



UNCLASSIFIED
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

5 August 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Central Command, 7115 South Boundary Boulevard, MacDill AFB, Florida 33621

SUBJECT: Executive Summary of Coalition Airstrike In the Vicinity of Arghandab, Afghanistan on 9 June 2014

1. On 8-9 June 2014, Coalition forces conducted an operation in the vicinity of Gaza Valley in Zabul Province, Afghanistan. The operation was designed to disrupt insurgent activity and improve security for local polling stations within the Arghandab District in advance of the Afghan runoff elections. The operation was led by Afghan security forces with support from US special operations forces and other US and Coalition elements.
2. Just before dawn on 9 June 2014, Afghan security forces began searching for enemy forces and equipment in the vicinity of the Gaza Valley. As soon as the "clearing" operations began, Coalition forces began receiving indications that insurgents in the area were reporting on Coalition movements. During the day, Coalition forces were attacked with harassing small arms fire, which paused when Coalition forces returned fire.
3. As the operation concluded, Coalition forces began moving towards three pre-planned locations to await exfiltration. The Ground Force Commander and the Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) were co-located at position A, which was over one kilometer southeast of position B. There were Afghan security forces, US special operations forces, and other Coalition elements at each of the three locations.
4. At 1915L, the aircraft tasked with providing close air support during the exfiltration of Coalition forces, arrived on station and established a five-mile orbit around the friendly positions. At 1922L, the JTAC passed grids to aircraft for all three pre-planned exfiltration locations, including the grid for position B, and stated that all friendly forces were located within 100 meters of those three locations. At approximately 1947L, Coalition forces at position B began receiving enemy fire from a location they believed was to their west at a distance of about 450 meters.
5. At 1951L, aircrew identified muzzle flashes at position B and told the JTAC that it appeared the muzzle flashes were "pointing out to the west." The JTAC confirmed the friendly muzzle flashes and direction of fire and reported that the friendly position was taking "effective fire." At 1954L, the JTAC restated that Coalition forces at position B were taking "effective fire" from a suspected enemy location bearing 230 degrees and 500 meters away.
6. As Coalition forces returned fire, six individuals from position B (located in a valley) climbed to higher ground near their location to maneuver on the enemy and began engaging suspected enemy locations. At 1954L, the aircrew informed the JTAC that they saw "muzzle flashes approximately 200 meters from the friendlies" and then clarified that the muzzle flashes appeared to be at "approximately 230 degrees for 150 meters." The aircrew then corrected this to "300 degrees for 150 meters." The JTAC stated that friendlies were the only ones marked with infrared strobes. Shortly thereafter, the JTAC asked the aircrew whether it was detecting any friendly marking devices at that ridgeline location, to which the aircrew replied "negative." The JTAC acknowledged and advised the aircrew to stand by for the formal authorization to strike the suspected enemy location.

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7. Between the time that Coalition forces at position B began receiving fire and the time the grid was passed targeting the ridgeline location, one leader at position A was informed that a team from position B had moved in an attempt to maneuver on the enemy. This movement of friendly forces was not effectively communicated to the JTAC or Ground Force Commander, which led to the team incorrectly identifying the muzzle flashes on the ridgeline as enemy activity – an incorrect target identification that was accepted by the aircrew.

8. All key leaders in this operation, including the Ground Force Commander, the JTAC and the aircrew of the aircraft, incorrectly believed that the aircraft's targeting pod was capable of detecting the friendly marking devices used by Coalition forces in this operation. In fact, the aircraft's targeting pod was not capable of detecting the marking devices.

9. The Ground Force Commander believed that Coalition forces at position B continued to receive enemy fire. The target location was identified by the team based solely on a negative report from the aircrew – the report that the aircrew did not see friendly marking devices at that location. This target location was just 150 meters from position B's location, which the JTAC had previously passed to the aircrew. When the JTAC passed the authorization for the aircrew to drop bombs on the target location, the JTAC incorrectly reported that the closest Coalition forces were located 300 meters away from the target location. None of the aircrew effectively questioned the abrupt change in friendly location.

10. Approximately 21 minutes later, the two bombs landed on the targeted ridgeline. Five US soldiers and one ANA soldier (SSG Jason McDonald, SSG Scott Studenmund, SPC Justin Helton, CPL Justin Clouse, PVT Aaron Toppen, and SGT Gulbuddin Ghulam Sakhi) had climbed to that ridgeline, and none of them survived the strike.

11. The key members executing the close air support mission collectively failed to effectively execute the fundamentals, which resulted in poor situational awareness and improper target identification. While this complex combat situation presented a challenging set of circumstances, had the team understood their system's capabilities, executed standard tactics, techniques and procedures and communicated effectively, this tragic incident was avoidable.

12. Notwithstanding the tragic loss of six Coalition soldiers, this operation disrupted insurgent activity and improved security within the Arghandab District in advance of the Afghan runoff elections.


JEFFREY L. HARRIGIAN
Maj Gen, USAF
Investigating Officer

**Investigation Report of the Fixed Wing Close Air Support
Airstrike In the Vicinity of Arghandab, Afghanistan on 9 June 2014**



Investigation Report of the Fixed Wing Close Air Support Airstrike In the Vicinity of Arghandab, Afghanistan on 9 June 2014

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Investigation Report of the Fixed Wing Close Air Support Airstrike In the Vicinity of Arghandab, Afghanistan on 9 June 2014

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

~~(S//RTUIN)~~ On 8-9 June 2014, Operational Detachment – Alpha (ODA) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g conducted OPERATION (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g in support of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM – AFGHANISTAN (OEF-A) in the vicinity of Gaza Valley in Zabul Province, Afghanistan. The operation was designed to disrupt insurgent activity and improve security for local polling stations within the Arghandab District, in advance of the Afghan runoff elections. The operation was led by Afghan security forces, including the Afghan District Chief of Police, the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) District Chief, and the Afghan National Army (ANA) 2nd Kandak, with support from ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g element, and several other US elements.

~~(S//RTUIN)~~ OPERATION (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g commenced with the ground tactical movement of key elements (e.g., ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, and Task Force (TF) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g) from FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g to FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g where the ODA conducted a Key Leader Engagement with the ANA leadership. At approximately 0230L on 9 June 2014, Coalition forces landed at three infiltration Helicopter Landing Zones (HLZs) in the vicinity of the Gaza Valley.

~~(S//RTUIN)~~ Clearing operations began at approximately 0430L, starting from the northwest, turning left and then moving in a southeasterly direction through the valley. Due to constraints placed on Coalition forces (including a ban on non-Afghan forces entering Afghan compounds), the primary clearing force was ANA soldiers with US and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g elements in a supporting role. As soon as the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g commenced clearing operations, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g indicated that insurgents in the area were reporting on Coalition movements and were planning to attack. During the day, while (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g were clearing, the southeastern most position (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g was attacked with harassing small arms fire described as “pop shots”; the enemy fire stopped after (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g returned fire.

~~(S//RTUIN)~~ Following clearing operations, Coalition forces began moving into their Pick-Up Zone (PZ) Posture locations shortly after 1900L. The three tactically-driven PZ Posture locations were approximately (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g from their respective exfiltration HLZs. The Ground Force Commander (b)(3), (b)(6), the Team Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6), and the Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC, call sign (b)(3), (b)(6)) were all co-located at the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g position near HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g which was over one kilometer southeast of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g position near HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g.

~~(S//RTUIN)~~ (b)(3), (b)(6), the B-1B tasked with providing armed overwatch during exfiltration, arrived on station and established a five-mile orbit around the friendly positions at an altitude block of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Mean Sea Level. At 1922L, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) passed grids for three friendly locations to (b)(3), (b)(6) and stated that all friendly were located within 100 meters of these three exfiltration HLZs. (b)(3), (b)(6) then asked (b)(3), (b)(6) to search three suspected enemy locations.

~~(S//RTUIN)~~ At 1949L, (b)(3), (b)(6) reported that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (located in a valley) was receiving enemy fire assessed to be from the west of their position at a distance of about 450 meters. The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge (“(b)(3), (b)(6)”) reported “troops in contact” to (b)(3), (b)(6) via (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and provided an updated grid for their location.

~~(S//RTUIN)~~ At 1951L, (b)(3), (b)(6) on the situation, stating that friendly forces at the previously-passed (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g grid were taking “effective fire.” (b)(3), (b)(6) identified muzzle flashes at the reported friendly (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g location and stated that it appeared the flashes were “pointing out to the west.” (b)(3), (b)(6) confirmed the friendly muzzle flashes and direction of fire.

~~(S//RTUIN)~~ As (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g returned fire, (b)(3), (b)(6) decided to mitigate the risk of remaining in low ground by splitting the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g element and maneuvering a team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g to higher ground. Five individuals split from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (later joined them), climbed to higher ground near their location, and began engaging suspected enemy locations.

~~(S//RTUIN)~~ At 1954L, (b)(3), (b)(6) gave (b)(3), (b)(6) a suspected enemy location at 230 degrees and 500 meters away, restating that the friendly position is taking “effective fire.” (b)(3), (b)(6) informed (b)(3), (b)(6) that they saw “muzzle flashes approximately 200 meters from the friendlies” and then clarified that the muzzle flashes appeared to be coming at “approximately 230 degrees for 150 meters,” which was quickly corrected to 300 degrees for 150 meters. (b)(3), (b)(6) asked (b)(3), (b)(6) whether there were “any IR strobes” in its sensor, to which (b)(3), (b)(6) replied “negative IR strobes.” (b)(3), (b)(6) affirmed and advised (b)(3), (b)(6) to stand by for the 9-line brief, which is the formal targeting brief used to initiate CAS.

~~(S//RTUIN)~~ Between the time that the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g element began receiving fire and the time the grid was passed targeting the ridgeline location, (b)(3), (b)(6) was informed that a team from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g had moved to higher ground in an attempt to maneuver on the enemy. This movement of friendly forces was not effectively communicated between (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(6), which led to (b)(3), (b)(6) incorrectly identifying and (b)(3), (b)(6) accepting the muzzle flashes at grid (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g as enemy activity.

~~(S//RTUIN)~~ Because the Sniper Pod on the B-1B is technologically incapable of detecting IR strobes, (b)(3), (b)(6) reported lack of visible IR strobes presented a false negative regarding whether friendlies were on the ridgeline. (b)(3), (b)(6) crew, (b)(3), (b)(6),

and ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b incorrectly believed that (b)(3), (b)(6) sensors were capable of detecting IR strobes. Believing that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b element was receiving “effective fire”, (b)(3), (b)(6) approved targeting grid (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. (b)(3), (b)(6) had authority under the Rules of Engagement (ROE) to approve dropping bombs in self-defense.

~~(S//RTUIN)~~ At 2001L, (b)(3), (b)(6) passed a 9-line brief that incorrectly reported that the nearest friendly location was 300 meters to the west – rather than the previously-reported (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b location about 150 meters southeast of the ridgeline – and requested delivery of two GBU (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b bombs with a 5 millisecond delay. It took approximately 21 minutes for (b)(3), (b)(6) to execute four passes and deliver a pair of bombs. At 2121L, the two bombs landed on the targeted ridgeline.

~~(S//RTUIN)~~ Almost immediately after the bombs impacted, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) realized that the bombs may have landed near friendly forces. When elements from ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b searched for survivors, they learned that five US soldiers and one ANA soldier (SSG Jason MacDonald, SSG Scott Studenmund, SPC Justin Helton, CPL Justin Clouse, PVT Aaron Toppen, and SGT Gulbuddin Ghulam Sakhi) had climbed to the ridgeline and none of them survived the strike.

~~(S//RTUIN)~~ Members of the original task force and the QRF/ARF conducted an exhaustive search around the strike location to recover remains and equipment. The search lasted nearly three hours and extended out to about 50-75 meters from the impact location. After recovering remains believed to be from five bodies, the ODA and QRF leadership assessed that the sixth body was unrecoverable, likely incinerated by the blast; they halted the search and exfiltrated all forces. The next day, remains from the sixth body were recovered. A ramp ceremony was held at Kandahar Air Field for all six soldiers killed during OPERATION (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g before their remains were flown to Dover Air Force Base for identification, repatriation, and delivery to next of kin. Memorial services were also held at SOTF-S (Kandahar Air Field) and FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

~~(S//RTUIN)~~ All participants in the CAS employment process are responsible for its safe and effective execution. (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(7)a, (b)(7)b, (b)(7)c

(b)(7)a, (b)(7)b, (b)(7)c Though this was a challenging set of circumstances, had the team executed standard tactics, techniques and procedures and communicated effectively, this incident was avoidable.

~~(S//RTUIN)~~ Notwithstanding the tragic loss of six Coalition soldiers, OPERATION (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g disrupted insurgent activity and improved security within the Arghandab District in advance of the Afghan runoff elections.

Approved for Release

Investigation Report of the Fixed Wing Close Air Support Airstrike In the Vicinity of Arghandab, Afghanistan on 9 June 2014

1. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ On 10 June 2014, the Commanding General of US Central Command directed an investigation into the airstrike by a Coalition fixed-wing aircraft conducting Close Air Support (CAS) in the vicinity of Arghandab, Afghanistan on 9 June 2014 that was alleged to have resulted in the deaths of five US soldiers and one Afghan soldier.¹ In accordance with the Appointment Order, this Report contains the Investigating Officer's findings and recommendations.

OPERATION [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

2. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ On 8-9 June 2014, Operational Detachment – [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g conducted Operation [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g in support of Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan (OEF-A) in the vicinity of Gaza Valley in Zabul Province, Afghanistan. Operation [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g was designed to disrupt insurgent activity and improve security for local polling stations within the Arghandab District, Zabul Province in advance of the 14 June 2014, Afghan runoff elections.²

3. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ Operation [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g was led by Afghan security forces, including the Afghan District Chief of Police, the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) District Chief, and the Afghan National Army (ANA) 2nd Kandak, 2nd Brigade, 205th CORPs. Operation [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g was supported by ODA [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g with additional support from their formally partnered [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g element and other Coalition elements, including a Joint Terminal Air Controller (JTAC) from the [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Special Tactics Squadron (STS) (call sign [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)), soldiers from Task Force Lethal ("TF [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g) and a B-1B Lancer (call sign [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)), the fixed-wing CAS asset that supported the exfiltration.³

¹ Appendix A, Page 1 (A1).

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g; (b)(3), (b)(6)

Pre-Mission Planning, Briefs & Preparations

4. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ In preparation for Operation (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g revised a CONOP for disruption and clearance operations in the Gaza Valley that had been previously created but never actioned.⁴ In accordance with properly-delegated authority, the final CONOP was approved by the Commander of Special Operations Task Force – South (SOTF-S) at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan.⁵

5. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g conducted mission planning, in part, by analyzing the historic and current threat assessment of the Gaza Valley, which indicated that the majority of the local population was from the Kakar Tribe and are assessed as being pro-Taliban. The overall threat assessment in the Gaza Valley was assessed as medium because no small arms fire (SAF) incidents were reported there in the preceding 180 days; however, insurgent capability was assessed to include small arms (AK-47), PKMs (Russia-made light machine gun), Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), and Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) devices.⁶

6. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ The enemy's Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA) was assessed to be primarily passive observation of the Coalition's movements, although insurgents were known to use harassing fire to cover their own departure from objective areas in the Gaza Valley. For the enemy's Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA), the assessment was that the insurgents would use SAF, PKMs, and RPGs to attack Coalition Forces from pre-established fighting positions and would use IEDs along primary and secondary infiltration and exfiltration routes.⁷

7. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ In the 180 days preceding this operation, the following enemy activity was reported within 7 kilometers of the objective area (slightly beyond the Gaza Valley): (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g⁸

8. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g solicited and incorporated planning input initially from the 2nd ANA Kandak stationed at Forward Operating Base (FOB) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and incorporated planning with the other supporting elements, including (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and EOD.⁹ On 3 June 2014, the ODA conducted a Key Leader Engagement

⁴ B23

⁵ "Clearing" or "clearance operations" are tactical terms that describe the process of searching compounds and surrounding areas for enemy forces and/or equipment. D1.

⁶ D1-2.

⁷ D2.

⁸ D2.

⁹ C113; D1; D5; and D7.

(KLE) with ANA and provincial leaders at FOB ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b~~ during which the Afghan leadership approved executing the operation.¹⁰




Figure 1: Map of Arghandab District, Zabul Province

9. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ The CONOP included a scheme of maneuver plan (with the infiltration and exfiltration locations, the blocking/overwatch locations, control measures), a Concept of Fires (CoF) plan, a communication plan, and a Gridded Reference Guide (GRG).¹¹ While the entire plan was not formally rehearsed, it was briefed to all elements at FOB ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b~~ and there were discussions between ANA and ODA leadership following the CONOP brief to clarify various aspects of the plan.¹²

10. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ ODA ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b~~ only conducted deliberate rehearsals for the Pickup Zone (PZ) Posture infiltration and exfiltration aspects of the operation.¹³ ODA ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b~~ saw these

¹⁰ D23.

¹¹ D1-D20.

¹² D26; B23.

¹³ C113. "PZ Posture" is a specific formation that is used to facilitate accountability and security prior to the arrival of a rotary wing exfiltration asset. While ODAs are taught to conduct full dress rehearsals, time

aspects as critical because of the diverse elements participating in the operation and the complexity of working with multiple partner nations.¹⁴ A full dress rehearsal was not conducted for this operation.¹⁵

11. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ The assigned JTAC, [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)], arrived in Afghanistan on 1 June 2014 and joined ODA [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g] 48-72 hours prior to this operation. This was [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] first operation with ODA [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g] but he believed it was a standard CONOP based on his experience supporting Special Forces' missions during previous deployments.¹⁶

12. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)], the Ground Force Commander (GFC) and ODA [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g] Team Leader (call sign [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)]), determined he would handle all "up and out" communications with higher authority, SOTF-S, while the ODA [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g] Team Sergeant, [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g], would battle track friendly positions and provide updates to [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)].¹⁷

13. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] was the primary JTAC supporting ODA [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g] but [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] as the GFC agreed that a JTAC qualified 18E assigned to ODA [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g] (call sign [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)]) would play a supporting role during the operation.¹⁸ The plan was for [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] to operate alongside [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] with the [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g] [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g], while [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] operated with [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g].¹⁹

14. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] created the GRGs that were included with the CONOP and distributed miniaturized GRGs to key personnel, including [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] and SSG Jason McDonald (call sign "Bravo 1"), the Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) for [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g] for their reference during the mission.²⁰ These pocket-sized GRGs (maps) of the objective area were intended to be a quick-reference tool during the operation, but they did not include marking of key locations (e.g., [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g]).

permitting, for all aspects of planned operations (see, e.g., JP 3-09.3, Ch. 3, para . 4.b(4)(k) at G67 and Ch. 4, para. 2 at G109; GTA 31-01-003 p. 2-49 at G689).

¹⁴ B31

¹⁵ ODA [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g] appears to have had established TTPs based on their previous combat experiences that led them to focus rehearsals on aspects of the operation that involved the most interaction with their Coalition partners and, thus, involved the most coordination challenges. There is no evidence that time constraints prevented additional dress rehearsals here. B23;B35.

¹⁶ [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] joined the US Air Force in 2005, first became a JTAC in 2008, and previously deployed to Iraq in 2007 and Afghanistan in 2008, 2009, and 2010. B22; B31; C4.

¹⁷ B31; B35; D10.

¹⁸ B24; B31.

¹⁹ The 18E is the communications expert on an ODA; each ODA ideally has at least one soldier who receives CAS training at Special Operations Terminal Attack Controller Course (SOTACC) or the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group (EWTG) and supports CAS as a collateral duty. D1; B24; B31; B51.

²⁰ B22; B23.

was not marked on the GRGs as it essentially fell between two pages).²¹ (b)(3), (b)(6) also distributed his GRG products to SOTF-S, which in turn loaded the GRGs onto their fires portal for reference by supporting elements, including CAS aircrews.²²

15. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) submitted an Air Support Request (ASR) for the following type of air assets to support both the infiltration and exfiltration phases of this operation: an Electronic Warfare platform, an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platform, and two fixed-wing CAS platforms.²³

16. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ At 1120L, about three hours prior to their scheduled takeoff of 1420L, (b)(3), (b)(6) received a pre-mission brief from their Ground Liaison Officer (GLO) and a threat assessment from their Intelligence Officer.²⁴ Pursuant to ASR number (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) was tasked to support Operation (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g by providing armed overwatch during the exfiltration between 1920-2120L.²⁵ Before supporting Operation (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) was tasked with supporting XCAS 1730-1920L and a Priority mission (PRI), which culminated with a Show of Force (SoF).²⁶

17. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) aircrew found the mission brief for Operation (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g to be standard. After the mission brief, the aircrew conducted their crew brief, which covered specific responsibilities and Crew Resource Management (CRM) emphases, including SNIPER-B tasks (reference 37 BS Tiger Standards), Emergency Procedure contingencies, and Knock-It-Off (KIO) procedures (which included a discussion on “words to honor” such as Climb, Go Around, Withhold, and Abort).²⁷

Mission Execution

18. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ Operation (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g commenced at approximately 1000L on 8 June 2014 with the ground tactical movement of key US elements (ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, JTAC, EOD, and MWD Team) from FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g to FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (see Figure 1).²⁸

²¹ C107-C112.

²² C7.

²³ D102-108.

²⁴ C7.

²⁵ D124.

²⁶ (b)(3), (b)(6) take off time was (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g local time at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. All times in this Report are in the local time zone (D) for Operation (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g which is + 4 hours 30 minutes from UTC (Zulu). (b)(3), (b)(6) ultimately supported XCAS (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g by conducting an aerial search of some areas of interest (AOI) and performing a SoF over the designated AOI which met the ground commander’s intent. D124; Video-25:00.

²⁷ Crew Resource Management (CRM) refers to training procedures and tactics which are designed to mitigate the effects of human error in the cockpit and maximize communication, leadership, and decision making. B1; B5.

²⁸ D26, C114.

19. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ Approximately ^{(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g} hours later, the ground convoy arrived at FOB ^{(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g} and conducted a KLE with the ANA 2nd Kandak leadership, as well as continued planning and mission preparation with the ANA soldiers.²⁹ The KLE focused on the CONOP and recent enemy activity in the vicinity of the Arghandab District, including a report of an attack with SAF and a DSHKA (a Russian-made heavy machine gun) against a newly-formed ANA checkpoint.³⁰

20. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ The ANA 2nd Kandak leadership informed ODA ^{(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g} that they could only provide about ^{(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g} ANA soldiers, rather than the ^{(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g} soldiers requested, because they were required to station more forces at checkpoints and polling sites in support of the Afghan election security plan.³¹ ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)} reasonably assessed that he still had the forces necessary to successfully execute the operation.³²

21. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ After completing planning and preparation with the ANA, ODA ^{(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g} conducted a rest plan, finalized mission preparations, and awaited the arrival of ^{(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g} CH-47s “Chinooks” that would facilitate their movement by air during infiltration.³³




Figure 2: Operation ^{(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g} Scheme of Maneuver

22. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ At 0115L on 9 June 2014, mission elements were moved into PZ Posture at FOB ^{(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g} to await the arrival of the Chinooks at approximately 0215L. Once

²⁹ B35; D26-27.
³⁰ D26-27.
³¹ B31;D26.
³² B31.
³³ D5; D7; D27.

the Chinooks arrived, the mission elements boarded the helicopters and conducted the approximately 15-minute flight to the planned Helicopter Landing Zones (HLZs).³⁴

23. (S//RTUIN) The three infiltration HLZs for the operation (mapped in Figure 2) were [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

24. (S//RTUIN) [redacted] was inserted at [redacted] and was co-located with [redacted] for the duration of the mission.³⁶ Air assets supporting the infiltration included an [redacted]³⁷

[redacted]

25. (S//RTUIN) Once on the ground, [redacted] moved to occupy their respective northern and southern "blocking" positions while [redacted] to begin the clearance operation.³⁹

26. (S//RTUIN) After [redacted] arrived at the northern blocking position and assessed the terrain, the element decided to split into two sections – one group went to the ridgeline to the northwest, while the remainder of the [redacted] element went to the ridgeline to the southeast of the original location. The original blocking position for [redacted] was on one of the two ridgelines, so the rationale for the split was to provide better coverage for the clearing element while remaining mutually supportive. The two groups remained close enough to each other during the clearance operations that they could communicate without radios if necessary.⁴⁰

27. (S//RTUIN) Clearance operations began at approximately 0430L, starting from the northwest, turning left and then moving in a southeasterly direction through the

³⁴ Minus [redacted], which was tasked with vehicle security at FOB [redacted] D6-7; D27; B30.

³⁵ The Grid coordinates for HLZ [redacted] for HLZ [redacted] they were [redacted] and for HLZ [redacted] they were [redacted]. "Blocking" is defined in US Army Field manual 4-01.45 as an advanced tactical technique to physically block a road to prevent traffic from passing, while "overwatch" is defined by FM 3-90-2 as a "movement technique used when contact with the enemy is expected ...[and an] overwatching element is positioned to support the moving unit by fire or fire and movement." However, Special Forces soldiers often use the term "blocking" to describe overwatch positions as well as true blocking positions, as the members of ODA [redacted] did here during their interviews with the Investigating Officer. D6-7; D27; B32; B35.

³⁶ B31; D1; D11.

³⁷ D17.

[redacted]

D27; B32.

⁴⁰ B41; B47.

valley.⁴¹ Due to constraints placed on Coalition forces (including a ban on non-Afghan forces entering Afghan compounds), the primary clearing force was ANA soldiers with US and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g elements in a Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA) role.⁴²

28. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) exerted considerable effort throughout the day managing the movements of the ANA soldiers who were not well disciplined in their clearing techniques. For example, (b)(3), (b)(6) had to re-direct ANA soldiers several times to clear areas they had passed without clearing and he had to warn the ANA about taking excessive breaks (attributable at least in part to the heat, which surpassed 100° F).⁴³

29. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ As soon as clearance operations commenced, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g indicated that insurgents in the area were reporting on Coalition movements and were planning to attack.⁴⁴ During the day, while (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g were clearing, the southern position (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g was attacked with harassing SAF (described as “pop shots”). The SAF stopped after (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g returned fire and no further enemy contact was reported by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g.⁴⁵

30. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ After (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g arrived at their final overwatch position below the military crest of the hill (just below the ridgeline), the SOT-A team picked up indications that some of the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g was coming from the Kuchi camps in the valley.⁴⁶ Thus, (b)(3), (b)(6) assessed that the Kuchi in the area were reporting on the Coalition movements and were not to be trusted.⁴⁷

31. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ Shortly after 1900L, all elements (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g began moving towards their PZ Posture locations (identified on Figure 2), which were tactically-driven locations about 100 meters from their respective exfiltration HLZs.⁴⁸

(b)(3), (b)(6) were to be co-located at the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g position near HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, which was over one kilometer southeast of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g position near HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g.⁴⁹

During this phase of the operation, the intent was to move all personnel down from the high ground in preparation for exfiltration while maintaining accountability and security.⁵⁰

⁴¹ D1; D6.

⁴² B32; B35; D20.

⁴³ B32; C113.

⁴⁴

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

B32.

⁴⁷ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g final overwatch location was at grid coordinates (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. Kuchis are Afghan nomads, primarily Pashtun, that live in tents and move freely between Afghanistan and Pakistan. D27; B32.

⁴⁸ B32; B35; E2; D6.

⁴⁹ D6.

⁵⁰ B39; B41; D27.

32. (~~S//RTUIN~~) At 1915L, (b)(3), (b)(6) checked in with (b)(3), (b)(6) to provide armed overwatch during exfiltration.⁵¹ (b)(3), (b)(6) established a five-mile orbit (see Figure 3) around the friendly positions and was cleared into the Restricted Operating Zone (ROZ) at an altitude block of 16,000-17,000 feet Mean Sea Level (~12K Above Ground Level), maintaining about 400 knots, using right-hand turns in order to keep a clear line of sight for the Sniper Advanced Targeting Pod ("Sniper Pod").⁵² (b)(3), (b)(6) request for a lower altitude was denied by (b)(3), (b)(6) due to the presence of an unmanned aircraft in their requested airspace.⁵³



Figure 3: Map Showing (b)(3), (b)(6) Orbit During Operation (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

33. (~~S//RTUIN~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) and the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) were the only air assets initially on station. After "troops in contact" was declared, the (b)(3), (b)(6) was ordered outside of the Restricted Operating Zone (ROZ).⁵⁴

⁵¹ E1.

⁵² E1-2.

⁵³ (b)(3), (b)(6) checked in with (b)(3), (b)(6) after conducting a SoF about 80 nautical miles away. The aircrew conducted a SNIPER-B check enroute to the killbox and arrived on station at about 1910L, establishing good two-way communication with (b)(3), (b)(6) six minutes later. E-4; B1; B9; B15.

⁵⁴ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) so it was moved out of the ROZ in order to give priority to (b)(3), (b)(6) the CAS aircraft, after "troops in contact" was declared. D16-17; C115.

34. (S//RTUIN) (b)(3), (b)(6) established communications and had positive authentication with (b)(3), (b)(6) until (b)(3), (b)(6) checked on at about 2012L.⁵⁵ (b)(3), (b)(6) requested a Fighter to Forward Air Controller (FAC) brief from (b)(3), (b)(6) and received all pertinent information including establishment of an abort code.⁵⁶

35. (S//RTUIN) At 1917L, (b)(3), (b)(6) passed the following situation update:

We're overlooking element that's sweeping through a valley. Threats are small arms, MANPADs [man-portable air defense systems], and possible DSHKA [Russian-made machine gun]. Threats are hostile intents against any ground force. We have (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g at three different locations. Ground Force Commander is call sign (b)(3), (b)(6). Plan is to Exfil at 2120, three different HLZs. Break.⁵⁷

36. (S//RTUIN) At 1922L, (b)(3), (b)(6) passed 6-digit grids for three friendly locations, each within 100 meters of HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, and HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and added that friendly forces would move into PZ Posture within 100 meters of the HLZs no later than an hour before the 2120L Exfil time. (b)(3), (b)(6) then established a sensor allocation plan and asked (b)(3), (b)(6) to check out three Named Areas of Interest (NAIs) for suspected enemy locations.⁵⁸ The NAIs were provided during the day by SOT-A and the ODA leadership.⁵⁹

37. (S//RTUIN) (b)(3), (b)(6) copied, read back each of the six-digit grids passed, and placed them in the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Rod as waypoints.⁶⁰ (b)(3), (b)(6) Offensive Systems Officer (OSO) placed his sensor on the friendlies at only one of the three friendly grids (HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g) provided because he believed (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g priority was searching the NAIs for enemy activity.⁶¹ (b)(3), (b)(6) scanned the three NAIs from about 1925L to 1940L before reporting to (b)(3), (b)(6) that they "didn't see anything out of the ordinary" but would continue scanning.⁶² (b)(3), (b)(6) attributed the reduction in visible insurgent activity to

⁵⁵ E1-E2; E7.

⁵⁶ E1-2.

⁵⁷ E1.

⁵⁸ E2.

⁵⁹ Within a 100-meter tolerance of the actual location; the three friendly grids were (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g E2; B25; B32;

B51.

⁶⁰ B9; E2.

⁶¹ B9.

⁶² E2.

the presence of aircraft overhead, saying “historically when they hear aircraft come over, they keep it down; the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g stops as well.”⁶³

38. (~~S//RTUIN~~) There were communications problems throughout the mission, which caused several missed transmissions between (b)(3), (b)(6). (b)(3), (b)(6) suggested shifting their orbit northward to mitigate further communications degradation due to terrain while on the East side of the orbit (see Figure 3), which (b)(3), (b)(6) approved.⁶⁴

39. (~~S//RTUIN~~) At 1939L, (b)(3), (b)(6) advised (b)(3), (b)(6) that all elements were moving to their PZ Posture locations in preparation for exfiltration. (b)(3), (b)(6) requested air refueling guidance, and (b)(3), (b)(6) responded that (b)(3), (b)(6) would check on in 35 minutes, so that would be the best time to depart for aerial refueling.⁶⁵

40. (~~S//RTUIN~~) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (located in a valley) began receiving SAF from a ridgeline assessed to be from a polar plot to the west (reportedly 260 degrees) of their position at a distance of approximately 450 meters.⁶⁶ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g reported enemy contact and provided an updated grid for their element’s location to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g⁶⁷

41. (~~S//RTUIN~~) At 1949L, (b)(3), (b)(6) reported to (b)(3), (b)(6) that friendly forces were taking “pop shots” and passed the grid for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) confirmed the coordinates by readback.⁶⁸ Notably, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g was the only element which reported enemy contact from this time through the end of the mission; (b)(3), (b)(6) believed the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g element was receiving fire from at least two positions.⁶⁹ As shown in Figure 2, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g were over one kilometer southeast, while (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g was approximately two kilometers east/southeast of the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g location.⁷⁰

42. (~~S//RTUIN~~) The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g element returned fire and SSG McDonald decided to mitigate the risk of remaining in low ground during the “troops in contact” (TIC) by splitting the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g element and moving a team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g to higher ground to maneuver on the enemy (see Figure 4).⁷¹ Five individuals (SSG Scott Studenmund, (b)(3), (b)(6)

63 (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g B9;

B15; B25.

64 E2; B1; B5; B16; B26-28.

65 E3.

66 D27.

67 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g provided their updated grid coordinate as (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

68 E4.

69 B32.


70 E4; B26; B32; D6.

71 B41; B47.

(b)(3), (b)(6) CPL Justin Clouse, PVT Aaron Toppen, and SGT Gulbuddin Ghulam Sakhi) split from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and began to move up the hill.⁷²

43. (~~S//RTUIN~~) When he was about halfway up the hill, (b)(3), (b)(6) was called verbally by SSG McDonald and instructed to return to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g because (b)(3), (b)(6) radio was nonresponsive due to a dead battery. SSG Studenmund's radio was also not responsive due to a broken Push-to-Talk function. SSG McDonald wanted to have communications with the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g element, so he sent SPC Justin Helton up the hill to be the communications link between (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g.⁷³

44. (~~S//RTUIN~~) Another volley of enemy fire started, and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g began returning fire while SSG McDonald called in to (b)(3), (b)(6) that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g was taking "effective fire." SSG McDonald then began to provide cover for the maneuvering (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g element by returning fire towards the areas he believed the enemy fire had originated from – in the words of (b)(3), (b)(6) SSG McDonald grabbed an M320 grenade launcher and while exposed to enemy fire and began "laying on fire to both hills where we were getting fire from."⁷⁴



⁷² B41; B47; B55; B59. SGT Sakhi was a rifle squad leader from (b)(6) (b)(6) Afghanistan and a member of the ANA 2nd Kandak. The photograph in Figure 4 was taken by (b)(3), (b)(6) with notations added to document his descriptions provided during his interview.

⁷³ B47. T (b)(3), (b)(6) radio had died and he did not have a spare battery.

⁷⁴ While (b)(3), (b)(6) and apparently SSG McDonald believed (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g was receiving effective fire from at least two different areas, (b)(3), (b)(6) believed the enemy fire may have originated from just one moving enemy fighter. B26-27; B32; B35; B41; B47; B39; B55.

Figure 4: Split Positions

45. Upon arriving at the top of the hill, the [redacted] engaged suspected enemy locations to the west with their organic weapons systems, which included a [redacted] machine gun, a [redacted] grenade launcher, and [redacted] rifles.⁷⁵ SSG Studenmund had a functional Infra-red (IR) strobe [redacted] affixed to the back of his helmet.⁷⁶

46. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ At 1951L, [redacted] reported to [redacted] that friendly forces from the previously-passed location were taking “effective fire.” [redacted] identified muzzle flashes at the reported friendly location [redacted] and stated that it appeared they were “pointing out to the west.” [redacted] confirmed the muzzle flashes and direction of fire. [redacted] to use its sensor to find the location of the enemy fire, although he did not initially provide a range and bearing from the friendly position.⁷⁷

47. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ At 1954L, [redacted] gave a suspected enemy location at 230 degrees at 500 meters distance and restated that friendly forces were taking “effective fire.” [redacted] designated the updated [redacted] grid location as a waypoint in the [redacted] Pod system, and scanned the [redacted] location, but did not identify any activity in that area.⁷⁸

48. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ Moments later, [redacted] reported good “handshake,” although Video Downlink (VDL) was intermittent and again asked if [redacted] had seen anything at the range and bearing given. At 1954L, as [redacted] moved its Sniper Pod westward, [redacted] (viewing the [redacted]) asked “you picking up anything over there?” Then the following exchange occurs:

[redacted]: “I see some muzzle flashes, approximately 200 meters from the friendlies. They’re on top of the ridgeline. Approximately 230 for 150 meters”

[redacted]: “Affirm, I’m copying, from friendlies, 230 degrees, 200 meters there’s enemy personnel engaging them, is that correct?”

⁷⁵ B36; B47.

⁷⁶ Several soldiers at [redacted] saw SSG Studenmund’s IR strobe after he climbed to the ridgeline, and all members of ODA [redacted] were given [redacted] IR strobes. B41; C113.

⁷⁷ The previously-passed grid for the [redacted] location was [redacted]. The Investigating Officer was unable to locate an official definition of “effective fire” notwithstanding the fact that the term has become a critical justifying term for actions in self-defense. Based upon discussions with the air and ground crews, it appears that the operational community uses the phrase “effective fire” to drive action du

⁷⁸ [redacted]

[redacted] E4; B7; B13; B27-28.

(b)(3), (b)(6): "It looks like it's actually 300 for 150 meters away from friendlies."

(b)(3), (b)(6): "Affirmed. Be advised friendlies are the only ones marked by IR strobes; so anybody else at 200 meters at that polar plot that is enemy target. You are contact at this time."

(b)(3), (b)(6): "(b)(3), (b)(6) is captured."

(b)(3), (b)(6): "Affirm; can you send me that ten-digit grid?"

(b)(3), (b)(6): Stand by; we are getting closer to get Cat 1."

(b)(3), (b)(6): "Affirm; I'll take Cat 2. Cat 2 or Cat 1, it doesn't matter. I'd just like to suppress enemy at this time. Over."

(b)(3), (b)(6): "Uniform Alpha (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g."

(b)(3), (b)(6): "Copy. Uniform Alpha (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g."

(b)(3), (b)(6): "Good readback."⁷⁹

49. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ Throughout this exchange and at least until the 9 line brief was passed, (b)(3), (b)(6) continued to orbit the area while monitoring the situation with its (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Pod as the Pilot Flying (in the right seat) scanned the ground through his Night Vision Goggles (NVGs). While the Pilot Flying saw occasional muzzle flashes, he did not detect any IR strobes.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ (b)(3), (b)(6) was using an L3 SIR associated 3"x5" video screen for Live Streaming Video (LSV). B2 "capture" is a term used by (b)(3), (b)(6) to indicate (b)(3), (b)(6) had their sensor on the intended "enemy" target. Per AFTTP 3-3 JTAC, "capture" means that the object of interest has been located and is being tracked. The use of "contact" followed by "captured" are CAS terms indicating that the JTAC and CAS aircraft are in agreement on the target and the aircraft is tracking the target. G414-15.

Per JP 3-09.3 (G122-123), coordinates are categorized according to their level of accuracy, from Level 1 (most accurate) to Level 6 (least accurate); Category II coordinates may add 1-8 additional meters of Circular Error (CE) Target Location Error (TLE). Although the Pilot considered tactical options such as a Show of Force (SoF) upon initially seeing the muzzle flashes (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, no one inside the aircraft mentioned it as a viable option as they collectively believed that the situation had escalated beyond a SoF option when friendly forces began taking "effective fire." B2; B16. Additionally, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) did not consider a SoF to be a viable option, and thus they did not discuss it as an option here, because they found a SoF to be ineffective in a previous TIC. E4-5; B27; B32.

⁸⁰ It should be noted that the Pilot in the right hand seat, which for this operation was the Pilot Flying (either the right or left hand Pilot can fly the B-1B), is the only member of the B-1B's aircrew with any significant view of the ground while the aircraft circles a target area in a right-hand turn. Additionally, the B-1B Pilots do not typically wear helmet NVGs due to the extra weight and duration of B-1B missions (typically over 10 hours), so the Pilot Flying periodically picks up hand-held NVGs and scans the ground while circling. B5.

50. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ At 2000L, (b)(3), (b)(6) again stated that he was (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) Sniper Pod and again asked whether there were “any IR strobes in your sensor at this time?” (b)(3), (b)(6) OSO replied “negative IR strobes.” (b)(3), (b)(6) affirmed and advised (b)(3), (b)(6) to stand by for the 9-line brief.⁸¹

51. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ Between the time that the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g element began receiving fire and the time the grid was passed targeting the ridgeline location, (b)(3), (b)(6) was informed via inter-team that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g had split their element and a team (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g had moved to higher ground.⁸² This information was not effectively communicated between (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6), which led to (b)(3), (b)(6) incorrectly identifying and (b)(3), (b)(6) accepting the muzzle flashes at grid (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g as enemy activity.⁸³

52. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ Furthermore, because the Sensor Pod on the B-1B is technologically incapable of detecting IR strobes and the Pilots’ NVGs only detect IR strobes at limited ranges (up to 7,000 meters), (b)(3), (b)(7)(a), (b)(7)(b) reported lack of visible IR strobes presented a false negative regarding whether friendlies were on the ridgeline. (b)(3), (b)(6) crew, (b)(3), (b)(6), and ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g incorrectly believed that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) was capable of detecting IR strobes.⁸⁴

53. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ Based on the intermittent reports from Bravo 1 to (b)(3), (b)(6) that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g continued to receive “effective fire”, (b)(3), (b)(6) approved targeting the ridgeline at grid (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g in self-defense.⁸⁵ The closest previously-reported friendly position to the target was (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g updated PZ Posture location, which was only about 140 meters to the southeast – but at no time was “Danger Close” ever declared.⁸⁶

54. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ At 2001L, approximately 4 ½ minutes after receiving the 10-digit grid from (b)(3), (b)(6) passed the following 9-line brief:

Type Control	not heard
Method of Attack	not heard
Line 1	not heard
Line 2	not heard
Line 3	not heard

⁸¹ E5.

⁸² B36; B26-27.

⁸³ E4.

⁸⁴ IR strobes such as those typically carried by ground forces have an IR (infra-red) micron range of 0.81-0.91 microns, while the Sniper Pod can only detect IR marking devices with an IR micron range of 3.3-5.0 microns. E107-113; B2; B5-6; B9; B15-16; B27-28; B32-33; B36; B39; B41; B47; E5

⁸⁵ E5-6.

⁸⁶ B2; B15; B27-29; B33.

Line 4 not heard

Line 5 multiple enemy on ridgeline

Line 6 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

Line 7 mark by tracer

Line 8 friendlies approximately 300 meters west

Line 9 Egress back to wheel

(b)(3), (b)(6) then directed a restricted attack heading of 330 degrees plus or minus 20 degrees ((b)(7)a, (b)(7)b, (b)(7)c), two GBU-(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g with a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g delay, requested (b)(3), (b)(6) standby to call in, and reported that they were in the process of getting final approval.⁸⁷

55. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ In this 9-line brief, (b)(3), (b)(6) incorrectly reported that the nearest friendly location was 300 meters to the west – rather than the previously-reported friendly location about 150 meters southeast of the ridgeline.⁸⁸

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)a, (b)(7)b, (b)(7)c

⁸⁷ A “9 line brief” is a standardized briefing format used by ground forces to call for CAS. See JP 3-09.3 p. V-39 (G158-159) and AFTTP 3-3.JTAC (G407-408). The GBU-(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g is a 500-pound Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) coordinate seeking weapons, and the 5 millisecond delay meant that the bomb would detonate 5 milliseconds after impact, which was intended to reduce the blast radius due to the presence of friendly forces. (b)(3), (b)(6) was also carrying GBU-(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Laser JDAM bombs, which are guided by laser and/or GPS and updatable during flight, so they are often preferred for moving targets. The choice of weapons here had no impact on the outcome. E5; G411.

⁸⁸ E5; B27-29. In his statement to the Investigating Officer, (b)(3), (b)(6) characterized his report that the close friendlies to the target location were 300 meters to the west as a “mistake”. (b)(3), (b)(6) reported the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g position as being about 150 meters from the ridgeline; it was actually about 140 meters from the ridgeline. B28.

⁸⁹ E5-6. The heading restriction was not read back in accordance with the AFG SPINS (F52-53), which provides: “[a]ircrew will read back lines 4, 6, 8, ordnance type, restrictions, and ROE.” See also AFTTP 3-3.JTAC (G411), which provides “Lines 4, 6, and any restrictions are required to be read back for each 9-Line passed”. See also (b)(3), (b)(6) mission document.

57. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ At (b)(1).4a, (b)(1).4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that the strike was approved by (b)(3), (b)(6) and that they were in a self-defense posture and directed (b)(3), (b)(6) to “action the 9-line” with a Time On Target (TOT) of 2006L.⁹⁰

58. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) did not enter the “target” grids, the last friendly location, or the 9-line friendly position grids into the FalconView system.⁹¹ Instead, the (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) plotted the 9-line positions using stick drawings on their 9-line card.⁹² There was no discussion amongst the aircrew or between (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) regarding the reported change in friendly location, or the fact that the target was about 140 meters from the previously-reported (b)(1).4a, (b)(1).4g location.⁹³

(b)(1).4a, (b)(1).4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

60. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ At 2007L, (b)(3), (b)(6) asked (b)(3), (b)(6) to confirm that friendlies were still 300 meters west of the target location. (b)(3), (b)(6) responded: “all friendlies are 300 meters west with IR strobes on taking effective fire; I need you guys in.” (b)(3), (b)(6) responded that they copied and would be “in” in one minute.⁹⁵

61. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ Over the next ten minutes, (b)(3), (b)(6) attempted three passes citing “systems” issues as the reason for the delays.⁹⁶ In fact, the aircrew had begun executing BOC procedures on the first pass but soon realized it was supposed to be BOT. After switching to BOT, the OSO input azimuth data (the angular separation between the two bombs) incorrectly so the weapons system could not assign bombs to the target. That drove the request to switch to BOC (approved by (b)(3), (b)(6)), which required the coordinates being manually re-entered. The third unsuccessful pass was

(b)(1).4a, (b)(1).4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

B9;B5.

⁹²

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)a, (b)(7)b, (b)(7)c

⁹⁴ E6.

⁹⁵ E6.

⁹⁶ E6-8.

caused by (b)(3), (b)(6) inability to establish communications with (b)(3), (b)(6) for clearance. ⁹⁷ (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(a), (b)(7)(c) also asked to change the weapons plan to 1x GBU (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. Degraded communications continued and there were at least 12 missed calls from (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) to (b)(3), (b)(6). ⁹⁸

62. (S//RTUIN) (b)(3), (b)(6) checked on station to provide overwatch during the Exfil. At 2017L, recognizing that (b)(3), (b)(6) could hear (b)(3), (b)(6) at times when (b)(3), (b)(6) could not, (b)(3), (b)(6) asked (b)(3), (b)(6) to begin relaying communications between (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) relayed time to target from (b)(3), (b)(6) approved (b)(3), (b)(6) into the ROZ at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g feet and passed the target location at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and a friendly location of 300 meters west, which (b)(3), (b)(6) read back. ⁹⁹

63. (S//RTUIN) (b)(3), (b)(6) relayed the system readback from (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6). This grid was off by about eight meters because (b)(3), (b)(6) improperly input (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g instead of the briefed (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g into the weapon system. ¹⁰¹

64. (S//RTUIN) (b)(3), (b)(6) again requested 2x GBU (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and (b)(3), (b)(6) acknowledged. ¹⁰² Communication between (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) degraded again, but at no point during the operation did (b)(3), (b)(6) attempt to change frequencies in accordance with the PACE plan. ¹⁰³

65. (S//RTUIN) Meanwhile, SSG McDonald removed the IR strobe from his helmet and affixed it to a pack on the ground near (b)(3), (b)(6) to mark that location as friendly. SSG McDonald then moved quickly up the hill to the ridgeline to support the individuals already there (SSG Scott Studenmund, SPC Justin Helton, CPL Justin Clouse, PVT Aaron Toppen, and SGT Gulbuddin Ghulam Sakhi). ¹⁰⁴

66. (S//RTUIN) At 2019L, (b)(3), (b)(6) called in from the south, made a "one minute" call, and again requested clearance calls from (b)(3), (b)(6) that went unanswered. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) again offered to relay and passed from (b)(3), (b)(6) "call in" with direction and expect clearance on final. At 2020L, (b)(3), (b)(6) called "in, final" and (b)(3), (b)(6) responded to (b)(3), (b)(6) relaying from (b)(3), (b)(6) "cleared hot, cleared hot, cleared hot." (b)(3), (b)(6)

⁹⁷

⁹⁸ (b)(3), (b)(6) (an EC-12) checked in at this time, but was told by (b)(3), (b)(6) to standby for five minutes so th d go kinetic. E6-8.

⁹⁹ (b)(3), (b)(6) checked on about 52 minutes late due to maintenance issues. E7-8; D16.

¹⁰⁰ E8.

¹⁰¹ (b)(3), (b)(6) was not aware that (b)(3), (b)(6) had changed the grid from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g until the error was bro attention during an with the Investigating Officer. B29; C117.

¹⁰² E8.

¹⁰³ When interviewed by the Investigating Officer, (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he did not attempt to change frequencies because he had good communications with all other assets throughout the day. B28.

¹⁰⁴ B41; B47.

copied and stated "two away, forty-five seconds." Ten seconds after impact, (b)(3), (b)(6) called "good hit, good hit" and (b)(3), (b)(6) acknowledged.¹⁰⁵

67. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) Navigation and Weapon Scoring data shows that the heading restriction, provided by (b)(3), (b)(6) in the 9-line brief, resulted in the bombs overflying the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b element. One of the GBU (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b landed accurately at the grid coordinates of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g which was passed in the 9-line brief. The second GBU (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b landed eight meters away at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g which was the grid passed from (b)(3), (b)(6) to (b)(3), (b)(6) in the readback.¹⁰⁶ It took about 21 minutes for (b)(3), (b)(6) to conduct four passes and deliver a pair of bombs.¹⁰⁷

68. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ Following impact, (b)(3), (b)(6) asked (b)(3), (b)(6) to put sensors on the impact site and look for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(3), (b)(6) replied that there was no movement. (b)(3), (b)(6) to identify friendly strobes near the impact due to reports that indicated the friendly position was close to the strike site. At 2023L, (b)(3), (b)(6) reported that they saw personnel with tactical equipment nearing the strike site.¹⁰⁸

69. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ At 2024L, (b)(3), (b)(6) engaged in this exchange:

- (b)(3), (b)(6) "Looking for IR strobe west of impact."
- (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) that grid you passed me did not have any IR strobes at it, is that correct?"
- (b)(3), (b)(6) "Affirm"
- (b)(3), (b)(6) "And your sensor can pick up IR strobes?"
- (b)(3), (b)(6) "Affirm"
- (b)(3), (b)(6) "We're getting word that it was close to our friendlies; I need (b)(3), (b)(6) to use that sensor and see what they can see."
- (b)(3), (b)(6) "Continuing to monitor those two pax. Negative strobe."¹⁰⁹

70. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) assigned sensor plans to (b)(3), (b)(6) to scan around the strike site to identify friendly positions, track friendly movement, and provide

¹⁰⁵ E8.
¹⁰⁶ C117.
¹⁰⁷ E5-8.
¹⁰⁸ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g E8-9.
¹⁰⁹ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

overwatch for friendly elements. (b)(3), (b)(6) assigned (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g to (b)(3), (b)(6) prior to the Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) and exfiltration to manage the stack.¹¹⁰

71. (~~S//RTUIN~~) After the bomb strike, ground and crew members became concerned that something was wrong. The first post-strike radio transmissions they received were from the members of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g who had remained in the low ground (at the last plotted friendly grid) who commented that the bombs had hit “our hill.”¹¹¹

72. Some members of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g made their way to the top of the hill first, reaching the site within 7 minutes after impact.¹¹² When they arrived at the top of the hill, they observed that SSG Studenmund was still alive and calling “help me, I can’t breathe.” (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) a medic attached to ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g attempted to keep SSG Studenmund alive, but was unsuccessful due to the severe nature of his injuries.¹¹³

73. (~~S//RTUIN~~) After learning that the bombs had hit close to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g position, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6), ran over one kilometer to the ridgeline.¹¹⁴

74. (~~S//RTUIN~~) Other than SSG Studenmund (who was still alive for a few minutes after the strike as noted above), other casualties included SSG McDonald (KIA), and PV2 Toppen (KIA).¹¹⁵ Two additional members of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g were later identified to be KIA, but they had not been located when the first casualty assessment was given to the ODA’s higher headquarters (SOTF-S). Once SOTF-S received the initial casualty report, the CASEVAC element was sent by Regional Command (RC) – South to the vicinity of the strike location.¹¹⁶

75. (~~S//RTUIN~~) Shortly after calling for CASEVAC, (b)(3), (b)(6) requested the Quick Reaction Force (QRF).¹¹⁷ The QRF for this operation was a sister ODA from the 5th Special Forces Group, ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g which was located at FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and assigned the role of primary QRF for Operation (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g with a 30-minute reaction time. ODAs (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g were co-located at FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and routinely support each other’s operations as either the primary or secondary QRF.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁰ E9.

¹¹¹ B42; B45; B36.

¹¹² E10.

¹¹³ B42; B48.

¹¹⁴ B36; B45; B33.

¹¹⁵ B36; B42; B45; E29.

¹¹⁶ The CASEVAC element consisted of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g UH-60 “Black Hawks” helicopters call sign (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g E29.

¹¹⁷ B33; B67.

¹¹⁸ C1.

76. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ The ODA (b)(3), (b)(6) QRF element was ready within 15 minutes and was waiting at the designated FOB (1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g HLZ awaiting the QRF rotary wing platform (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g CH-47s call sign (b)(3), (b)(6)).¹¹⁹ At this time, SOTF-S, in coordination with RC-S, directed that the Air Reaction Force (ARF) from TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g would also accompany the QRF, bringing the personnel count to over (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g.¹²⁰

77. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ At (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g upon landing at the base of the ridgeline where the strike occurred, the CASEVAC element was informed that the initial report of one WIA was updated to six KIA.¹²¹ This updated report was based off of the search results for survivors, which indicated that five US soldiers and one ANA soldier were KIA.¹²² At this point the decision from the flight lead of the CASEVAC aircraft was to remain at the site and not depart until the remains were recovered and loaded onto the aircraft.¹²³

78. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ The CASEVAC aircraft were still on the ground waiting for the recoverable remains when the QRF/ARF arrived on the scene at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g.¹²⁴ The QRF/ARF re-enforced security at the strike scene and began searching for casualties and recovering remains and equipment while (b)(3), (b)(6) conducted overwatch.¹²⁵

79. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ The QRF/ARF element and members of the original task force conducted an exhaustive search around the strike location to recover any of the remains and equipment.¹²⁶ The search lasted nearly three hours and extended out to about 50 meters from the impact location. No "boots on the ground" BDA was conducted and no evidence of EKIA or enemy round casings were reported.¹²⁷

80. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ After recovering remains believed to be from five bodies, the ODA and QRF leadership assessed that the sixth body was unrecoverable, likely incinerated by the blast, and halted the search.¹²⁸ (b)(3), (b)(6) with the awareness of the TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

¹¹⁹ B67, D28.

¹²⁰ SOTF-S requested that the ARF accompany the QRF; RC-S concurred. C1.

¹²¹ E16-17, C9.

¹²² D28, E31.

¹²³ C9.

¹²⁴ D28, E20.

¹²⁵ The QRF was delayed about 40 minutes by the decision to send the TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g ARF to accompany the QRF; however, this delay did not have any substantial impact on the security on the ground. B67; E-15; B39; B42; B55; B59; C1; C6.

¹²⁶ C1.

¹²⁷ "Boots on the ground" BDA implies that a physical search of suspected enemy locations is conducted. The bombs dropped at 2021L and exfiltration at 2324L was three hours and three minutes later; personnel began searching for survivors and remains almost immediately after impact. B48; B36; B42; B45; D28.

¹²⁸ B33; B69.

commander called for all elements to evacuate the objective area, which they did via two lifts of ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b~~ OH-47s at 2324L.¹²⁹

81. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ The next morning, on 10 June 2014, a ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g~~ flying over the impact location identified what appeared to be a portion of a body and tactical gear approximately 60-75 meters from the impact location.¹³⁰ The ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g~~ ARF and two members of ODA ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g~~ returned to the scene of the previous night's strike and recovered a portion of the leg from the sixth body, assessed to be CPL Clouse.¹³¹

82. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ A ramp ceremony was held at Kandahar Air Field for all six soldiers killed during Operation ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g~~ before their remains were flown to Dover Air Force Base for identification, repatriation, and delivery to next of kin. Memorial services were also held at SOTF-S and FOB ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g~~.¹³²

83. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ On 13 June 2014, the remains of all six soldiers were identified by the Deputy Medical Examiner at Dover Air Force Base.¹³³

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS

Pre-Mission Training

84. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ Prior to deploying in support of OEF-A, ODA ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g~~ conducted Pre-Mission Training (PMT) events at Fort Campbell, KY. ODA ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g~~ also conducted two months of PMT with their partnered ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g~~

~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g~~ The PMT conducted at Fort Campbell focused on preparing the ODA for their upcoming deployment, while the PMT in ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g~~ was designed primarily for the ODA to train the ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g~~ element for their deployment with ODA ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g~~ in Afghanistan. Due to a training event cancellation, ODA ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g~~ did not conduct collective CAS training during PMT prior to the subject deployment.¹³⁴

85. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ Upon arriving in Afghanistan in January 2014 (in advance of their RIP/TOA on February 15th), ODA ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g~~ was assigned to SOTF-S and attached to Advance Operating Base (AOB) 7220 (Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Special

¹²⁹ E57; D28; C1; B29.

¹³⁰ C1; E102.

¹³¹ C1.

¹³² C1; C121.

¹³³ C121

¹³⁴ ODA ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g~~ did conduct Close Combat Attack (CCA) training near FOB ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g~~ in April and employed CCA on three separate occasions previously with their previous JTAC. B

Forces Group (Airborne)). ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b operated out of FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b which is in the vicinity of Qalat, Zabul Province.¹³⁵

86. (S//RTUIN) (b)(3), (b)(6) was assigned by the Commander of (b)(3), (b)(6) STS to support ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b (b)(3), (b)(6) was originally tasked to support operations in (b)(3), (b)(6) Afghanistan, but he was diverted to support ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b. After arriving in Afghanistan, (b)(3), (b)(6) conducted a 48-hour turnover with (b)(3), (b)(6) the previous JTAC supporting ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b. The turnover consisted of (b)(3), (b)(6) introducing (b)(3), (b)(6) to the ODA leadership, including (b)(3), (b)(6) a battlespace familiarity brief, a review of unit SOPs, and other team-specific information.¹³⁸

87. (S//RTUIN) (b)(3), (b)(6) deployed as a Combat Mission Ready (CMR) JTAC and conducted all pre-deployment training required by the US Air Force, US Special Operations Command, Air Force Special Operations Command, ISAF, and IJC.¹³⁹

88. (S//RTUIN) The crew of (b)(3), (b)(6) deployed as a CMR crew, and a review of their flight records showed them all to be current and qualified. (b)(3), (b)(6) was the Mission Lead for the sortie and the Pilot Not Flying (PNF) during the engagement. PNF monitors the airspace and maintains overall situational awareness. (b)(3), (b)(6) had overall responsibility for the mission, including primary weapons release authority., (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was the Pilot Flying during the engagement; he was responsible for flying the aircraft and searching for Friendly Forces with NVGs). (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was the Offensive Systems Officer (OSO), and was responsible for operating the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b Pod and communicating with the JTAC. (b)(3), (b)(6) took part in the squadron's CAS spin up training, which included a Green Flag exercise and two weeks working with JTACs from supporting Air Support Operation Squadrons. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was the Defensive Systems Officer and was responsible for managing weapons and backing up the OSO).¹⁴⁰ (b)(3), (b)(6) was an attached flyer, meaning he was not part of the regular aircrew for (b)(3), (b)(6) although he was highly experienced and had been flying missions with the preceding squadron.¹⁴¹

¹³⁵ C1; B31.

¹³⁶ C5; B22.

¹³⁷ B31; C21.

¹³⁸ The (b)(3), (b)(6) STS commander requires his JTACs to complete at least 48 hours of turnover with the previous JTACs. B31; B22; C21.

¹³⁹ C25-26.

¹⁴⁰ C17.

¹⁴¹ B1; B15.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

89. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ The (b)(3), (b)(6) crew did not understand the Sniper Pod's capabilities with respect to IR strobes; these capabilities were not specifically covered in CAS and Sniper academics or in recommended publications and references.¹⁴²

90. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ There is a pervasive belief, held by all four members of the (b)(3), (b)(6) crew, other Air Force aviators, (b)(3), (b)(6) other JTACs, and many ground units (including (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6)), that Sniper Pods can detect IR strobes; relevant publications and references do not address this technical limitation.¹⁴³

91. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ The B-1B's Offensive Avionics Systems require various processes and inputs in order to acquire and maintain good situational awareness. For example, some units of measurement presented on the Sniper must be mentally converted (i.e., feet to meters) before being passed to ground forces, and grids must be manually input into multiple systems (FalconView and AFS).¹⁴⁴

Pre-Mission Planning, Briefs & Preparations

92. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ Operation (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g was affected by multiple significant human factors that were not addressed or successfully mitigated during mission analysis and planning. Specific factors include the following: this was (b)(3), (b)(6) first mission on this deployment and his first with ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g this was the last mission for ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(3), (b)(6) had not previously employed CAS (though he had executed CCA) on this deployment, the (b)(3), (b)(6) ANA Kandak had a low competency level; and (b)(3), (b)(6) had not dropped bombs on his 21 previous missions.¹⁴⁵

93. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) of 21st ESTS, made the decision to replace (b)(3), (b)(6) with (b)(3), (b)(6) while ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g was conducting CONOP refinement for Operation (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(3), (b)(6) asked that (b)(3), (b)(6) the previous JTAC, accompany (b)(3), (b)(6) on his first mission with ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g but that request was not supported due to dwell time requirements.¹⁴⁶

94. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) did not adequately rehearse how they would battle track and collaborate during the operation, which led to

¹⁴² C117; B2; B5.

¹⁴³ See, e.g., B2; B5; B9; B15; B26; B32; B33; B36; B39; B47; E9-10; C117.

¹⁴⁴ C117-120; B9.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

compartmentalized execution at critical moments and impeded shared situational awareness.¹⁴⁷

95. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ Although adequate time was available, ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b did not conduct a comprehensive Full Dress Rehearsal, which could have allowed (b)(3), (b)(6) and associated personnel to anticipate potential contingencies (i.e., friendly markings, PACE plan and communication contingencies).¹⁴⁸

96. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) was overly confident in (b)(3), (b)(6) abilities and (b)(3), (b)(6) (the ODA's JTAC) was underutilized as a qualified JTAC. (b)(3), (b)(6) was not properly incorporated into the CAS and air platform management aspects of the operation.¹⁴⁹

97. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) understood that Danger Close is when targets are within 300 meters of friendly forces. He knew that the GFC must provide his initials to authorize CAS in a Danger Close situation, but he believed Danger Close could be mitigated down to 100 meters (by, for example, friendly forces getting into a prone or sheltered position).¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ B22-29;B31-33; B35-36; C113.

¹⁴⁸ C113; B23; B35.

¹⁴⁹

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)a, (b)(7)b, (b)(7)c

98. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) attempted to source a Joint Fires Observer or Forward Observer to align with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b but T5 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b did not have the resources to support that request.¹⁵¹ Given the lack of rehearsal, little effort was made to develop a process for (b)(3), (b)(6) to receive timely and accurate targeting data or updated friendly positions from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b on the fires net. This resulting gap contributed to poor situational awareness.¹⁵²

99. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ The three exfiltration HLZs were not mutually supporting; terrain impeded visibility of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b was over 1.5 kilometers away from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b.¹⁵³

100. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) inadequate mission analysis impacted his ability to adapt to mission requirements (communications and targeting) and maintain situational awareness – e.g., not packing a PRC-117 (which may have alleviated communications issues with the B-1B), a 1:50k map, a PSN-13 (GPS), or a tactical computer with mapping software.¹⁵⁴ Additionally, (b)(3), (b)(6) did not conduct an adequate map study, as evidenced by the fact he was unaware that a key friendly location (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b straddled two pages on the miniaturized GRGs.¹⁵⁵

Mission Execution

101. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ Under current OEF-A ROE, the GFC is the strike approval authority (target engagement authority) for the use of air-to-ground munitions in self-defense of Coalition forces.¹⁵⁶

102. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7) misprioritized maintaining communications with higher authority, which contributed to a lack of situational awareness of friendly positions, friendly activities, and oversight of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)¹⁵⁷

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)a, (b)(7)b, (b)(7)c

- B31.
- ¹⁵² B31; C113; B23; B35.
- ¹⁵³ D6.
- ¹⁵⁴ B22; B24; C25.
- ¹⁵⁵

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)a, (b)(7)b, (b)(7)c

103. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ Degraded communications plagued this operation. Several members of this operation had radio failures, which appeared to be caused by the length of the operation [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g], environmental conditions (high temperatures and poor line of site/terrain), and from a lack of mission preparation (insufficient spare batteries and redundant “push-to-talk” systems).¹⁵⁸

104. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ There was no discussion between the aircrew and [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] about Danger Close considerations; however, the pilot flying and the OSO did state that there was discussion about Danger Close inside the cockpit prior to the 9-line being issued.¹⁵⁹ The Sniper Pod video also evidences Danger Close considerations as the aircrew established a 140 meter frag circle around the plotted friendly location.¹⁶⁰

105. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ The Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) used by US Air Force pilots have [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g]
[redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g] However, given that [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] flew a five-mile orbit around the area of operations at an altitude of approximately 12,000 feet AGL (a distance of over 8,000 meters from the operating area), it was highly unlikely that [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] pilot would detect IR strobes through his NVGs.¹⁶¹

CONCLUSIONS

106. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ The term “effective fire” was used to drive a sense of urgency and the decision to employ CAS; it is unclear whether Coalition forces were still receiving “effective fire” when bombs were dropped nearly 21 minutes later.

107. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] did not independently verify the target or friendly locations. Relying on the intermittent VDL feed from [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] sensor as the sole source of target identification was not reasonable and resulted in an invalid identification of the target by [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] and the [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] aircrew.¹⁶²

108. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] and [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] did not make any distinguishable marks on their maps or GRGs indicating they plotted the target location on [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g] last updated friendly position [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g]; they did not effectively battle track or collaborate regarding the changing locations of [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g] during the TIC.

¹⁵⁸ B25; B31; B36; B45; B47; B51; C113.

¹⁵⁹ E1-E8; B2; B15; B27.

¹⁶⁰ B9.

¹⁶¹ E110; C154; [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g]

[redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)a, (b)(7)b, (b)(7)c]

109. (~~S//RTUIN~~) Throughout the targeting process, the key players (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(6) and the (b)(3), (b)(6) aircrew) moved towards a pre-determined action (dropping ordnance). Not one member of the team challenged the updated report of a friendly position 300 meters to the west – when the previously reported friendly position was 150 to the southeast and that friendly position was still displayed on (b)(3), (b)(6) Sniper Pod screen – nor did any member of the team reassess the enemy situation to evaluate assumptions and ensure appropriate risk assessment based on current, updated information. The continuous reports that friendlies were taking “effective fire” led to a false sense of urgency and willingness to forgo standard TTPs. This urgency contributed to B22 aircrew ineffectively executing CRM which highlights the importance of collaborating and asking questions to address discrepancies.

110. (~~S//RTUIN~~) (b)(3), (b)(6), given his previous experience (just under 6 years as a JTAC), was confident in his abilities to process information, but inexplicably did not use standard TTPs and interpersonal communication skills (with both (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) aircrew) to validate positive identification of the target and confirm updated friendly locations, thus significantly degrading his situational awareness.


111. (~~S//RTUIN~~) After the 9 line was passed, compartmentalized execution led to missed opportunities to share information and develop a collaborated understanding of the situation. While (b)(3), (b)(6) worked communication issues with higher (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) struggled to communicate with the (b)(3), (b)(6) aircrew, who simultaneously were working a weapon system issue within the aircraft and preparing for weapons delivery. Notably, (b)(3), (b)(6) queried (b)(3), (b)(6) six minutes after the 9 line about the friendly position, but he did not challenge (b)(3), (b)(6) to assess this information. Though not expressly stated in his sworn statement, a reasonable inference from (b)(3), (b)(6) query was that he sensed that something may have been amiss with the disparate distances provided regarding the location of Friendly Forces..

112. (~~S//RTUIN~~) At the time (b)(3), (b)(6) authorized the CAS strike, he believed Coalition forces were under hostile attack and that dropping two bombs on the enemy location was a necessary and proportionate response. That was a reasonable belief justifying the CAS strike under the ROE. However, as discussed in more detail above (see, e.g., paragraphs 95, 96, 99, 103, 108, 109 and 111), (b)(3), (b)(6) should have taken additional steps, both before and during this operation, to ensure he received accurate information on friendly force locations. (b)(3), (b)(6) identification of the target location as “enemy” based primarily on data from a single source ((b)(3), (b)(6) Sniper Pod) – without plotting the location, comparing it to the previously-reported (b)(3), (b)(6) location, or taking other reasonable steps to confirm friendly locations – did not constitute a “reasonable certainty” that the target location was, in fact, an enemy position. (b)(3), (b)(6) failure to implement and utilize standard battle tracking and

target identification TTPs caused him to misidentify friendly forces (b)(1.4a, (b)(1.4b)) as enemy. Thus, the identification of the target was not reasonable under the circumstances.¹⁶³

113. ~~(S//RTUIN)~~ Operation (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g disrupted insurgent activity and improved security within the Arghandab District in advance of the Afghan runoff elections. On 14 June 2014, the day of the runoff elections, there was only one attack on Afghan security forces in Arghandab District, which resulted in 1 x ANA WIA, 1x EKIA, and 1 x EWIA.

RECOMMENDATIONS



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)a, (b)(7)b, (b)(7)c

(b)(5)

Pages 36 through 37 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(5)

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APPENDIX A - Administrative

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5	A19	Interview List
6	A21	Briefing to CENTCOM CCDR
7	A35	Biographies
8	N/A	(b)(3), (b)(6) Sniper Pod Video



~~SECRET//REL USA, ISAF, NATO~~
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

10 June 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR Major General Jeffrey L. Harrigian, Deputy Director, CCJ3, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 33621-5101

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigating Officer Appointment Order – Fixed Wing Close Air Support Airstrike In the Vicinity of Arghandab, Afghanistan on 9 June 2014
(~~S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO~~)

1. (~~S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO~~) I appoint you as an Investigating Officer (IO) pursuant to Army Regulation (AR) 15-6, Chapter 2, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers, to conduct an investigation into the 9 June 2014 fixed wing close air support (CAS) airstrike in the vicinity of (IVO) Arghandab, Afghanistan, in Regional Command-East (RC-(E)). Initial reports indicate that a Special Forces Operational Detachment Team (ODA) was conducting partnered operations in RC-E when it began receiving small arms fire from an unknown number of insurgents (troops in contact) and requested CAS. A B-1 aircraft delivered two Guided Bomb Units (GBU) (4a, (b) (1)) allegedly resulting in five U.S. killed-in-action and one Afghanistan Special Operation's Force killed-in-action.

a. (U) The USCENTCOM Staff Judge Advocate will appoint a Legal Advisor as part of your Investigative Team to provide you and the Investigative Team with legal advice and legal support during the conduct of this investigation.

b. (U) Your investigation will use the informal procedures under the provisions of AR 15-6, Chapters 3 and 4. Complete your report and submit it for a legal review to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (CCJA), immediately following the conclusion of your investigation, but no later than 11 July 2014.

c. (U) Unless I release you sooner, your appointment remains in effect until the investigation is complete and I determine no further investigation is required. Conducting this investigation is your primary duty until the legal review in this case is complete.

2. (U) You and your Investigative Team will obtain a legal in-brief before beginning your investigation by contacting [redacted] (b)(6), Administrative Law Division, CCJA, at [redacted] (b)(6), or his designee.

3. (~~S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO~~) You will determine and make appropriate findings and recommendations on the following:

a. (U) A detailed chronology and key participants from the receipt of mission until the completion of the Quick Reaction Force and recovery.

b. (~~S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO~~) If the enemy situation and intelligence existed concerning the possibility of insurgent activity in the area of operation IVO Arghandab, Afghanistan, in RC-(E). If so, what preparations and plans, if any, to include contingency plans for CAS, did the ODA and other friendly forces prepare before the mission?

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigating Officer Appointment Order – Fixed Wing Close Air Support Airstrike In the Vicinity of Arghandab, Afghanistan on 9 June 2014

c. ~~(S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ A description of the targeting process in place and any deviation from established procedures and targeting protocols before and during the engagement, to include adherence to any Commander's guidance, command and control function (deconfliction, authorizations, and approvals) associated with this incident.

d. ~~(S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Assess the adequacy of procedures to establish target Positive Identification (PID) and coordinate Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems and firing platforms before and during the CAS mission, and whether the decision to strike was in accordance with applicable Rules of Engagement, Tactical Directives, or other guidance. Make appropriate recommendations, if you determine any pre-attack steps need improvement, clarification, or correction.

e. ~~(S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Determine if the pre-CAS attack ODA and mission support coordination was adequate, and if not, why not. Specifically, were target engagement procedures used during the strike appropriate for the situation? What role, if any, did Afghan Forces play in planning and conducting the operation? Identify the proximate cause or causes that contributed to the results of this strike.

f. ~~(S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Assess who approved the CAS and what measures, if any, were employed to prevent friendly casualties. Assess the adequacy of the communications between the ODA Team on the ground and the aircraft that delivered the munitions. What, if any, gaps or errors occurred in the communication chain?

g. ~~(S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Assess all the damage caused by the strike, to both the intended target(s) and unintended personnel and property. Detail any deaths or injuries and their cause because of the strike.

h. ~~(S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Determine if the post-attack response by the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) from Forward Operating Base (FOB) ~~(b) (1), 1.4a, (b)(1)~~ was adequate, timely, and responsive (e.g., was the area properly secured and recovered, and did any delay by the QRF contribute to the loss of life or injury).

i. (U) Make any immediate recommendations for any time sensitive corrective measures you deem appropriate. Include in your recommendations any administrative or other corrective action against any individual derelict, negligent, or otherwise responsible for the events leading to or resulting in the consequences of this strike.

j. (U) Determine if any policy, procedure, or pre- or post-strike training requirements or control measures should be implemented, changed, enforced, or reinforced at all levels (e.g., lessons learned). Evaluate the situational awareness (SA) and common operating picture tools used, and make recommendation on how they may be improved to ensure better overall SA.


k. (U) Prepare appropriate Action Memoranda for my or the USCENTCOM Chief of Staff's signature to implement your recommendations.

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigating Officer Appointment Order – Fixed Wing Close Air Support Airstrike In the Vicinity of Arghandab, Afghanistan on 9 June 2014

1. (U) Provide any other key findings, recommendations, or matters you deem relevant and important to this investigation, such as factors you discover that did not contribute to the incident, or individuals whose performance may warrant appropriate recommendation.
4. (U) You have the discretion to examine relevant documents, to include obtaining evidence from U.S. Government email and other digital media files and storage; visit relevant locations if necessary; evaluate procedures; conduct inventories; take or obtain pictures, diagrams, or charts; and interview witnesses in person or using Video Conferencing (VTC) capabilities. You are not limited to these investigative means and your Legal Advisor may provide you with additional guidance. All witness statements will be in writing and sworn using a DA Form 2823 Sworn Statement whenever possible. If it is not possible to obtain a written or sworn statement from a particular witness, you will provide a summary or transcription of such witness testimony, signed by you, within your report of investigation. Article 136, UCMJ, provides your authority to administer oaths for Servicemembers and 5 U.S.C. §303 for Civilian employees and contractors.
5. (U) If in the course of your investigation, you come to suspect persons may have committed a crime, you must properly advise them of their rights before you may solicit self-incriminating information. If you suspect a U.S. Servicemember may have committed a crime, you must advise them of their rights under Article 31, UCMJ, using a DA Form 3881, and include it in your report of investigation. Consult your legal advisor if you deem it necessary to advise a witness of his rights. You will obtain Privacy Act Statements from all individuals who may have information pertinent to this case.
6. (U) Address your findings and recommendations to me. You will base your findings on the facts you gather, and you will base your recommendations on your findings. Cite the tab and exhibit page number, if the exhibit is more than one page, supporting each fact in your findings. Your findings will be as thorough as necessary to capture the facts and circumstance surrounding the scope of this investigation and fully answer the matters posed in paragraph 3. Consider and include as evidence in your investigation any material you deem relevant and material.
7. (U) Develop in your recommendations any courses of action you deem appropriate to resolve any issues raised by your findings. As noted, in the event you determine misconduct has occurred, your recommendations may include, but are not limited to, appropriate administrative or disciplinary action for those involved in this investigation, specifying what, if any, further investigation or action is necessary, and any potential changes to regulations, policies, orders, or procedures, as appropriate. If during the course of your investigation you determine matters worthy of investigation extend beyond the scope of this appointment memo, you will continue investigating this case, but raise such matters through your appointed Legal Advisor.
8. (U) Your final report will include a table of contents, and you will tab all exhibits; do not use staples or other types of fasteners, and do not double side any exhibit. Submit the completed report, along with the completed DA Form 1574 for a legal review to the CCJA, immediately following completion of your investigation, but no later than the date noted in paragraph 1 of this memorandum. In assembling your report, ensure you include the following:

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigating Officer Appointment Order – Fixed Wing Close Air Support
Airstrike In the Vicinity of Arghandab, Afghanistan on 9 June 2014

- a. (U) A completed DA Form 1574.
 - b. (U) This appointment memorandum.
 - c. (U) An Executive Summary, if report exceeds ten pages, an summary may be classified, if necessary.
 - d. (U) An unclassified Executive Summary.
 - e. (U) Table of Contents (index of exhibits and all exhibits labeled in successive order).
 - f. (U) A chronology of your investigation.
 - g. (U) List all people interviewed and those whom no statement was taken and why.
 - h. (U) A tab for each exhibit; paginate every exhibit.
 - i. (U) To the extent practical, use unclassified materials in your report; however, you may include classified information. Ensure proper classification markings for the overall investigation, each exhibit, page, and paragraph included within your report of investigation.
 - j. (U) Action memoranda, as necessary.
9. (U) Should you need an extension, you will submit a written request explaining the need for a delay, through the CCJA for my approval. Include all delay requests and documentation with your report of investigation.
10. (U) This appointment memorandum authorizes you and your Investigative Team Priority 1 travel status throughout the USCENTCOM area of operation to conduct this investigation.


LLOYD J. AUSTIN, III
General, U.S. Army



UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
 7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
 MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

CCCC-CCC

17 June 2014

MEMORANDUM THRU Major General Jeffrey L. Harrigian, Deputy Director, CCJ3, U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 33621-5101

FOR: [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)], USAF, MAP Planner, 609th Air Operations Center; [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)], CJ35 Operations Planner, NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A; [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] Fire Support Officer, Joint Special Operations Center; [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] CCJ1, USCENCOM

SUBJECT: Appointment Order to the AR 15-6 Investigative Team – Fixed Wing Close Air Support Airstrike In the Vicinity of Arghandab, Afghanistan on 9 June 2014

1. Pursuant to AR 15-6, Chapter 2, *Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers*, I appoint you as indicated below to assist the Primary IO, Maj Gen Jeffrey Harrigian in conducting an informal investigation into the 9 June 2014 fixed wing close air support (CAS) airstrike in the vicinity of (IVO) Arghandab, Afghanistan, in Regional Command-East (RC-(E)). I appoint you as part of the Investigative Team into this case, as indicated:

- a. [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] – Assistant IO and B-1 Subject Matter Expert
- b. [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] – Assistant IO and SOF Subject Matter Expert
- c. [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] – Assistant IO and JTAC Subject Matter Expert
- d. [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] – Administrative Support to the Investigative Team

2. I designate Maj Gen Harrigian as the Primary IO in this case.

3. This investigation is your primary duty and takes precedence over all other duties until Maj Gen Harrigian tenders his completed findings and recommendations for a legal review to the U.S. Central Command, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (CCJA), immediately following completion of the investigation, but no later than 11 July 2014, absent an approved extension. Unless I release you sooner, your appointment remains in effect until the investigation is complete and I determine no further investigation is required.

4. You will assist Maj Gen Harrigian in gathering and synthesizing information and if necessary, sworn statements and other evidence in this investigation, to include from Qatar and Afghanistan. Enclosed and incorporated into this memorandum is the original 10 June 2014 order appointing Maj Gen Harrigian as the IO. You will comply with the scope and instructions in the original appointment memorandum. You will direct questions you have about this investigation to the Primary IO and take all direction from him unless I specify otherwise.

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] at [redacted (b)(6)] or email [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)]

LLOYD J. AUSTIN, III
 General, U.S. Army

Approved for Release

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER/BOARD OF OFFICERS

For use of this form, see AR 15-6; the proponent agency is OTJAG.

IF MORE SPACE IS REQUIRED IN FILLING OUT ANY PORTION OF THIS FORM, ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS

SECTION I - APPOINTMENT

Appointed by Commander, United States Central Command
(Appointing authority)

on 10 June 2014 (Date) (Attach inclosure 1: Letter of appointment or summary of oral appointment data.) (See para 3-15, AR 15-6.)

SECTION II - SESSIONS

The (investigation) (board) commenced at US Central Command Forward HQ, Al Udeid AB, Qatar at 0630Z
(Place) (Time)

on 14 June 2014 (Date) (If a formal board met for more than one session, check here . Indicate in an inclosure the time each session began and ended, the place, persons present and absent, and explanation of absences, if any.) The following persons (members, respondents, counsel) were present: (After each name, indicate capacity, e.g., President, Recorder, Member, Legal Advisor.)

- (b)(3), (b)(6) : Investigating Officer
- (b)(3), (b)(6) Legal Advisor
- (b)(3), (b)(6) B-1 Subject Matter Expert
- (b)(3), (b)(6) Special Forces Subject Matter Expert
- (b)(3), (b)(6) : Joint Terminal Air Control Subject Matter Expert
- (b)(3), (b)(6) Recorder

The following persons (members, respondents, counsel) were absent: (Include brief explanation of each absence.) (See paras 5-2 and 5-8a, AR 15-6.)

The (investigating officer) (board) finished gathering/hearing evidence at 1530Z on 20 June 2014
(Time) (Date)
and completed findings and recommendations at 2100Z on 05 August 2014
(Time) (Date)

SECTION III - CHECKLIST FOR PROCEEDINGS

A. COMPLETE IN ALL CASES		YES	NO ^{1/}	NA ^{2/}
1	Inclosures (para 3-15, AR 15-6)			
	Are the following inclosed and numbered consecutively with Roman numerals: (Attached in order listed)			
	a. The letter of appointment or a summary of oral appointment data?	✓		
	b. Copy of notice to respondent, if any? (See item 9, below)			✓
	c. Other correspondence with respondent or counsel, if any?			✓
	d. All other written communications to or from the appointing authority?	✓		
	e. Privacy Act Statements (Certificate, if statement provided orally)?	✓		
	f. Explanation by the investigating officer or board of any unusual delays, difficulties, irregularities, or other problems encountered (e.g., absence of material witnesses)?			✓
	g. Information as to sessions of a formal board not included on page 1 of this report?			✓
	h. Any other significant papers (other than evidence) relating to administrative aspects of the investigation or board?	✓		

FOOTNOTES: 1/ Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet.
2/ Use of the N/A column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation or board.

		YES	NO ^{1/}	NA ^{2/}
2	Exhibits (<i>para 3-16, AR 15-6</i>)			
	a. Are all items offered (<i>whether or not received</i>) or considered as evidence individually numbered or lettered as exhibits and attached to this report?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	b. Is an index of all exhibits offered to or considered by investigating officer or board attached before the first exhibit?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	c. Has the testimony/statement of each witness been recorded verbatim or been reduced to written form and attached as an exhibit?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	d. Are copies, descriptions, or depictions (<i>if substituted for real or documentary evidence</i>) properly authenticated and is the location of the original evidence indicated?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	e. Are descriptions or diagrams included of locations visited by the investigating officer or board (<i>para 3-6b, AR 15-6</i>)?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	f. Is each written stipulation attached as an exhibit and is each oral stipulation either reduced to writing and made an exhibit or recorded in a verbatim record?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	g. If official notice of any matter was taken over the objection of a respondent or counsel, is a statement of the matter of which official notice was taken attached as an exhibit (<i>para 3-16d, AR 15-6</i>)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
3	Was a quorum present when the board voted on findings and recommendations (<i>paras 4-1 and 5-2b, AR 15-6</i>)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
B. COMPLETE ONLY FOR FORMAL BOARD PROCEEDINGS (<i>Chapter 5, AR 15-6</i>)				
4	At the initial session, did the recorder read, or determine that all participants had read, the letter of appointment (<i>para 5-3b, AR 15-6</i>)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	Was a quorum present at every session of the board (<i>para 5-2b, AR 15-6</i>)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	Was each absence of any member properly excused (<i>para 5-2a, AR 15-6</i>)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	Were members, witnesses, reporter, and interpreter sworn, if required (<i>para 3-1, AR 15-6</i>)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	If any members who voted on findings or recommendations were not present when the board received some evidence, does the inclosure describe how they familiarized themselves with that evidence (<i>para 5-2d, AR 15-6</i>)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C. COMPLETE ONLY IF RESPONDENT WAS DESIGNATED (<i>Section II, Chapter 5, AR 15-6</i>)				
9	Notice to respondents (<i>para 5-5, AR 15-6</i>):			
	a. Is the method and date of delivery to the respondent indicated on each letter of notification?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	b. Was the date of delivery at least five working days prior to the first session of the board?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	c. Does each letter of notification indicate —			
	(1) the date, hour, and place of the first session of the board concerning that respondent?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	(2) the matter to be investigated, including specific allegations against the respondent, if any?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	(3) the respondent's rights with regard to counsel?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	(4) the name and address of each witness expected to be called by the recorder?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	(5) the respondent's rights to be present, present evidence, and call witnesses?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	d. Was the respondent provided a copy of all unclassified documents in the case file?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	e. If there were relevant classified materials, were the respondent and his counsel given access and an opportunity to examine them?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10	If any respondent was designated after the proceedings began (<i>or otherwise was absent during part of the proceedings</i>):			
	a. Was he properly notified (<i>para 5-5, AR 15-6</i>)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	b. Was record of proceedings and evidence received in his absence made available for examination by him and his counsel (<i>para 5-4c, AR 15-6</i>)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11	Counsel (<i>para 5-6, AR 15-6</i>):			
	a. Was each respondent represented by counsel?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Name and business address of counsel:			
	(<i>If counsel is a lawyer, check here <input type="checkbox"/></i>)			
	b. Was respondent's counsel present at all open sessions of the board relating to that respondent?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	c. If military counsel was requested but not made available, is a copy (<i>or, if oral, a summary</i>) of the request and the action taken on it included in the report (<i>para 5-6b, AR 15-6</i>)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12	If the respondent challenged the legal advisor or any voting member for lack of impartiality (<i>para 5-7, AR 15-6</i>):			
	a. Was the challenge properly denied and by the appropriate officer?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	b. Did each member successfully challenged cease to participate in the proceedings?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13	Was the respondent given an opportunity to (<i>para 5-8a, AR 15-6</i>):			
	a. Be present with his counsel at all open sessions of the board which deal with any matter which concerns that respondent?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	b. Examine and object to the introduction of real and documentary evidence, including written statements?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	c. Object to the testimony of witnesses and cross-examine witnesses other than his own?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	d. Call witnesses and otherwise introduce evidence?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	e. Testify as a witness?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	f. Make or have his counsel make a final statement or argument (<i>para 5-9, AR 15-6</i>)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14	If requested, did the recorder assist the respondent in obtaining evidence in possession of the Government and in arranging for the presence of witnesses (<i>para 5-8b, AR 15-6</i>)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15	Are all of the respondent's requests and objections which were denied indicated in the report of proceedings or in an inclosure or exhibit to it (<i>para 5-11, AR 15-6</i>)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FOOTNOTES: ^{1/} Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet.				
^{2/} Use of the N/A column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation or board.				

SECTION IV - FINDINGS (para 3-10, AR 15-6)

The (investigating officer) (board) , having carefully considered the evidence, finds:

See attached report.

SECTION V - RECOMMENDATIONS (para 3-11, AR 15-6)

In view of the above findings, the (investigating officer) (board) recommends:

See attached report.

Approved for Release

SECTION VI - AUTHENTICATION (para 3-17, AR 15-6)

THIS REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS IS COMPLETE AND ACCURATE. (If any voting member or the recorder fails to sign here or in Section VII below, indicate the reason in the space where his signature should appear.)



JEFFREY L. HARRIGAN, Maj Gen, USAF

(Investigating Officer) (President)

(Recorder)

(Member)

(Member)

(Member)

(Member)

SECTION VII - MINORITY REPORT (para 3-13, AR 15-6)

To the extent indicated in Inclosure _____, the undersigned do(es) not concur in the findings and recommendations of the board. (In the inclosure, identify by number each finding and/or recommendation in which the dissenting member(s) do(es) not concur. State the reasons for disagreement. Additional/substitute findings and/or recommendations may be included in the inclosure.)

(Member)

(Member)

SECTION VIII - ACTION BY APPOINTING AUTHORITY (para 2-3, AR 15-6)

The findings and recommendations of the (investigating officer) (board) are (approved) (disapproved) (approved with following exceptions/substitutions). (If the appointing authority returns the proceedings to the investigating officer or board for further proceedings or corrective action, attach that correspondence (or a summary, if oral) as a numbered inclosure.)

See attached memorandum.

Approved for Release



UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101


6 August 2014

CCCC-CCC

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Approval Action - DA Form 1574, Section VIII, Army Regulation 15-6 Report of Proceedings by Investigating Officer into the Fixed Wing Close Air Support Airstrike, 9 June 2014 (S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO)

1. (U) This memorandum completes DA Form 1574, Section VIII, Action By Appointing Authority.
2. (U) I have reviewed the enclosed ROI, dated 5 August 2014, prepared by Maj Gen Jeffrey L. Harrigian, the appointed Investigating Officer (IO).
3. (U) The IO's findings are (select one):
 - a. AM Approved.
 - b. _____ Disapproved.
 - c. _____ Approved subject to the changes noted in the attached memorandum.
4. (U) The IO's recommendations are (select one):
 - a. AM Approved.
 - b. _____ Disapproved.
 - c. _____ Approved subject to the changes noted in the attached memorandum.
5. (U) _____ This investigation is returned for further investigation or correction in accordance with the attached memorandum.


LLOYD J. AUSTIN, III
General, U.S. Army

Encl
As stated

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

Approved for Release

~~(S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Fixed Wing Close Air Support Airstrike In the Vicinity of
Arghandab, Afghanistan on 9 June 2014 - Event Log
All times ZULU

13JUN2014

1500: Team members (Maj Gen Harrigian, [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)]) arrive in Doha, Qatar.
Met by [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] for pickup and transported to Al Udeid.

14JUN2014

0430: Initial arrival @ CFH.

0500: Brief meeting for investigation parameters and deliverables. (Maj Gen Harrigian, [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)])
[redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)]

0630: Arrival of [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] (B1 SME) @ CFH

0730: Evidence delivered to investigation team, rec'd by [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] delivered by [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)]
[redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)]

0745: ~~(S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Began review of evidence and timeline details. Reviewed
targeting pod video of airstrike from [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)]

1500: Sharepoint site created for data collection

15JUN2014

0445: Rec'd/Reviewed USFOR-A/ISAF Org structures and C2

0800: ~~(S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Reviewed extended [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] targeting pod video.

1445: ~~(S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Initiated Falcon View system to sync plot locations with
[redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] targeting pod video and radio transmissions.

1830: [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] arrived @ CFH. Investigation team is complete and in
place.

1925: Reviewed targeting pod strike video for [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)]

16JUN2014

0450Z: Aircrew interview preparation and discussion.

1000Z: Interview and statement taken from [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] (Left Seat
Pilot/Aircraft Commander).

1220Z: Interview and statement taken from [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] (Right Seat Co-Pilot).

1420Z: Interview and statement taken from [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] (Offensive
Systems Officer).

1610Z: Interview and statement taken from [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] (Defensive Systems
Officer).

17JUN2014

0815Z: Aircraft 86-111 released to 379 EMXG for functional checks. Aircraft forms returned.

0830Z: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (Ground Liaison Officer)
1120Z: Received signed statement from [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)
1220Z: Team departs Al Udeid for Kandahar Air Field
1655Z: Team arrives Kandahar Air Field
1715Z: (~~S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO~~) Interview prep study on [redacted] (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g

18JUN2014

0425Z: Team departs Kandahar Air Field for FOB [redacted] (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g
0510Z: Team arrives at FOB [redacted] (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g and receives inbrief
0730Z: Interview and statement taken from [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (ODA [redacted] (b)(3)(b)(6) GFC).
1025Z: Evidence collection from [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), rec'd by [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)
1035Z: Interview and statement taken from [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (ODA [redacted] (b)(3)(b)(6) Team Sgt)
1155Z: Interview and statement taken from [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (ODA [redacted] (b)(3)(b)(6))
1230Z: Interview and statement taken from [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (ODA [redacted] (b)(3)(b)(6))
1305Z: Interview and statement taken from [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (ODA [redacted] (b)(3)(b)(6) QRF)
1320Z: Interview and statement taken from [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (ODA [redacted] (b)(3)(b)(6))
1430Z: Interview and statement taken from [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (SOT-A @ [redacted] (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g)
1525Z: Interview and statement taken from [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (EOD Team Leader)

19JUN2014

0450Z: Depart FOB [redacted] (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g for incident area overflight.
0530Z: Return to FOB [redacted] (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g
0715Z: Interview with incident medevac team [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)
0825Z: Interview and statement taken from [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (FST at [redacted] (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g)
0930Z: Interview and statement taken from [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (TF [redacted] (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g at [redacted] (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g)
1015Z: Interview and statement taken from [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (TF [redacted] (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g at [redacted] (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g)
1040Z: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (TF [redacted] (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g Machine Gunner at [redacted] (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g)
1300Z: Interview and statement taken from [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g Uplift ??CDR??)
1425Z: Depart FOB [redacted] (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g for Kandahar Air Field
1505Z: Arrive at Kandahar Air Field
1650Z: Interview and statement taken from [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (SOTF JOC Battle Captain)
1705Z: Evidence collected from [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6), rec'd by [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)
1705Z: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (SOTF JOC FSO)
1720Z: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (SOTF JOC Battle NCO)
1730Z: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (SOTF-S OPCEN DIR)
1745Z: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (SOTF-S JOC)
1800Z: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Operations Officer, KAF Mortuary
1905Z: Initial notification of IR strobe/aircraft sensor disconnect sent to MG Lofgren (AFCENT CD) with wording recommendation for Flight Crew Information File (FCIF).

20JUN2014

0035Z: Wording approved for FCIF covering friendly identification capabilities.
0330Z: Depart Kandahar Air Field for extended incident area overflight.
0640Z: Return to Kandahar Air Field.
0845Z: Depart Kandahar Air Field for Bagram Air Field.
1120Z: Interview and statement taken from [redacted] (JTAC for ODA [redacted])
1430Z: Evidence collected from [redacted], rec'd by [redacted]
1530Z: Interview with [redacted] (AC-130 Pilot – IRT [redacted])
1530Z: Evidence collected from [redacted], rec'd by [redacted]
1625Z: Interview with [redacted] ([redacted] Commander)

21JUN2014

0735Z: Depart Bagram Air Field for Camp Integrity.
0755Z: Arrive at Camp Integrity
0925Z: FCIF 14-05B (Friendly Identification Capabilities) pushed to all aircrew.
1100Z: Update brief w/ BG Schwartz (SOJTF DCG-O)
1500Z: Update brief w/ MG Reeder

22JUN2014

0540Z: Initial draft of Red Stripe notification sent to MG Colt.
0640Z: Depart Camp Integrity for Bagram Air Field
0705Z: Arrive at Bagram Air Field
0905Z: Depart Bagram Air Field for Al Udeid Air Base
0950Z: Received confirmation of A/C 86-111 Sniper pod functional check and BitLog.
1235Z: Arrive at Al Udeid Air Base
2355Z: Action items/investigation update sent to Gen Austin

23JUN2014

0430Z: Begin construction of incident narrative.
1325Z: Aircraft 86-111 released for use per MG Harrigan upon review of functional check and Bit Log review.
1500Z: Tour of B1 cockpit and aircraft familiarization at 379 EAMXS

24JUN2014

0430Z: Continued construction of incident narrative and statement refinement.
0600Z: Phone interview conducted with [redacted] (EBS Flight Surgeon)
0715Z: Meeting for [redacted] strike video and incident overview with BG Darren Hartford (379 AEW/CC).
0825Z: Approved Red Stripe received from ISAF CJ3.

25JUN2014

0110Z: Transcript received from (b)(3), (b)(6) mIRC chat.
0500Z: Incident narrative refinement and statement finalizing begins.
1300Z: Transcription for (b)(3), (b)(6) strike video begins.
1355Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) aircrew medical and training records reviewed.
1205Z: Duplication of evidence given to Army Safety Center team (maps, ops papers).
1320Z: Transfer of evidence to Army Safety Center team. (RMM/Medical Records).
1340Z: Ground forces statements dispersed for signature.

26JUN2014

0500Z: Continued narrative construction and dictation of facts.
1205Z: Aircrew statements dispersed for signature.

27JUN2014

0450Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) video transcription continued.
0500Z: Investigation team begins review of findings of fact.
0905Z: Findings of fact board editing begins.
1910Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) video delivered to team

28JUN2014

0500Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) video reviewed for narrative timeline
0710Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) video reviewed for narrative timeline
0810Z: Technical findings of fact split from event narrative, editing begins.
0830Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) stride video transcription complete
1130Z: Visit/interviews with (b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g

29JUN2014

Day off
0940Z: First draft of report narrative completed

30JUN2014

0430Z: Writing for investigation recommendations
0710Z: Evidence/exhibits scanned into digital files
0825Z: Report V2 completed
1105Z: CAOC Walkthrough
1320Z: Phone interview with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3)(b)(6) prior JTAC)
1435Z: Phone interview with (b)(3), (b)(6) (JTAC Instructor)
1655Z: Report V3 completed

1JUL2014

0440Z: Edit board for recommendations
0505Z: Construction of presentation
0715Z: Evidence consolidated and sorted for citation
1420Z: Cited Arghandab polling station post-op security
1630Z: Walkthrough/interview with (b)(3), (b)(6) Air Control Center
1955Z: Report V4 completed

2JUL2014

0455Z: (b)(3), (b)(6) video reviewed for editing time stamps
0550Z: Report V5 completed
0600Z: Report review board
1110Z: Sniper Pod video editing started at AFFOR/PA office
1535Z: Report V6 completed

3JUL2014

0440Z: Citation board started
0555Z: Report V7 completed
0830Z: Sniper Pod video editing completed

4JUL2014

0515Z: Report V8 completed
0520Z: Presentation edit board

5JUL2014

0045Z: Report V9 completed
0450Z: Presentation observations and recommendations started
0755Z: Incident timeline review
1020Z: Timeline/report review

6JUL2014

0520Z: Appendix refinement and final report editing

7JUL2014

1415Z: Team departs Al Udeid Air Base

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Key Players Interviewed

Aircrew	Unit	Position	Call Sign	Sworn Statement	Interview Date
	EBS	Left Seat Pilot / Aircraft Commander		X	16-Jun-2014
	EBS	Right Seat Pilot		X	16-Jun-2014
(b)(3), (b)(6)	EBS	Offensive Systems Officer	(b)(3), (b)(6)	X	16-Jun-2014
	EBS	Defensive Systems Officer		X	16-Jun-2014


Ground/Response Forces At Site	Unit	Position	Call Sign	Sworn Statement	Interview Date
	ODA (b)(3)(b)(6)	Ground Forces Commander		X	18-Jun-2014
	(b)(3)(b)(6) STS	Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	X	20-Jun-2014
	ODA	Team Sergeant		X	18-Jun-2014
	ODA	Medic		X	18-Jun-2014
	ODA	Communications / SOTAC		X	18-Jun-2014
	ODA	Quick Response Force Lead	(b)(3), (b)(6)	X	18-Jun-2014
(b)(3), (b)(6)	ODA (b)(3)(b)(6)	Quick Response Force Team Sergeant		X	18-Jun-2014
	ODA	SOT-A		X	18-Jun-2014
	ODA	Explosive Ordnance Disposal		X	18-Jun-2014
	ODA	Medic		X	19-Jun-2014
	BCT	TF 1.4a, (b)(1) Element Leader		X	19-Jun-2014
	BCT	TF 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g		X	19-Jun-2014
	(b)(3), (b)(6) BCT	TF 1.4a, (b)(1) Machine Gunner		X	19-Jun-2014
	BCT	CASEVAC Response Team	(b)(3), (b)(6)		19-Jun-2014

Support Elements/Oversight	Unit	Position	Call Sign	Sworn Statement	Interview Date
	(b)(3), (b)(6) BCT	TF 1.4a, (b)(1) Commander			19-Jun-2014
	CAOC	Ground Liaison Officer			17-Jun-2014
	SOTF-S	JOC Battle Captain			19-Jun-2014
	SOTF-S	Fire Support Officer			19-Jun-2014
	SOTF-S	JOC Battle NCO			19-Jun-2014
	SOTF-S	OPCEN Director			19-Jun-2014
(b)(3), (b)(6)	SOTF-S	JOC SEL			19-Jun-2014
	CJSOAC	AC-130 SME			20-Jun-2014
	CJSOAC	Crewmembers	(b)(3), (b)(6)	X	20-Jun-2014
	21 STS	Commander			20-Jun-2014
	717 EASOS	Commander	(b)(3), (b)(6)		28-Jun-2014
	71 EACS	Commander			1-Jul-2014

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(b)(1), 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g



AGENDA

- CONOP
- Mission Planning / Preparation
- Execution
- Post Strike
- Observations
- Recommendations

Maj Gen Jeff Harrigian

Pages 23 through 28 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g
(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b)(5), (b)(6)

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Questions

0062 - 08/14/28

UNCLASSIFIED



USCENTCOM FOIA 14-0253

0063 - 08/14/19

Approved for Release

Backups

Pages 31 through 34 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g

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Approved for Release

SSG Jason McDonald - (b)(3)(b)(6) 18B

- 28 yrs old
- From Columbus, GA
- Enlisted May 2004
- 4th Deployment
- Survived by wife and two daughters

Biography

SSG Jason McDonald

SSG McDonald, 28, was born December 18, 1985 in Columbus, Georgia. He joined the Army in May of 2004, attending Basic training at Ft Benning, GA. After graduation he attended Airborne Training and was then assigned to Charlie Company, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment where he served as a grenadier, later deploying in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM from May 2005 to September 2005 and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM from March 2006 to July 2006 and December 2006 to April 2007. He was then assigned to A Company, 2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment as a rifleman. In 2008, SSG McDonald volunteered to become a Special Forces Soldier. He attended the Special Forces Qualification Course, graduating as a Special Forces Weapons Sergeant (18B), at Fort Bragg, NC in March 2012. He was assigned to Special Forces Operational Detachment – (b)(3)(b)(6), Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Campbell, KY later deploying in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM assigned to Special Operations Task Force – South in January of 2014. SSG McDonald's military education includes Warrior Leaders Course, Advanced Leaders Course, Infantry Mortar Leaders Course, Basic Airborne Course, Special Forces Qualification Course, Ranger Course, Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) School, and the Combat Life Savers Course. SSG McDonald's Awards and decorations include the Army Commendation Medal, Army Achievement Medal, Good Conduct Medal (3rd award), National Defense Service Medal, Afghanistan Campaign Medal with one Campaign Star, Iraq Campaign Medal with two Campaign Stars, Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, and Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Ribbon with numeral two device, Army Service Ribbon, Combat Infantryman Badge, Expert Infantryman Badge, Parachutist Badge, Special Forces Tab, Ranger Tab and the Royal Netherlands Army Parachutist Badge. SSG McDonald died as a result of injuries sustained while conducting combat operations in Afghanistan on 9 June 2014. SSG McDonald is survived by his wife (b)(6)

SSG Scott Studenmund (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g 18X

- 24 yrs old
- From Pasadena, CA
- Enlisted Sept. 2009
- First deployment
- Survived by mother and father

Biography

SSG Scott Studenmund

SSG Studenmund, 24, was born in Pasadena, California on 26 June 1989. He Graduated from Flintridge Preparatory High School in La Canada Flintridge, California on 7 June 2008, later attending Pitzer College in Claremont, California from August of 2008 to December of 2008. He enlisted in the Army in September 2009 as an 18X. SSG Studenmund attended Basic Training at FT. Benning, GA and entered into the Special Forces Qualification Course in February 2010. SSG Studenmund graduated the Special Forces Qualification Course in September 2011 as an 18B Weapons Sergeant. His first assignment was to 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), FT. Campbell, Kentucky. Upon arrival to Bravo Company, SSG Studenmund served as a Weapons Sergeant on Special Forces Operational Detachment (b)(3)(b)(6). In January 2014 he started his first deployment to Afghanistan in support of ENDURING FREEDOM assigned to Special Operations Task Force - South. SSG Studenmund's Military Education Includes Special Force Qualification Course, Combat Diver Qualification Course, Special Operations Target Interdiction Course, Advanced Leaders Course, Warrior Leaders Course, Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) School, Basic Airborne Course and Light Wheeled Vehicle Operators Course. SSG Studenmund Awards and decorations include the Army Achievement Medal, Army Good Conduct Medal (1st Award), National Defense Service Medal, Afghanistan Campaign Medal with one Campaign Star, Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Ribbon with numeral two device, Army Service Ribbon, NATO Medal, Special Forces Tab, Combat Infantryman Badge, Expert Infantryman Badge, Parachutist Badge, Special Operations Divers Badge, and Marksmanship Qualification Badge Expert - Carbine. SSG Studenmund died as a result of injuries sustained while conducting combat operations in Afghanistan on 9 June 2014. He is survived by his father (b)(6) and his mother (b)(6).

SPC Justin Helton - EOD for (b)(3)(b)(6)

- 25 yrs old
- From Chillicothe, OH
- Enlisted May 2010
- 1st deployment
- Survived by mother, father, 2 brothers and 1 sister

Biography

SPC Justin Helton

SPC Justin R. Helton, 25, was born on August 10, 1988 in Chillicothe, Ohio where he graduated from Eastern High School in Beaver, OH in 2007. SPC Helton enlisted in the Army in May 2010 as an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Specialist and attended Basic Combat Training (BCT) at Ft. Jackson, SC. After completing BCT, SPC Helton was stationed at Redstone Arsenal, AL for the first phase of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) School where he graduated in September 2010. SPC Helton was then stationed at Eglin AFB, FL where he completed the second phase of EOD School in July 2011. His first assignment was to the 18th OD CO (EOD), 192nd OD BN (EOD), 52nd OD Group (EOD), Fort Bragg, NC where he was assigned as an EOD Team Member. In 2014 SPC Helton was deployed to Afghanistan in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM where he served as an EOD Team Member. SPC Helton's military education includes Explosive Ordnance Disposal Course, Warrior Leader Course, Combat Life Saver Course, Global Antiterrorism and Operational Readiness Course, and the Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms Homemade Explosives Course. His awards and decorations include the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Badge – Basic, Army Good Conduct Medal (1st Award), National Defense Service Medal, Afghanistan Campaign Medal with one Campaign Star, Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, Army Service Ribbon, Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Ribbon, NATO Medal, and Marksmanship Qualification Badge – Carbine. SPC Justin R. Helton died as a result of injuries sustained while conducting combat operations in Afghanistan on 9 June 2014. He is survived by his father (b)(6), his mother (b)(6), and his two brothers and sister.

CPL Justin Clouse - TF (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g

- 22 yrs old
- From Spokane, WA
- Joined in Feb 2012
- 2nd Deployment
- Survived by mother, father, and brother

Biography

CPL Justin Clouse

CPL Justin Clouse was born on September 12th, 1991 in Spokane, Washington. He graduated from Sprague High School in 2010 and enlisted as an Infantryman in the United States Army in February of 2012. That June, following his completion of Basic Training and Advanced Individual Training at Fort Benning, Georgia, he reported to Fort Carson, Colorado where he was assigned as a Rifleman for Apache Company, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment and deployed to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. In July of 2013, he was assigned as an Assistant Gunner to Dagger Company. In October of 2013, prior to attending the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California, CPL Clouse completed the Army's Advanced Situational Awareness Training Course, and in February of 2014, he deployed for a second time to Afghanistan, as a Team Leader. His awards and decorations include the Bronze Star Medal (Posthumous), the Army Commendation Medal (1OLC), the Army Achievement Medal, the Army Good Conduct Medal (Posthumous), the National Defense Service Medal, the Afghanistan Campaign Medal w/ Campaign Star, the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, the Army Service Ribbon, the NATO Medal, and the Combat Infantryman's Badge. CPL Clouse is survived by his mother, (b)(6), his father, (b)(6), and his brother, (b)(6).

PFC Aaron Toppen - TF (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g

- 19 yrs old
- From Hazel Crest, IL
- Enlisted July 2013
- First deployment
- Survived by mother and two sisters

Biography

PFC Aaron Toppen

PFC Aaron Toppen was born on September 28th, 1994 in Hazel Crest, Illinois. He attended Lincoln-Way East High School and subsequently enlisted as an Infantryman in the United States Army in July of 2013. That November, following his completion of Basic Training and Advanced Individual Training at Fort Benning, Georgia, he reported to Fort Carson, Colorado where he was assigned to Dagger Company, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment. In March of 2014, he deployed as an Assistant Gunner to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. His awards and decorations include the Bronze Star Medal (Posthumous), the Army Commendation Medal (Posthumous), the Army Good Conduct Medal (Posthumous), the National Defense Service Medal, the Afghanistan Campaign Medal w/ Campaign Star, the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, the Army Service Ribbon, the NATO Medal, and the Combat Infantryman's Badge (Posthumous). PFC Toppen is survived by his mother, (b)(6), and his sisters, (b)(6).



APPENDIX B - SWORN STATEMENTS

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Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION CENTCOM FORWARD HQ, AL UDEID AB, QATAR	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2014/06/16	3. TIME 1000Z	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (b)(3), (b)(6)			
9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:			
(b)(3), (b)(6)			

I didn't have any issues or concerns when I went in for the mission brief. There were no scheduling issues, but it wasn't our full normal crew. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I are part of that normal four man crew. (b)(3), (b)(6) was just with us for this mission. I had enough rest and had taken one "go pill" before going kinetic. I also took one after the (b)(3), (b)(6) tasking.

Our mission brief was at 1015. The mission planning cell briefed Intel and CONOPS. The Ground Liaison Officer (GLO) gave us a standard brief. He did a tactical overview, gave us updated information, and some ongoing issues. We went over the tanker rendezvous, and discussed the sequence of expected mission events. We went through the battle schemes and the daily SPINs. We briefed crew coordination, using the last page of the Tiger Standards in the smart pack--a squadron standard. We went through all phases of flight.

We have Words to Honor in the cockpit. Some are standard, like "withhold," "level off," and "turn." Others are specific and added on for the mission.

There were some Special Interest Items (SIIs). We talked about Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) sensitivity and the rescinding of the rudder shaker FCIF. We didn't brief anything specific on Close Air Support (CAS). We have daily briefs in the squadron on Lessons Learned and that slide stays up for 30 days. Tiger Tactics are briefed once a month. There was a standard weather brief--humidity, moon illumination, etc. It was nothing unusual.

I was familiar with the mission objectives. It was a helo INFIL/EXFIL. There were three helicopter landing zones (HLZs). There was a moderate threat to the ground force. They had been taking indirect fire and dealing with IEDs for about seven months. There were hot and cold spots of activity. We've supported a handful of these SOTF ops and this one appeared normal, it seemed like the standard vetted plan.

When in the cockpit, the pilot and the Weapons Systems Officers (WSO) can't see each other. We have a touch screen laptop that has a screen share repeater to the WSO's screen. We have the pod video up and moving map on about two thirds of the screen. The other third is messages and a keyboard. The HLZs were already in the computer with the points that the GLO put in for us.

We had a slightly late takeoff because we had to go to a spare jet. The jet we ended up on was fine. It flew Code 1 on the previous flight. When we made contact and checked in with (b)(3), (b)(6) I was updated with the situation. It seemed like a standard JTAC situation update, and (b)(3), (b)(6) maintained that friendlies were located within (b)(3), (b)(6) meters of the three HLZs. (b)(3), (b)(6), the Ground Forces Commander (GFC), was expecting (b)(3), (b)(6) EXFIL. There was no hostile activity at the time, though he did report that they had taken some enemy fire around (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. The comms weren't great. There was a ridge that was impacting our

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CENTCOM FWD HQ DATED 2014/06/16

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

communications with (b)(3), (b)(6) on the East side of our wheel, and we were on FM. When it started to get dark, we put on our night vision goggles (NVGs).

As usual, we found the friendly forces (FF) locations, and slew the pod to them. I understood all of the FF to be within (b)(4a), (b)(1)1.4g meters of the HLZs. The HLZs were preloaded in our systems, so we used the grids passed by (b)(3), (b)(6) to cross-check and correlate. (b)(3), (b)(6) was doing almost all of the flying. I was trying to manage situational awareness (SA) for the crew.

I was in the left seat in a right wheel turn so I can see through about half the windscreen. (b)(3), (b)(6) was focused on getting the pod on the friendlies while (b)(3), (b)(6) was trying to get the POIs into the system, putting waypoints into two different systems. For the majority of missions when the other pilot is flying, I'm talking about what we want to do and look at. When the WSO is moving the pod, we're looking for friendlies solely relying on the pod; I'm usually clearing visually and looking at FalconView and not relying exclusively on the pod.

When reports of enemy fire and three possible enemy locations (EL) came out, (b)(3), (b)(6) started scanning with the pod, focusing on the possible ELs with the coordinates he'd gotten from the ground. (b)(3), (b)(6) was telling us about the scan he was doing, and the front station was trying to correlate their visual with the pod. Eventually we came to the conclusion that there was nothing significant at the three possible ELs.

About 30 minutes later, some pop shots were reported from the ground. We got the coords, scanned in the area, and we saw some muzzle flashes. At that point I started checking through options for the plane and thinking through possible scenarios. I considered the possibility of a Show of Force (SoF), requested a lower block, calculated fuel, and other things that pertain to the aircraft. I have a sense that something tactical is going to happen. We heard "effective enemy fire" reported from the ground, but we hadn't yet positively identified the FF or the ELs. We were looking for a built up defensive FF position, possibly a three to five man team.

When the different azimuths and distances came out, there wasn't confusion in the cockpit. We didn't get the sense that we were correcting the JTAC on enemy fire locations. We were just calling out to them what we were seeing--confirming locations. At this point I saw no reason to think there were friendlies anywhere other than where they were initially briefed -- within (b)(4a), (b)(1)1.4g meters of the HLZs. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g But we adjusted the frag and confirmed that we'd use a low-collateral damage weapon for the distance.

I wasn't directly involved with the (b)(1)1.4(a), (b)(4a), (b)(1)1.4g (b)(3), (b)(6) was looking out the window, correlating the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g frag from the pod to the muzzle flashes. At this point, we were discussing the option of whether or not we want to drop the bombs, and confirming the location where we would do so. We're constantly sanitizing the area, checking carefully for IR strobes. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g but we never saw a strobe -- and we know the difference between a strobe and muzzle flash. We never saw a strobe in that area of interest until 8 minutes after the drop, and I think it was a ground element doing the BDA. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I never visually acquired IR strobes in the target area, through the NVGs, also.

When the 9-line is passed, the stress level definitely goes up. We could hear the inflection in the JTAC's voice, he sounded tense and the amount of fire appeared continuous. With the escalation that was happening, a Show of Force was no longer an option, but we could not verify two separate sets of muzzle flashes. We heard a plot of FF location come out (b)(4a), (b)(1)1.4g meters west, and I can only speculate on what that meant. I thought maybe they had fired and maneuvered to another location. At any rate, I assumed it meant that the nearest FF location was at (b)(4a), (b)(1)1.4g meters. We're running through options, (b)(3), (b)(6) said that he wanted the enemy location "surpressed" and I was developing COAs and weaponing and thinking through the ROE although this wasn't verbalized on the tape.

We are following our standards in plotting and going through release criteria. The request we got for the original Time on Target (ToT) was (b)(4a), (b)(1)1.4g but that eventually changed. The request for 2X (b)(4a), (b)(1)1.4g didn't bother the crew. With a FF position of (b)(4a), (b)(1)1.4g meters away, there was enough space -- (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Also, dropping two bombs is common; it's the usual request. It's very common for a SOF commander to double tap, so to speak, with two bombs.

The system issue we encountered did cause a delay, but it wasn't a malfunction or degradation in capability. The system wasn't allowing the WSOs to load the bomb pattern into the system correctly without inputting them separately. It required more "hand-jamming." At this point there was some continued discussion about the FF positions. Whenever it was brought up, we would make another query to the ground; we were seriously busy in the jet. (b)(3), (b)(6) is flying, I am backing everyone up, and ensuring ops are going correctly. (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) are working the weapons issues.

The situation on the ground was sounding escalatory and I was trying to expedite getting the bombs of the jet. We changed from Bomb-on-Target to Bomb-on-Coordinate because we were having trouble allocating the correct weapons to the coordinates of the EL. So we just cut to a direct coordinate, locked it in, and then there were no more changes. We weren't seeing muzzle flashes at this point, but we were still scanning for IR strobes. When we got a flat field of view, about (b)(4a), (b)(1)1.4g miles from the target, I was looking

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

No one ever re-engaged the JTAC just before the release to ask him if they were still taking fire on the ground. We had been having so many comm problems; we didn't want another dry pass (and loss of life) due to not receiving a "cleared hot" call. We didn't feel rushed once we were on approach. I've never personally relayed clearance through another aircraft before and I was comfortable with this course-of-action because I didn't want any lives lost on the ground and I knew (b)(3), (b)(6) wouldn't call "cleared hot" until he received our inbound call (through (b)(3), (b)(6)).

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(b), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(b), (b)(7)(c) We understood that we had no Afghan National Army personnel or blocking sites on that ridgeline.

We eventually did see IR strobes after the impact. It was about (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g. It looked like a ground search party.

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6) (Signature)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) USA
(b)(3), (b)(6)
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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SWORN STATEMENT

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION CENTCOM FORWARD HQ, AL UDEID AB, QATAR	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2014/06/16	3. TIME 1220Z	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (b)(3), (b)(6)			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

the other officers the best view possible. It was a slightly non-standard crew makeup--three of us normally fly together and (b)(3), (b)(6) was added on for this mission. We have Words to Honor in the cockpit, and they are briefed every time. There weren't any non-standard scheduling issues, and I had enough rest. I've participated in one other kinetic op on this deployment, which was a Joint Targeting Message (JTM).

In the mission brief, it seemed like this would be a typical sortie. There is no such thing as a "standard" mission, but this one didn't seem out of the ordinary. Nothing stuck out as unusual from the CONOP, but there were a lot of unknowns. We take lessons learned seriously, and those were briefed prior to our mission. We discussed the possible locations of friendly forces (FF) in detail. The Ground Liaison Officer (GLO) was very brief concerning this CONOP. It seemed like "business as usual."

The friendly HLZ locations were preloaded on our laptop, but they changed during the mission. I don't remember if the laptop was updated with different locations later. I don't think the possible enemy locations were marked on the laptop (b)(3), (b)(6) initially stated that all friendlies were within 4.5 meters of the HLZs, and that stuck out at me.

The FM comms were unusually bad on this mission, and there were periods where we couldn't communicate with the JTAC at all. I scanned the area with night vision goggles (NVGs) intermittently between flying and keeping the plane in orbit.

When we were given possible enemy ranges, we slewed the pod to check. When we are in support of a ground operation, the JTAC owns the sensor.

Potential ranges for enemy fire were relayed from the (b)(3), (b)(6) I was flying and taking in the dynamic information from multiple locations. In the cockpit, we were trying to figure out where this effective fire was coming from. We were trying to correlate the effective fire (b)(3), (b)(6) was relaying thru estimate ranges, with the muzzle flashes we were seeing on the ground. I was not wearing my helmet, but I was using hand-held NVGs when looking at the ground.

I could see a lot of muzzle flashes, and they were at the (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) location, which (b)(3), (b)(6) confirmed as the effective fire location. I did not see any infrared (IR) strobes through my NVGs prior to the weapons drop. Some time after weapons impact, I did see an IR strobe in a different location from weapons impact. We were getting the sense that things were getting hectic for (b)(3), (b)(6) Within the cockpit, we were listening and letting the WSOs do their job.

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(b), (b)(7)(c)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CENTCOM FWD HQ DATED 2014/06/16

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(b), (b)(7)(c)

Using two CBI's, it didn't seem out of place. That's what the JTAC wanted. If the request for munitions wouldn't have made sense for the circumstance, I would have pushed back. (b)(7)(b), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(7)(b), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(b), (b)(7)(c)

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INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CENTCOM FWD HQ DATED 2014/06/16

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) USA
(b)(3), (b)(6)
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this ___ day of ___ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION CENTCOM FORWARD HQ, AL UDEID AB, QATAR	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2014/06/16	3. TIME 1420Z	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(b)(3), (b)(6)

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

systems. I had a normal amount of crew rest prior to the sortie and was mentally and physically prepared for the mission.

We have Words to Honor in the cockpit. There is a standard list, and in our mission brief we may get a few more. There's no question when a Word to Honor is voiced in the jet. Pilots also have a consent switch in the front that can override a weapon drop.

During the pre-mission brief, the Ground Liaison Officer (GLO) gave us a quick rundown, including the friendly forces composition; he briefed primarily off the map page, which was page 2 in the CONOP brief. We knew it was an EXFIL mission, meaning we would arrive on station to provide overwatch prior to the exfiltration of the ground force. We were not briefed on enemy positions, but were given a general overview of the enemy threats. I don't recall any specific brief on close air support (CAS) for this mission. I don't remember if the Helicopter Landing Zone (HLZ) coordinates were preloaded into our systems, but if I remember right (b)(3), (b)(6) I loaded all three of the HLZ positions into the (b)(1)1.4a system.

Upon our initial contact with (b)(3), (b)(6), we heard him and (b)(3), (b)(6) talking about passing us coordinates where friendlies had received fire from. I slewed the sensor to at least one of the HLZ and the coordinates matched our products and the passed grid. (b)(1)1.4g I don't remember if we put the friendly locations in the laptop, but looking at the waypoints in the sensor showed us where the HLZs were.

We can move to an offensive or defensive scan, depending on the request from the JTAC or the situation. We generally slew the pod to the coordinates if they are confirmed. (b)(7)(b), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(7)(b), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(b), (b)(7)(c) We saw friendlies at one of the HLZs; (b)(1)1.4a

When (b)(3), (b)(6) reported that the friendlies at (b)(1)1.4g were taking fire, the Defensive Systems Officer (DSO) put the coordinates into the system, marked it as waypoint 8, then we stayed glued to the screen. We confirmed it with (b)(3), (b)(6) and were comfortable that this was a friendly location. I do not recall seeing any infrared (IR) strobes. We froze the frag circle to the friendly location, and then scanned for enemy forces around this location. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g I didn't think the JTAC himself was at the (b)(1)1.4g location; it seemed he was somewhere else and at one point he mentioned being about a km away. At this point we are still just building the picture of the battlefield. In the cockpit, nobody saw any IR strobes. When I saw muzzle flashes on the ridge, the pod showed that they were approximately (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g from the previously identified friendly location.

When the JTAC confirmed the distance of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g meters between the enemy and friendly locations, we discussed this distance in the cockpit, but only in reference to the fact that it was outside of danger close for the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g which is (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g meters.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CENTCOM FWD HQ DATED 2014/06/16

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

The DSO or I changed the frag circle to (b)(4a), (b)(6) meters to check this distance in the sensor with the friendly coordinates in the center.

Approved for Release

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREE THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION 379 AEW WING OPS CTR, AL UDEID AB, QATAR	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2014/06/27	3. TIME 1830Z	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (b)(3), (b)(6)			
9.			

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

This statement is in regards to the CDI requesting more information on "the problems that resulted in the delay & multiple passes during the engagement [it was not covered in detail during the interview and I don't want to speculate from the pod and CFM]."

1. I was under the impression that the 9-line was a BOC since (b)(3), (b)(6) passed the CAT 1 10-digit grid, so initially we were setting up for a BOC.
2. After I confirmed with (b)(3), (b)(6) that it was a BOT, the hand jamming had to start over to set up a target shell for the BOT.
3. I input the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g wasn't accepted by the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
4. The 9-line was later changed back to a BOC so the hand jamming had to be re-accomplished for 2 target shells.
5. Degraded radio communication with (b)(3), (b)(6) and relaying radio transmissions through (b)(3), (b)(6) also caused delays.

Approved for Release

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT (b)(3), (b)(6) DATED 2014/06/27

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Approved for Release

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT (b)(3), (b)(6) DATED 2014/06/27

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION CENTCOM CFH, AL UDEID AIR BASE, QATAR	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2014/06/14	3. TIME 1610Z	4. FILE NUMBER
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5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)
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8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(b)(3), (b)(6), USAF

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

We have a standard set of "Words to Honor" in the cockpit. Anyone can say them, and everyone abides by them. On this sortie I was the Defensive Systems Officer (DSO). My primary responsibility is to defend the jet. In short, my primary responsibilities are data entry into the avionics system and targeting pod, and inputting munitions data into the weapons pages, aligning them to the grids. I would have been the Offensive Systems Officer (OSO) on this mission, but decided to switch with (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(b), (b)(7)(c) (??name??) briefed the mission, and there was nothing out of the ordinary about the mission parameters. It was a standard op--overwatch during an exfil. The Ground Liaison Officer (GLO) didn't brief anything out of the ordinary. There was nothing brought up about possible enemies or enemy positions. I had no concerns prior to takeoff. Additionally, there were no problems with the jet we eventually taxied in.

Our first situation update with (b)(3), (b)(6) indicated that there were 3 Helo Landing Zones (HLZ) in the area. We were given the coordinates of the three groups of friendly forces, and those locations were preloaded in the jet's avionics system and into the targeting pod, but we did not verify the positions via the targeting pod. We have huge faith in the coordinates given to us by the Joint Terminal Air Controller (JTAC), so actually verifying that friendlies are located at this grid is not as important as searching for attackers. At this point we are not aware of any other intel or threats.

(b)(3), (b)(6) reported a new friendly coordinate (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and that it was taking fire from several possible locations. We put the new friendly coordinate on the system and labeled it as a friendly force on both the Toughbook (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and targeting pod. Right

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(b), (b)(7)(c)

moving map. At some point it's good to do confirm coordination with the JTAC, and we accomplished that when we obtained (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g with (b)(3), (b)(6) in 9 line receipt, friendly forces are reported at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g meters west of the enemy coordinate. (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b)(7)(b), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b)(7)(b), (b)(7)(c)

10. EXHIBIT	(b)(3), (b)(6)	ALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CFH, AUAB, Qatar DATED 2014/06/17

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

In hindsight, it should have been.

The Mission Lead requested an elevation change, which I saw as great leadership initiative as it opened up our options. We could sense tension in the JTAC's voice and knew he was receiving effective fire. I think the pilots saw tracer fire and requested (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4g)

After I input the target coordinates from the 9 line, the OSO could slew the targeting pod. He went to targeting template (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4g) and could not get a good bomb on target solution. That's also why we went to bomb-on-coordinate rather than bomb-on-target. After the "9 line" is received, there was no discussion about whether it would be more appropriate to use a Show-of-Force rather than kinetic action. Once we saw the muzzle flashes firing we knew it was time to intervene. And because of known enemy TTPs, it seemed reasonable that they would be on that ridgeline and we would not have been too concerned about the varying range and bearing estimates from the JTAC as they often vary and, for example, we did not know if the JTAC had been using a lazer range finder.

We did not question the JTAC's request for 2X GBU (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4g) (it seemed appropriate, and we would not question the JTAC's choice of munition unless it was clearly inappropriate. Unless I'm in a weapons conservation mode, I'm probably going to give the JTAC what he asks for. After this (b)(3), (b)(6) confirmed the friendly location at (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4g) meters to the west--this was probably as he was marking the step off of his release criteria checklist. Comms were not great. We were making calls and not getting responses. Once the "9 line" came through, that became the focus.

IR strobes were discussed before the "9 line" came out. We never saw any strobes, and we (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4g) at least twice to walk the pilot's eyes onto the target location to look for IR strobes. (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4g). We primarily (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4g) verify this and confirm with the JTAC. We normally use IR strobes to a lesser extent. The JTAC's focus on IR strobes was moer than normal, but I'm not going to question the JTAC in a situation like this. I can hear the stress in his voice and see (b)(1), (b)(1.4a), (b)(1.4g) on the pod, so given the comms condition I'm not going to waste precious time questioning the informaion the JTAC is passing.

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b)(7)(b), (b)(7)(c)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Camp Alpha, Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2014/06/20
3. TIME: 1120Z
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: (b)(3), (b)(6)
6. SSN: (b)(3), (b)(6)
7. GRADE/STATUS: (b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: (b)(3), (b)(6)

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Reference attached statement (7 pages, titled "Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6) (JTAC for ODA (b)(3), (b)(6) to the Investigating Officer.")

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

10. EXHIBIT
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____
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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

[Redacted Statement Content]

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6) HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 7. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

Pages 24 through 31 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7)(b), (b)(7)(c)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION SOTF-S, FOB (b)(1) Afghanistan	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2014/06/18	3. TIME 0730Z	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (b)(3), (b)(6)			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

followed by a six week PMT at JTC, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. Calling for a MEDEVAC was the only training we conducted at PMT that addressed air-ground integration. The detachment had rotary wing training scheduled but was cancelled due to weather and asset constraints. The detachment deployed to Afghanistan on (b)(3), (b)(6), conducted our first Level 1 CONOP on (b)(3), (b)(6), and conducted our Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority (RIP/TOA) on (b)(3), (b)(6). Immediately following RIP/TOA, we began conducting operations to prepare for the elections. The enemy threat in this area was active from the beginning. We received accurate PKM and SAF from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g on the first mission. The Task Force does not have a dedicated partner force, so we worked with the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. We were partnered with the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g on this mission; we've operated with the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g previously and while they are not the best KANDAK operationally, we have the best relationship with them. Our ANA partners typically provide significant input on mission planning, but they do not always show up with the forces promised. On this mission, we planned and requested a Afghan National Army (ANA) force, but it showed up for the operation; this was not ideal, but the personnel were sufficient for the mission. This is typical with the ANA. Although (b)(3), (b)(6), our Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC), had just conducted his RIP/TOA and joined our detachment only about (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g hours before the start of this mission, he was fully integrated in the planning of the operation from the beginning. Our previous JTAC, (b)(3), (b)(6), recommended to his higher authority that he accompany (b)(3), (b)(6) on his first mission. I had learned a lot from (b)(3), (b)(6) and as the Ground Force Commander (GFC), I supported his recommendation to stay through (b)(3), (b)(6) first mission with the detachment, but that request was disapproved. The JTAC always has a sensor plan and intelligence also plays a big part. Together we work out effective blocking and Helicopter Landing Zones (HLZ) positions. Grid Reference Guides (GRG) are key for planning as well. The tactical plan is developed by the entire team and is vetted through the Team Sergeant, Intel Sergeant, JTAC, and myself. Prior to this mission, our detachment had only used Close Air Support (CAS) to conduct a "show of force" during other operations. Everyone on our detachment has a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. We requested a JFO, who carries (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g radio, but (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g was not able to support the request. Every location had (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g capability and both JTACs ((b)(3), (b)(6)) had (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g radios and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(3), (b)(6) was the primary JTAC for this mission, but (b)(3), (b)(6) was also SOTAC qualified. The KANDAK has a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g radios. My radio burned up/malfunctioned during this operation because of the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g but as the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g operate properly. The JTAC stayed next to me the entire day and throughout the entire operation.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) 26 JUN 14 (b)(3), (b)(6) 26 JUN 14

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIAL STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g DATED 2014/06/18

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. There were three HLZs, two of which were used by the blocking positions. Each blocking position had (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g team from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g team (ODA) with a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. From the main effort's initial infiltration position, it was about (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g kilometers to the exfiltration HLZ. The detachment took point due to the ANA's inability to move during periods of darkness. The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g positions provided overwatch while the ANA cleared the villages in the valley. At approximately (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g the ANA became stagnant and were hiding in the green zones. The detachment recommended to the ANA CDR to move positions and continue clearing further down the valley. (b)(3), (b)(6) position was (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g that we were not; we track enemy movement and possible positions (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. As we started moving to the exfiltration (EXFIL) locations, we followed the ANA through the village in order to avoid (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. There were (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g camps throughout the valley; we understand that the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g camps are used to harbor enemy and aid in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. The ANA claimed to have cleared the entire valley but our positions identified that they had cleared only half of the valley. According to the ANA CDR, that was as much clearance as they were going to conduct. We typically arrive at our EXFIL locations early. By late afternoon, we confirmed HLZs with the SOTF-S Air LNO. There was no early communication with CAS assets. There was some confusion with the EXFIL assets because we thought that we were receiving an AC-130, so the B1 was a surprise. As it started to get dark, we activated our IR strobes. All of the detachment members have IR strobes and are able to identify friendly locations by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g one another with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
 had identified (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g throughout the day and the ANA had taken pop shots into the mountains but nothing significant derived from their engagements. Each position marked frontline locations with IR strobe. The ANA went into the green zone and were ineffective. We were only able to clear about half of the valley because if this. We moved HLZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g about (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g meters due to brownout conditions at the original location. The Shaping Efforts (SE) began a sequential movement from their hilltops just prior to darkness. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(3), (b)(6) position, began movement first and began taking ineffective small arms fire after arriving at their HLZ position. Prior to this, all positions were instructed to turn on IR strobes in order to confirm friendly locations at the HLZs, it was confirmed multiple times. I had eyes on (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g until they moved into PZ posture; it took (b)(3), (b)(6) about (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g minutes to move down the hill. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) gave telephonic verification that they had their (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(3), (b)(6) element was in PZ posture they received pop shots from about (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g meters. The B1 (b)(3), (b)(6) was on station at this point. We could clearly hear the B1 in its orbit, but the enemy maintained its position, which was unusual. Typically the enemy moves to buildings as soon as they hear aircraft overhead. We saw rounds firing over the ridge, both to and from (b)(3), (b)(6) location. The enemy increased their fire and was doing so at night, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g I considered that they might had been foreign fighters from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g fighting in the town due to a local infighting with the Taliban leadership. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g rift between "the has beens," the locals who previously were in power, and the foreign fighters who recently came to the area and took over. During this time (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) were lining the ANA in chalk order for PZ posture, while the JTAC and I were about (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g feet away. Then the enemy fire got heavier; (b)(3), (b)(6) position was heavily engaged and (b)(3), (b)(6) reported that he was taking accurate and effective fire. We confirmed again that all positions had their IR strobes on. After (b)(3), (b)(6) was tasked to scan the area for enemy positions and friendly grids had been passed up, (b)(3), (b)(6) said that "we have PID" (positive identification) of the enemy position and (b)(3), (b)(6) confirmed that he was at his PZ location. (b)(3), (b)(6) position was aggressive with returning fire and my element saw that they were taking fire from at least two separate locations, one from the village to the east (b)(3), (b)(6) had reported that they were in a ditch and needed effects immediately. The JTAC sent up the friendly position to the B1, and I to SOTF-S, because (b)(3), (b)(6) had said they were in PZ posture and confirmed that location each time the B1 delayed the strike. (b)(3), (b)(6) had about (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g personnel with him; (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(3), (b)(6) told me later that their position was receiving rounds near their feet and our element could see, through NODS, RPGs being launched at their position. The B1 confirmed a Time on Target (ToT). We confirmed IR strobes again (b)(3), (b)(6) got on inter-team and said "every (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g with an IR strobe needs to turn it on." I knew mine was turned on because the aircraft crew had to tell me to turn it off during EXFIL. (b)(3), (b)(6) confirmed PID of enemy locations and the friendly grid that (b)(3), (b)(6) had sent up. I was updating SOTF-S during the entirety of the strike. During the entire time, we could see (b)(3), (b)(6) element being engaged. The (b)(3), (b)(6) element checked in just prior to the B1's call to execute the strike and (b)(3), (b)(6) on his excitement, said "I want to kick (b)(3), (b)(6) off." He didn't feel comfortable with his comms with the B1, lost contact with (b)(3), (b)(6) multiple times,

2014 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES (b)(3), (b)(6)

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

and was having systems issues, (b)(3), (b)(6) had comms issues with (b)(3), (b)(6) the entire time they were on station and didn't think the problems were with (b)(3), (b)(6) equipment. He communicated easily with (b)(3), (b)(6) and other aircraft during the mission. (b)(3), (b)(6) said it would take time to hand off (b)(3), (b)(6) so we (b)(3), (b)(6) and I decided to keep (b)(3), (b)(6) on as they were already locked in. We kept receiving delays in munitions delivery. I was upset with (b)(1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g) continued delays and told (b)(3), (b)(6) that (b)(3), (b)(6) needed effects now." Suddenly, (b)(3), (b)(6) said "cleared hot, 30 seconds." (b)(3), (b)(6) position stated that they needed support. From our position, I felt comfortable with everything that was happening on the ground; I was 100% comfortable. I honestly thought that we had mitigated everything. We saw the effects of the blast and radioed in for BDA (battle damage assessment). After the impact, (b)(3), (b)(6) radioed in "that's our hilltop, cease fire, cease fire." (b)(3), (b)(6) said that (b)(3), (b)(6) wanted to re-attack" but I said "negative," I wanted to see BDA. (b)(3), (b)(6) immediately took as many men as possible to go and see what happened. I saw his IR strobe as he started his movement. He initially reported back one WIA and two KIA. Shortly after, he reported five KIA. I had already prepped the Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) and requested Quick Response Force (QRF). At this point, (b)(3), (b)(6) head was not in the game; I stayed next to him to make sure he was operational. (b)(3), (b)(6) front line trace was as if (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) position were together. (b)(3), (b)(6) had confirmed their original location multiple times, and (b)(3), (b)(6) was talking to (b)(3), (b)(6) on inter-team throughout the strike. I felt comfortable--I thought they were at the bottom of the hill in a ditch. I found out later that (b)(3), (b)(6) and some guys had moved forward from their location. SOTF-S would not and did not question our decisions. They would only raise an issue if something was flagrantly wrong. I was on (b)(1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g) with SOTF-S and could only hear team internal comms through (b)(3), (b)(6) radio but never heard that (b)(3), (b)(6) had moved positions. I discussed danger close with (b)(3), (b)(6) during the mission planning and recall him saying "it's (b)(1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g) meters, they prefer (b)(1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g) meters, but you can go down to (b)(1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g) meters mitigated." The guys were in a ditch which mitigated the strike. After the impact, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) maneuvered to the impact site on the hill. From (b)(3), (b)(6) accounts, the (b)(1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g) lift personnel seemed disoriented, ineffective, and the TF (b)(1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g) ANA, and (b)(1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g) were sitting in a circle at the base of the hill. (b)(3), (b)(6) was trying to control aircraft, but he was visibly shaken. The EXFIL aircraft loitered while (b)(3), (b)(6) was pulling equipment and remains from the hill. (b)(3), (b)(6) reported that he was sending one escort with the remains, I concurred. At my position, we established security and separated personnel into chalk order. This was after I consolidated (b)(3), (b)(6) position at mine. I confirmed total numbers of personnel on the ground didn't request EXFIL until (b)(3), (b)(6) said that the site, remains, and equipment were secured. Clouse was the last name passed. It took a while to identify remains because (b)(3), (b)(6) was shorthanded, due to the ANA, (b)(1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) ineffectiveness, and was having trouble identifying the remains. It was reported that the bomb had disintegrated the Afghan commander and we thought that we had Clouse. I was impressed with the QRF response time. EXFIL aircraft and MEDEVAC aircraft kept being pulled and it seemed as if there were other higher elements that were attempting to control the aircraft. When (b)(3), (b)(6) said he was good, I called in the birds and we exfilled together. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I were never more than 10 feet away from each other. (b)(3), (b)(6) looked at the (b)(1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g) but every time I went to (b)(1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g) it was static due to (b)(3), (b)(6) comms issues and IR strobes were never identified. I asked (b)(3), (b)(6) if he could PID weapons and (b)(3), (b)(6) said yes. (b)(3), (b)(6) never said "this is danger close." We never discussed or considered a show of force, because during previous missions the enemy shot at us as soon as they realized the plane wasn't dropping on that pass.

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:
(b)(3), (b)(6)
Zabul Province, Afghanistan
APO AE 09383
(b)(3), (b)(6)
Zabul Province, Afghanistan
APO AE 09383
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 26 day of JUNE, 2014 at FOB (b)(1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g) Zabul Province, Afghanistan
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)
Article 136-B (4)
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION SOTF-S, FOB 1.4a, (b)(1) Afghanistan	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2014/06/18	3. TIME 1035Z	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (b)(3), (b)(6)			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I've been in (b)(3), (b)(6) almost 10 years. I've done three deployments to Iraq and this is my second trip to Afghanistan. The ODA (b)(3), (b)(6) and I have been here since January. I'm a special forces Dive Team operations sergeant, trained in scuba, freefall, and I'm a jumpmaster. My job is to make sure we have appropriate leadership and personnel on each effort and supporting effort. During the operation I'm herding cats: I ensure the right placement of weapons, and I'm also a backup comm to SOTF-S for the Ground Force Commander (GFC). I fill the task organization, then figure out how to maneuver through the operation. During the operation I run the tactical piece while the (b)(3), (b)(6) runs the "up and out," or communications with higher authority.

Our team has an excellent working relationship. The teams here prior to us have had a slightly slower tempo; they were a little more relaxed than us. I have a whole team of ambitious go-getters. We've been pretty busy trying to build a partner force. We can't always control our partner force, but we make sure they understand we need to know where they are at all times. We've adopted consistent tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for our operations, which we adopted after getting shot up in our first mission (fortunately no one was hurt).

We don't have much experience in CAS as a team. We didn't have experience with CAS during our pre-mission training (PMT); while we had BI's on station a couple times previously, this mission was our first drop.

There was nothing that stuck out or seemed unusual in the mission planning; it was a typical pre-mission workup and briefing. We were thorough on the maps and locations. We were comfortable with (b)(3), (b)(6) as well. We did planning, walkthroughs, and we discussed the mission through the CONOPS. The GFC makes the call on crucial medevac, CAS and other mission decisions with my recommendation. We met with our Afghan National Army (ANA) partner forces at FOB 1.4a, (b)(1) and talked through the mission and our respective roles and movements.

The Captain and I were together throughout the mission until detonation. We knew we needed good blocking positions, and we were just looking to push through to the helicopter landing zones (HLZs). We landed at our infiltration positions and moved forward, setting up strong points, allowing the ANA to clear for us. We had about 1.4a, (b)(1) people in the main effort, and about 1.4a, (b)(1) people at each of the (b)(3), (b)(6) supporting (blocking) locations. We basically spent (b)(3), (b)(6) hours baking in the sun while our partner force cleared the villages.

The blocking positions provided over watch and kept the front lines, looking for spotters; (b)(11.4a, (b)(11.4g)). The hills we were on were pretty steep and rugged, so we started moving down to our pick-up zone (PZ) posture before dusk; we understood we may take fire on the way down. SSG McDonald's position began taking fire as they were coming down, and the GFC declared troops in contact (TIC). SSG McDonald's position reported taking fire from three positions; I didn't hear RPG fire, but guys reported that up. I understood that McDonald (SSG Jason McDonald) was taking fire from 1.4a, (b)(1) at about 1.4a, (b)(1) meters (from the South/Southwest).

~~(b)(3), (b)(6) 26JUN14 (b)(3), (b)(6) 26JUN14 (b)(3), (b)(6) 26JUN14~~

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB (b)(1).4a, (b)(1)1.4g DATED 2014/06/18

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

I was trying to get comms with McDonald, and when I finally reached him, he said he was going to push Studenmund (SSG Scott Studenmund) out to a more effective position. I understood that there was going to be separation between the elements. At the time the grid for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g was passed, I had comms with McDonald and I understood he was going to move out slightly to maneuver on the enemy. It was critical to me that everyone had their infrared (IR) strobes on, and I gave those specific instructions to SSG McDonald. He relayed that guidance to the personnel on his position, and he acknowledged receipt of the guidance. That specific guidance was given and acknowledged three times prior to the detonation of the munition. We have heard ANA say that the enemy has night vision goggles (NVGs), but I've never been able to validate that - regardless we turned on our IR strobes. Jason absolutely would have turned on his strobe when he pushed forward.

I didn't know it at the time, but I now know that McDonald was firing (b)(3), (b)(6) rounds. McDonald did make it clear that there was going to be separation, but I didn't know exactly when that happened. By the time the target location was identified by the B1, I knew that (b)(3), (b)(6) had separated and that McDonald had comms with the separate element; I knew that SSG Studenmund and at least (b)(3), (b)(6)1.4g gun team had gone to the top. At this point, I understood McDonald to be at the bottom of the hill. I let (b)(3), (b)(6) know that an element had broken off.

(b)(3), (b)(6) and I were within 10-15 feet the whole time. I don't interject into what he is doing unless he asks. I don't remember any discussion about the coordinate that marked (b)(3), (b)(6) meters west. All personnel were conducting their assigned tasks. I assumed the enemy was maneuvering, but I told my guys to stay put and make sure they had their strobes on. My understanding was that all my guys had strobes on and that the aircraft had identified guys without strobes on - it was clear to me that it had been relayed to aircraft that there were american elements with I/R strobes on.

Between the time the 9 line was passed and impact, (b)(3), (b)(6) was trying to work comms with the bird, while I was talking with McDonald's group expecting they would receive fire again. (b)(3), (b)(6) reported munitions had been released and I told my guys to keep their heads down, and then I saw the impact. At that moment, (b)(3), (b)(6) got on the radio and said "that was our hill". (b)(3), (b)(6) went up and reported casualties. Myself and six other members from my element began the (b)(3), (b)(6) kilometer movement to their position. Communications with (b)(3), (b)(6) were sporadic and broken until my element made it to their position.

I linked up with the three (b)(3), (b)(6)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g personnel briefly and they said that there were casualties, so I headed up the hill. I saw three personnel lying next to two craters, and (b)(3), (b)(6) was attempting to give care to SSG Studenmund. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was recovering personnel and equipment and facilitating movement of casualties to the HLZ. I stayed up on top the entire time. At approximately (b)(3), (b)(6) the medevac arrived and began loading casualties for movement to FOB (b)(1).4a, (b)(1)1.4g. The Quick Reaction Force (QRF) took action effectively; it played out like it's supposed to. Once they got on the ground, they adjusted their radios to our frequency and we conducted a successful linkup.

I felt comfortable that everyone had strobes on. All blocks were being checked, and I don't question any of the calls on the ground.

-----nothing follows-----

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

TAKEN AT

FOB 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g

DATED

2014/06/18

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
26 JUN 14

(b)(3), (b)(6)
26 JUN 14

(b)(3), (b)(6)
26 JUN 14

(b)(3), (b)(6)
26 JUN 14

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

FOB 1.4a, (b)(1) Zabul Province, Afghanistan

APOAE 09383

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

FOB 1.4a, (b)(1) Zabul Province, Afghanistan

APOAE 09383

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 26 day of June, 2014 at FOB 1.4a, (b)(1) Zabul Province, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Administering Oath

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Article 136-B (4)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION SOTF-S, FOB (b)(1) Afghanistan	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2014/06/26	3. TIME 1255L	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (b)(3), (b)(6)			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

company supporting CJSOTF-A and subordinate SOTFs across Afghanistan. I was sent to support one of the two ODAs on station at FOB (b)(1) (b)(1). I volunteered to work with ODA (b)(3), (b)(6) and would not have changed how (b)(3), (b)(6) operated as the leadership was thorough in planning, PCC/PCIs, and applied effective TTPs that mitigate the INS threat in Zabul Province. For this mission, I was part of the main effort. Prior to the incident, I was on a strong point to the south of our designated exfiltration HLZ. We moved to the HLZ at dusk and began to prepare for PZ posture. We shifted our two chinks to the west about (b)(1) meters due to some rocks that could be a risk for the rotary assets. As we set into our alternate position and lined up the ANA in our chalk, I observed INS tracers and heard gun shots from automatic weapon systems that were directed to the hill top of (b)(1) (b)(1). I countered the attack with organic weapon systems and the fire fight, at one point in time, lasted for more than a minute. I saw enemy fire originating from the west of (b)(1) (b)(1) one approximately from 30 degrees magnetic from (b)(1) and the other 100 degrees magnetic from (b)(1). During preparation of fires on standby to suppress the enemy, (b)(3), (b)(6) instructed (b)(1) to turn on IR Strobe Lights. I saw two sets of strobe lights (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1). There was one flashing on the hilltop and one flashing near the base of the hill of (b)(1) (b)(1). I watched the B1 bomber fly overhead. I observed where I expected the kinetic strike to occur, but instead witnessed the strike land exactly on the hill with a strobe light flashing. I do not know if one of the strobe lights belonged to SPC Justin Helton, or if he had a strobe light. It was already SOP that organic members of (b)(3), (b)(6) had to have strobe lights on hand in order to be recognized by air assets and ground forces. I do however assume that SPC Helton may not have had his (b)(1) (b)(1) on him because he knew the team would have plenty on hand and would lean to his left or right if needed. This is an assumption and not a known fact. I do know that I made SPC Helton maintain (b)(1) (b)(1) compass, and (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1). He kept those items on him for each mission. I was part of the recovery team made up of (b)(1) of us that maneuvered to the incident site. Upon arrival I took control of the MEDEVAC HLZ. I did not go to the crater at the hill top and security was required for the HLZ. I stayed at the base of the mountain coordinating security, guiding MEDEVAC in to the HLZ, and secured all the equipment in the ditch near the HLZ.

NOTHING FOLLOWS

(b)(3), (b)(6) 26 JUN 14

(b)(3), (b)(6) 26 JUN 14

(b)(3), (b)(6) 26 JUN 14

(b)(3), (b)(6) 26 JUN 14

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g DATED 2014/06/26

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

NOTHING FOLLOWS



(b)(3), (b)(6)

26 JUN 14

(b)(3), (b)(6)

26 JUN 14

(b)(3), (b)(6)

26 JUN 14

(b)(3), (b)(6)

26 JUN 14

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 26 day of June, 2014

at FOB 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g Zabul Province, Afg APO AE 09383

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Article 136-B(4)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

FOB 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g Zabul Province, Afg

APD AE 09383

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

FOB 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g Zabul Province, Afg

APD AE 09383

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION SOTF-S, FOB (b)(1) Afghanistan
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2014/06/18
3. TIME 1430Z
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)
6. SSN
7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (b)(3), (b)(6)

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
I joined 5th Special Forces Group in (b)(3), (b)(6) and was attached to ODA (b)(3), (b)(6) in October 2013. We deployed to Afghanistan in (b)(3), (b)(6). I've had Airborne, Air Assault, CLS, and LTT training, as well as completed the (b)(3), (b)(6) 101 course. I am the (b)(3), (b)(6) operator on the team.
On June 9, 2014, ODA (b)(3), (b)(6) along with members of TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, and ANSF conducted operations in the vicinity of Gaza Valley, Argandab. During this mission I was located with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g consisting of SSG McDonald, SSG Studenmund, (b)(3), (b)(6), SPC Helton, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b personnel, (b)(3), (b)(6) personnel, (b)(3), (b)(6) personnel, interpreter, ANA soldiers, and myself. The purpose of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g was to provide overwatch for the main element. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
At dawn, SSG Studenmund (along with members of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g) moved to a hilltop north of our location which provided a better view of the main element. He and SSG McDonald passed the grid coordinates of both (b)(3), (b)(6) elements to (b)(3), (b)(6). We were at our location for approximately (b)(3), (b)(6) hours.
At (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g SSG Studenmund's element returned to our location in preparation for movement to the HLZ site and EXFIL. At (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g SSG McDonald communicated to (b)(3), (b)(6) that all (b)(3), (b)(6) personnel were present and that we were going to set up HLZ security. After arriving at the EXFIL site and setting up security, SSG McDonald passed the grid coordinate of (b)(3), (b)(6) over the radio.
At approximately (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g SSG Studenmund asked SSG McDonald if he could take an element to a hilltop approximately (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g meters northwest of the PZ posture site, in order to provide better security for (b)(3), (b)(6) and the HLZ. Shortly afterward, we heard the first set of "pop" shots. This caused SSG Studenmund and his element (b)(3), (b)(6), and ANA commander) to run up the hill and set up a blocking position. A few minutes later, our position (bottom of the hill) began taking effective fire. SSG McDonald instructed (b)(3), (b)(6) to return fire and passed to (b)(3), (b)(6) that our position was taking effective fire. We returned fire to the hilltops west and southwest approximately (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g meters away from our location. Shortly afterward, we were informed that the B-1 Bomber was going to drop munitions and that we needed to mark our locations. At this point, (b)(3), (b)(6) and SPC Helton had already switched locations. SSG McDonald asked (b)(3), (b)(6) if he could see an IR strobe marking SSG Studenmund's location (top of hill). (b)(3), (b)(6) said he could, I then saw SSG McDonald take his IR strobe and place it on top of a ruck sack at our location. Some time after the 10 minute mark, SSG McDonald ran up the hill and the personnel at that location began marking the target with tracer rounds for the B-1 Bomber. Prior to the 3 minute mark, I asked SSG McDonald if they needed me to move up the hill and provide support, he told me to stay at my location because the munitions were 3 minutes out.

10. EXHIBIT
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

TAKEN AT

FOB 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g

DATED 2014/06/18

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

26 JUN 14

(b)(3), (b)(6)

26 JUN 14

(b)(3), (b)(6)

26 JUN 14

(b)(3), (b)(6)

26 JUN 14

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6)

HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

FOB 1.4a, (b)(1) Zabul Province, Afghanistan

APOAE 09383

FOB 1.4a, (b)(1) Zabul Province, Afghanistan

APOAE 09383

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ent)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 26 day of June, 2014

at FOB 1.4a, (b)(1) Zabul Province, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Article 136-B (4)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION SOTF-S, FOB 1.4a, (b)(1) Afghanistan	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2014/06/18	3. TIME 1155Z	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (b)(3), (b)(6)			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I joined ODA (b)(3), (b)(6) about a year ago. I was originally in (b)(3), (b)(6) but I was then switched to (b)(3), (b)(6) for this deployment (7-9 months). I am a jack of all trades for the group, but I'm the (b)(3), (b)(6) sergeant for the team and normally stay with the Team Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6) during operations.

Given the circumstances, nothing seemed abnormal about the mission in Gaza Valley, Arghandab District on 09 June 2014. It didn't seem like this would be a significant challenge. It was a well-rehearsed operation. We'd been in 5 to 6 engagements previously, although this was the first one on this deployment with a completed Close Air Support (CAS) drop from a bomber, and the first drop for (b)(3), (b)(6) with our team. We had begun the mission in the early morning of 09 June 2014 and after conducting missions all day, the main element and I maneuvered to our over watch site as an element. After it started to get dark, the blocking position started taking accurate and effective enemy fire. Initially, it was just a few rounds here and there, but it quickly progressed to automatic weapons fire. I could see tracers going back and forth. I was co-located with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6), and (b)(3), (b)(6) when the decision was made to utilize the B1 bomber that had checked in overhead. The initial time on target was delayed multiple times as issues with the B1 delayed the drop time.

The CAS drop was eventually completed and just after the impact, communications with the blocking position became very bad. I heard (b)(3), (b)(6) get on the radio and state "That's our hill!" after which communications with the position became spotty and unreliable. The (b)(3), (b)(6) sent an element consisting of myself and several other team members to the impact zone.

As we completed the movement to the blocking position, communications with (b)(3), (b)(6) became sufficient enough to utilize (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g as a far recognition signal to confirm we saw his position and he saw our element. Upon cresting the prominent ridgeline between his position and mine, I noted two IR strobes, one located at the top of the hill at the impact site and one at the bottom of hill where I found the Task Force 1.4a, (b)(1) personnel. On initial examination, the Task Force 1.4a, (b)(1) personnel appeared physically fine but in a state of shock. (b)(3), (b)(6) went up the hill to check on the impact site with me. I don't remember taking enemy fire after the bomb. If we did, it wasn't significant enough to impact my movement on the hill. I found Studenmund (SSG Scott Studenmund) and (b)(3), (b)(6) along the ridge. (b)(3), (b)(6) had been working on Studenmund before he expired and that's where I found him. (b)(3), (b)(6) was responsive but difficult to arouse. I sent him and (b)(3), (b)(6) to the bottom of the hill. (b)(3), (b)(6) had previously assisted (b)(3), (b)(6) in moving Studenmund to a safer location out of potential gunfire. Studenmund originally landed approximately 20 meters from the blast site. I located five separate sets of remains and proceeded to try and collect equipment and body parts.

Medevac arrived in about 1.4a, (b)(1) minutes from the initial B1 bomb blast. Utilizing litters from the 4a, (b)(1) medevac UH-60s, I directed the movement of the five sets of remains down to the HLZ. As I was moving down to the HLZ with the final set of remains, I encountered the Quick Response Force coming up the (b)(3), (b)(6) and the remains back to FOB 1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

26 JUN 14 (b)(3), (b)(6)	26 JUN 14 (b)(3), (b)(6)	26 JUN 14 (b)(3), (b)(6)
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10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT (b)(3), (b)(6) DATED (b)(3), (b)(6)

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

26 JUN 14

(b)(3), (b)(6)

26 JUN 14

(b)(3), (b)(6)

6 JUN 14

(b)(3), (b)(6)

26 JUN 14

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Zabul Province, AFG

APO AE 09383

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Zabul Province, AFG

APO AE 09383

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 18th day of June, 2014 at (b)(3), (b)(6) province, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Article 136-B(4)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION SOTF-S, FOB (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) Afghanistan	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2014/06/19	3. TIME 0825Z	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (b)(3), (b)(6)			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

This is my third deployment; the first two were in Iraq and this is my first in Afghanistan. I've been in the Army for 13 years, and I'm a Senior Medic for the (b)(3), (b)(6). Our unit works a lot with the Forward Surgical Team (FST). (b)(3), (b)(6) saw me perform medical procedures during a CASEVAC drill and asked me to join their team as they were down a (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g. The ops planning was normal Level Zero stuff; nothing seemed unusual. I was the medic for (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g, and our group had (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g gunners; we had myself, Jason (SSG McDonald), Scott (SSG Studenmund), Justin (SPC Helton), and (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) plus (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g guys and our Afghan National Army (ANA) partnered force.

The Afghans led out during the mission and we made our way through the valley. It was really hot, and it was quite a climb to our position on high ground. Toppen had some trouble, his legs gave out, so we had to carry his gear and help him up the hill. When we got to the top, we realized that there were actually two vantage points we really needed to cover. The other high point was just across the ridge, with a "saddle" in the ridge between us, so we split the saddle and put guys on each ridge. But we were still close enough that we could holler across at each other if we wanted to.

It was relatively quiet most of the day and uneventful, other than sitting, baking in the sun – it was a scorcher. Once we were ready to move down the hill to link back up with Jason's position, Scott's push -to-talk wouldn't work, so I was relaying to Jason. The (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g guys, (b)(3), (b)(6) and the interpreter were behind us. Scott, Jason, Justin and I were together and (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g and the Afghans we about (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g meters to our 9 o'clock. Once at the bottom of the hill we sat and waited for it to get near dark before moving further into the valley for exfil.

It was almost dark, a little before (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g when the first pop shots rang out. The initial shots were not effective (they were on the other side of the hill and over our heads), so Scott grabbed (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g guys and (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g ANA and went up the hill so we would have an OP. The second round of enemy shots started right before Scott got to the top of the hill, and these shots sounded closer. Jason said that it sounded like recon by fire. Jason told me to move up the hill so I could relay for him and Scott. I started up the hill to support the forward group, but Jason yelled at me to come back because my radio wasn't working. My battery had died; I always carry an extra battery, but for some reason I apparently didn't that day. I returned and Jason sent Justin up in my place. Jason said we needed coms up there so Justin could call down the grid from Scott's GPS.

After that, a third set of shots started and was tagging all around me and Jason and we all started returning fire and Jason called in that we were taking effective fire. I heard one explosion but I'm not 100% sure if it was an RPG. After a few minutes there was a pause in the firing and then it started up again. Jason remembered that we had a (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g position, and he exposed himself to fire and ran to it and started firing, laying on fire to both hills where we were getting fire from. We were still firing while Jason shot the (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g on the hill tops. A few minutes later the firing stopped and Jason ran back to my position.

Once Jason was back he said to get ready that there was an air strike coming in just a few minutes and was getting and calling up grids and distances. Jason asked if I could see Scott's infrared (IR) strobe up on the hill (he was pulling out his NVGs). I said I could (everytime Scott moved I could see his strobe flashing), so Jason pulled out his strobe and turned it on and asked if I could see it flashing. I told him I could and he put it on my bag and jokingly said, "well they won't hit us now".

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB 1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g DATED 2014/06/19

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

About this time Scotts position on the hill was taking fire again. The air strike was already supposed to have happened but was now saying one minute. Since they were taking fire on the hill Jason was yelling up to "laze the targets with your tracers". they continued to take fire and Jason ran up the hill to help them. I know Scott had his IR strobe on as I could see it still when Jason was running up the hill.

A couple minutes after this, the bombs hit and I said to (b)(3), (b)(6) "they hit us, they hit our hill." (b)(3), (b)(6) called in that they hit our hill and I grabbed my aid bag and we quickly went up the hill. I was praying that everyone was ok and that there wasn't going to be a second pass because they were supposed to hit the other hill. (b)(3), (b)(6) found Scott first on the other side of the ridge and called for me. He was still alive and was saying "help me, I can't breathe". My first thought was that his legs were blown off, but then I saw that they were bent under him and his gear was all mangled, so I started trying to cut it all off. He was still talking and said he couldn't breathe, that it was getting harder. At that time I got (b)(3), (b)(6) and the ANA to help me move him to where his head was up more with the hill and at the same time pulled his legs out from under him so I could put a tourniquet on his legs and told (b)(3), (b)(6) to see if he could find any more wounded.

I put a SOF-T tourniquet on his left leg after pulling some of his gear loose from there. I then moved to the right leg and tried one of the new SWOT-T tourniquets right away, but it broke after two turns. I tried another SWOT-T, and it broke as well. At that time I grabbed another SOF-T tourniquet. (b)(3), (b)(6) came back and said he couldn't find anyone right now. I gave (b)(3), (b)(6) the tourniquet and told him to put it on Scotts leg. Scott grabbed my arm and said he couldn't breathe and then he stopped breathing; I put a tube in his throat via his Crycothyroid membrane and the interpreter started chest compressions, but then saw his pupils were fixed and dilated. It was apparent at that time that Scott's injuries were to great.

I said a quick prayer for Scott, then moved his body back to the other side of the ridge. Myself and (b)(3), (b)(6) then went to search for the others where the bombs dropped. The first body in the crater had its head blown off, but I rubbed the dust off the rank and saw that it was Toppen from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. The second body in the crater was Jason, we recognized his boots; his injuries were inconsistent with life. Next we found Justin face down and blood poured out of his Kevlar when we turned him over; I knew it was Justin from his gear and he had expired as well. We continued to search for Clouse; the other (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g soldier but could not find him. At that point I was physically exhausted, I've never been that tired in my life, and hadn't drank water since the firefight started. I found myself back where Scott was and then (b)(3), (b)(6) and his guys showed up and I pointed out where the bodies were and sat down beside Scott.

The medevacs came, the Quick Response Force came, and they started helping with the bodies. We didn't do any battle damage assessment on enemy positions. We still couldn't find Clouse, but (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g found him the next morning when they went out for search and recovery. */// END OF STATEMENT ///*

Approved for Release

(b)(3), (b)(6)

06/19/2014

06/19/2014

06/19/2014

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

06/19/2014

(b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6) 06/19/2014
(b)(3), (b)(6) 06/19/2014
(b)(3), (b)(6) 06/19/2014
(b)(3), (b)(6) 06/19/2014
(b)(3), (b)(6) 06/19/2014

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES: (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Zabul Province, AFG
APO AF 09383
(b)(3), (b)(6)
FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Zabul Province, AFG
APO AF 09383
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 28 day of June 2014 at FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Qabul, Zabul Province, AFG
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)
Article 136-B(4)
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION SOTF-S, FOB (b)(1) Afghanistan	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2014/06/18	3. TIME 1230Z	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (b)(3), (b)(6)			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I joined the Army in 2009 as an X-ray. In 2011 I was assigned to 5th Special Forces Group in (b)(3), (b)(6) and joined ODA (b)(3), (b)(6) I've been the Special Operations Terminal Attack Controller (SOTAC) for about a year, but have not given any 9 lines during this Afghanistan deployment.

Our normal mission prep would be (b)(3), (b)(6) our previous CCT) setting up the GRGs and map layouts. We'd print them and take them out with us; it was mostly the same on that day with (b)(3), (b)(6) The pre-mission planning and preparations went normally.

I usually carry a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g map, ground reference guides (GRGs), and binoculars.

Throughout the entirety of the mission, I was up on the Fires Net, but was not very active on it – mainly just monitoring it or passing areas of interest. The enemy had been harassing us all day. We got up to the top of the hill and into our blocking position. I was at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, the southern blocking position. We synched with each other, identified our position with the other blocking position. We had a line of bearing from the (b)(3), (b)(6) elements (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g where we had received fire that day (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g which is why we passed the three NAI positions to the B1 after check in.

Around (b)(3), (b)(6) or so, we started breaking down our position and prepping to go to pick-up zone (PZ) posture. We packed up and started making our way down the hill. About halfway down I heard heavy machine gun fire, so we held in a creek bed. I was on the fires net, and (b)(3), (b)(6) let me know that (b)(3), (b)(6) had come over the radio saying they were taking effective fire.

From our perspective it looked like fire was coming at them from the village; we could hear rockets and saw rocket explosions. I looked over at (b)(3), (b)(6) position and could see two infrared (IR) strobes; there was one slightly higher up on the hill and one lower, and neither one was moving.

I heard (b)(3), (b)(6) come over the fires net and pass to the B1 that (b)(3), (b)(6) was taking effective fire and to prepare for a 9 line. After a brief period, (b)(3), (b)(6) then passed the gameplan, 9 line, and remarks/ restrictions to the B1 (b)(3), (b)(6) had given the B1 a time on target (TOT) that was (b)(3), (b)(6) minutes away. The TOT was missed and (b)(3), (b)(6) contacted the B1 who responded that they needed to push the TOT another (b)(1)1.4a (b)(3), (b)(6) minutes. Throughout the conversation between (b)(3), (b)(6) and the B1, there were many communication issues due to the orbit of the B1 in conjunction with the mountainous terrain causing terrain masking. Shortly after it was said on the Fires Net that there were some (b)(3), (b)(6) issues and the B1 requested to change from a bomb on target to a bomb on coordinate (b)(3), (b)(6) approved the change and the B1 began pulling CAT 1 grids. The timeline continued to get pushed a few more minutes. Throughout the entirety of the call (b)(3), (b)(6) had asked the B1 to verify that there were no strobes visible in the B1's pod. The B1 continued to verify that they saw no strobes in their pod. During this time an AC-130 gunship checked on station but was held outside of the ROZ because (b)(3), (b)(6) and the B1 were working an active 9 line. There were no communications issues with the AC-130 and eventually the AC-130 began acting as a relay between (b)(3), (b)(6) and the B1. The fourth time the timeline for the B1 to drop got pushed (b)(3), (b)(6) let the B1 know that friendlies were still taking effective fire and that if the B1 was unable to come in that he needed him to push off to allow the AC-130 to come to the aid of (b)(3), (b)(6) The B1 stayed on and was able to make the "IN" call on their next pass (b)(3), (b)(6) cleared the B1 to

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.


STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB (b)(1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g) DATED 2014/06/18

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

drop two (b)(3), (b)(6) and a few seconds later I heard the explosions. Looking back at (b)(3), (b)(6) that they were located at it looked like the bombs had hit extremely close to the higher strobe at their location. After the bombs dropped I could no longer see either strobes at (b)(3), (b)(6) position.

There was a pause on the Fires Net and then (b)(3), (b)(6) came over the radio and asked the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g to try and identify anyone on the ground at the blast site. (b)(3), (b)(6) was able to identify four individuals walking up to the blast site. Next, I heard (b)(3), (b)(6) say that it looked like one of the people they were watching seemed to be performing CPR and (b)(3), (b)(6) said it seemed that the individuals were wearing kit and one of the individuals seemed to have a larger radio on their back. It was then confirmed over team internal that that was a friendly position that was dropped on.

After that, my position was asked to collapse to the main efforts location to help reinforce security at their position. I switched my radio to our team internal frequency and began helping with moving all of our element to the main efforts location.



INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

TAKEN AT

FOB 1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

DATED 2014/06/18

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
26 JUN 14

(b)(3), (b)(6)
26 JUN 14

(b)(3), (b)(6)
26 JUN 14

(b)(3), (b)(6)
26 JUN 14

(b)(3), (b)(6)
26 JUN 14

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Galat, Zabul Province, AFG

APD AE 09383

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Zabul Province, AFG

APD AE 09383

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 29 day of JUNE, 2014 at FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Galat, Zabul AFG

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Article 136B(i)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: SOTF-S, FOB [redacted] Afghanistan
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2014/06/19
3. TIME: 0930Z
4. FILE NUMBER:
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [redacted]
6. SSN: [redacted]
7. GRADE/STATUS: [redacted]
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: Task Force [redacted]

9. I, [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
This is my third deployment in Afghanistan and my first in RC-South. I'm a squad leader for [redacted] and we had [redacted] gun teams on this mission. This was my first mission with ODA [redacted] it was an honor.
During mission planning, we discussed where we were going, the medevac plan, location details, and we (TF [redacted]) were told to stay off the radio--stay off the radio--just monitor the activity.
When we reached the area of our helicopter landing zones (HLZs), our group split up and went on different hills. We were first consolidated on one hill, but then I suggested that we move an element forward.
We conducted over watch for many hours; it was very hot, so hot that our clothes would nearly burn our skin when we moved. I saw one of my guys starting to get flush, then McDonald said "let's head down". We started to make our way down for the EXFIL at about [redacted] meters. We made pretty quick time down the hill, it took less than ten minutes to get down the hill and we then set security. At about [redacted] we fixed our night vision goggles (NVGs). Then one of the [redacted] guys behind us racked his weapon, and we looked up to see flashes and dust started kicking up around us. We returned fire right away and pulled back to find some cover. As soon as I started firing my [redacted] the enemy fire stopped.
A part of our team split and moved forward, higher up on the hill. There were grids and locations being sent back and forth on the team net. One moment did stick out to me, when somebody, I think Mac (SSG McDonald) said "I know you want to kill everyone on your hill up there, but that's your friendly position."
When Jason was up on the hill before impact, he was giving us updates and there seemed to be pretty good updates being passed between the SF guys. I saw McDonald drop down and run across to someone, and this was before he turned his IR strobe on. Jason was firing in a broad arc, well short of where the fire was coming from. My gun team up there didn't have a radio, but I could tell we were only fighting one person. I've been involved in a lot of firefights where we were engaged from multiple locations, but this one was just one guy - I remember thinking "why are they dropping a JDAM this close and for one guy?" And I'm certain we weren't engaged with an RPG, no recoilless rifle, and there was no PKM - only AK.
I saw two strobes at the top of the peak, north of my position. My team had their strobes on--we had turned them on when we heard the last notice of five minutes out. I was scared as fuck; I've been involved in other JDAM drops before and this one was the closest at about [redacted] meters. I got scared because I didn't see any strobes at all on the hill after the strike.
I went up and confirmed one of my soldiers. We helped move bodies, medevac was called, and the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) was called. The QRF set up at high ground as we helped moving the bodies out.
[redacted] picked up some [redacted] after the second "five minutes" call that the bad guys were headed home. They were home drinking Chai before the bomb dropped. I really think some of this could have been slowed down; it seemed like a rush to failure. // END OF STATEMENT !!!

10. EXHIBIT:
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: [redacted]
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT [redacted] DATED [redacted]"
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOIA 1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g DATED 2014/06/19

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(This section is crossed out with a large X and contains redacted text.)

Approved for Release

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6)

TAKEN AT FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

DATED 2014/06/19

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

[Redacted statement content]

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES: (b)(3), (b)(6)
FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, Zabul province
APO AE 09383

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 28 day of JUN 2014 at FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Zabul Province, AFG

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g ZABUL PROVINCE
APO AE 09383
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)
Article 136-8/4
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION SOTF-S, FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Afghanistan	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2014/06/19	3. TIME 1015Z	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN	7. GRADE/S (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I'm from (b)(3), (b)(6) and I've been in the Army four years. This is my second deployment, but my first in Afghanistan. This was my first mission with (b)(3), (b)(6)

On this mission I had an (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. I spent a lot of the day at our blocking position on top of the hill. We came down about (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and settled into our pick-up zone (PZ) posture, and then heard some potshots.

Jason and a few people in our group split off and went to the top of the hill to get a better position. Of our guys (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g only (b)(3), (b)(6) had strobes, and I saw three or four strobes from our guys (friendlies) at the top of the hill. They were up there about five minutes when one of the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g soldiers racked his weapons and pointed it to the ridgeline, then we started taking fire very close, we were getting splashed. We reacted to contact, loaded a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g round belt, and returned fire. I only remember seeing one person shooting at us; I could just make out an outline in the dark. I only saw one guy shooting at us, but based on the amount of fire maybe it was 2-3 guys.

They stopped shooting at us after the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g started firing their direction and I think at that point we lost him over the top of the hill, like maybe he was escaping to the village, but I couldn't tell for sure. I didn't have a radio, but I heard the chatter going on. I remember hearing them talk about the airstrike, and then I remember hearing someone say "Break, break, break; I know you want to kill everyone around you, but that's your grid." I don't know when exactly this was said.

After the impact, we basically maintained security until the medevac came in. We didn't have time for an After Action Report. We just escorted the bodies to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and everyone separated after that. */// End of Statement ///*

Approved for Release

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOIA 1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g DATED 2014/06/19

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

D. Co. 2-12 IN

FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g AFG 09383
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

DL 2-12 IN

FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g AFG 09383
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of June, 2014 at FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Military Officer Article 136-2(f)
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION SOTF-S, FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Afghanistan	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2014/06/19	3. TIME 1040Z	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
Task Force (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I've been in the Army for just over a year. This is my first deployment. I am a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g gunner. On this mission I was on an over watch position at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g with (b)(3), (b)(6). We were providing security and took a couple of potshots from somewhere, but we didn't return fire. (b)(3), (b)(6) The other OP saw a spider and fired on him.

After we came down the hill and were waiting for a helo, one of the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g guys racked his weapon, we started taking shots and returned fire. I scanned for the location of the guys shooting at us while a team went up the hill. Then a shot came in close, striking the ground next to us. The team on the hill started firing, but I don't know where.

We shot a few rounds toward where we thought the enemy was, and it went quiet after we engaged with the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g although some of our guys kept shooting. I have a Firefly infrared (IR) strobe that I turned on when we started down the hill. I saw one infrared (IR) strobe on the hill (I saw it when the individuals were going up the hill and again on top), but the others didn't appear to have theirs on.

They called "thirty seconds to impact" and we hunkered down, but nothing. One of the SF guys said it was delayed, then a second five minute call came down and then impact. The bomb hit the exact spot I saw the last SF guy that was directing our guys. After the impact, we didn't have good radio contact with the team. People went to the top to check, and they confirmed that the bomb hit the wrong place. About ten minutes before we got picked up, one of the SF guys came over to say they picked up (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g but nothing happened. Medevac came and I helped with the evacuation ops. ///

End of statement ///

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB (b)(3), (b)(6) 1.4a, (b)(1) 1.4g DATED 2014/06/19

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(This section is crossed out with a large X and contains redacted text.)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)


Approved for Release

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

9 STATEMENT (Continued)



AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLU

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES: (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
Fob (b)(3), (b)(6), Zabul province
Apoff 09383
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
Fob (b)(3), (b)(6) Zabul Province
APO AE 09383
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(b)(3), (b)(6)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 18 day of JUN 2014 at Fob (b)(3), (b)(6) Zabul Province, AFGN

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6) Oath)
Article 136-8/4
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.


1. LOCATION SOTF-S, FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Afghanistan
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2014/06/19
3. TIME 1305Z
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)
6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)
7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS SOTF-S ODA (b)(3), (b)(6)

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was commissioned in (b)(3), (b)(6) as an infantry officer. I served in Iraq for 12 months in (b)(3), (b)(6) as a platoon leader and company executive officer. I completed the Special Forces Qualification course in (b)(3), (b)(6) and joined ODA (b)(3), (b)(6) in August 2013. ODA (b)(3), (b)(6) was the Quick Response Force (QRF) for ODA (b)(3), (b)(6) mission on June 9, 2014. We received the CONOP from ODA (b)(3), (b)(6) leadership and I briefed it to my detachment. We planned for possible HLZs and danger areas where we would need to respond. ODA (b)(3), (b)(6) and ODA (b)(3), (b)(6) regularly serve as QRF for each other's missions, but this was the first time we actually launched as the QRF in support of (b)(3), (b)(6). My QRF task organization consisted of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g.

I received notification from our detachment radio guard that (b)(3), (b)(6) was initiating a nine line MEDEVAC request. I moved to the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Tactical Operations Center (TOC) to get the most up to date information. While I met with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Commander) and (b)(3), (b)(6) Commander, my team sergeant, (b)(3), (b)(6) alerted the detachment. The initial report I received was three wounded in action while in pickup zone (PZ) posture. After approximately 5 minutes at the TOC, I heard that the report was 5x US KIA. Prior to leaving the TOC, I was told that my detachment would be alternate QRF rather than primary as planned. The reason for this was not clear, but shortly afterward we received word that the ODA and the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g QRF would both be infiled via (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. My detachment was at the FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g within (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g minutes of notification. We boarded the helicopters and were forced to wait for approximately 20 additional minutes until the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g QRF arrived and boarded the aircraft. There had been no prior coordination with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g QRF because we had never seen the primary and secondary QRF launched simultaneously. ODA (b)(3), (b)(6) was monitoring ODA (b)(3), (b)(6) frequency during infil; however, the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g QRF had no radio contact with elements on the ground because they had not preloaded frequencies prior to the mission.

We landed in the objective valley, east of where the casualties were taken. There were (b)(3), (b)(6) MEDEVAC UH-60s on the ground at that time and I quickly established radio and visual contact with (b)(3), (b)(6) remained the Ground Force Commander (GFC) after we arrived and we moved quickly to support the ODA. I took a split element of half of my detachment and some (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g QRF personnel and seized a hilltop to provide security for the element moving casualties. My team sergeant, (b)(3), (b)(6) and the other split element linked up with (b)(3), (b)(6) and assisted them in carrying casualties and gear to the MEDEVAC helicopters. Because (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g had no way to communicate with our elements, we directed them verbally around the battletief. (b)(3), (b)(6) then took an element to search for additional remains and equipment. They searched out to a radius of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g meters on all sides of the hilltop. During the search, there was heavy enemy activity on all sides. We observed multiple motorcycles moving in the area where the contact was received and Taliban on multiple hilltops were signalling each other with




10. EXHIBIT
11. INITIAL (b)(3), (b)(6) NG STATEMENT
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT (b)(3), (b)(6) DATED (b)(3), (b)(6)
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

I received word from (b)(3), (b)(6) that five bodies had been recovered and were on the aircraft. At that point, we received word from (b)(3), (b)(6) that everyone would be exfiling together. My understanding was that due to heavy enemy activity and the probability that they were staging for a follow on attack, the GFC deemed it prudent to exfil all personnel. My understanding at the time was that there was 5x US KIA and we had recovered five bodies. I relayed this information to multiple personnel from TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and no one objected. We moved our personnel and TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g personnel down to the pickup zone and boarded a CH-47. During PZ posture, which was approximately (b)(3), (b)(6) minutes, no one indicated that we should remain behind or that we were missing someone. When we passed the three TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g personnel who were on the site with the casualties, we tried to talk to them to get them in PZ posture, but they were not reacting, appearing to be in a state of shock and (b)(3), (b)(6) took control of them to make sure they boarded the correct aircraft. It was not until I spoke with (b)(3), (b)(6) at the PZ that I found out that the casualties were due to US ordnance. We all boarded our respective aircraft and returned to FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. It was the next day, 10 June 2014, that I learned that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g several body parts remaining in the area. I sent three Special Forces Soldiers from my detachment with TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g that day and they recovered the rest of PV2 Aaron Toppen's remains.

NOTHING FOLLOWS



AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLU

WITNESSES (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
ODA (b)(3), (b)(6)
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
ODA (b)(3), (b)(6)
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 10 day of June, 2014 at FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Bakt, AFG
(b)(3), (b)(6)
Person Administering Oath
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)
Company Commander, Article 131-B6
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

SWORN STATEMENT

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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION SOTF-S, FOB (b)(3), (b)(6) Afghanistan	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2014/06/26	3. TIME 1320Z	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS (b)(3), (b)(6)	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS SOTF-S ODA (b)(3), (b)(6)			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On the evening of 9 June, 2014 ODA (b)(3), (b)(6) was alerted and launched as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) in support of ODA (b)(3), (b)(6). This was the first SOTF-S mission, in my recollection, that criteria on the ground required QRF support. My Detachment had all equipment ready to go and we familiarized ourselves with (b)(3), (b)(6) mission brief/ CONOP on the evening of 8 June.


On the morning of the mission, our Detachment rotated OPCEN duties to monitor progress of (b)(3), (b)(6). At approximately (b)(3), (b)(6) minutes prior to their planned EXFIL time, and with air coverage providing overwatch, I departed the OPCEN for a few minutes and at that time (b)(3), (b)(6) monitored the OPCEN. Within 10 minutes of me leaving, (b)(3), (b)(6) came to my room and reported that (b)(3), (b)(6) was calling a 9-line MEDEVAC. Myself and (b)(3), (b)(6) immediately met with the AOB Commander over at FOB (b)(3), (b)(6) TOC. At this time, we received MEDEVAC updates stating that some US were KIA. At this time I moved back to our compound and alerted the detachment to prepare for QRF launch. We were ready to go and staged at the HLZ within (b)(3), (b)(6) minutes of this alert.

At the HLZ, (b)(3), (b)(6) CH-47's were standing by to launch. We loaded the Chinooks and waited to take off. Several times over the next several minutes, (b)(3), (b)(6) elements trickled in to the HLZ and boarded the QRF helicopters. They were elements of the Aerial Reaction Force (ARF). I did not know that they were launching in support of this operation as my detachment was primary QRF as depicted on the CONOP. We did not conduct any prior coordination or rehearsals with the ARF platoon nor did we have their radio frequencies loaded into our radios.

At the objective, (b)(3), (b)(6) Team Sergeant directed us to his location utilizing IR strobe and (b)(3), (b)(6). We had zero communication problems with (b)(3), (b)(6) as we were now operating on their team internal frequency which is standard procedure for QRF duties. The supporting element always loads and "drops down" to the element needing support frequency.

We assisted (b)(3), (b)(6) in establishing security as (b)(3), (b)(6) carried the last of the casualties down the hill to the MEDEVAC helicopter. At the top of the hill, near the blast site, we conducted a thorough night time search of the immediate blast area to a distance of approximately (b)(3), (b)(6) meters in all directions. We were unable to locate any other sensitive items, equipment, or body parts at this time. ODA (b)(3), (b)(6) was confident that all casualties had been recovered, aside from possibly 1 ANA soldier who had apparently been vaporized by the blast. This turned out to be inaccurate when an additional US body was recovered the following day.

Continued-----



10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB (b)(1), (b)(1.4g) DATED 2014/06/26

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

At approximately (b)(4a), (b)(1) hours, we were notified that (b)(4a), (b)(1) CH-47s were enroute to our location to EXFIL all personnel including the QRF/ARF element. We moved to PZ posture, loaded the helicopters, and conducted EXFIL. ODA (b)(3), (b)(6) was dropped off at FOB (b)(4a), (b)(1) and our element was brought back to FOB (b)(1), (b)(1.4g)

I have observed discrepancies between grids that we identify on the ground with our devices and grids that aircraft identify with their devices from the air. I am not sure if this is due to the abnormally high mineral and iron deposits of Zabul Province, I have not had this issue in my previous three rotations to Afghanistan or my trips to Iraq. Devices on the ground and devices on airborne platforms seem to be giving off different readings.

-----NOTHING FOLLOWS-----

Approved for Release

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

-----NOTHING FOLLOWS-----

[Large redacted area with a large 'X' and a diagonal watermark reading 'Approved for Release']

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UN

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ODA (b)(3), (b)(6)

OR (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ODA (b)(3), (b)(6)
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 26 day of June, 2014

at FOB (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Olat, AFG

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Company Commander Article 136-B(4)
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF SUSPECT/WITNESS/COMPLAINANT				SUSPECT
				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WITNESS/COMPLAINANT
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT				
<small>AUTHORITY: 10 U.S.C. 8013; 44 U.S.C. 3101; and EO 9397 PRINCIPAL PURPOSES: Used to record information and details of criminal activity which may require investigative action by commanders, supervisors, security police, AFOSI special agents, etc.; and to provide information to appropriate individuals within DoD organizations who ensure proper legal and administrative action is taken. ROUTINE USES: Information may be disclosed to local, county, state, and federal law enforcement/investigative authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution or civil court action. Information extracted from this form may be used in other related criminal and/or civil proceedings. DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY: SSN is used to positively identify the individual making the statement.</small>				
I. STATEMENT INFORMATION				
DATE (YYYYMMDD)	TIME	LOCATION AND INSTALLATION (Bldg/Room No)	UNIT TAKING STATEMENT	REPEAT (If known)
20140609	2207	CJSOAC Bagram	CJSOAC	<input type="checkbox"/> OFFENSE <input type="checkbox"/> COMPLAINT
II. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (Print or Type)				
NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)		SSN	STATUS/GRADE	
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	
LOCAL ADDRESS (Include Zip Code)		DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (If required)	TELEPHONE	
(b)(3), (b)(6)			HOME	DUTY (b)(3), (b)(6)
PERMANENT ADDRESS OR HOME OF RECORD (Include Zip Code)		MILITARY ORGANIZATION/EMPLOYER	DEROS	
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)	Dec 14	
SPONSOR INFORMATION				
NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)		GRADE	SSN	ORGANIZATION
N/A				
III. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF OFFENSES AND 5TH AMENDMENT/ARTICLE 31 RIGHTS ADVISEMENT (Suspect Only)				
<i>I have been advised that I am suspected of the following offenses:</i>				
ADVISED BY (Full Name and Rank)			INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFIED HIMSELF/HERSELF AS A (SF, special agent, etc.)	
SUSPECT INITIALS	and advised me that I have the following rights according to the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution/Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.			
	I have the right to remain silent - that is to say nothing at all.			
	Any statement I make, oral or written, may be used as evidence against me in a trial or in other judicial, non-judicial, or administrative proceedings.			
	I have the right to consult with a lawyer.			
	I have the right to have a lawyer present during this interview.			
	I may obtain a civilian lawyer of my own choice at no expense to the government.			
	I may request a lawyer any time during this interview.			
	If I decide to answer questions with or without a lawyer present, I may stop the questioning at any time.			
	MILITARY ONLY: If I want a military lawyer, one will be appointed for me free of charge.			
	CIVILIANS ONLY: If I cannot afford a lawyer and want one, a lawyer will be appointed for me by civilian authorities.			
SUSPECT INITIALS	I have read my rights as listed above and I fully understand my rights. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind have been made to me. No pressure or coercion has been used against me. I make the following choice. (Initial One)			
	I do not want a lawyer. I am willing to answer questions or make a statement or both, about the offense(s) under investigation.			
	I do not want a lawyer and I do not wish to make a statement or answer any questions.			
	I want a lawyer. I will not make any statement or answer any questions until I talk to a lawyer.			
I fully understand my rights and that my signature does not constitute an admission of guilt.				
SIGNATURE OF SUSPECT			SIGNATURE OF WITNESS/INTERVIEWER	

(b)(3), (b)(6) After being delayed for a maintenance issue, we took-off from Bagram about (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g on 9 June, 2014. Our callsign was (b)(3), (b)(6), and we were tasked to support (b)(3), (b)(6) (the JTAC on the ground) and the friendly force of about (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g he was imbedded with. Transit time to the Op was about (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g minutes. About (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g minutes out (approx (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g) The CISOAC fires desk (callsign (b)(3), (b)(6)) notified us that (b)(3), (b)(6) had declared a TIC (troops in contact). We were monitoring the fires frequency, but to this point were still out of range. Soon after, I began to hear broken transmissions from ~~the~~ the B-1 overhead (b)(3), (b)(6). The transmissions were spotty, but it ~~was~~ clear became clear that (b)(3), (b)(6) was coordinating for a strike. At this point, ~~I could still~~ we still had no reception from (b)(3), (b)(6). As we got to within about (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g of RDZ, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g instructed us to hold current airspace because (b)(3), (b)(6) was going not in the RDZ. We ended-up holding (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g to the Northeast of the RDZ. On the part of our orbit closest to the RDZ, we began to hear (b)(3), (b)(6) over the fires net. I tried multiple times to contact (b)(3), (b)(6) but when it became apparent that they were in the ~~middle~~ of ~~coordinating an airstrike~~ final stages of coordinating an airstrike, I did not press my check-in so as not to interfere at a critical juncture. ~~I~~ However, it quickly became apparent that (b)(3), (b)(6) was having difficulty communicating with (b)(3), (b)(6). I remember (b)(3), (b)(6) telling (b)(3), (b)(6) that if he couldn't communicate he would have to call (b)(3), (b)(6) off. At this point, I contacted (b)(3), (b)(6) again and got a reply. We were still a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g away and level at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(3), (b)(6) acknowledged our position, and cleared us into (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

2 of 7

(b)(3), (b)(6) the ROZ at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. He also passed to us that (b)(3), (b)(6) was about to drop on the following grid: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and that friendlies were located (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g meters West. He instructed us to get eyes on that area as soon as possible. At the same time, (b)(3), (b)(6) was having difficulty passing his panel readback to (b)(3), (b)(6), so I relayed the following panel readback from (b)(3), (b)(6) to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. (b)(3), (b)(6) responded in the affirmative. At this point, (b)(3), (b)(6) seemed to be having some difficulty getting set-up for the strike, and his comms were still broken with (b)(3), (b)(6). We were in the descent from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and planned to stay at the edge of the ROZ until (b)(3), (b)(6) dropped since he was at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g block (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (above us). (b)(3), (b)(6) pressed (b)(3), (b)(6) a couple times for how much longer he would take, and that he needed 1 to 3 bombs as soon as possible because friendlies were taking effective fire. We relayed from (b)(3), (b)(6) to (b)(3), (b)(6) ~~that to expect clearance on final call in with direction and to expect clearance on final.~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) called "in" (from the South I believe) and called "cleared hot, cleared hot, cleared hot" which we relayed to (b)(3), (b)(6) to ensure he heard it. ~~Just prior to~~ Just prior to this (b)(3), (b)(6) requested that we track any (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g from the impact. At the time of the drop, we were about (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g out and had limited visibility of the area. We were in the process of re-focusing our sensors from the descent, and the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g picture was not optimal. We did ~~not yet see any movement on the~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) not yet see any movement on the (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) judge (b)(3), (b)(6) was targeting. ~~I~~ I'm not sure how long (b)(3), (b)(6) 1 Jun 14
it was from the time we got comms with (b)(3), (b)(6)
to when (b)(3), (b)(6) dropped. ~~Immediately after observing~~
(b)(3), (b)(6) called 2 away and soon after I observed
two impacts on the grid that (b)(3), (b)(6) had passed. Immediately,
we proceeded overhead to get a better look and to be
in position to shoot (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g if required. The Nav first
spotted two fax behind a rock about (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Northeast
of the impact point, and called it out to (b)(3), (b)(6). I then
observed 5-8 fax moving in close proximity and towards
the impact point. (b)(3), (b)(6) instructed us ~~that~~ to be ready with
the gun. I noticed that all the personnel in the vicinity
of the impact were dressed tactically, and later observed
that one had a radio. During this time, the interteam freq;
that we pulled-up on one of our radios was very busy
with chatter trying to confirm friendly positions. (b)(3), (b)(6)
was admit about confirming with (b)(3), (b)(6) that they
observed no IR strobes prior to dropping, and that
they were indeed capable of seeing strobes, to which
(b)(3), (b)(6) responded in the affirmative on both counts. I reported
to (b)(3), (b)(6) that more tactically dressed personnel were
arriving at the impact point and that it appeared
first-aid was being administered on at least one fax.
Up until this point, we had not observed a strobe
in the vicinity of the impact, but soon after ~~passed~~
the Nav observed a strobe among the fax at the
impact and called it out to (b)(3), (b)(6). ~~Up until this point,~~
soon after, (b)(3), (b)(6) acknowledged that there was a
possible blue on blue incident, and gave control of
Brief, stack, and mark to us. At this point multiple other (b)(3), (b)(6)
air (b)(3), (b)(6) players began checking in ~~and we gave them~~ with us 4 of 7

listen for BI & CI over Team

~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g out, (b)(3), (b)(6) called that IIC occurred~~ - ~~SECRET~~ -

~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g out, intermittent reception from (b)(3), (b)(6)~~

- ~~- Told to hold current airspace ((b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g) by (b)(3), (b)(6)~~
- ~~- On south side of orbit had intermittent with (b)(3), (b)(6)~~
- ~~-~~

Approved for Release