. These policies guide USSTRATCOM strategic planning and operations.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities is the principal advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense working through the USDP on national security issues and defense strategy. The Assistant Secretary provides guidance to align resources, activities, and capabilities necessary to implement the strategy and direct the employment of the force. These policies guide USSTRATCOM global force posture, strategic planning, and operations.

The Commander, U.S. Northern Command

Commander, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is responsible for a variety of important missions including Homeland Defense—which is closely related and integrated with USSTRATCOM’s Strategic Deterrence responsibility. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the CDRUSNORTHCOM, to achieve their mission and strengthen strategic deterrence for our Nation and assurance of our Allies and partners.

The Commander, USNORTHCOM, is also the Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), which conducts aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning in the defense of North America.

The Commander, U.S. Space Command

Commander, U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) is responsible for the planning and execution of global space operations as directed. This responsibility, until recently, was assigned to Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and as such USSTRATCOM continues to support the smooth and seamless transfer of this mission.

Both commands have implemented a Memorandum of Understanding which will ensure the space domain is supported until USSPACECOM achieves full operational capability (FOC). Further, USSPACECOM will provide vital space resources and capabilities to USSTRATCOM in support of its strategic deterrence mission.

If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with Commander, USSPACECOM, throughout this process and will maintain this working relationship through FOC and beyond.

The Commander, U.S. European Command

USSTRATCOM supports Commander, U.S. European Command's (USEUCOM) mission in the European area of responsibility to secure and defend the United States and its Allies, and interests. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Commander, USEUCOM to achieve their mission and strengthen strategic deterrence for our Nation and assurance of our Allies and partners.

The Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

USSTRATCOM supports Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command's (USINDOPACOM) mission in the Indo-Pacific area of responsibility to secure and defend the United States and its Allies, and interests. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Commander, USINDOPACOM to achieve their mission and strengthen strategic deterrence for our Nation and assurance of our Allies and partners.

The Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration

Title 50, U.S. Code, section 2402, appoints the Department of Energy's Under Secretary for Nuclear Security as Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration. All Department of Energy programs and activities related to nuclear weapons, including the stockpile stewardship program are the Administrator's responsibility. Furthermore, the Administrator serves as a principal of the Nuclear Weapons Council and executes duties of importance to USSTRATCOM, but remains separate from the DoD's operational control. If confirmed, I will work closely and confer regularly with the Administrator.

Major Challenges

In your view, what are the major challenges you would confront if confirmed as the Commander, STRATCOM?

Having been the Deputy Commander of USSTRATCOM, I am confident the command has a highly trained strategic force. I have direct insight into our nation's strategic capabilities and I am confident in the ability of our combat ready force to provide strategic deterrence and respond decisively. The challenges facing USSTRATCOM mirror those across our joint force.

First, the current strategic environment requires a globally integrated force capable of conducting operations in all conditions, across combatant commands and all domains.

Second, I am impressed by our efforts to modernize our strategic nuclear deterrent capabilities across the TRIAD; their supporting stockpile and infrastructure; Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3), and Indications and Warning/Attack Assessment (ITWAA). I recognize the challenges posed by the budget process and its implications to achieving nuclear recapitalization and modernization. Many of these modernization/recapitalization efforts are just in time with little to no margin for delay.

If confirmed, I will continue existing efforts to confront the global integration challenge and ensure our nuclear modernization plans are realized.

What plans do you have for addressing each of these challenges, if confirmed?

If confirmed, I plan to be a strong advocate for our nation's strategic forces. I support the need to modernize our nuclear TRIAD. I support the continued development of capabilities to deter strategic attack in all domains.

I will continue the path General Hyten set with leading the effort to modernize and synchronize Nuclear Command, Control and Communications. Additionally, I will work with the Office of Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and other Combatant Commands to further the development of integrated global planning, posturing, and operations.

National Defense Strategy

The 2018 NDS moved beyond the “two-war construct” that has guided defense strategy, capability development, and investment for the past three decades, and refocused DOD on a “2 + 3 framework.” That framework prioritizes “great power competition and conflict” with China and Russia as the primary challenges with which the United States must contend, together with the imperative of deterring and countering rogue regimes like North Korea and Iran. Finally the framework emphasizes the defeat of terrorist threats to the U.S. and the consolidation of gains in Iraq and Afghanistan, while moving to a “more resource sustainable” approach to counterterrorism.

In your view, does the 2018 NDS accurately assess the current strategic environment, including prioritization of the most critical and enduring threats to the national security of the United States and its allies? Please explain your answer.

Yes, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Force provided their best military advice in developing the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). It accurately reflects the current

strategic environment and articulates the position of the Joint Chiefs with appropriate focus on great power competition.

In your view, does the 2018 NDS correctly specify and prioritize DOD missions in the context of the current strategic environment?

Yes, in the context of the current strategic environment, the NDS correctly prioritizes the Department of Defense's mission. China and Russia's growing capabilities pose the greatest risk to strategic stability.

In your view, does the 2018 NDS specify the correct set of capabilities by which the United States can achieve its security objectives in the face of ongoing competition and potential conflict with China and Russia? What do you perceive as the areas of greatest risk?

Yes, the NDS correctly prioritized the Department of Defense's (DoD) mission. The DoD needs to continue its focus on increasing lethality and attracting new Allies and partners in the face of ongoing great power competition. China and Russia's growing capabilities pose the greatest risk to our nation and the DoD must develop capabilities to counter all potential threats.

What would successful implementation of the 2018 NDS "look like" for STRATCOM, in your view?

A successful implementation of the 2018 NDS would mean deterring China and Russia, countering rogue regimes and terrorist organizations, and assuring the security of our Nation and our Allies. Specifically, this includes a fully modernized nuclear TRIAD of ICBMs, SSBNs, and bombers with air delivered weapons—including Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) and supporting infrastructure. It would also include air and missile defense assets to defend the homeland, while simultaneously improving our regional security architectures. Additionally, it would mean possessing the capabilities to maintain Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) superiority.

Finally, it would include our continued close engagement with Allies and partners shaping the strategic environment such that we are prepared to act in a combined manner during a crisis or in contingency operations.

In your view, are the operational concepts and STRATCOM's plans to implement them, appropriately focused, scoped, and resourced to counter the threats and achieve the national security objectives identified by the NDS?

Combatant Command Contingency Plans (CONPLAN) and Operational Plans (OPLAN) are necessary but do not capture the full scope and challenges of global operations. To address these priority challenges, the Joint Force is developing Globally Integrated Base Plans (GIBPs). GIBPs use the capstone OPLAN to prioritize military objectives across the globe, identify global campaigning activities, and achieve the NDS national security objectives.

The NDS references “expanding the competitive space.” What does “expanding the competitive space” mean for STRATCOM, in your view?

For USSTRATCOM “expanding the competitive space” means continuing the planned modernization of our nuclear TRIAD of ICBMs, SSBNs, and bombers with air delivered weapons—including Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) and supporting infrastructure. A modernized TRIAD remains the best approach to deter potential adversaries while assuring our Allies that we are committed to their security.

It also includes air and missile defense assets and advanced capabilities to defend the homeland, while simultaneously improving our regional security architectures. And it means possessing the capabilities to maintain Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) superiority.

USSTRATCOM’s engagements with Allies and partners are critical in shaping the strategic environment, strengthening relationships, and building trust. In doing so the command is prepared to act in a combined manner to deliver a decisive response in crisis or during contingency operations.

If confirmed, what changes or adjustments would you advise the Secretary of Defense to make in the Department’s implementation of the 2018 NDS?

Implementation of the NDS relies on achieving the three pillars; building a more lethal force, strengthening alliances and attracting new partners, and reforming the department for greater performance and affordability. I have no changes to recommend at this time but I commit to periodically reviewing the NDS in context of the strategic environment to assess if and when changes may be warranted.

If confirmed, what revisions or adjustments would you recommend the Secretary of Defense make to the 2018 NDS as a result of changes in assumptions, policy, or other factors?

I have no changes to recommend at this time but as previously stated, I commit to periodically review the strategic environment to assess if and when changes may be warranted.

Nuclear Modernization and the Nuclear Posture Review

In your view, how well do the findings and recommendations of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review synchronize with the framework of the 2018 NDS?

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and NDS are closely synchronized in the evaluation of the threat environment and prioritizing the Joint Force on Great Power competition and conflict. The NPR’s critical roles for nuclear forces are to deter nuclear and non-nuclear attack, assure Allies and partners, achieve objectives if deterrence fails, and hedge against an uncertain future. These roles synchronize with the NDS objectives to defend the homeland, deter adversaries, assure allies, and establish an unmatched twenty-first century National Security Innovation Base.

In addition, the NPR and NDS both underscore the need to modernize U.S. nuclear forces, in particular the nuclear triad, nuclear command, control and communications, and the supporting

infrastructure. The NPR also addresses the NDS' recommendation to counter competitors' coercive strategies, predicated on the threatened use of nuclear or strategic non-nuclear attacks.

Do you believe the current program of record is sufficient to support the full modernization of the nuclear triad, including delivery systems, warheads, and infrastructure?

Yes. Full and timely funding of the modernization and recapitalization of programs as articulated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is necessary to ensure our aging nuclear forces are replaced and that we have the capability and capacity to deter adversaries and assure allies. The 2018 NPR confirms the finding of previous NPRs that the nuclear triad, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's dual-capable aircraft and a robust nuclear command, control, and communications system is the most cost-effective and strategically sound means of ensuring nuclear deterrence.

What are your ideas for working across the Joint Force to mitigate the risk that all three legs of the nuclear triad will "age out" simultaneously at the end of the 2020s?

The nuclear triad has credibly deterred adversaries and assured allies for more than six decades. The Department of Defense's number one priority is nuclear modernization. We must maintain our nuclear enterprise, while concurrently building the future Triad, and when possible, accelerate modernization with calculated smart risks. I will work closely with OSD and the services to mitigate risks across the three legs of the Triad created by previous nuclear modernization deferrals.

Do you support changes to U.S. nuclear force structure recommended by the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, including deployment of the W76-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile and the possible return of a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile?

Yes, these supplemental capabilities called for in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) strengthen deterrence by providing the U.S. an assured ability to respond in kind to a low-yield nuclear attack thereby discouraging an adversary from pursuing such an attack. The NPR rightly concluded that the supplemental capabilities are needed to ensure Russia, China and others do not perceive a gap in our regional deterrence posture. Although low-yield capabilities are not new, the supplemental capabilities demonstrate the United States' commitment to extended deterrence and to send a message that we are prepared and have a range of means to respond to the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

Specifically, do you support and intend to advocate for the funding, development, and fielding of the Long-Range Stand-Off weapon and the associated W80-4 warhead?

Yes, the current AGM-86B Air-Launched Cruise Missile will be nearly 50 years old when the Long Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile is scheduled to replace it. Development and deployment of LRSO is essential to maintain an effective and credible air-delivered nuclear deterrent, especially as adversaries deploy advanced air-defense systems.

The LRSO's ability to hold global/high value targets at risk is critical to provide flexible response options, assure Allies and meet our extended deterrence commitments. The W80-4 Life Extension Program (LEP) is essential to the LRSO program and the subsequent accomplishment of these imperative objectives.

Do you support and intend to advocate for the funding, development, and fielding of the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent and the associated W87-1 warhead?

Yes, I strongly support the GBSD and Mk21A/W87-1 programs. GBSD is the most cost-effective approach with the lowest technical risk, to maintaining an effective land-based strategic ballistic missile capability as part of a credible nuclear Triad. The Mk21A/W87-1 reentry vehicle/warhead is critical to replacing our aging Mk12A/W78 ICBM weapon.

Do you believe a nuclear “No First Use” policy would be appropriate for the United States?

No. Given the contemporary threat environment, such a policy would serve to undermine our nuclear deterrent and the assurance of our allies. Such a policy could invite attack or coercion and could encourage U.S. allies to pursue their own nuclear weapons, thereby undermining U.S. nonproliferation goals.

Do you support reducing the alert level of the deployed intercontinental ballistic missile force? Why or why not?

No, I do not support any change in our current ICBM alert level. Every Nuclear Posture Review, spanning multiple Administrations, assessed our nuclear force posture and decisively concluded maintaining an alert ICBM force is appropriate to meet our deterrence objectives. Current alert postures are appropriate given our strategy, guidance, and policy; with an alert ICBM force, no potential adversary can confidently execute a disarming first strike – the cost-benefit calculus enhances deterrence.

Do you support the New START Treaty?

I support any diplomatic solution which enhances the security of our nation. To date, the New START Treaty has been an important transparency mechanism for maintaining U.S.-Russian stability. The verification regime allows insights into the Russian strategic TRIAD which significantly contributes to our understanding of their force posture. New START remains the most recent in a decade's long, mutual effort by the U.S. and Russia to implement strategic nuclear arms control.

However, Russia is deliberately developing and fielding nuclear capabilities outside of New START limitations. This expansion requires further analysis, dialogue, and interagency review prior to making a final determination on a five-year extension.

Do you supporting extending the New START Treaty?

I support any diplomatic solution which enhances the security of our nation. New START is an important transparency mechanism for maintaining U.S.-Russian stability. The verification regime allows insights into the Russian strategic TRIAD which significantly contributes to our understanding of their force posture. New START remains the most recent in a decade's long, bipartisan effort by the U.S. and Russia to implement strategic nuclear arms control.

However, Russia is deliberately developing and fielding nuclear capabilities outside of New START limitations. This expansion requires further analysis, dialogue, and interagency review prior to making a final determination on a five-year extension.

The Nuclear Weapons Council has laid out a schedule for modernization of the nuclear weapons stockpile over the next 20 years. This schedule involves multiple warhead life extension and replacement programs, in addition to maintenance of the existing stockpile systems.

Is this schedule—and the program priorities it establishes—appropriate in your view?

Yes, the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) Strategic Plan provides a long-term vision for the nuclear weapons stockpile and is aligned with the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the National Defense Strategy, and the National Security Strategy.

Are the multiple components of the nuclear modernization plan appropriately sequenced and scoped to meet the operational needs of the STRATCOM commander?

Yes, based on National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) production planning documents for the stockpile and Service delivery systems acquisition strategies and plans. The DoD and NNSA nuclear modernization programs will continue to meet USSTRATCOM's current and projected operational requirements.

These priorities are integrated and aligned together with infrastructure recapitalization programs in the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) Strategic Plan to form a cohesive enterprise wide acquisition and modernization strategy.

In your view, does the Stockpile Stewardship Program provide the tools necessary to ensure the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile without testing? If not, what tools are needed?

Yes, the Stockpile Stewardship Program relies on state-of-the-art supercomputers, large-scale scientific facilities, and workforce expertise. Continued support for the National Laboratories is crucial for the viability of the Stockpile Stewardship mission.

In your view, what priority should be attached to programs to modernize and replace critical infrastructure of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)? On what timeline should these programs be executed, in your view?

Recapitalizing our aging nuclear infrastructure is a national imperative. After decades of neglect, NNSA faces the need to modernize multiple facilities in support of the nation's strategic requirements. Re-establishing a plutonium pit manufacturing capability of 80 pits per year by 2030 is the first priority. Given the multiple needs and protracted timeline, all infrastructure recapitalization efforts must include a balanced approach with ongoing sustainment efforts to maintain a safe, secure, and effective stockpile.

Do you support the long-standing STRATCOM requirement for NNSA to produce 80 plutonium pits per year by 2030?

Yes, the requirement to re-establish a credible pit production capability is the number one infrastructure priority. There are three factors driving the need to establish a capability to deliver at least 80 plutonium pits per year by 2030 to the stockpile: 1) replacement of aging pits in the stockpile; 2) modernization of stockpile systems to enable improved margins, safety, and security; and 3) risk mitigation to address unforeseen technical issues in the stockpile.

What do you intend to do to mitigate the risk that, according to the NNSA's own analysis, none of the considered options for plutonium pit production seem likely to meet 2030 requirement?

Risk mitigation measures include evaluating options to re-use newer legacy pits, produced prior to the 1990 Rocky Flats closure, in future stockpile modernization programs. Reuse will allow stockpile modernization programs to continue near-term, as scheduled. However, this will limit opportunities to improve safety, security, and effectiveness of modernized stockpile systems and does not address aging issues over the long term.

STRATCOM Readiness

How would you assess STRATCOM's current readiness to execute the 2018 NDS and STRATCOM's operational concepts and plans?

USSTRATCOM is ready today to execute our strategic deterrence and assurance mission. USSTRATCOM conducts continuous operations in accordance with its operational concepts and plans in support of the National Defense Strategy. While the aging TRIAD generates readiness challenges, USSTRATCOM remains postured to execute our plans and conduct joint force operations.

What is your assessment of the risk that STRATCOM has accepted in regard to its readiness to execute operational concepts and plans in furtherance of the 2018 NDS and the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review?

USSTRATCOM manages risk through continuous assessment of the geopolitical environment, evaluation of assigned forces, and modifications to its operational concepts and plans. USSTRATCOM assumes minimal risk in meeting the national security objectives put forth in the 2018 National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review. This risk will increase if

current efforts to modernize the TRIAD and its supporting nuclear command, control, and communications systems are delayed.

If confirmed, how would you address any gaps or shortfalls in STRATCOM's ability to meet the demands placed on it by the 2018 NDS and the operational concepts and plans that implement the strategy?

The United States must never jeopardize its ability to deter war. If confirmed, I will continue to clearly identify the threats we face and develop strategies to deter, and if necessary defeat those threats. Paramount to this ability is fielding the next generation of forces with the capabilities and resiliency to counter any challenger's aggressions with a decisive response.

STRATCOM Organization and Missions

STRATCOM's missions have shifted substantially over the last five years, with the transition of U.S. Cyber Command to a unified combatant command, the transfer of the combatting weapons of mass destruction mission to U.S. Special Operations Command, and the stand-up of U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) as a Unified Combatant Command.

Do you believe that the remaining Joint Forces Component Commands are still the most effective structure for STRATCOM?

USSTRATCOM's structure provides a simple, domain-focused warfighting chain of command empowering component commanders to integrate across the Joint Force to achieve objectives. I agree with USSTRATCOM's focus to lead through "mission-type" orders and enable component commanders to execute as required. If confirmed, I will continue to evaluate the Joint Force Component Command's structure to provide the most effective method to employ the command's forces.

If confirmed, what innovative ideas would you consider providing to the Secretary of Defense regarding STRATCOM missions, organization, and operations?

If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary to continue advocacy for USSTRATCOM's global warfighting missions and the capabilities enabling mission success. Part of that success is to continue efforts across the Department, Joint Staff, and Services to rapidly develop and field innovative technologies for the Joint Force. We must continue to collaborate with government, industry and academia to decrease the time it takes to prototype and field these next-generation systems from research labs to the warfighters.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that there is no diminution in strategic capability as missions, functions, and tasks continue to be transferred to SPACECOM?

The Unified Command Plan was updated to effect a smooth transfer of the space mission from USSTRATCOM to USSPACECOM. For over a year, USSTRATCOM planned for the realignment and transfer of space responsibilities. A Memorandum of Understanding between

USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM ensures the space domain is supported throughout the USSPACECOM establishment process until full operational capability is declared. Further, USSPACECOM will provide vital space resources and capabilities to USSTRATCOM in support of its strategic deterrence mission. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with Commander, USSPACECOM throughout the transition process.

In your view, if confirmed, what will be your responsibility with respect to the findings of the Global Threat Characterization and Assessment Report?

Prior to the establishment of USSPACECOM, USSTRATCOM was responsible for addressing the findings contained within the Global Threat Characterization and Assessment (GTCA) Report. With the recent establishment of USSPACECOM and the transfer of missile warning and global sensor management Unified Command Plan responsibilities to that command, USSTRATCOM has transitioned GTCA response to them for implementation and tracking. If confirmed, I will continue to provide advocacy and support for that effort.

If confirmed, what role would you establish for yourself in coordinating with the Commander, SPACECOM, to advocate for space programs critical to missile defense, missile warning, and nuclear capabilities?

USSTRATCOM will continue to advocate for space capability associated with Missile Warning, Protected Communications, and future Missile Defense initiatives. USSTRATCOM adheres to the Memorandum of Understanding with USSPACECOM to further architectural developments that enable the Nuclear Command and Control enterprise and associated space capabilities.

Nuclear enterprise requirements, including future missile warning and communications, will have continued oversight and advocacy through the newly established NC3 Enterprise Center (NEC). If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with USSPACECOM to coordinate, preserve, and expand, as necessary, critical space programs until such time that USSPACECOM is resourced to stand up an organic capability.

STRATCOM retains responsibility for the integrity of the Integrated Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) System. Yet, U.S. Space Command will retain responsibility for the ground and space sensors, the Missile Warning Center, and the Combatant Commander's Integrated Command and Control System, which fuses the data from these sensors.

Specifically what would you do, if confirmed, to ensure that these ITW/AA elements of the missile warning mission are not lost or degraded in the standup of SPACECOM?

If confirmed, I will continue to conduct operations under the Memorandum of Understanding between USSPACECOM and USSTRATCOM. USSTRATCOM is responsible for certifying all systems associated with ITW/AA. In this capacity, I will continue to monitor and ensure the integrity of all ITW/AA systems through annual recertification processes.

Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications

In response to a task from the Secretary of Defense in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, last year, the Commander, STRATCOM, directed the creation of the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Enterprise Center, housed under the STRATCOM J6.

What is your understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the NC3 Enterprise Center?

CDRUSSTRATCOM is designated as the NC3 Enterprise Lead with increased responsibility for operations management, requirements, and system engineering and integration. These responsibilities include: overseeing and managing day-to-day operations; assessing enterprise risk; defining NC3 enterprise level requirements; and directing enterprise systems engineering and integration.

How will you address the inherent challenge associated with housing a systems engineering and architecture organization within a warfighting combatant command?

USSTRATCOM leverages the engineering and architecture expertise and associated Service ties already established in the former DISA Joint Systems Engineering and Integration Office. This office now reports to the NC3 Enterprise Center and their manpower will transition in October 2020. USSTRATCOM has put in place a chain of reporting to mitigate associated challenges.

What is your understanding of the relationship between the NC3 Enterprise Center and the Military Services that procure, operate, and maintain various NC3 systems? For example, how would disagreement between STRATCOM and the Air Force or Navy on the utility of a particular NC3 system be resolved, in your view? How does the new organization differ from the prior Combatant Command-Service relationship?

The Services and Combat Support Agencies (CSAs) remain responsible for delivering the NC3 capabilities needed to execute our NC2 operations. As the Enterprise Lead, the NC3 Enterprise Center (NEC) will provide the Services and CSAs with overarching NC3 enterprise requirements, engineering, operations, and planning guidance to inform their systems requirements development, resource planning, reporting and engineering.

What is your understanding of the relationship between the NC3 Enterprise Center and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment?

USD (A&S) serves as the NC3 Capability Portfolio Manager with increased responsibilities for resources and acquisition. In this capacity, USD (A&S) supports the NC3 Enterprise Lead by executing day-to-day management of the NC3 Portfolio and advising on acquisition, mitigation options and prioritization.

What is your understanding of the relationship between the NC3 Enterprise Center and the Defense Information Systems Agency?

As a Combat Support Agency (CSA), DISA will retain program management of key NC3 infrastructure programs (i.e. red switch, Crisis Management System (CMS)). Director DISA exercises authority, direction, and control for Joint System Engineering and Integration Office (JSEIO) administrative functions. As the Enterprise Lead, the NEC will provide the Services and CSAs with overarching NC3 enterprise requirements, engineering, operations, and planning guidance to inform their systems requirements development, resource planning, reporting and engineering. On 1 Oct 2020, the administrative functions of DISA JSEIO will be transferred to the NEC.

What is your understanding of the continued role of the Council on National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications Systems as it relates to STRATCOM and the NC3 Enterprise Center?

The Council continues to serve as the oversight and synchronization body for the broader National Leadership Command Capability (NLCC) Enterprise (i.e. COOP/COG, and senior leader communications). The Council makes prioritization decisions among competing NLCC interests. The NC3 Enterprise Lead represents and advocates for the NC3 Enterprise Stakeholders to the Council. Furthermore, the Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) arm of the NC3 Enterprise Center will continue to provide engineering and architecture support across NC3, COOP/COG and Senior Leader Communications.

In your view, is the NC3 Enterprise Center authorized the appropriate number of people, in the appropriate occupational specialties and skill sets, to accomplish its mission?

As I understand, the NC3 Enterprise Center has acquired additional resources in FY20 to help support increased manning needs. The Joint Manpower Validation Board (JMVB) validated all NEC manpower requirements in FY19. Resourcing of these validated positions is underway. There are challenges to develop, recruit, and retain the talent needed as the private sector competes for the same skills. If confirmed, I will pursue multiple approaches to recruit talent from private-public partnerships, academia and industry.

If confirmed, how would you use your new role to advocate for the modernization of NC3 systems?

If confirmed, I will also serve as the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) Enterprise Lead. Modernization of NC3 must remain a top priority. I will work to ensure NC3 capabilities meet national objectives and are adequately resourced. As a member of the Council on National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications Systems, I will stay aligned with senior leaders and continuity of government communications efforts.

I will work closely with the Joint Staff, Services and stakeholders to execute NC3 modernization requirements and advocate for the rapid delivery of threat-based NC3 capabilities that enable our TRIAD.

Nuclear Weapons Council

If confirmed, you would become a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council, together with the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy, Acquisition and Sustainment, and Research and Engineering; and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration.

Yes, if confirmed, per Title 10, Section 179 of the United States Code (10 USC 179).

If confirmed, what would be your priorities for the Nuclear Weapons Council?

I support the Nuclear Weapons Council's (NWC) enduring priority to maintain a safe, secure, effective, and ready nuclear capability for the Nation. Collaboration between the DoD and our National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) partners has proven increasingly successful in sustaining legacy weapons and moving forward with critical, synchronized modernization efforts for the stockpile and DoD delivery systems.

My priority will be to build upon this success to ensure the enterprise executes balanced programs within budget constraints to sustain legacy systems and field modernized capabilities. Deterrence is not effective without the underlying confidence in our capabilities. I would make it a priority to develop the necessary modern research and production facilities and retain trained people to sustain the force.

In your view, what challenges does the Nuclear Weapons Council faces over the next four years, and what would you do to address these challenges?

The next four years mark a critical juncture as we enter a multi-decade period of increased risk to the TRIAD and across the stockpile. There is a comprehensive modernization requirement across the nuclear weapons enterprise to address aging nuclear weapons stockpile, re-establish critical nuclear infrastructure capabilities, and execute Service delivery system acquisition programs.

If confirmed, my responsibilities will include working with other NWC members to address multi-agency programming and budget matters pertaining to nuclear weapons programs:

- Identifying options for cost-effective schedules for nuclear weapons production
- Considering safety, security, and control issues for existing weapons and for proposed new weapon program starts
- Ensuring adequate consideration is given to design, performance, and cost tradeoffs for all proposed new nuclear weapons programs
- Providing specific guidance regarding priorities for research on nuclear weapons and priorities among activities including production, surveillance, research, construction, and any other programs within the NNSA.

I look forward to participating in executing these responsibilities to ensure USSTRATCOM has a safe, secure, effective and reliable stockpile.

Would you recommend any changes in STRACOM's role in the annual certification process, or the process generally?

At this time, I have no recommendations for change. If confirmed, I will receive copies of annual assessments from the heads of each national security laboratory and inputs from a USSTRATCOM team of experts to support the annual assessment letter. This process has proven to be an effective tool for identifying stockpile issues of concern.

Nuclear Enterprise Review

In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Hagel directed a comprehensive review of the DOD nuclear enterprise in response to adverse incidents involving U.S. nuclear forces and their senior leadership. The report included recommendations to address management of personnel, attend to security requirements, increase senior leader attention, promote culture change, and numerous other concerns. After five years, monitoring of the implementation of corrective actions has been transferred from OSD back to the Services. If confirmed, you will be arguably the most visible advocate for the service members responsible for executing STRATCOM's mission.

In your view, are the Military Services maintaining appropriate focus on implementing the corrective actions required by the Nuclear Enterprise Review?

Yes. The Services are actively engaged in addressing the items identified from the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews. The Department has chartered a body comprised of members from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Services, Joint Staff, and Combatant Commands to oversee completion of the corrective actions. The Service Secretaries and Chiefs personally participate in update briefings to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on at least an annual basis. This construct ensures continued senior level awareness and involvement.

What progress has been made to date to correct the deficiencies identified by the Hagel review?

The Deputy Secretary of Defense-chaired Nuclear Deterrence Enterprise Review Group tracks completion of tasks identified by Secretary of Defense Hagel's comprehensive review. Progress has been made in advocating for modernized nuclear forces, updating security rules to accurately reflect modern threats and weapons system vulnerabilities, and actively engaging nuclear enterprise professionals at all levels to promote a positive culture necessary to field a credible nuclear deterrent.

What are the most important tasks that remain to be done, in your view?

My understanding is the most important open tasks from Secretary Hagel's review are:

- Continued advocacy and on time fielding of modernized TRIAD forces and Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications capabilities

- Active engagement from leadership at all levels to ensure we do not repeat the mistakes of the past and provide a ready force able to meet future challenges

If confirmed, how would you ensure that attention and focus on the morale and welfare of the service members executing and supporting STRATCOM's mission is maintained?

If confirmed, I am committed to engaging all levels of USSTRATCOM and other elements of the nuclear enterprise from operations, maintenance, and security personnel at the unit-level to scientists and engineers at the National Laboratories to ensure a sustainable and effective nuclear deterrent.

Relationship with the Geographic Combatant Commands

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 5, 2019, General Scaparrotti stated, "I am not comfortable yet with the deterrent posture that we have in Europe in support of the National Defense Strategy."

In your assessment, what capability and/or capacity shortfalls in the current joint force present the most significant challenge to addressing threats in Europe?

While this is best answered by CDRUSEUCOM, the most significant challenge, as discussed in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), is Russia's belief that limited nuclear first use can provide an advantage over the US and our allies.

In your assessment, does the United States have sufficient air and missile defense capability and capacity to defend critical infrastructure in the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), such as command and control locations and air bases, against cruise missile attack? What do you perceive as the areas of highest risk?

If confirmed, I will work with CDRUSEUCOM to assess their missile defense needs and advocate for additional capability and capacity to defeat regional cruise missile threats and emergent hypersonic capabilities.

How would you plan to work with the Commander, EUCOM with respect to nuclear weapons security and policy, if confirmed?

If confirmed, I will ensure the CDRUSEUCOM has my full support. I fully intend to discuss and understand their challenges and I will work with him to advocate for safe, secure, effective, and reliable nuclear weapons to meet his needs. USSTRATCOM and its personnel possess significant experience and expertise in nuclear policy, strategy, planning, and operations.

On August 2, 2019, after years of Russian treaty violations, the United States officially withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

In your view, should withdrawal from the treaty affect the development of U.S. capabilities going forward, and if so, how?

Yes, the United States should not further constrain our capabilities development and possible deployments based on one-sided U.S. treaty compliance. I agree with the Department's current focus on conventional systems to address known military challenges.

Are there any areas of common interest between the United States and Russia in the security sphere, in your view?

Yes, we both have a common interest in managing nuclear risks.

In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S. nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?

Yes. As discussed in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), these forces are essential to the Alliance's deterrence and defense posture now and in the future. Forward deployed U.S. weapons serve as the linchpin to the trans-Atlantic link.

If confirmed, how will you work with the Commanders of both EUCOM and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDO-PACOM) to enable theater nuclear planning capabilities?

If confirmed, I intend to continue the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman's efforts to integrate and synchronize global plans, including nuclear planning, into all Combatant Command OPLANs. I will work closely with my fellow Combatant Commanders to ensure USSTRATCOM integrates our planning efforts and coordinates actions with all Commands across all domains.

Missile Defense

What is your understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the STRATCOM commander related to missile defense?

The Unified Command Plan (UCP) specifies a broad range of tasks for STRATCOM which are elaborated by Departmental guidance documents. STRATCOM as the designated combatant command for synchronizing missile defense planning assignment is perhaps the most vital. As missile threats around the globe continue to expand, trans-regional implications to missile defense continue to grow in importance.

As one with a global perspective, the coordinating authority facilitates greater planning synchronization across all regions. The Missile Defense Review (MDR) called for a deeper review which is currently under way of the roles, responsibilities and authorities for trans-regional missile defense. The review conclusions may impact the future of USSTRATCOM's missile defense missions.

What do you believe to be the appropriate function of the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense?

At present, Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD) synchronizes global missile defense planning in support of USSTRATCOM, and is the recognized subject matter expert across the missile defense enterprise in matters of operational support, policy, strategy, joint training, and education.

JFCC IMD also supports advocacy for the Warfighters' global missile defense requirements through engagement and partnering with Missile Defense Agency (MDA), other Agencies, the Services, Combatant Commands and, Allies and partners.

I believe these functions are appropriate.

If confirmed, what role would you anticipate playing in representing the views and advocating for the needs of the Combatant Commanders for missile defense capabilities, and how do you believe the warfighter perspective should inform the U.S. missile defense program?

The Unified Command Plan (UCP) directs CDRUSSTRATCOM to be the advocate for missile defense. USSTRATCOM accomplishes this through a collaborative Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP), which includes the warfighter informed Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Prioritized Capabilities List (PCL). The warfighter perspective is critical; USSTRATCOM advocates for the warfighter capabilities needed to successfully execute operational plans.

The United States enjoys a measure of protection against ballistic missile threats from rogue nations like North Korea and Iran, but the threat from Russian and Chinese ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles against U.S. forces, allies, and the U.S. homeland continues to grow. The 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) codified existing policy on missile defense and endorsed follow-on actions to improve U.S. capability.

What are your views on the relationship between missile defenses and nuclear deterrence? Both are critical elements of our overall strategic deterrent. Priority one is the nuclear deterrent. The TRIAD is foundational to deterring strategic attack and the use of nuclear weapons against the U.S. and our Allies.

Missile defense systems diminish adversaries' confidence to achieve their strategic objectives through limited missile attacks against our nation and allies. A robust and credible layered missile defense system paired with our conventional and nuclear force capabilities provides the ability to deter strategic attacks, deny benefits, and impose costs against any potential adversary.

If confirmed as Commander, STRATCOM, what priorities would you recommend for U.S. missile defense capabilities for the homeland?

The first priority must be the ability to find, fix, and track inbound missiles. You can't shoot it if you can't see it. The Department must look to innovative technologies that give us the capability to defeat missiles, whether before they launch or during the boost phase.

Do you believe the current ground-based interceptor fleet is appropriately sized to address potential ICBM threats from North Korea and other rogue nations?

The currently emplaced Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) have the capability to defend the U.S. from a limited threat from rogue nations. If confirmed as the Commander of USSTRATCOM, I will make it my priority to support an appropriately sized ground-based interceptor fleet.

In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could take to improve U.S. and allied defenses against North Korea's missile capabilities?

The Department needs to advance passive defense and survivability measures for critical assets in theater to counter present and emerging threats. In addition, we need to improve our combined pre-launch attack operations to degrade the numbers of adversary missiles in the early phases of conflict. The DoD must continue integration efforts with regional partners and allies to increase technical interoperability, greater burden sharing of defenses, and improve command and control for more efficient use of limited defensive capabilities.

The MDR also described the advantages of space-based sensors to provide capability for improved tracking and targeting of advanced threats.

Do you agree that a space-based sensor layer is a required next step to enable a wide variety of missile defense capabilities, including improved tracking and targeting of advanced threats?

If confirmed, I will work closely with the USSPACECOM and USNORTHCOM Commanders to track and target threats to the nation. Space-based sensors can monitor, detect, and track missile launches from locations almost anywhere on the globe, unimpeded by the constraints that geographic limitations impose on terrestrial sensors. I will work with our partners at MDA and SDA to advance and expand space-based sensors and boost-phase defense capabilities to achieve greater efficiencies for active missile defenses. Our approach must integrate active missile defense and advanced technologies to neutralize missile threats.

What are your views on the efficacy of space-based interceptor capabilities?

Space-based intercept concepts have great potential and, as directed by the 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR), the Department is exploring how to resolve the challenges associated with space-based interceptors. I understand Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)) will provide an assessment of the cost, feasibility, practicality, and timelines on different architectures and programs. If confirmed, I will engage stakeholders in operational discussions to ensure a thorough examination of these concepts.

What are your views on the efficacy of boost-phase intercept systems?

Boost-phase intercept concepts have great potential and as directed by the 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) the Department is exploring how to resolve the challenges associated with boost-phase intercept. I understand (USD(R&E)) will provide an assessment of the cost, feasibility,

practicality, and timelines on different architectures and programs. The value of boost-based intercept programs remains an open question. I expect there will be challenges in creating these programs on the scale needed to provide robust coverage of threat areas. If confirmed, I will engage stakeholders in operational discussions to ensure a thorough examination of these concepts.

Has DOD developed and implemented operational concepts, plans, and policies appropriate to the governance and utilization of space-based and boost-phase intercept programs? What would you do to address this issue, if confirmed?

DoD continues to examine concepts and technology for a space-based defensive layer consistent with the Missile Defense Review. Operational concepts, plans and policies will be developed in parallel as space-based and boost-phased intercept programs develop and are fielded. If confirmed, I will continue to examine concepts and technology for a space-based defensive layer.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that any missile defense system that is deployed is both operationally effective and cost-effective?

If confirmed, I will work with the Missile Defense Agency to ensure missile defense requirements are met through capability and utility assessment, operational tests and evaluations, and that life cycle cost estimates enable operational sustainment to meet mission operational plans.

Electronic Warfare and Spectrum Operations

STRATCOM is the designated combatant command for synchronizing electronic warfare, as well as for ensuring the warfighter has adequate spectrum resources to conduct operations.

What are the major issues associated with joint electronic warfare operations, in your view?

Assured access to, and freedom of maneuver within the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) can no longer be assumed. As such, the Department has taken initial steps to gain and maintain superiority in a contested and congested electromagnetic operational environment. Presently, joint electronic warfare is rebuilding – both in capability and force structure. The Department is engaged to ensure these efforts are integrated in such a manner that fosters Service interoperability and Joint Force efficacy.

In your view, should STRATCOM should be responsible for synchronizing non-kinetic fires for the geographic combatant commanders? If so, how should STRATCOM accomplish this mission?

USSTRATCOM is participating in a Joint Staff-led Globally Integrated Operations (GIO) exercise/wargame series to ascertain how GIO, to include global fires integration and

synchronization, should be accomplished and by whom. If confirmed, I will await the outcome of this effort in order to fully inform my views on how best to accomplish this mission.

Do you believe the Department has adequate simulation capability to test joint electronic warfare operations?

No. Due to the congested nature of the electromagnetic spectrum, the ability to conduct open-air testing is increasingly constrained. There are few ranges where advanced electronic warfare testing can take place; often these locations are forced to cease testing due to unintended interference. These challenges also affect the manner by which the Joint Force trains. Despite renewed emphasis and efforts to fund and fix, the Department's simulation capability is still limited. Past Departmental initiatives such as Electronic Warfare Infrastructure Improvement Plan (EWIIP) are now being fielded on our test and training ranges. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is investigating closed-loop simulation, which may provide the capability needed to conduct such simulations.

Do you believe that DOD has adequately integrated electronic warfare operations into its operational plans?

While we are making some progress in advancing electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMS) to include electronic warfare across the Department, there is still much work to be done. Adequately integrating EMS into our operational plans requires understanding how electromagnetic spectrum operations are conducted across the joint force.

What are the major spectrum issues facing DOD in regard to its ability to conduct operations?

The spectrum continues to be constrained by increased commercial use, limiting the availability for operational, training, and testing purposes. We must achieve a balance – where possible – to advance new virtual approaches enhancing joint electronic warfare capabilities and training without dependence on spectrum access.

The Department is actively seeking solutions to provide situational awareness across the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) and for command and control of offensive and defensive EMS operations across all domains and mission areas.

If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to ensure that the Department continues to have access to the spectrum necessary to train and conduct operations?

If confirmed, I would continue to advocate on behalf of the Department for radio frequency spectrum access – to include microwave, infrared, and ultraviolet bands for training and operations.

We must consolidate departmental efforts to maintain/retain EMS superiority. This requires joint collaboration on requirements for future EMS/Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities. The Services should leverage and develop capabilities that are interoperable across the Department.

Evaluating and addressing the impacts of private sector spectrum competition is critical to DoD training and operations. Developing an analytical capability to rapidly assess potential impacts to DoD programs from EMS auctions must be a priority. Additionally, DoD must engage with other federal agencies to advocate for required spectrum to ensure the Department can operate without interference. I support the regulatory work DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO) is undertaking with National Telecommunications and Information Association (NTIA), to guarantee DoD spectrum access, to meet the Department's EMS requirements-based needs.

Operations in the EMS pervade every military domain, across all Joint Functions, and throughout the entire range of military operations. We must properly train and equip the Services and Joint Force to ensure success.

DOD Senior Official Education and Training

In your view, do a sufficient number of General/Flag officers and members of the Senior Executive Services (SES) have the advanced training, academic degrees, and expertise in scientific and technical disciplines needed to lead the future joint force and the scientific/technical civilian workforce?

Yes. However, I am concerned about our ability to continue to attract and retain the highest quality talent necessary to achieve the NDS. To that end, we must compete with the public and private sectors for talent, and further establish the Department as an employer of choice, by effectively describing the importance of the Nation's defense to prospective employees.

Are the career paths for General/Flag officers and SES with technical skills sufficient to ensure that DOD and its Components can develop capability performance requirements that will counter rapidly changing technological threats, execute complex acquisition programs, and make informed investment decisions? If not, what would you do to address this deficiency, if confirmed?

Yes. We must continue to evolve as our industrial and technology bases evolve. If confirmed, I will work with the OSD, Joint Staff, and other DoD stakeholders to ensure our senior leaders continue to receive the training, advice, and assistance they need to continue to do so.

In your view do current General/Flag officer and SES assignment policies incentivize highly qualified senior leaders to serve in scientific and technical programs? If not, what changes do you believe are necessary to incentivize qualified senior leaders to seek assignment to such positions and duties?

In my opinion, the Department's biggest civilian workforce challenge is ensuring we continue to attract and retain the highest quality talent necessary to achieve the NDS. We must compete with the public and private sectors for talent, and further establish the Department as an employer of choice, by effectively describing the importance of the Nation's defense to prospective employees. If confirmed, I will work with OSD, Joint Staff, and other DoD stakeholders to ensure our senior leaders continue receiving the needed training, advice, and assistance.

Are you satisfied that OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Military Services have in place sufficient training and resources to provide General/Flag officers and members of the SES the training, advice, and assistance they need to “play the ethical midfield”? Please explain your answer.

Yes. Sufficient training and resources are in place to provide senior military and civilian leaders the training, advice, and assistance they need to “play the ethical midfield.” The ability to make ethical decisions is identified as a specific Desired Leader Attribute for leaders throughout the military and is foundational to all Joint and Service developmental efforts.

Insider Threat

DOD has experienced devastating attacks from insider threats—attacks that have led to the death and injury of DOD personnel, as well as to the loss of highly-classified information critical to national security. The National Insider Threat Task Force published the Insider Threat Program Maturity Framework in November 2018.

In your view, how will DOD’s newly-designated Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), better posture the Department to deter, detect, and mitigate insider threats before they reach a critical point and potentially harm national security.

If confirmed, I will review the issue of implementing the newly-designated Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), as required.

What can the Department do to ensure that senior leaders in each DOD Component—not only the intelligence or counterintelligence communities—are fully invested in protecting their people, facilities, information from insider threats as a core mission objective?

This is an active defense problem, not a passive problem. To defend against insider threats, all elements of the Department must be actively engaged on the network and defending against all threats.

Component Commanders have a great framework for Insider Threat Programs (InTP) that include clear policies, procedures, responsibilities, training/reporting requirements and mechanisms, and joint programs created for information sharing and consolidation.

However, there remain challenges including program uniformity, funding, and manpower due to the swift timeline for InTP establishment. Most notably, each Component is creating their program without any additional funding or manpower resources to support this new mandate. This has led to uneven implementation of InTPs policies. The Department of Defense can assist senior leaders in successfully instituting the InTP standards by ensuring they have the necessary resources to execute the InTP Maturity Framework of 2018.

Prevention of and Response to Sexual Assault

In your view, are the policies, programs, and training that the Department has put in place to prevent sexual assault and respond to sexual assault when it does occur, adequate and effective?

One sexual assault in the Joint Force is too many. If confirmed, I will continue to support efforts to address chain of command accountability, prevent retaliatory behavior, reduce root causes, and foster a culture of dignity, respect, and one that is free from sexual assault and sexual harassment. While we have put forward great effort and resources to prevent and respond to sexual assault and prevention, we still have work to do.

The DoD and Joint Force Leadership are committed to the safety of our men and women and will not relax our comprehensive efforts to combat sexual assault. Any form of retaliation goes against our core values and has no place in our military. The Military Services are committed to eliminating retaliatory behavior and have implemented a number of policies and procedures to address retaliation and work on understanding what causes this problem.

What is your view of the role of the chain of command in maintaining a command climate in which sexual harassment and sexual assault are not tolerated?

Commanders are accountable for the command climate they foster. Commanders at all levels are expected to promote an environment of dignity and respect, free from unlawful discrimination, sexual harassment, and sexual assault. The chain of command sets the tone in every aspect of the command climate and with the maintenance of good order and discipline.

If confirmed, what role will you establish for yourself in increasing focus on the *prevention* of sexual harassment and sexual assault?

We must demand that every Service member, from new recruits to our most senior officers, adhere to a culture of professionalism and respect, which starts with the leadership. We must empower our commanders and hold them accountable for the command climate in their units.

What is your view of the necessity of affording a victim both restricted and unrestricted options to report a sexual assault?

Every support mechanism should be provided to sexual assault victims, including the opportunity to elect to file either restricted or unrestricted reports. These options provide victims a personal choice, and a much greater voice.

What is your assessment of the potential impact, if any, of proposals to remove from military commanders, case disposition authority over felony violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, including sexual assaults?

Commanders are crucial to our ability to effect institutional change, and disposition authority is one of the most effective instruments available to them. Commanders are responsible for the

good order and discipline of their units, and removing their authority will undermine this long-standing principle. Commanders must retain the ability to hold all Service members in their formation accountable for their actions. The authority to discipline service members, to include convening courts-martial, is an important tool that enables commanders to fulfill their responsibility to their people and to establish an appropriate culture where victims are treated with dignity and respect.

What is your assessment of the Department's implementation of protections against retaliation (including reprisal and social ostracism) for reporting sexual assault?

One sexual assault in the DoD is too many. The Department recognizes sexual assault victims require protection against retaliation and that more protections are required. There are a number of protections against reprisal and retaliation available to victims and witnesses of crimes. The Department has implemented the following three programs; Retaliation Prevention and Response Strategy Implementation Plan, Catch a Serial Offender Program, and Sexual Assault Accountability and Investigation Task Force to provide victims of sexual assault protection against retaliation. If confirmed, I will ensure USSTRATCOM complies with all Department programs/directives.

In your view, do military and civilian leaders in STRATCOM have the training, authorities, and resources needed to hold subordinate commanders and supervisors accountable for the prevention of and response to sexual harassment and sexual assault? If not, what additional training, authorities, or resources do you believe are needed, and why?

The DoD's investigative and prosecutorial training, authorities, and resources are adequate. Criminal investigative agencies prioritize sexual assault cases and thoroughly investigate all allegations of sexual assault. With increased training and specialization, both investigators and prosecutors are becoming increasingly skilled in dealing with these types of complex cases.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, and when asked before this committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate committees of Congress to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the position of the Administration?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress?

Yes.